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Abstract 
 This thesis examines the development of health and safety in the British coalmining 
industry in the period of rapid expansion 1840 to 1913 through a case study of the 
Warwickshire coalfield. It will assess the contribution of the miner, the coalowners and the 
State to improvements to mine safety. Although historians have been attracted to this period 
of coalfield expansion, they have tended to concentrate upon the complex economics 
necessary for success or the fractious record of industrial relations, with health and safety 
marginalised to the periphery. They have also mainly taken their exemplars from the 
important coal exporting activities of the North-East and South Wales, together with the 
larger coalfields of Scotland, Lancashire, Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire. By studying the 
Warwickshire fatalities and comparing that experience with the neighbouring counties of the 
East Midlands and national data, this thesis will reveal how local factors influenced safety in 
the mines. 
 The individual miner had little influence upon mine safety in the period 1840 through to 
the mid 1870's when the sub-contracting butty system removed owners from the 
responsibilities of production. The establishment of a permanent Warwickshire Miners’ 
Association from the 1880’s, characterised by moderate leadership who sought to work 
closely with employers, gained for the Warwickshire miner superior earnings and conditions 
of employment, even when compared to neighbouring coalfields in the prosperous Midland 
Division. This undermines the national caricature of coalowners as brutal capitalists with 
little regard for their workers or communities where they gained their wealth. The results 
showed conclusively that it was not the mode of management but the size of the enterprise 
that was the dominating factor. Fatalities increased in the large deep mines that became more 
common at the turn of the century and were more susceptible to deaths from falls of coal and 
men crushed by wagons on the surface. The role of the State was somewhat patchy. Mine 
Inspectors could recommend that horses employed in oncost haulage should work in shafts 
rather than chains and that low tension batteries should be used to bring down coal, but 
owners were free to ignore this advice, with fatal consequences to the workforce. They were 
more successful in promoting the professionalization of mine management and at the turn of 
the century legislation was the dominant factor in the adoption of patent explosives to replace 
the use of gunpowder in Warwickshire mines. 
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This thesis builds upon recent studies by McIvor and Mills which have sought to address 
this neglect of health and safety in the British coal mining industry. By approaching this 
through the study of a small coalfield that has largely been ignored by mining historians, it 
reveals how local factors influenced the contribution of the miner, the coalowner and the 
State to the problem of accidents and fatalities in the coal industry. 
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Introduction 
The British coal industry has been explored extensively by historians with certain areas 
having attracted more attention than others. Historians have been fascinated by the complex 
economics that had to be mastered to secure success
1
 and conversely there has been a 
vociferous debate on the responsibility of coalowners for the diminishing productivity that 
condemned the industry to decline in the 20th century.
2
 The combative approach to industrial 
relations adopted by coalowners against miners’ trade unions3 was such that some accounts of 
regional trade unions have attracted a succession of scholars.
4
 Social historians and 
sociologists have immersed themselves in the study of coal mining communities, with some 
believing that their relative isolation from other members of the working class meant that 
they developed unique characteristics of strong bonds in the work force resulting in increased 
militancy.
5
 However the need to identify dangers in the mines and assess the measures 
adopted to address them has been consigned to the periphery of historical investigation. This 
thesis will build upon recent studies by McIvor and Mills
6
 to contribute to remedying this 
omission through an examination of the Warwickshire coalfield which is largely invisible in 
the literature of the development of the British coal industry in its period of expansion from 
1840 through to 1913. 
In the second half of the 19
th
 century the production of coal in Britain rapidly increased 
as it fuelled the factories and foundries, railways and steamships that drove the industrial 
                                                 
1
 C. Pamely, The Colliery Manager’s Handbook (London, 1898); R. Redmayne and H. Bulman, Coalmining and 
the Coal Miner (London, 1920). 
2 A. Taylor, ‘Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry 1850 to 1914’, 
Economic History Review X1V (1961) 48-67, and A. Taylor, ‘The Coal Industry’, in D. Alcroft, (ed.), The 
Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition (London, 1968) pp. 37-70. 
3 
R. Church and Q. Outram, Strikes and Solidarity: Coalfield Conflict in Britain 1889 to 1866 (Cambridge, 
1998). 
4 
N. Emery, The Coalminers of Durham (Stroud, 1992), H. Beynon and T. Austrin, Masters and Servants: Class 
and Patronage in the Making of a Labour Organisation; the Durham miners and the English Political Tradition 
(London, 1994). 
5
 C. Kerr and A. Siegel, ‘The Inter-industry Propensity to Strike: an international comparison’, in A. Kornhauser, 
R. Dubin and A. Ross (eds.), Industrial Conflict (New York, 1954) pp. 189-212. See also R. Church, Q. Outram 
and N. Smith, ‘The Isolated Mass Revisited: strikes in British coal mining’, The Sociological Review 39.I 
(February 2001) 55-87. 
6 
A. McIvor and R. Johnston, Miner’s Lung: a History of Dust Disease in British Coalmining (Aldershot, 2007); 
C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 2010). 
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revolution. To satisfy these increasing demands mine owners sought out the deeper seams of 
virgin coal but this exploitation came at a cost to miners’ lives. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine how the rise in fatalities was addressed in this period of expansion from the first 
government intervention into the health and safety of the coal industry in 1840
7
 through to 
the pinnacle of development in 1913 when Britain was the premier coal producer in the 
world. This is achieved through a case study of the Warwickshire coalfield and the role 
played by the miners, the owners and the State. 
This thesis will be anchored in a relatively unknown minor inland coalfield that will 
supplement the dominant exemplars in the literature from the exporting coalfields of the 
North-East of England and South Wales. By studying the Warwickshire fatalities and 
comparing that experience with the neighbouring counties of the East Midlands and national 
data, it will reveal how local factors influenced safety in the mines. McIvor has recently 
lamented that safety issues were marginalised by trade unions for the sake of increased wages 
and ‘they failed as a countervailing force.’8 This study will investigate what Warwickshire 
miners did both underground and at the surface to reduce fatalities and what means they 
employed to protect their families from the consequences of misfortune. The examination of 
local coalowners will test the hypothesis that as mine engineers were the experts on mine 
safety the mines that they controlled may exhibit a greater record of safety than those mines 
run by landowners or colliery companies. Catherine Mills has criticised the State as an 
inconsistent and reluctant innovator
9
 and this study will question this analysis together with 
the impact of such intervention on the Warwickshire coalfield. While accepting her general 
conclusions, the thesis will stress the need for the State to reconcile competing demands and 
develop a consensus to make meaningful progress. 
Chapter One examines the historiography of the British coal industry. Given the 
importance of the industry to the national economy early histories stressed its economic 
development. They tended to take their exemplars from the important coal exporting regions 
                                                 
7 Lord Ashley began the Children’s Employment Commission in 1840 although the first report was not issued 
until 1842. 
8
 A. McIvor and R. Johnston, Miner’s Lung: a History of Dust Disease in British Coalmining (Aldershot, 2007) 
p. 24. 
9 
C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 2010) p. 243. 
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of the North-East and South Wales and neglect the inland coalfields like Warwickshire with 
their different markets and managerial traditions. To overcome the problem of supervision 
owners insisted upon payment by results with fines for incorrectly filled tubs deemed 
underweight or containing too much rock, and special payments negotiated for working 
abnormal places with difficult geological conditions. Such a system appeared designed to 
generate discontent and industrial unrest was the inevitable consequence.
10
 Many historians 
have been drawn to this conflict between capital and labour and the area of health and safety 
has been somewhat neglected. Early trade union histories adopted a heroic approach to their 
role in this conflict through an inevitable progression towards socialism,
11
 although later 
scholars, who replaced the trade union officials and sympathetic commissioned historians as 
authors, have utilised a wider range of sources and taken a broader and more complete 
interpretation of these events.
12
 The rise of social history from the 1960’s and community 
studies from the 1980’s13 have both increased our understanding of the coal industry, and the 
examination of health and safety that follows will contribute to this developing 
historiography. 
Chapter Two charts the development of the Warwickshire coalfield from the Roman era 
to the rapid expansion prior to the First World War. There is no trade union history of 
Warwickshire and although a Warwickshire colliery currently holds the record for annual 
output of any colliery in Europe
14
 little is known of the coalfield’s past. This chapter will 
attempt to remedy this by utilising all available research with particular emphasis on the 
period 1840 through to 1913. It will show that although deep pits dominated the coalfield 
from the turn of the century smaller collieries also survived, either as scavenger pits taking 
                                                 
10 
Miners would obviously resent the fact that they were to receive no payment for a tub rejected by an official 
or that they faced dismissal for refusing to work in difficult geological conditions where it was impossible for 
them to earn what they considered a fair day’s pay. 
11
 See for example R. Page Arnot, The Miners: a history of the MFGB to 1910 (London, 1947); The Miners: 
Years of Struggle. A history of the MFGB from 1910 (London, 1953), The Miners: Crisis and War (London, 
1961) and The Miners: One Union, One Industry (London, 1979). 
12 
Contrast R. Page Arnot, A History of the South Wales Miners (London, 1967) with C. Williams, Capitalism, 
Community and Conflict: The South Wales Coalfield 1898 to 1947 (Cardiff, 1998). 
13 Community studies became increasingly popular from the 1980’s although there are examples from the 
1950’s. 
14
 In 2008 at Daw Mill Colliery, Warwickshire, a new European record coal output of 3,120,000 tons, was 
produced by a workforce of 680 men. In 2009 it set another record producing 3,218,000 tons. Daily Mail, 21 
March 2009 ‘The New King Coal: the unlikely comeback of the Mining Industry.’ Daw Mill, the last 
Warwickshire colliery, closed in 2013 following a fire caused by spontaneous combustion Guardian 7 March 
2013. 
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advantage of temporary coal shortages or as specialist collieries to extract ironstone for Black 
Country furnaces
15
 or clay for the brick and tile industry. 
Chapter Three examines the danger faced by Warwickshire miners through the records of 
fatal and non-fatal accidents and compares these dangers to those encountered by miners 
elsewhere in the Midland District and in the British coal industry as a whole. It will utilise 
both the Mine Inspectorate’s Annual Reports and coroner’s court proceedings reported in 
local newspapers. Falls of coal were the main cause of fatalities in Warwickshire as was the 
case elsewhere on the coalfields, but it will also explain why Warwickshire underground 
haulage deaths were higher and surface deaths lower than in other districts. Although gas 
explosions were a relatively minor factor in Warwickshire due to the geological advantage of 
possessing fewer gassy seams, the Baddesley disaster of 1882 was the greatest single cause of 
loss of life in the county and merits a detailed investigation. The difficulties of obtaining non- 
fatal accident figures will also be addressed. Despite being slow to be recognised or for the 
medical profession to offer any amelioration, the data relating to occupational diseases that 
were inherent in the coal industry will be explored. By comparing the statistics for tons of 
coal raised per life lost and deaths per thousand employed for both the coal industry as a 
whole and Warwickshire in particular, it maps the extent of the dangers in mining coal in this 
county and how these dangers changed over time. 
Chapter Four investigates what individual miners could do to reduce the risk of accidents, 
the role of the trade union in contributing to this decline and what steps miners took to protect 
their families from the consequences of adversity. It particularly highlights the issue of 
working in a male dominated environment where risk taking was accepted practice. By 
reference to evidence from field clubs, trade union insurance schemes, permanent relief 
societies and insurance companies, the myth of the feckless miner who did little to protect 
their families from the consequences of working in a dangerous occupation is exposed.
16
 The 
role of the trade unions at the national and local level is investigated and evaluated with 
                                                 
15 
Wyken Colliery Sales Ledger revealed that most of the ironstone production went to four Black Country 
ironworks with over £18,000 sales to Bankfield Ironworks, Bilston. CRO 285//3/1 
16 See for example J. Benson, ‘Coalminers, Coalowners and Collaboration: the Miners` Permanent Relief Fund 
in England 1860 to 1895’, Labour History Review 68.2 (2003) 181-194. 
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particular stress upon the moderating influence of William Johnson’s leadership of the 
Warwickshire Miners’ Association.17 
Chapter Five identifies the influence of coalowners in reducing fatalities using evidence 
from selected Warwickshire collieries, and discovers if there are any difference in the safety 
records of those owners who came from a landed gentry background, those who led 
companies and those who were mine engineers. There is a negative perception of coalowners 
that characterises them as grasping capitalists unconcerned for the welfare of their 
workforce
18
 but as Warwickshire miners patently received superior pay and enjoyed better 
working conditions compared to miners elsewhere, this local evidence suggests that the 
stereotype requires revision. 
Chapter Six charts the development of State intervention in promoting safety through the 
Mine Inspectorate, the professionalization of management and the involvement of the law 
courts, and evaluates the contribution of each to improved safety in the mines. The Mine 
Inspectorate established in 1850 has received vociferous criticism from trade unions for 
alleged failure to rigorously promote safety.
19
 The difference between the limited powers of 
the Mine Inspectorate and trade union aspirations is contrasted, together with the need for the 
passage of time to create the political will and the technological solutions to problems. 
Nevertheless the Inspectors’ call for miners to be better trained remained mere platitudes until 
the 1890’s and mine rescue was not addressed until 1911. 
With sincere deference to Church who stated that ‘it is impossible to assess the relative 
importance of factors that led to an increase in mine safety,’20 the conclusion draws together 
the relative contribution from the miner, the coalowner and the State to such improvements 
that have been identified in the thesis. It advances the argument that future research at the 
local/regional level is needed to gain a more detailed understanding of the complexity of the 
development of health and safety in the British coal industry.  
                                                 
17 
William Johnson (1849-1919) led the Warwickshire Miners’ Association 1885 to 1918. See Dictionary of 
Labour Biography Volume 2. 
18 
The Times, 11 July 1842 and 27 November 1916. Quentin Outram has specialised in the study of coalowners. 
See ‘The Stupidest men in England: The Industrial Relations strategy of the Coalowners between the lockouts 
1923 and 1924’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations (1997) 65-95. 
19 
See for example the Evidence of B. Owen, Minutes of Evidence of the Select Committee Appointed to Inquire 
into the Operation of the Acts for the Regulation and Inspection of Mines. 431. (1866). 
20 
R. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume 3 1830 to 1914 (Oxford, 1986) p. 587. 
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This thesis builds upon recent developments in the historiography of the British coal 
industry. It is anchored in a minor county which has largely escaped the attention of 
historians and as part of the relatively prosperous and moderate East Midlands coalfield with 
its different traditions of paternalistic management practice and consensual industrial 
relations, gives a nuanced perspective on the development of the British coal industry. By 
centring this study in the reduction of potential injury and death that overshadowed all that 
worked in the mines, it will contribute to a wider understanding of the social history of coal. 
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Chapter One: Historians and the Coal Industry 
The late 19
th
 century saw the emergence of the coal miner to a predominant position 
among the industrial working class. Production and employment soared reflecting an 
increased demand for coal to warm houses, power factories and drive railways and 
steamships and by 1913 miners accounted for 10 per cent of the male working population.
1
 
The miners’ trade unions were the most powerful in the country and had twice in 1893 and 
1912 prompted the unprecedented intervention of the State in an industrial dispute. The most 
important single factor in the increased demand for coal was the iron industry
2
 and a 
government Select Committee of 1873 blamed the national shortage of coal in the early 
1870’s on the iron industry’s ‘insatiable demand.’3 It was still consuming 10 per cent of coal 
production in 1913. But the most striking success was the exploitation of overseas markets. 
In 1855 less than 10 per cent of coal production was exported accounting for 3 per cent of 
British exports. By 1913 a third of coal produced was shipped abroad and was valued at 10 
per cent of British exports.
4
 It is therefore not surprising that such an important industry 
should attract the attention of so many historians. 
The following analysis will evaluate the historiography of the coal industry and explain 
why interpretations of this history changed over time. In order to present the literature in a 
meaningful way the following structure has been adopted. The first section will examine 
economic histories of the coal industry which appeared in the late 19
th
 century as mainly 
professors of mining or economics described and analysed the industry that had come to 
underpin the surging economy. A focus upon the economic principles of coal production 
dominated most of the 20
th
 century but was expanded to include a social perspective from the 
1960’s. The second section looks at mining institutional histories of the trade unions and how 
these created the myth of miner solidarity and how subsequent researchers from the 1970’s 
sought to challenge this simplistic view of industrial relations in the British coal industry. 
Such revisionist views nevertheless underplayed the formidable strength of the miners’ union 
which was capable of impacting on the national economy. Section three, community studies, 
                                                 
1
 J. Rowe, Wages in the Coal Industry (London, 1923) statistical appendix. 
2
 N. Buxton, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry (London, 1978) pp. 56-8. 
3
 Quoted in the Nuneaton Chronicle, 26 July 1873. 
4
 N. Buxton, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry p. 91. 
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examines the literature that has sought to understand the life of the miner outside the confines 
of the coal mine. Originating in the 1930’s they became increasingly popular in the 1980’s as 
researchers charted the impact of industrial decline. In section four attention is turned to the 
coalowners and their characterisation in the existing historiography. Historians have been 
challenged by the lack of source material, particularly from the coalowners themselves. In 
stark contrast, section five’s analysis of industrial relations has a surfeit of historical 
commentary. Here the fiction of the militant miner constantly on strike will be challenged by 
the statistical analysis of historians like Church and Outram. Section six investigates the 
contribution of autobiography and biography to the history of the coal industry and how such 
studies have increased the depth of our understanding. In section seven the spotlight is turned 
upon the neglected area of State intervention into the health and safety of those who worked 
in the industry. The final section examines the limited historiography of the Warwickshire 
coalfield. 
Economic Histories 
Given the significance of coal to the British economy it was not surprising that the 
earliest histories of the industry attempted to explain the economics of coal production. 
Robert Galloway was a colliery owner and mine engineer whose brother was the first 
Professor of Mining at Cardiff University in 1891. His History of Coal Mining in Great 
Britain published in 1882 concentrated upon the technological development of coal mining. 
His later Annals of Coal Mining and the Coal Trade published in 1898 and a second series in 
1904
5
 arose from articles published in the Colliery Guardian
6
 and were intended for a more 
specialised audience. Galloway delves into the minutiae of technical detail but can still be 
useful to the historian that does not possess an engineering background. One example is how 
he describes and evaluates each technical improvement in the design of safety lamps by 
different engineers which explains why so many diverse types were in use in the late 19
th
 
century.
7
 In 1915 Stanley Jevons published his classic study of The British Coal Trade.
8
 
Although he taught at Cardiff University as a professor of economics, this was the first book 
                                                 
5
 R. Galloway, History of Coal Mining in Great Britain (London, 1898) and Annals of Coal Mining and the Coal 
Trade (London, 1904). 
6
 The Colliery Guardian first published 1858 was the main newspaper of the coal industry and voice of the 
colliery owners. 
7
 R. Galloway, History of Coal Mining in Great Britain (London, 1898) pp. 263-4. 
8
 H.S. Jevons, The British Coal Trade (London, 1915). 
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intended for the general reader rather than participants in the coal industry. This volume of 
over 850 pages explored every aspect of the industry but was a description of the coal 
industry in 1913 rather than a history of coal production. His eclectic style is easily accessible 
to the modern reader and the scope of the book is such that he even includes two chapters on 
social history. In ‘Miners Life and Work’ and ‘Housing of Miners’ he comments upon the 
recent introduction of pit head baths, mining communities, the character of miners and their 
political and academic achievements.
9
 Similar descriptive and weighty volumes were 
produced by Pamely, Redmayne and Bulman but were intended for colliery managers.
10
 The 
period before the mid nineteenth century expansion was admirably covered in the inter-war 
years by Ashton and Sykes’ 1929 study of Coal Mining in the Eighteenth Century and Nef’s 
two volumes The Rise of the British Coal Industry published in 1932.
11
 Yet in his 1935 
historiographical survey of the Basic Industries of England 1850 to 1914, Beales lamented 
that; ‘the history of mining trade unions is more accessible than that of mining enterprise or 
the coal trade.’12 It had become almost the credo of coal mining trade union leaders to 
proudly publish the history of their well-established institutions but for the important period 
of the coal industry’s growth in the late 19th century Beales claimed there were only dated 
sources for the student of history.
13
 
For forty years no historian attempted to fill the gap identified by Beales to provide a 
national history of the coal industry. From the 1970’s a number of books began to appear that 
charted its economic development. Some like Kirby’s The British Coalmining Industry 1870 
to 1946
14
 published in 1977 grew from the Taylor inspired controversy of a decade before 
that coalowners had failed to develop the technological and organizational structures to 
counter the declining productivity that was to condemn the industry to decline in the 20
th
 
                                                 
9
 H.S. Jevons, The British Coal Trade pp. 608-36 and 637-59. 
10
 C. Pamely, The Colliery Manager’s Handbook (London, 1898); R. Redmayne and H. Bulman, Coalmining 
and the Coal Miner (London, 1920). 
11
 T. Ashton and J. Sykes, The Coal Industry in the Eighteenth Century (Manchester, 1929) and J. Nef, The Rise 
of the British Coal Industry (London, 1932). 
12
 H. Beales, ‘Historiographical Studies 5: The Basic Industries of England 1850 to 1914’, Economic History 
Review 5 (April 1939) 99-112, especially p. 102. 
13
 For example in South Wales before the First World War there were two histories, both contemporary accounts, 
written by employees of the Coalowners Association after industrial disputes to justify the actions of employers. 
W. Dalziel, The Colliers’ Strike in South Wales (Cardiff, 1872) and D. Evans, Labour Strife in the South Wales 
Coalfield 1910 to 1911 (Cardiff, 1911). 
14
 M. Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry 1870 to 1946 (London, 1977). 
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century in the face of increased foreign competition.
15
 Buxton’s Economic Development of 
the British Coal Industry published in 1978 is arguably the best introduction currently 
available.
16
 Despite attempting to cover the full history of the industry in less than 300 pages 
it manages to give a succinct summary of economic issues and can be used as a framework 
for extended study. In 1984 Mitchell published the first detailed economic study of the coal 
industry in the 19
th
 century.
17
 It covered the usual topics of capital, labour, technological 
developments, wage bargaining, pricing and productivity, but admits in the preface a neglect 
of social history. As it originated in a doctoral thesis on the inland coalfields it was 
particularly interesting for this study as it used a limited number of exemplars from the 
Warwickshire coalfield. This important period of expansion was further developed by Church 
in his 1986 History of the British Coalfields: Volume Three 1830 to 1913.
18
 In eight chapters 
covering some 630 pages this now seminal work attempted to summarise available research 
on every aspect of the industry. 
Church’s monograph was part of a five volume official history of the British coalfields 
sponsored by the National Coal Board that was published between 1984 and 1993.
19
 
Historiography had now moved a very long way from Jevons’ aim to provide ‘facts and a 
point of view.’20 Such histories now saw a social dimension as an essential part rather than an 
optional addendum. In a later study Church and Outram outlined their methodology; ‘we 
have attempted to combine the statistical approach with narratives that are illustrative rather 
than descriptive, interpretive rather than synoptic.’21 With the aid of research assistants the 
authors were able to tap into a wealth of primary sources and academic investigations and 
bring them to the attention of a more general readership. By applying statistical vigour to 
such sources they brought new interpretations to the history of the industry. To cite but one 
                                                 
15
 A. Taylor, ‘Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry 1850 to 1914’, 
Economic History Review X1V (1961) 48-67, and A. Taylor, ‘The Coal Industry’, in D. Alcroft (ed.), The 
Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition (London, 1968) pp. 37-70. 
16
 N. Buxton, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry (London, 1978). 
17
 B. Mitchell, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 1800 to 1914 (London 1984). 
18
 R. Church, History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three 1830 to 1913 (Oxford, 1986). 
19
 History of the British Coal Industry: T. Hatcher, Volume One: Before 1700 (Oxford, 1993), M. Flynn, Volume 
Two: 1700 to 1830 (Oxford, 1984), R. Church, Volume Three: 1830 to 1913 (Oxford, 1986), B. Supple, Volume 
Four: 1913 to 1946 (Oxford, 1987) and W. Ashworth, Volume Five: 1946 to 1982 (Oxford, 1986). 
20
 Cited in the book review section of the Economic Journal (June 1916) 240. 
21
 R. Church and Q. Outram, Strikes and Solidarity: Coalfield Conflict in Britain 1889 to 1866 (Cambridge, 
1998) p. XV1. 
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example, Taylor in 1961 used output per man year figures to suggest that declining 
productivity began in the last quarter of the 19
th
 century. Church analysed output per man 
shift statistics and found that the decline in productivity only became pronounced after 
1909.
22
 These figures are more accurate as they take into account the number of hours miners 
actually worked but are only available from 1894. 
The strengths of such economic histories are that they clearly highlight the unique 
difficulties of running a successful colliery enterprise. Demand was subject to seasonal and 
cyclical fluctuations and the few marketing schemes attempted by owners in the North-East, 
South Wales and Lancashire all failed.
23
 As largely price takers the skill of management was 
therefore to control the supply side of the industry, yet capital once sunk in a pit had no resale 
value and geological changes could derail the most fastidious planner. All economic histories 
describe the complex wage structure including piece rates for coal produced, wage bargains 
for working different seams and places, and fines for improperly filled tubs that were 
intended to overcome the difficulties of supervision. They also describe the tensions and 
industrial conflict that inevitably flowed from such a system. A major weakness of these 
histories is an over reliance of exemplars from the important exporting districts of the North-
East and South Wales. Consequently there is an under representation of inland coalfields with 
their different markets and managerial traditions and often a total neglect of smaller 
coalfields like Warwickshire. This thesis will make a contribution to remedying this 
oversight.  
Miners’ Trade Unions 
Early histories of the miner as distinct from the coal industry as a whole became 
synonymous with the history of the trade unions. In 1894 the socialist writers Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb
24
 published A History of Trade Unionism detailing the roots and development 
of the British trade union movement.
25
 Their archival detective work and a utilisation of 
union records was to influence future labour historians. The communist historian Robin Page 
                                                 
22
 R. Church, History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three 1830 to 1913 (Oxford, 1986) p. 471. 
23
 M. Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry 1870 to 1946 (London, 1977) p. 9. For the coalowners’ view of the 
Coalowners’ Associations see Mining Association of Great Britain, Historical Review of Coalmining (London, 
1924) pp. 351-77. 
24
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Arnot
26
 was commissioned by the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain formed in 1888 and its 
successor, the National Union of Mineworkers established in 1945, to write their history.
27
 He 
adopted a sympathetic approach attributing much of the improvements in working conditions 
to the efforts of the union.
28
 He charted the transition from support for the Liberal Party to 
Socialism
29
 and used a similar approach to his regional histories of the Scottish and South 
Wales miners’ unions30 making full use of union records and prompting one critic to describe 
them as his ‘resolutionary histories.’31 Some regional or district histories predate Page 
Arnot’s national four volume history, yet they share his dated reliance on union records and 
omission of internal tensions. Most of the mining districts, with the exception of 
Warwickshire and some of the smaller coalfields, have produced a trade union history, with 
the regional NUM often assuming the role of publisher.
32
 Such histories are sympathetic to 
the trade union movement and tend to stress the presence of socialist beliefs, class 
consciousness and solidarity. The image that was created was that of the militant miner, a 
mythical ‘class warrior’ who achieves success and suffers failure through the auspices of his 
trade union. Their narratives are enlivened by passionate descriptions of industrial battles, the 
suffering of the community and the benefits achieved for its members by the union. Page 
Arnot’s description of the 1893 strike is still required reading for anyone interested in that 
dispute, even if his conclusion that the miners had gained a wage independent of the price of 
                                                 
26
 ODNB: Robin Page Arnot (1890-1986). A founder member of the British Communist Party in 1920 he was a 
prolific author and pamphleteer. 
27
 R. Page Arnot, The Miners: a history of the MFGB to 1910 (London, 1947); The Miners: Years of Struggle. A 
history of the MFGB from 1910 (London, 1953), The Miners: Crisis and War (London, 1961) and The Miners: 
One Union, One Industry (London, 1979). 
28
 For example he claimed that the 1893 strike secured a minimum wage but miners did not achieve this until the 
1911 Act. 
29
 The MFGB was one of the last trade unions to affiliate to the Labour Party in 1909 and in 1910 three miner 
MPs from the North-East refused to sign the Socialist Charter and continued to sit as Lib-Labs. Two Midland 
MPs were expelled from the Labour Party in 1914 for their continued support for their local Liberal Party. This 
will be discussed in Chapter Four. See R. Gregory, The Miners and British Politics 1906 to 1914 (Oxford, 1968) 
pp. 37-9. 
30
 R. Page Arnot, A History of the Scottish Miners (London, 1955) and A History of the South Wales Miners 
(London, 1967). 
31
 S. Berger and N. Evans, ‘Two Faces of King Coal: the impact of Historiographical Tradition on Comparative 
History of the Ruhr and South Wales coalfields’, in S. Berger, A. Croll and N. Laporte, (eds.), Towards a 
Comparative History of Coalfield Societies (Aldershot, 2005) p. 38. 
32
 For example R. Fynes, The Miners of Northumberland and Durham: a history of their political and social 
progress (Sunderland, 1923), W. Garside, The Durham Miners 1919 to 1960 (London, 1971) and C. Griffin, The 
Leicestershire and South Derbyshire Miners 1840 to 1914 (Coalville, 1981). 
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coal was erroneous.
33
 When peace talks broke down in November 1893 because the 
employers refused to countenance the union’s insistence upon a minimum living wage, the 
subsequent government intervention made no mention of the term and the following July 
wages were cut by the new National Conciliatory Board citing the fall in prices.
34
 Yet the 
leader of the South Wales NUM made clear in the preface to the 1981 history of his union 
that these histories were intended to act as a rallying call to promote strength through unity.
35
 
These underlying political partialities, together with a tendency to rely on official union 
documentation and national personalities, have come under increasing scrutiny. Berger and 
Evans describe them as; ‘works of left wing antiquarianism … useful to modern historians as 
sources of narrative and quarries of information rather than analysis.’36 Nevertheless they 
remain a valuable insight into how trade unions saw themselves and how they coloured a 
view of trade unions in others. 
Trade unions saw the gradual erosion of laissez-faire capitalism as a direct result of their 
petitioning of parliament and actions in the courts in defence of injured miners. At the turn of 
the century they were powerful established bodies with their leaders’ influential in the 
corridors of power. Such leaders or union officials were proud to record their institutional 
history and highlight their perceived successes. Fynes published the history of the 
Northumberland and Durham union as early as 1873, Wilson the Durham union in 1907, 
Edwards the South Wales union in 1938, Griffin the miners of Nottingham in 1955 and 
Machin the Yorkshire miners in 1958.
37
 Each documented the conditions that colliers were 
forced to endure, the difficulties and persecutions that the founders faced in establishing the 
union and the progress that the union had accomplished. 
                                                 
33
 R. Page Arnot, The Miners: a history of the MFGB to 1910 (London, 1947) pp. 230-53, particularly p. 253. 
34
 See K. Burgess, The Origins of British Industrial Relations: the 19
th
 century experience (London, 1975) pp. 
205-7. 
35
 Preface, H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed: a history of the South Wales miners in the 20
th
 century (London, 
1980) p. XV. 
36
 S. Berger and N. Evans, ‘Two Faces of King Coal: the impact of Historiographical Tradition on Comparative 
History of the Ruhr and South Wales coalfields’, in S. Berger, A. Croll and N. Laporte (eds.), Towards a 
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(Sunderland, 1923), J. Wilson, A History of the Durham Miners’ Association 1870 to 1904 (Durham, 1907), N. 
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Yet despite their obvious scholarship, the perceived ideological bias
38
 and limited source 
selection of many of these works has been challenged by subsequent historians. Ackers notes: 
This tradition combines a curious brand of Marxist romanticism with an 
institutional focus on central union resolutions and minutes at the expense of 
sources which could illustrate a wider more complex social history.
39
 
He argues that Marxists tend to neglect the economic basis of mining industrial relations and 
attribute setbacks not to vagaries of the trade cycle or wider economic pressures but to the 
betrayal of renegade union leaders, the management and/or the government. By defining a 
miner as a trade union member, such histories must vilify or neglect those that chose not to 
walk that path or deviated from it in ways critical to the Marxist approach to history. The 
1980 study of the South Wales miners by Francis and Smith discovered that in the 1930’s40 
membership averaged only half those in employment suggesting that ‘The Fed’ could not be a 
history of all Welsh miners. Like Page Arnot’s history it suffers similar limitations but has a 
more sophisticated methodology. Francis and Smith relied more on oral evidence to 
supplement union records and acknowledged the divisions amongst miners. However written 
at a time of growing industrial tension it remains a tool of union propaganda by emphasising 
the advantages of miners’ solidarity.41 
Since the 1970’s there has been a more sceptical view of working class formation and 
solidarity and Marxism has been replaced as an analytical tool by a more consensual view of 
social relations that stresses the sectional splits in the working class.
42
 Yet researchers can still 
make profitable use of institutional histories, partly by drawing upon them as a source of 
narrative and detail as highlighted by Berger and Evans cited above, but also taking 
                                                 
38
 Page Arnot was a communist and most of the writers of regional histories were socialists who believed in the 
eventual nationalisation of the coal industry. 
39
 P. Ackers, 'Christian Brethren; Union Brother’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wolverhampton 1993) 
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40
 H. Francis and D.Smith, The Fed: a history of the South Wales miners in the 20
th
 century (London, 1980) p. 
106. 
41
 In his study of the South Wales coalfield Chris Williams makes the point that ‘The Fed’ remains a strong basis 
to build upon rather than replace. C. Williams, Capitalism, Community and Conflict: The South Wales Coalfield 
1898 to 1947 (Cardiff, 1998). 
42
 A good summary of this is found in R. Fagge, Power, Culture and Conflict in the Coalfields: West Virginia 
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cognizance of how many working class people interpreted their lives through such heroic 
images and sentiments. 
The search for a ‘wider more complex social history’ of the coal industry was first 
pioneered by Williams in his 1962 study of Derbyshire miners.
43
 This challenged the 
traditional historiography by introducing a greater emphasis on cultural and social factors to 
supplement the stress on political and economic approaches to the past. In this he mirrored a 
general trend across the discipline of history in the late 20
th
 century. From Challinor’s 1972 
study of the Lancashire miners, through Campbell’s 1979 and 2000 studies of Scottish 
miners, Emery in 1992 and then Beynon and Austrin in 1994 account of the Durham miners, 
Bayliss’ 1993 study of Yorkshire miners and Gildart’s 2001 study of the miners of North 
Wales, few would now attempt a district union study without a significant social history 
element.
44
 These new writers were not employees of the union or commissioned historians 
but independent academics that were prepared to use the full range of sources available to 
them. Benson described this change as follows; 
slowly the history of industrial labour is being rewritten from the standpoint of 
the rank and file workers rather than the vantage point of the union head office.
45
 
In his pioneering 1980 study of the social history of 19
th
 century coalminers, trade unions are 
relegated to one section of a chapter on ‘the Miner and his Clubs’, the main thrust of which 
was to challenge the stereotypical view that miners failed to provide insurance cover for their 
families in times of need. Instead he examines the homes in which miners lived, the 
conditions in which they worked, the ways in which they received their pay, spent their 
money, looked after their wives and children and protected themselves from an uncertain 
future. He shows how miners struggled to better themselves and how they shared in the 
gradual improvement in living standards in the latter half of the 19
th
 century. Such an 
approach has influenced those who have attempted a more panoramic history of the industry. 
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In his 1986 study of the 19
th
 century coal industry Church also devoted one of eight chapters 
to the miner and synthesised the then current research on wages, occupational mortality and 
health, housing and environment, and the mining communities.
46
 Industrial relations were 
also assigned a chapter but although this reflected the importance of trade unions it also 
embedded the now current view that a coal miner was more than simply a union member. 
The movement towards social history as a means of studying labour had received its 
initial impetus from the publication in 1963 of E P Thompson’s The Making of the English 
Working Class. Thompson stressed how cultural factors reflected and shaped working class 
responses to industrial society. This approach flourished for twenty years or so winning its 
battle to stand alongside political and economic history, but then its concentration upon class 
and Marxist conflict models of society made it look increasingly anachronistic. From the 
1980’s there was a move to the study of gender and ethnicity as themes in history and a 
greater emphasis on cultural identity. Evans described this change: 
The emphasis was less on ‘society’ and particularly not society as a set of 
structures; it was on individuals, attitudes and beliefs. Cultural historians were 
interested in group activity but of a less formal kind – not so much trade unions 
or political societies but in carnivals, celebrations, rituals and festivals.
47
 
Just as social history was the dominant trend in the 1960’s and 1970’s the last decades of 
the 20
th
 century saw a new emphasis upon community studies. Here the trade union moved 
from being the focus of study to one of a number of different strands of influence. 
Community Studies 
Community Studies developed in the fields of sociology and anthropology, where field 
workers live in an area and through the social sciences methodology of conversation and 
observation attempt to analyse different influences on different members of a defined 
community. Although not historical studies, such research opened up new perspectives on 
mining communities. Models were developed to explain why miners appeared to be the most 
militant section of the working class. In 1954 Kerr and Siegel postulated the ‘isolated mass 
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theory’ which stated that as miners were removed from the rest of society strikes could be 
seen as ‘a kind of colonial revolt against far removed authority.’48 This was challenged as 
early as 1959 when in a comparative international study Rimlinger discovered that Anglo-
American miners were more strike prone than their Franco-German counterparts.
49
 The 
reasons for this were not expanded but suggested that the answers lay beyond the 
commonality of employment. The classic British study was Coal Is Our Life, a 1956 
examination of a Yorkshire mining village. While stressing the legend of the militant miner, 
Dennis et al. attempted to analyse the broader influences of ‘work, leisure and the family.’50 
Later Fagge described this study as ‘the most famous exposition of this view that extreme 
exploitation made the miner the archetypal proletarian.’51 
In 1976 Bulmer published Mining and Social Change: Durham County in the 20
th
 
century,
52
 a study of miners in the North-East of England, and in 1977 Samuel edited Miners, 
Quarrymen and Saltworkers,
53
 a study of different extractive industries in the 19
th
 century. 
Yet perhaps the most influential was Harrison’s Independent Collier: the coal miner an 
archetypal proletarian reconsidered
54
 published a year later. In a series of micro studies it 
was revealed that miners are subject to what Fagge terms; 
different economic, geographical and cultural influences that can only be 
understood by examining the reality of historical experience rather than the ideal 
type.
55
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Harrison’s work led to a serious critique of the ‘militant miner’ thesis. With the decline of 
the coal industry following the bitter dispute of 1984-85 researchers again returned in force to 
mining communities to analyse the divisive impact of social change at a time of industrial 
decline. Parker’s 1986 study of a North-East town and the Open University’s Split and the 
Seams are examples of this.
56
 Warwick and Littlejohn’s 1992 study of mining communities in 
West Yorkshire is particularly useful.
57
 Evidence of variety is reinforced by studies of 
different coalfields in different counties. The moderation of the Nottingham miners was 
explored by Waller in 1983
58
 and this was complemented by Gilbert in his 1992 comparison 
of Nottingham with the South Wales coalfield.
59
 Gilbert used ‘rational choice theory’ to 
explain how socialists were able to permeate social institutions in South Wales but were less 
successful in Nottingham where the management had a less combative style. In Nottingham 
owners had a tradition of paternalism but in South Wales industrial relations were akin to the 
battlefield, symbolised by the 1910 Tonypandy Riots where Metropolitan police and the army 
were drafted in to the Rhondda Valley to maintain order and 500 were injured and one miner 
killed in the disturbances.
60
 To the miners of South Wales the class enemy was visible and 
actively engaged against them, whereas in the Midlands he appeared more a figment of 
socialist rhetoric.
61
 
To explain why coal mining districts should develop such differing personas historians 
have attempted to isolate what Barron terms the ‘meanings’ of community. In her 2010 study 
of the Durham coalfield during the 1926 lockout she investigated the collective identity and 
behaviour based around class and occupation, and how gender, religion, age, poverty and 
individual aspiration both challenged and reinforced particular characteristics. Durham 
continued to display support for the lockout not because the community was homogeneous 
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but because it could, in her words, ‘subsume and integrate other categories of identity.’62 
These categories of identity had been studied previously. The importance of religion was 
identified by Moore in 1974 when he attempted to explain the blunting of militancy in 
Durham by the presence of Methodism.
63
 The emergence in the 1860’s of moderate 
Methodist leaders in the North-East who were less inclined to rely on the singular weapon of 
the strike, led to the first permanent trade unions. Ackers in his doctoral thesis ‘Christian 
Brethren, Union Brother,’ showed a similar influence of religion in the establishment of a 
union for deputies.
64
 
One strand that has received increasing attention from the 1980’s is that of gender. This 
grew from the ‘history from below’ movement of the 1960’s and 1970’s which sought to 
develop, through movements like History Workshop and the Oral History Society, the hidden 
history of the common people.
65
 The first to apply this to the coal industry was Angela John 
in By the Sweat of their Brow, published in 1980.
66
 This described how women continued to 
work on the surface and their role in trade unions and the mining community. Recent gender 
based studies have built on the work of John. White and Williams (1998) focussed on 
womens’ lives in the South Wales valleys between the wars and Carr (2001) on women in the 
North-East in the early 20
th
 century.
67
 Gier and Mercier (2006) added an international 
perspective by examining the role of women in different coal communities around the 
world.
68
 Bruley’s study of women in South Wales during the 1926 lockout has made a 
significant contribution. In her 2007 article, ‘The Politics of Food’, she examined the way 
that although communal eating in soup kitchens reduced gender segregation, women in 
mining communities were more concerned to maintain support for their men rather than make 
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social advances for women.
69
 She concluded that maintaining the masculine identity of the 
militant miner, which necessarily incorporated male bonding and womens’ subjugation, was 
regarded as an essential feature of the class struggle. Her 2010 book, The Women and Men of 
1926, extends this analysis with extensive oral evidence. 
The notion of masculine identity and how it impacted upon life in the pit and in the wider 
community, is only now receiving attention from historians. Gildart notes that;  
‘The physicality of coal mining created an individualistic and competitive strain 
within miners’ identity that led to tensions within and beyond the workplace.’70  
The archetypal hard man that displayed his physical prowess would gain respect from his 
peers, even if his actions sometimes undermined efforts to enforce safety. In 2007 McIvor 
explored this ethos of masculinity through extensive oral evidence and concluded that 
workplace culture could act as a ‘drag anchor,’ slowing the pace of improved occupational 
health and safety standards. ‘Risks were taken, especially if the trade-off was higher wages or 
a shorter work shift.’71 In this he echoed the findings of Weyman, Clarke and Cox who in 
2003 attempted to develop a model of coal miners’ attributions on risk taking at work. The 
three main factors they identified were time pressures, the management commitment to mine 
safety and the miner’s confidence in their ability to deal with risk.72 
The historiography of the coal miner has now moved far beyond the narrow parameters 
of the early institutional histories. Gildart however has issued a warning against their 
marginalisation: ‘Class consciousness, institution building and industrial militancy are themes 
that might have been pushed to the margins in recent years but they cannot be completely 
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ignored.’73 For evidence he cites the numerous autobiographical and oral testimonies of 
miners and their families that attest to the importance of their class identity and their union. 
To many miners the union was more than just a protector of their interests at work. It offered 
education and welfare and was a vehicle of social and political change. Just as institutional 
histories were never a complete history of the miner without reference to the community, so 
community studies would be impaired without mention of the union. 
The Owners 
Why the coalowners have received so little scrutiny from historians is difficult to 
comprehend. They would certainly be handicapped by a dearth of source evidence as Church 
and Outram discovered in their 1998 study of coalfield conflict: ‘On the coalowners we have 
a great scarcity of material, even biographical material.’74 One reason may be the very 
negative public persona that they made little attempt to counter. In 1842 The Times wrote of 
the need for coalowners to realise ‘that profits should not be made out of a barbarous and 
indecent system which disclaims any other law than that of productiveness,’ and in 1916 it 
was still complaining of ‘the mismanagement, obstinacy and greed of coalowners.’75 For 
many there is something unattractive about a group that pursue economic goals without 
consideration for their social consequences. Coalowners believed that providing capital 
allowed them the licence to use every means at their disposal to defend their right to run their 
firms and their labour force as they saw fit and they appeared to many to deserve the jibe by 
Lord Birkenhead that they were ‘the stupidest men in England.’76 
The historiography for the coalowners is therefore somewhat limited. The Mining 
Association of Great Britain produced An Historical Review of Coal Mining in 1924 with the 
secretary of the Association providing a sanitised chapter on its history.
77
 Church produced a 
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statistical analysis of business leaders in his 1986 history of the coal industry
78
 and in an 
international comparison of industrial relations of 1990 his chapter on the British experience 
is a succinct summary of available knowledge.
79
 Outram is one of the few historians who 
have attempted to study owners in depth. In his 2009 analysis of those coalowners involved 
in the 1926 dispute he describes them as ‘class warriors’ of whom only the Warwickshire 
representative had risen from the status of a working miner.
80
 A good regional study is 
provided by Walters’s 1975 business history of the South Wales steam coal industry 1840 to 
1914. Although doctoral theses often form the basis of future publication, this was published 
in its entirety in 1977.
81
 What emerges is that the nineteenth century pattern of ownership of 
family enterprise, partnerships and private companies dominated the industry through to 
nationalisation in 1947. The few large public companies before 1913 were mainly in the 
exporting regions of South Wales and Scotland. Coalowners were largely descended from 
coal owning families, as well as those who were involved in colliery management and 
consultancy and iron masters. In South Wales Walters discovered a sizeable number of coal 
dealers, mercantile interests and railway companies who had applied vertical integration. 
Many had qualified as mine engineers and served as magistrates or local councillors but few 
attended university or had national political aspirations. 
The quality of leadership amongst coalowners is difficult to assess but a few have 
attempted this. Between 1923 and 1928 the Colliery Guardian ran a series entitled ‘Men of 
Note in the British Coal Industry.’ In 1993 Dintenfass analysed this elite from the perspective 
of ‘family, training and career.’82 Of the 155 listed, forty-four were from the public side of 
government officials, scientists and educators; seven were trade union officials although 
unsurprisingly the more militant miners’ leaders like Smillie and A. J. Cook were omitted, 
and one hundred and four were from private enterprise. Of these sixty-three were coalmasters 
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defined as ‘proprietors, chairman, directors and managers of coal mining enterprises’, thirty-
four were practical mining men like mine engineers, managers and agents, twelve were 
merchants and five officials of coal trade associations. Dintenfass discovered that those 
coalmasters with familial ties to the industry tended to attend the more prestigious schools 
and universities and rise to positions of power at an earlier age but that any other difference 
with those without family connections was marginal. He found little evidence from either 
group of entrepreneurship, either in the sense of creating new businesses or restructuring 
existing ones, and that overwhelmingly men joined existing institutions and stayed there for 
most if not all their career. In this he mirrored the findings of Church in 1986 who found that 
two thirds of a cohort of 170 mainly post 1880 coalmasters spent their entire career with one 
or two companies.
83
 Dintenfass concluded by posing the question: 
Is it not possible that men who remained with the same organisation for decades 
on end – frequently the organisation with which they began their working lives 
and at which they achieved professional distinction – may have found it difficult 
to promote the innovation in production techniques and marketing strategies that 
changing economic conditions demanded from British industry after 1914 and for 
which the coal trade for one was slow to make.
84
 
Yet this was not unique to the coal industry. In 1967 Levine, a Canadian Professor of 
Economics, published Industrial Retardation in Britain 1880 to 1914. He described the lack 
of technical and organisational innovation in Britain in comparison with the industrial rivals 
of the USA and Germany and concluded that the failure was due to poor entrepreneurial 
performance across all industries citing amateurism, nepotism, social immobility and neglect 
of education.
85
 
The problem of productivity began after the fall in profits following the boom years of 
the early 1870’s. Owners sought to offset price falls by increasing output achieved by 
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increasing the inputs of labour, mainly in the unproductive oncost and surface workers. 
Figures presented to the 1925 Royal Commission reveal that production increased 60 per cent 
between 1889 and 1913 yet employment of miners went up 90 per cent and the number of 
surface workers increased by 188 per cent. Output per man year fell from a high of 319 tons 
1879-83 to 282 tons 1889-93 and further declining to 257 tons 1909-13.
86
 Owners have been 
blamed for the slow introduction of mechanised mining and the continued use of marginal 
ageing and outdated pits. Both Burgess (1975) and Kirby (1977) give good summaries of the 
debate.
87
 Church (1986) contributed to the discussion by referring to the more accurate output 
per man shift figures which take account of the number of hours actually worked. These 
figures are only available from 1894 but he claims productivity was flat until around 1909 
when it declined partly due to the introduction of the Eight Hour Day.
88
 
The main issue that has interested historians is how far coalowners were responsible for 
this declining productivity from the late 19
th
 century. The stereotypical view of coalowners 
has been summarised by Benson: ‘The coal owners (their viewers, managers and other 
agents) are seen almost without exception as the epitome of capitalist selfishness and 
intransigence.’89 The negative opinion of coalowners as effective entrepreneurs was 
championed by Taylor in the 1960’s90 but in the following decade historians like Buxton, 
Supple and most noticeably McCloskey came to their defence by offering mitigating factors 
to explain their shortcomings.
91
 McCloskey attributed American superiority in productivity to 
their geological advantage of working virgin seams rather than entrepreneurial management
92
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and Checkland believed that owners saw a degree of ruthlessness as an economic necessary if 
an enterprise was to prosper: 
There seemed no other sensible rule but to resist claims for wage increases in 
good times and to enforce decreases in bad.
93
 
Wale presented a case study of a number of entrepreneurs and managers in the coal industry 
from 1880 to 1914 as her doctoral thesis and concluded that the case for or against 
entrepreneurial failure ‘was still unproven.’94 Nevertheless Church in his 1986 panoramic 
study concluded that the industry did not realise its potential but did not take the next logical 
step of condemning those that ran the industry.
95
 Taylor at least offered an explanation for the 
self-satisfaction of coalowners claiming that they tended to measure the efficiency of their 
industry not by physical output but by financial return: 
Between 1900 and 1914 mining was enjoying a run of prosperity unprecedented 
in the memory of either mine owner or mine worker. Under such circumstances 
complacency about the industry’s shortcomings was perhaps pardonable but in 
mining unlike theology, the sin which is venial today may well become mortal 
tomorrow.
96
 
There is a pressing need for further studies on coalowners that digs beneath the accepted 
stereotype. 
Industrial Relations and Class Conflict 
Much has been written about the supposed militancy of the coal miner. Evidence gleaned 
from the great national disputes of 1893, 1912, 1921 and 1926 was mirrored in the period of 
nationalisation by government challenging disputes in 1972, 1974 and 1984-85. Socialist 
histories portrayed a fighting portrait of the miner as the heroic class warrior against capitalist 
exploitation. This view was challenged by Harrison in 1978 who suggested that colliers were 
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more independent in their actions and given statistical credence by Church in 1986 who 
suggested that miners were not as strike prone as fable suggests.
97
 Geary’s international 
comparisons of 2005 further undermined the myth of the militant miner.
98
 The heroic image 
re-emerged for its swan song in the great strike of 1984-85 when proposed pit closures meant 
that community survival rather than wages was at stake. Yet Gildart makes the telling point 
that: 
The fact that a significant minority of miners continued to defy the NUM 
throughout the dispute pointed to the legacy of division and factionalism in 
mining trade unionism since the Victorian period.
99
 
The 1984-5 strike has been charted by Goodman in 1985 and from the hindsight of distance 
by Beckett and Hencke in 2009.
100
 Miners shared a common identity based upon their 
occupational experience, which was challenged when major disputes revealed local and 
regional internal divisions in their trade union and community. To gain an understanding of 
these differences one must delve back to the formative years of the Victorian expansion of the 
coal fields. 
The institutional histories cited above and the autobiographies and biographies addressed 
below all give narratives of national and regional events that rely heavily on recorded ‘facts’ 
around industrial disputes. The employers’ perspective can be found in two works, Dalzeil 
(1872) The Colliers’ Strike in South Wales and Evans (1912) Labour Strife in the South Wales 
Coalfield.
101
 Both authors were employees of the Coalowners Association who according to 
Berger and Evans, were mainly attempting to justify the actions of employers in recent 
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disputes, with the latter managing to do so with hardly a reference to trade unions.
102
 A good 
description of the latter period can be found in the first volume of Page Arnot’s History of the 
MFGB
103
 published in 1947, with a more sober analysis
104
 from Burgess (1975) Origins of 
British Industrial Relations
105
 and Church’s (1990) chapter on Employers, Trade Unions and 
the State.
106
 In his 1986 History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three Church devotes a 
chapter to industrial relations, covering the topics of coalowners’ associations, the growth of 
trade unions, the clashes between capital and labour in 1893 and 1912, and wages and wage 
determination throughout the period.
107
 The most fascinating section is that devoted to trade 
unions where official statistics are utilised to analyse the number of working days lost, the 
major strike issues, the results of strikes and the methods used to settle disputes. Between 
1890 and 1913 published figures from the Board of Trade reveal a staggering 130 million 
working days were lost to strikes with 31.5 million and 24.4 million in the two main strike 
years of 1912 and 1893. Yet when Church calculated the number of days lost per employee 
per year the figure was only eight days for the period up to 1899 falling to under five days in 
the period after 1900. Regional figures were published after 1894 and these revealed that 
most strikes were in the coal exporting regions with South Wales the most strike prone 
accounting for 35 per cent of days lost but employing only 20 per cent of British miners.
108
 
When he examined the major strike issues wages declined in importance. In the period before 
1899 it was cited as the major instigating factor in over half the strikes in Scotland, 
Lancashire, the East and West Midlands and the three minor counties. After 1900 it reached 
only 40 per cent in the West Midlands and the minor counties. The results of strikes revealed 
that roughly a quarter were successful, a quarter failed and half were settled by arbitration. 
The chances of success depended largely upon the stage of the trade cycle but regional 
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figures reveal that failure was more common in the North-East and Scotland and success in 
the East Midlands. Although there were regional and national arbitration boards the vast 
majority of disputes were settled by pit head conciliation with official arbitration only 
common in South Wales. Such research has shattered the myth of the militant miner.
109
 
Collective bargaining gave miners a greater say in their pay and working conditions but it 
did not end disputes. It was impossible to reconcile movements in wage rates with the 
pronounced fluctuations in coal prices during the trade cycle, or to adopt an equitable system 
of piece rate earnings that could accommodate for the changing working conditions in every 
colliery. The relative bargaining skill and potential power could have a significant impact 
regarding earning potential of both sides of industry. In 1913 Jevons mused: 
Very different results have been obtained in different collieries so that there may 
be as much as 20 per cent difference in the cutting price of coal for the same 
seam under practically identical conditions between one colliery and the next.
110
 
If contemporaries found it difficult to decide what was fair and reasonable in the coal 
industry it is not surprising that historians have experienced a similar problem in analysing 
industrial relations. Most historians of the Victorian era have concluded that it was the actions 
of coalowners that contributed most to industrial tension.
111
 
Any history of the coal industry will be coloured by the views of its author and must be 
read with caution. Even the statistical analysis of Church could be criticised for underplaying 
the reality of militancy which led a fearful government to intervene twice to protect the 
national economy. Yet history is more than a narrative of events and an analysis of statistical 
data. All history can be enlivened by viewing proceedings through the eyes of those that lived 
them. The following section will identify the main autobiographical and biographical sources 
available to the historian of the coal industry in this period of coalfield expansion. 
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Miners’ Lives: Autobiography and Biography 
A sophisticated understanding of the coal industry cannot be gained from a simple 
chronology of events. An empathetic understanding of the role of different individuals helps 
to illuminate how their lives were shaped by what occurred around them and their 
motivations for their actions. This thesis will examine the lives of a number of Warwickshire 
coalowners and trade unionists in an attempt to discover what influenced their contribution to 
the county improvement in mine safety. 
The leadership of trade unions has been well covered in the literature and as early as 
1894 Hallam published thirty biographical sketches of miners’ leaders.112 A number of these 
pioneers published their own accounts of their lives like John Wilson of Durham (1910), 
Thomas Burt of Northumberland (1924), Robert Smillie of Scotland (1924) and Frank 
Hodges of South Wales (1925).
113
 A notable exception to the ‘pit to parliament’ 
autobiographies is that of Edward Rymer (1898), The Martyrdom of the Mine.
114
 He never 
remained attached to one particular coalfield or trade union or received any monetary rewards 
for his sacrifices, but in a career that spanned fifty years he travelled around helping to 
establish different unions and publicizing their cause in newspapers and at meetings. Of 
particular interest are the autobiographies of Burt and Smillie, both published in 1924, as they 
represent the two different political wings of the labour movement. Thomas Burt was a 
moderate Methodist inspired leader who served for forty-four years as the Liberal MP for 
Morpeth in Northumberland. In contrast Robert Smillie was a radical socialist leader of the 
MFGB and a founder of the Independent Labour Party, who succeeded Burt as MP for 
Morpeth in 1923, symbolising the move from Liberal to Labour Party support.
115
 There is 
also a biography of the influential moderate South Wales leader William Abraham (1959), 
known universally as ‘Mabon’, who like Burt was a Lib-Lab MP for thirty-five years.116 The 
miners` leaders of the twentieth century have been adequately covered by historians with 
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some attracting more than one biographer.
117
 An illuminating source for the historian of the 
Victorian era is the Dictionary of Labour Biography. Ten volumes appeared between 1971 
and 2000 under the founding editors with three more volumes appearing in 2003, 2005 and 
2010. The time span of each volume covers the period of industrialisation from the late 
eighteenth century to the present day, while entries range from national personalities to 
regional and local labour leaders.
118
 Particularly in Volumes One and Two there are 
biographies of local mining officials that have otherwise escaped the attention of historians. 
Important to this study, William Johnson, the leader of the Warwickshire Miners Association, 
is covered in Volume Two.
119
 
Biographies whether in the written or visual media, tend to be very personal accounts of 
events. Paradoxically this is both their strength and their weakness. They may not be 
objective and others with similar life experiences most certainly would view the world 
through different eyes, but they do reveal that person’s observation of reality and their 
reaction to it. The value of an eye witness account will never be detracted by the need for the 
historian to treat that content with sensitivity and discrimination. This has been assisted by 
recent developments in the study of oral history
120
 which McIvor sees being transformed 
from a reconstructive to an interpretive mode; 
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practitioners now tending to be more sensitive towards the complexities of 
memory construction, the interrelationship between the present and the past, 
dominant discourses (narratives and messages) embedded within testimonies and 
the inter-subjective nature of the interview itself.
121
 
Both the History Workshop Movement which specifically championed feminist and 
labour history and the Oral History Society had established themselves in Britain in the 
1970’s, both dedicated to revealing the ‘hidden history’ of the less powerful members of 
society through the collection of oral testimony.
122
 Together they have accumulated an 
invaluable bank of autobiographical material that has deepened our understanding of history. 
McIvor for example in his 2007 study of A History of Dust Disease in British Coal Mining 
discovered from a number of interviewees that the machismo nature of working in the pits 
undermined statutory safety legislation.
123
 In basing his study in the Health and Safety of the 
mines McIvor was treading relatively virgin ground. With a few notable exceptions, this 
important area has been neglected by historians and one aim of the study of Warwickshire 
that follows is to help redress this failure. 
The State: Health and Safety in Mines 
The history of Health and Safety regulation has failed to excite or attract historians in 
considerable numbers and unlike the similar omission for coalowners, the reasons for this are 
more problematic. There is an abundance of source material with the debates in parliament 
surrounding every reform recorded in Parliamentary Debates and the resulting reports and 
legislation familiar territory for historical enquiry. Although trade unions were critical of the 
pace of reform, the work of the MAGB in the 1840’s and the MNU from the 1860’s is 
testament to the importance they attributed to government intervention. Similarly social and 
economic reform was allied to the rise of parliamentary democracy that was central to the 
Whig theory of history that dominated historical study in the first half of the 20
th
 century. Yet 
to historians of the coal industry health and safety in the mines has remained at the periphery. 
One can only speculate that it was the challenge of understanding the economic intricacies of 
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coal manufacture and the drama of industrial dispute that exerted too strong an attraction to 
most scholars. 
From Boyd
124
 in 1879 to Bryan
125
 in 1975 many writers simply chronicled change and 
attributed progress to modernisation instigated by enlightened individuals. They saw the 
origins of social reform in the Tory belief in social responsibility
126
 or Liberal radicalism 
based upon the Utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.
127
 In 1958 MacDonagh postulated 
a new model for change that described it as an historical process that did not rely on human 
agency or ideology. The Government only intervened when obliged to do so by exposure to 
circumstances that were ‘intolerable to society.’ It proposed a legislative solution but then was 
attacked by endangered interest which brought political pressure to bear. This resulted in a 
compromised emasculated law that was insufficient to remove the original abuse but gave 
potential for widening State regulation. Inspectors who were forced to uphold an inefficient 
law then moved in to remove problems piecemeal.
128
 This five stage model which specified 
stages of reform from identifying the problem to bureaucratic solution has been criticised by 
Parris in 1960 for its concepts of ‘intolerability’ and ‘History as a process.’129 Parris claimed 
the MacDonagh model only fitted his specialist area of emigrant regulation and reiterated the 
claim that the philosophy of Utilitarianism underpinned any theory of a revolution in 
government. Mills in her 2010 study identified a number of areas where events do not follow 
the theory.
130
 In the 1840’s the Government responded to sustained pressure for reform by 
appointing eminent scientists to investigate explosions and promoted a voluntary diffusion of 
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improved safety knowledge to avoid intervention. Similarly the systematic collection of 
information by Mine Inspectors would not necessarily result in legislation if, as in the 1880’s 
debate on dust in coal mines, the conclusions were controversial.
131
 She stressed the role of 
the individual to explain the more proactive government approach to safety from the 1870’s 
and concluded that ‘historical processes were more malleable to extraneous forces than 
MacDonagh originally envisaged.’132 Nevertheless the MacDonagh theory, advanced in a 
short fifteen page article, remains the starting point for any historian attempting to explain 
government intervention in the 19
th
 century. 
The first – and only – Mine Inspector of the 1840’s was Seymour Tremenheere. He was 
appointed following the passing of the 1842 Coal Mines Act with very limited powers. The 
chronology and particulars of the Act are well covered by Bryan (1975) The Evolution of 
Health and Safety in Mines
133
 and the underlying principle of social control, by Heesom 
(1981) and Kirby (2007).
134
 Heesom cites Shaftsbury`s call for reform to blunt the twin 
dangers of Chartism and Socialism, and Kirby the moral dangers for women and girls 
working with naked men. The life and work of Tremenheere has been documented by his 
biographer Edmonds in an article of 1963 and a book published in 1965.
135
 Lacking any 
technical knowledge in mining, Tremenheere brought to the position his skill as a barrister 
and his experience gained as the first Inspector of Schools. His technique was to visit an area, 
gather information from a variety of sources and then report back to parliament offering his 
recommendations. A contrary view is offered by Page Arnot who cites the evidence of a 
founder member of the Miners’ Association that claimed Tremenheere relied for information 
on colliery officials. Martin Jude
136
 stated that: 
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He only went among the petty officials … the men were not in a single instance 
consulted. He took it for granted that what the agents told him was true and as 
such presented it … for all he knew or cared.137 
Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between these extremes. Tremenheere was against 
compulsion, believing that owners would use this as an excuse to neglect their responsibilities 
for safety. Instead he believed in what Bryan terms ‘the moral and intellectual approach to 
mine safety’138 If an accident was shown to be the result of an owner or manager failing to 
adopt a practice previously recommended by an Inspector and in successful use in other 
collieries, the adverse publicity would prevent a reoccurrence. However he did come to see 
the need for suitably qualified safety inspectors who would receive notification of all mining 
fatalities and offer practical advice on prevention from a position of knowledge. 
The 1850 Coal Mines Act appointed four Mine Inspectors, rising to six in 1851. Unlike 
Tremenheere they had to possess a mining background but not be practising mine agents or 
owners. Their role was now more directed towards safety and they had the power to enter and 
examine coal mines (ironstone mines from 1860), view the working plans of the colliery and 
receive notice of fatal accidents. The work of the Inspectorate in these early years has been 
studies by Job who published articles in 1991 and 1994.
139
 Edmonds (1963), MacDonagh 
(1967) and Bartrip (1982) have also contributed to the debate.
140
 Page Arnot gives a 
withering critique of this early legislation describing the Act of 1850 as ‘a dead letter’ and 
citing Boyd’s description of the Act of 1855 as ‘a master’s measure.’141 Job is more 
understanding of the limited success of the Inspectorate. Even when the number of Inspectors 
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was doubled to twelve in 1855, each had a vast area of responsibility. Job and Edmonds both 
see the model of politeness shown by Inspectors to owners to reflect their very limited power 
rather than an abdication of enforcement. Their only realistic sanction was to prosecute the 
most blatant abuses but this sanction was difficult in coal mining districts where the 
magistrates were drawn from coalowners, their families and friends and juries were 
comprised of men who depended upon those owners for continued employment.
142
 
The subsequent development of the Inspectorate has been charted by Bryan (1975) and 
Mills (2010).
143
 Their differing approach can be gleaned from their titles. Bryan, a former 
Mine Inspector, 
144
 talks of the ‘evolution’ of health and safety regulation. He charts progress 
through the adoption of technological innovation and scientific knowledge. Mills as a 
contrast comes from an academic background and is more critical of the State response:
145
 
Beyond the assumption of progress portrayed in the historical literature lies a 
story of missed opportunities and indifference by the British government that 
resulted in a large number of men dying unnecessarily in pursuit of the nation`s 
mineral wealth.
146
 
Rather than the Bryan technique of explaining the technical advances in different Acts of 
Parliament, Mills stressed the ‘agents of change,’ from the early emphasis on ventilation due 
to the ‘visibility’ of the effects of explosions, the Inspectorate’s ambivalence to pushing for 
increased power, the reasons for the Home Office move to a more proactive stance in the 
1870’s and the need to address the health of miners following the difficulties in recruiting fit 
volunteers for the Boer War campaign.
147
 Both works offer fascinating insights into the 
history of State intervention and tend to complement rather than contradict each other. 
Occupational disease, which occurs over a much longer period of time than the 
immediate impact of an accident, has until recently received scant attention. It lacked the 
                                                 
142
 O. Edmonds and E. Edmonds, ‘An Account of the Founding of HM Inspectorate of Mines and the work of H. 
S. Tremenheere’, British Journal of Industrial Medicine 20 (1963) 211. 
143
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industry 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 2010). 
144
 Sir Andrew Bryan (1893-1988) was the Chief Inspector of Mines 1947 until 1951. 
145
 C. Mills, 'Safety and Health Provision in the British Mining Industry with particular reference to non-ferrous 
metals’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Exeter 2004). 
146
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industry pp. 243. 
147
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industry pp. 243-6. 
 Page | 36 
 
visibility to inspire an ‘agent of change’ and although the consequences of working in the pit 
were immediately obvious to anyone who cared to make an observation of a mining 
community, the medical profession could offer little hope of amelioration. The twin curses of 
miners’ asthma and black spit were noted in the 1842 Children’s Employment Commission148 
and debated in medical journals,
149
 yet as late as 1927 a doctor appointed as a government 
adviser could still talk of the ‘beneficial’ effect of working in coal dust.150 Nystagmus, 
identified in 1875,
151
 received particular attention resulting in a seven article special from the 
British Medical Journal in 1892 to discuss the two rival theories of its cause.
152
 Some 
believed that the oscillating eyeballs was caused by the posture of hewers working in narrow 
seams and forced to look up obliquely at the coal, whereas others blamed the poor 
illumination from working in safety lamp pits. When the latter theory was proven in the early 
20
th
 century, the introduction of electric lighting helped to diminish the disease, although 
reported cases reached their peak in 1922.
153
 In 1943 Rosen published the first classic history 
of miners’ diseases from ancient times and historical attempts to treat them.154 Around the 
time of nationalisation of the mining industry the medical profession again turned their 
attention to miner’s lung disease with Meikeljohn and then Holman looking specifically at 
silicosis from rock removal.
155
 In 1972 Rogan, the Chief Medical Officer of the National 
Coal Board edited Medicine in the Mining Industry 
156
 with chapters covering many common 
ailments facing coal miners. This updated Rosen`s pioneering work of 1943. Since then 
standard works like Benson (1980) and Church (1986) have included sections on 
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occupational disease.
157
 In 2007 McIvor and Johnston’s A History of Dust Disease in British 
Coalmining summarised available literature and added their research based upon oral 
testimony. What emerged was that the competitive masculine culture of the pit undermined 
safety legislation and that production frequently took precedence over considerations of 
health.
158
 
A few post graduate students have also recently turned their attention to the study of 
Health and Safety in the mining industry. In 1981 Bedington looked at the origins of health 
and safety awareness.
159
 She covers the full range of hazardous industries but includes 
sections on both accidents and the occupational diseases of miners. In 1991 Habibi gave a 
safety analysis of industrial accidents with reference to coal mining around the world.
160
 His 
coverage includes the British coal mining industry from the early 19
th
 century through to the 
end of nationalisation, and his analysis of the development of the industry in various 
countries offers interesting areas of comparison. In 1992 Job studied the contribution of the 
Mine Inspectorate to improvements in safety with particular reference to explosions.
161
 
Calvert’s 1970 examination of education and training in the mining industry with special 
reference to the work and influence of the Mine Inspectorate,
162
 offers insight into this 
important area and Mills’ 2004 thesis on health and safety in the non-ferrous metals 
industries
163
 became the basis for her book of 2010. Kitteringham’s 2005 study of health and 
safety on the East Midland coalfield in many ways mirrors this current study, but 
concentrates on the larger Nottingham and Derbyshire coalfields and omits Warwickshire 
altogether.
164
 This thesis follows in their footsteps and will attempt to identify the 
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contribution to health and safety in the mines from the miner, the owner and the State through 
the prism of the Warwickshire coalfield. 
The Warwickshire Coalfield 
Historians of the coal industry have centred their research on the major coalfields of the 
North-East and Yorkshire, South Wales, Nottinghamshire, Lancashire or Scotland. Minor 
coalfields have been relegated to footnotes or simply ignored altogether. In rooting this study 
in Warwickshire, this research is following the lead of historians like Gildart for North Wales 
and Benson for Staffordshire in attempting to remedy this neglect of the smaller coalfields.
165
 
Compared to larger coalfields the literature for Warwickshire is extremely limited. 
Howell, working for the Geological Society, published the first Geology of the Warwickshire 
Coalfield in 1858.
166
 He was the first to prove the existence of the concealed coalfield to the 
west of the coal outcrop where early collieries were sited. A more accessible source is by the 
Warwickshire colliery manager Mitchell who published a chapter on the Warwickshire 
coalfield in 1950 in Birmingham and its Regional Setting.
167
 Local history sources are 
surprisingly weak. The Victoria County History is perhaps the best known but despite 
publishing two Warwickshire volumes in 1908 the coal industry is limited to a description of 
the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.
168
 The historical/geographical literature was pioneered by Redmill 
(1931) and Bunker (1952) who both used census data to show the development of coal 
mining parishes, with Bunker expanding his MA thesis with a detailed account of agricultural 
and industrial development in the 19
th
 century.
169
 In 1982 Grant published a summary of his 
thesis in a chapter in Field and Forest which charted the changing perspectives of the 
Warwickshire coalfield.
170
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The engineering literature tends to be rather specialised. Brown (1906) and (Smith 1907) 
both give general surveys of the Warwickshire coalfield, Kendrick (1896) discusses the 
difficulties of sinking Kingsbury Colliery, Swallow (1903) gives an interesting review of the 
introduction of coal heading machines at Nuneaton Colliery, and Neath (1859) relates coal 
mining to the working of Griff Colliery.
171
 A surprising source is the 1836 Miners Guide by 
Thomas Smith who gives a description of working at Hawkesbury Colliery where he was 
employed as the agent.
172
 There are also Colliery Guardian reports relating to various 
collieries.
173
 
The most useful sources for the Warwickshire coalfield are in the field of economic 
history. In 1937 Court made a detailed reconstruction of Hawkesbury Colliery in the 18
th
 
century from a single source.
174
 White produced both an MA and PhD thesis in 1969 and 
1972 on the Newdigates of Arbury and their Griff Colliery, both in the 18
th
 century.
175
 Grant’s 
doctoral thesis of 1977 The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire coalfield, charts the 
movement of the collieries from the outcrop to the concealed coalfield, but although he is 
excellent on the early period he tends to treat the late nineteenth century to broad general 
analysis.
176
 Wale’s 1986 doctoral thesis studied case studies of entrepreneurs and managers in 
the coal industry 1880 to 1914, one of which was the Griff Colliery Company of 
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Warwickshire.
177
 The most detailed source is Fretwell’s four volumes Warwickshire 
Coalfield, published by Warwickshire Library.
178
 A colliery deputy and industrial 
archaeologist, he spent a lifetime collecting material and writing articles on the Warwickshire 
coalfield. He was only an amateur historian and there are a number of minor historical 
inaccuracies in the body of work, but his analysis of technical detail is excellent.
179
 However 
his negative critical evaluation of the role of William Johnson’s leadership of the WMA will 
be challenged in this study.
180
 
This study of the Warwickshire coalfield makes a significant contribution to the 
historiography of the British coal industry. For most of the period, from 1855 to 1910, 
Warwickshire was part of the four county Midland Division of the Mine Inspectorate together 
with Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire. This area is geographically defined as 
the East Midlands coalfield and is treated as a homogeneous unit, but there are a number of 
indicators that suggest this were not so. In 1888 a committee of employers and workmen 
updated the special rules to comply with the Act of 1887 and produced one set for 
Warwickshire and one to cover the other three counties. Special rules were safety regulations 
that were applicable to a District and supplemented the General rules laid down for all British 
coal mines. Warwickshire deserved particular attention because of the geological 
‘peculiarities of the district,’ 181 that is the unstable characteristics of the roof and working a 
seam up a slope of thirty degrees. Between 1890 and 1909 the Mine Inspectorate published 
the average number of days worked for each coalfield in their district. Taking 250 days to 
represent a typical year of full time employment, Warwickshire achieved this for sixteen of 
the twenty year period, but this falls to nine for Derbyshire and only five and four 
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respectively for Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire. The mean average for the period was 
258 for Warwickshire, 249 for Derbyshire, 233 for Nottinghamshire and 232 for 
Leicestershire.
182
 Why should Warwickshire work on average an extra fortnight a year 
compared to Derbyshire and over a month in comparison to Nottinghamshire and 
Leicestershire? It may well be that the Warwickshire reputation for amicable relations 
between the coalowners and trade union had tangible rewards. Perhaps Kitteringham`s 
decision to omit Warwickshire from his doctoral study relating to the East Midlands coalfield 
is not as inexplicable as it first appeared.
183
 
The aim of the present study is to investigate the engines of change to Health and Safety 
through the equally neglected area of the Warwickshire coalfield in the period of national 
coalfield expansion from 1840 to 1913. The following chapter will utilise all available 
research to provide a history of that coalfield. 
                                                 
182
 Tabulated from the Annual Report of the Inspectors of Mines, Midland Division 1890 to 1909. 
183
 D. Kitteringham, 'Health and Safety in the Collieries of the East Midlands 1850 to 1911’, (Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham 2005). 
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Chapter Two: Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield 
This overview of the development of the Warwickshire coalfield will begin with a 
geological definition of the district. Archaeological evidence dates exploitation from the 
Roman era but written evidence, like most British coalfields, is from the thirteenth century. 
Section two will examine how the coalfield was established. The medieval bell pits were 
replaced by square tree lined shafts by the late sixteenth century when the ‘great mine’ at 
Bedworth employed five hundred men. Section three will then analyse the eighteenth century 
when Warwickshire was a leading innovator of technology. The arrival of steam pumping 
engines in the early eighteenth century proved a false dawn until the development of canals in 
the later part of the century allowed coal to be transported more easily to its markets. Section 
four charts the early nineteenth century which saw the traditional three collieries of Griff, 
Hawkesbury and Wyken, all in the south, being joined by another medium sized colliery of 
Baddesley in the central area. This period also saw the first development of the northern area 
of the coalfield and a number of new collieries in the south, as described in the 1842 
Children’s Employment Commission. Section five explores the late nineteenth century period 
of steady growth across the whole coalfield. Section six analyses why smaller collieries 
survived, sometimes mushrooming in the periods of coal shortages in the early 1870’s and 
early 1890’s, while at other times for the extraction of ironstone or clay. Some like the highly 
specialised Peel Colliery continued to use the pillar and bord system of extraction rather than 
the longwall system favoured by most coal mines.
1
 The rapid expansion from the 1890’s is 
charted in section seven with the sinking of deeper more technologically advanced collieries
2
 
across the prosperous Midland coalfield. 
                                                 
1
 The bord and stall system developed in the North-East. Bords or passageways were driven into the coal, pillars 
of coal were left to support the roof and men worked in small groups in areas known as stalls. The longwall 
system developed in Shropshire. Hewers worked together at an advancing or retreating face, allowing the roof to 
subside where the coal was worked out. For the variants of each system see R. Church, The History of the 
British Coal Industry: Volume Three 1830 to 1914 (Oxford, 1986) pp. 328-39. 
2
 Colliery is the name given to the business. Each colliery contained a number of pits at least two from 1861. 
The downshaft was for man riding and production. The upshaft was for ventilation. Miners often called their 
colliery after the name of the downshaft that they used. For example Newdigate Colliery was called 'Frankies' 
after Francis Pit. 
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Map 2:1 Map of the Warwickshire Coalfield. 
Source: unknown, donated to the author by Fred Phillips of Bedworth. 
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Geology 
The Warwickshire coalfield was situated in the north of the county.
3
 The exposed 
coalfield had the shape of a shepherd’s crook, running north-east from Coventry through 
Bedworth to Nuneaton, then north-west through Atherstone to Tamworth before turning 
south- west to Dosthill. Triangular in shape, it was one of the smallest in Britain with a length 
of only twenty-five miles north to south and a maximum width of nine miles at Nuneaton. 
The exposed coalfield covered an area of eighty square miles and there were great boundary 
faults to the west and to the east. The faults that edge the coalfield occurred long after the 
deposits that became coal were laid down. They were formed by continental drift in the form 
of two enormous land masses moving towards each other and squeezing the land together. 
The uplift occurred over millions of years in a very gradual series of movements instigated by 
earthquakes. The coal measures uplifted at the faults were gradually eroded away to reveal 
the exposed coalfield. These measures consisted of alternative layers of sandstone and shale, 
with beds of coal, ironstone and fireclay. Around Nuneaton there was a bed of limestone at a 
depth of fifty yards. The northern and eastern fringe made up the ‘visible’ or exposed area. 
This was because the coalfield was a trough or basin with the main axis of the syncline 
running north to south. It was not until 1858 that Howell proved the existence of the 
concealed coalfield and encouraged economic exploitation there.
4
 The beds rose on the east 
and north-west edge at an angle of thirty degrees but were flatter towards the centre. To the 
west and the south-west the coal measures passed beneath the Permian and Triassic 
formations known locally as the red rocks.
5
 The eastern margin was indicated by the 
Cambrian rocks which rose from below the coal measures from Atherstone to Bedworth 
where the coal measures passed beneath the red rocks. In the south the beds came together to 
form one seam of twenty to twenty-five feet thickness with a few small partings of dirt and 
fireclay between them. At Bedworth the partings slightly increased and to the north swelled 
out to a distance of many yards. There are fourteen seams but only five were worked in the 
                                                 
3
 Victoria County History; (VCH) Warwickshire Volume Two (London, 1908) pp. 217-26 The VCH was a 
history project began in 1899 in honour of Queen Victoria with the aim of creating an encyclopaedia of each 
English county; See also E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Birmingham 1977) pp. 26-30. 
4
 H. Howell, Geology of the Warwickshire Coalfield (Memoirs of the Geological Survey) (London, 1858) pp. 8-
26. The Geological Survey was the first in the world. Founded in 1835 as part of the Ordanance mapping 
survey, its aim was to make a systematic geological survey of the UK. 
5
 These were red shale, the colour derived from manganese in the rock. See H. Howell, Geology of the 
Warwickshire Coalfield p. 9. 
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19
th
 century: four foot coal; two yard rider and bare coal; ell and slate coal; seven foot coal; 
and bench coal. Writing in 1841 the Children’s Employment Commissioner for 
Warwickshire, Dr Mitchell, noted: 
As in other districts of England the name given to beds of coal are not by any 
means characteristic. Thus the beds called slate coal are not slateier than other 
seams and the bed called the seven foot seam is sometimes not as thick as the two 
yard seam.
6
 
To exploit the mining of the coalfield engineers had to master the geological characteristics of 
the area, in particular the thirty degree dip of the coal seam and the covering of water laden 
Halesowen sandstone. When Mine Inspectors began to record every coalfield fatality from 
1851 Warwickshire emerged with twice the national average of underground haulage deaths 
largely from having to work on a steeply inclined plane.
7
 
In his 1858 geological survey Howell charts the changes in the Warwickshire seams.
8
 He 
noted that from Wyken in Coventry to Hawkesbury in Bedworth the top five seams of two 
yard, bare, rider, ell and slate form the thick Warwickshire coal of some twenty-five feet. 
There is a fireclay seam of a foot deep between the two yard and rider seams and another 
larger blue fireclay seam between the ell and slate seams. The seven foot seam is some forty 
feet below the slate seam. At Griff in Nuneaton a new seam appears that is called the four 
foot above the two yard but now the partings widen out considerably. There is a fifty feet 
parting between the four foot and the two yard, a nine feet parting between the rider and bare, 
seventy feet parting between bare and slate and eighty feet between slate and seven foot. At 
Baddesley in the centre of the coalfield they mined a fourteen foot seam of rider and bare 
coal with just a foot parting between them and a six feet seven foot seam. At Birch Coppice 
they mined a thick seam of rider and bare that was known collectively as double coal, but 
both seams peter out there to be replaced by fireclay at Tamworth to the north. There were a 
couple of seams that Howell could not classify. At Wyken there was a seam known as lady 
                                                 
6
 J. Mitchell, Report on the Employment of Children and Young Persons in the mines of the Warwickshire and 
Leicestershire coalfields, and on the State, Condition and Treatment of such Children and Young Persons, pp 89-
110 of Employment of Children Report (London, 1842) p. 91. 
7
 Fatalities are discussed in Chapter Three. 
8
 H. Howell, Geology of the Warwickshire Coalfield (Memoirs of the Geological Survey) (London, 1858) pp. 
11-17. 
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coal between the slate and seven foot seams and they had mined a seam called smithy at 
Baddesley. In the Coventry-Bedworth area and again at Baddesley ironstone was found 
below the slate seam but not deposited in beds but in ‘balls or nodules of great size.’9 The 
location of a colliery on the coalfield could have a major impact on costs and potential 
profits. 
Emergence of the Warwickshire Coalfield 
The earliest documentary reference to coalmining in Warwickshire is in 1275 
10
 but 
archaeological evidence predates this by a thousand years. Fragments of coal discovered 
during the evacuation of Shakenoak Roman villa near Wilcote in Oxfordshire and analysed 
by the National Coal Board,
11
 pronounced Warwickshire as the most likely source.
12
 The 
Shakenoak site is some forty-five miles from the coalfield but could have been easily reached 
by Roman roads. The main settlement on the coalfield was Mancetter near Atherstone on the 
Watling Street. There were pottery and glass making kilns at Mancetter and pottery and tile 
kilns around Nuneaton indicating that the Romans must have been aware of local coal 
supplies. Outcrops at Grendon and Baddesley a few hundred yards from Watling Street and 
three miles from Mancetter would have provided an ideal accessible source. During the 
medieval period there is a reference to coal being mined at Glascote but the majority of 
evidence is centred on the Nuneaton areas of Chilvers Coton, Haunchwood and Stockingford, 
Grant noted: 
This may imply that Nuneaton had emerged as the centre of the Warwickshire 
coalfield or merely reflect the biased survival of documentary evidence when so 
much comes from the accounts of Nuneaton Priory.
13
 
                                                 
9
 H. Howell, Geology of the Warwickshire Coalfield (Memoirs of the Geological Survey) (London, 1858) p. 19. 
10
 Victoria County History; Warwickshire Volume Two (London, 1908) p. 217. The VCH gives the date of 1275; 
Nef inaccurately gives 1276 but this may be a printer’s error. See E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the 
Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 1977) p. 46. 
11
 Information from NCB deputy and industrial archaeologist Laurence Fretwell, interview February 1995. 
12
 A. Brodribb, Excavation at Shakenoak Farm near Wilcote, Oxfordshire. Part One sites A and D. Part Two 
sites B and H (private publication 1968 and 1971); and E.Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire 
Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 1977) pp. 38-43. 
13
 E. Grant, ‘Changing Perspectives of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, in G. Slater and F. Jarvis (eds.), .Field and 
Forest. (Norwich, 1982) The first record of coal mining in Warwickshire is from the Nuneaton Priory accounts. 
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The main method of production was working at the outcrop on the exposed coalfield in a 
succession of short life shallow bell pits (see Drawing 2:1 below) whose depths were 
governed by the length of a ladder. 
 
Drawing 2:1 Bell Pits 
Source: Fretwell The Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Four p 59.
14
 
Nef asserts that there was a revolution in the use of fuel in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries due 
to a shortage in timber supply. Throughout the British coalfields a new breed of coal master 
and miner emerged ‘who changed not only the scale of operation but also changed the 
organisation, finance, labour force and status of the industry.’15 He claimed production in 
Warwickshire rose from around 2,000 tons in 1550 to 70,000 tons in 1700. However Grant 
claimed that Nef confused potential for actual production and speculates an output of 30,000 
tons annually, dropping to 20,000 tons in the absence of a major colliery working at 
Coventry, Bedworth or Griff. 
16
 There is plenty of evidence of increased mining activity as 
shaft work replaced outcrop and bell pits by the late 17
th
 century but less evidence of 
financial success or sustained output in this period. Grant discovered seventeen documented 
                                                 
14
 Laurence Fretwell was a colliery deputy and local industrial archaeologist. He had spent a lifetime collecting 
material on the Warwickshire coalfield and generously made his archive available to me in addition to acting as 
my technical advisor. His work was published by Warwickshire Library in four volumes shortly before his 
death. 
15
 J. Nef, Rise of the British Coal Industry (London, 1932) p. 327. 
16
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1977) p. 146. 
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areas of working from Wyken in the south to Dordon in the north along the exposed coalfield, 
and postulates a further five sites of likely mining activity in the 17
th
 century. All pits were 
confined to the narrow outcrop and the intensity of mining decreased as one travelled north.
17
 
In the south much of the land had been owned by the Coventry Priory but after the 
dissolution of the monasteries part was purchased by Sir Thomas White’s Charity18 and 
administered by Coventry Corporation. The city leased the three mines at Hawkesbury, Sowe 
and Wyken as one enterprise to interested entrepreneurs, and the proximity of Coventry 
ensured a steady demand for coal and willing ‘undertakers’ to work the mines. Between 1595 
and 1682 eleven leases were issued but the short life of many demonstrates that few were 
successful. Some lessees were important industrial figures like Huntingdon Beaumont 
(1595)
19
 and his son Sir Thomas (1611), who were from a prominent Leicestershire mining 
family; Earl of Dover (1636) who had ran successful lead mines in Derbyshire and Sir John 
Winter (1671) who was a noted coalmaster from the Forest of Dean.
20
 Such undertakers had 
to balance the high rent demands of Coventry Corporation against possible production after 
their initial outlay and the ongoing heavy drainage costs. A 1674 inventory of Hawkesbury 
lists three engine houses, an animal house with an old rag wheel and a counting house for 
domestic equipment, all valued at £133.
21
 This was used by the next operators, Evans and 
Broome, who received the most favourable lease of the century and invested between 
£14,000 and £17,000, yet even they could not sustain a profit. When the Coventry mines 
closed in 1688 a new lease was not issued for thirty years. 
At Bedworth the ‘great mine’ which employed 500 was abandoned by the Beaumonts in 
1618 but revived by Bigge and Robinson in the 1620’s.22 By 1630 they had reached an output 
of 20-30,000 tons and are described by Nef as only one of a dozen collieries of this size in the 
                                                 
17
 E.Grant, ‘Changing Perspectives of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, in G. Slater and F. Jarvis (eds.), Field and 
Forest (Norwich, 1982) p. 328. 
18
 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Sir Thomas White (1492-1567) was a cloth merchant, founder of 
St John’s College, Oxford and civic benefactor. His charity, still active today, allows pupils from King Henry 
V111 School, Coventry – and others in Bristol and Reading – to obtain scholarships to his Oxford college which 
was dedicated to the saint for Merchant Tailors. 
19
 The date notes the year of the lease. 
20
 ODNB: Huntingdon Beaumont (1561-1624), Sir Thomas Beaumont (1555-1614), Earl of Dover (1636-1708), 
Sir John Winter (1600-1676). See also A. White, Men and Mining in Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) pp. 12-24, 
covers Huntingdon Beaumont and the Earl of Dover. 
21
 Coventry Council Meetings (28 April 1675) p 235,CRO A14 6. 
22
 Victoria County History: Warwickshire Volume Two (London, 1908) pp. 26-30. 
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country.
23
 They invested £4,000 on two pumping engines and a sough
24
 and had an annual 
outlay of £2,500 on labour and equipment to drain the pits.
25
 Grant claims; ‘their success was 
due to hard work, ability and sharp practice.’ 26 Like the Beaumonts they tried to buy out the 
opposition and were not averse to using the law to gain access to coal seams and in 1631 to 
resort to blatant sabotage to flood rival Coventry mines.
27
 Production problems arose in the 
1630’s when they suffered ‘quicksand’ after heavy rain and were forced to employ thirty men 
on ten pumping engines night and day. They were in financial difficulties and when Fuller 
visited the town in 1662 the mines were depressed.
28
 
Griff to the north was only slightly less important than Bedworth, yet Grant estimates that 
between 1599 and 1710 the colliery was only in operation for thirty-nine years.
29
 A number of 
entrepreneurs initiated production but from the mid 17
th
 century the landowning Newdigate 
family dominated coal production. Their fifth entry into coal mining (1700-09) was an 
attempt to create a large well capitalised colliery but the results were disappointing. The well 
planned colliery ran two miles along the outcrop and used imported Shropshire miners to 
teach the new longwall method of production.
30
 White calculated that one hundred and 
twelve were employed, which included forty-two miners and forty-six waggonmen.
31
 A 
£2,000 initial outlay was supplemented with a £2,360 water wheel in 1708. A 1705 map of 
the site shows that drainage was tackled by soughs, horse gin, barrel gin, water wheel and 
wind power.
32
 In 1705 16,000 tons were raised, but an underground collapse the following 
year led to thirty weeks of lost production and an estimated net loss of £!,200. There is no 
                                                 
23
 J. Nef, Rise of the British Coalfield (London, 1932) p. 360. 
24
 A sough is a drainage channel dug into a hill. 
25
 State Papers Domestic SP16/204/83 and SP14/133/69 PRO. 
26
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1977) p. 88. 
27
 State Papers Domestic SP 16/204/85 PRO, and A. Lawrence, Bedworth (Coventry, 1951) pp. 33-4. 
28
 T. Fuller, The History of the Worthies of England (London, 1662) p. 403. 
29
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1977) pp. 93-106. 
30
 Arbury household cash book, WCRO CR 136/V 56 53. 
31
 A. White, 'Sixty Years of Coalmining Enterprise on the North Warwickshire Estate of the Newdigates of 
Arbury 1680-1740’, (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Birmingham 1969) quoted E. Grant, 'The Spatial 
Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 1977) p. 
104. 
32
Newdigate Arbury Accounts, WCRO CR 136/C 147. These are different types of drainage equipment. 
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evidence that Sir Richard
33
 made the expected fortune from his mine and when he died in 
1709 he left his son the outstanding debts on his estate of £56,000.
34
 There were no other 
major collieries north of Griff but there is some evidence of sporadic mining along the 
outcrop. 
Stutteringly by 1710 a Warwickshire coalfield had emerged. This was created by the new 
coalmining landed families like the Newdigates, Astons, Pagets and Stratfords; local 
businessmen like Bigge, Robinson, Collins and Potter and the arrival of outside adventurers 
like the Beaumonts, the Earl of Dover and Sir John Winter.
35
 All had to master two major 
production problems. The steep one-in-three dip meant that more pits were needed in 
Warwickshire than in other coalfields. They progressed along the narrow exposed coalfield in 
short life pits that were exhausted after a year or so. The deepest shaft was only 140 feet at 
the Newdigate colliery of 1700-09. The second problem was that of drainage. The large 
number of pits required proportionately more drainage equipment, and the need for more 
expensive drainage methods. Building a sough or tunnel was expensive to set up, but cheap to 
operate once the tunnel was built, yet limited to shallow pits of twenty-five feet depth. 
Windlass power which utilised human labour on a barrel pump or rag and chain pump, was 
expensive in wages, horse gins were expensive in feed and water wheels had high 
construction costs. Given such high fixed and operating costs, Warwickshire coal was more 
expensive than elsewhere. 
The 18
th
 Century: Steam Pumping Engines and Canals 
The arrival and spread of steam pumping in the early 18
th
 century was traditionally seen 
as an important successful phase of development.
36
 The first Newcomen engine arrived at 
Griff in 1714 and a second in 1717 or 1718. They spread through the southern part of the 
                                                 
33
 ODNB: Sir Richard Newdigate (1644-1710). 
34
 Newdigate Arbury Accounts, WCRO CR 136/C 1978. Yet Grant claims this was the ‘zenith of expertise for an 
inland coalfield.’ E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Birmingham 1977) p. 101. See also A. White, Men and Mining in Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) 
pp. 25-35; Sir Richard Newdigate, a brief summary of his MA thesis, and D. Fordham, Coal and Water: an 
Industrial History of Arbury (private publication, 2010) copy Nuneaton Library, pp. 33-60. 
35
 For additional detail see Victoria County History: Warwickshire Volume Two (London, 1908) pp. 217-26. 
36
 See E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of Birmingham 1977) pp. 160-81; A. White, Men and Mining in Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) pp. 25-45; J. 
Harris, ‘The Employment of Steam Power in the 18th century’, History 52 (1967) 133-40; J. Allen, ‘Some early 
Newcomen engines and the legal disputes surrounding them’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society 41 (1968-
69) 181-201. 
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coalfield and by 1734 there were twelve – three at Griff, three at Hawkesbury and six at 
Wyken – though they never worked at the same time. Although they could easily drain the 
Warwickshire pits, entrepreneurs soon discovered that they could be an expensive liability. 
Steam engines were expensive to produce, involved a high carriage cost from Coalbrookdale 
and the expense of erecting an engine house, shaping a beam and assembly. On top of the 
high cost of spare parts additional costs included the payment to the patent holder until it 
expired in 1733 and the high consumption of coal. As Court illustrates; ‘an engine might kill 
a weak mine, not save it.’37 Two Staffordshire entrepreneurs, Parrot and Sparrow, were 
responsible for introducing steam to Warwickshire.
38
 They leased Griff from the Newdigates 
and soon expanded into Hawkesbury and Wyken. They acted as middlemen for the holders of 
the patent and the owners of flooded pits and used their influence to create a monopoly 
position for themselves. Despite their partnership they soon fell out over perceived advantage 
from the engines and spent much of the time suing each other and being sued by owners of 
collieries that had become flooded or sabotaged during the protracted litigation. Between 
1730 and 1744 the three largest collieries closed. Sir Richard Newdigate died in 1727
39
 and 
on the advice of a commissioned respected local mining surveyor and engineer, Griff closed 
in 1730. Stonier Parrot, proprietor of Hawkesbury, was declared bankrupt in 1732 and when a 
creditor tried to work the pits he soon closed it declaring it ‘a losing and prejudicial 
undertaking.’40 Similarly when Henry Green, proprietor of Wyken since 1718, died in 1744 
with debts of £15,000, his heir closed the pits and a new lease was not issued until 1789.
41
 
The southern Warwickshire coalfield had collapsed, but the north continued with short life 
shallow pits with little evidence of change. According to Grant: ‘The root problem was a 
technological one: too much technology on one hand and not enough on the other.’42 Steam 
power allowed mining at greater depth, but the increased output lacked the transport to get 
coal to customers. 
                                                 
37
 W. Court, ‘A Warwickshire Colliery in the 18th century’, Economic History Review 7 (1936-37) 221-8. 
38
 A. White, Men and Mining in Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) pp. 37-48. 
39
 This is the son of the Sir Richard that had died 1710. 
40
 M . Rowlands, ‘Stonier Parrot and the Newcomen engine’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society 41 (1968-
69) 49-67. 
41
 Coventry Council Meeting Book, CRO A14/K pp 477-600. 
42
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1977) p. 179. 
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It was in the late 18
th
 century that turnpikes and more importantly, canals solved this 
transportation dilemma, and with the adoption of the more efficient Watt steam engine for 
both pumping and winding, the Warwickshire coalfield at last emerged as a viable economic 
venture.
43
 Production increased due to more medium depth pits of 150 to 750 feet although 
few reached 500 feet, and by 1800 the three principal collieries of Griff, Hawkesbury and 
Wyken were for the first time in simultaneous and successful operation.
44
 The untarmaced 
rutted tracks that passed for roads were difficult to use in the summer months and impassable 
in winter. Coalmasters invested in turnpikes and in 1755-56 the Himley-Nuneaton-Coventry 
road was opened, with a link to Polesworth and Tamworth by 1760. But it was canals that 
were ideal for the transport of bulky cargo like coal. The first section of the Coventry canal 
was opened in 1771 between Coventry and Atherstone, and the second section to Fazely 
(Tamworth) in 1790. It was a difficult and expensive undertaking with a cost of £5,395 per 
mile compared to the Warwickshire average of £3,325.
45
 The Oxford canal moved south from 
its junction at Hawkesbury, reaching Banbury in 1778 and Oxford in 1790. Coalmasters 
invested even more in canals than turnpikes. Sir Roger Newdigate of Griff invested £2,000 in 
the Oxford canal and £1,000 in the Coventry canal. Richard Parrott of Hawkesbury invested 
£1,000 in the Oxford canal, and lesser coalmasters like England of Polesworth and Ludford 
of Ansley, smaller sums. The joining of the Birmingham-Fazely canal to the Coventry canal 
in 1790 introduced competition from the cheaper and more popular Staffordshire coal. The 
perceived superiority of Staffordshire coal has little basis in fact as the National Coal Board 
classified both very similar.
46
 But although it failed to dominate the local market gaining only 
10 per cent penetration in Coventry by 1806-07, it did penetrate the traditional Warwickshire 
market of the hinterland of the Oxford canal and prevented the expected boom.
47
 
                                                 
43
 A. White, Men and Mining in Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) p. 49-62. 
44
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1977) p. 181. 
45
 E. Ardeyfic, 'The Development of Canals in Warwickshire and their Influence on the Social and Economic 
Geography of the County’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 1974); and E. Grant, ';The 
Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield,.' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 
1977) p. 185. 
46
 Information obtained from Laurence Fretwell. 
47
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1977) p. 195 
 Page | 53 
 
Hawkesbury was the first colliery to recover.
48
 On the death of Stonier Parrott in 1744 the 
colliery passed to his lawyer John Bourne and his son Richard Parrott and the colliery was in 
production in 1748. The partners bought up adjoining land and leased further parcels from the 
Charity Trust. When Richard Parrott died in 1774 he was succeeded by his brother, Francis 
who acted as managing director. They raised £5,000 to modernise the colliery in the 1770’s 
and in 1776 a further £4,500 to purchase from Boulton and Watt what was reputed to be the 
most powerful engine in the country. Its fame was such that it was known as the ‘Bedworth 
engine.’49 The success of the company was apparent in 1791 when they purchased the first 
Boulton and Watt steam winding engine in Warwickshire. They bought another engine in 
1792 and a third in 1796. Capital development for land purchase and technological 
development was gained by widening the partnership to include Thomas Wheildon a 
Staffordshire potter, George Taylor a local coal merchant and reverend John Freyhough from 
Newcastle-under-Lyme.
50
 
Sir Roger Newdigate 
51
 re-established a colliery at Griff in 1779.
52
 He was MP for 
Oxford University and involved in the total rebuilding and refurbishment of his Arbury home. 
His estate stretched one and a half miles along the outcrop in Nuneaton. After investing 
heavily in turnpikes and canals to stimulate demand, he spent six years employing experts to 
ensure the latest advances in mining engineering was available. John Barnes, a Newcastle 
mining engineer, examined the former workings and drew up plans of operation in 1770-71.
53
 
He ordered two Newcomen engines from Caron Iron Works, Falkirk at a cost of £658 and 
£579, and two more in 1791 and 1793.
54
 The first coal was raised in 1776 but there were a 
number of underground difficulties before full production could be achieved. Barnes 
reckoned that 500 tons a month was needed just to cover operating costs. The initial centre of 
                                                 
48
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, p. 199; A. White, Men and Mining in 
Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) pp. 50-55; Victoria County History: Warwickshire (London, 1908) p. 224. 
49
 Birmingham Reference Library, Boulton and Watt collection, Box 6 bundle ‘Bedworth.’ 
50
 L.Fretwell, The Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Four (Warwick, c2005) pp. 70-80. 
51
 ODNB: Sir Roger Newdigate (1719-1896) and A. White, Men and Mining in Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) 
pp. 57-62. 
52
 E. Grant, 'The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1977) pp. 214-16. 
53
 Arbury Estate Records, Griff Colliery, WCRO CR 136/C/626 and 640. White asserted that Sir Roger saw the 
failure of his father and grandfather as a lack of strategic planning and failure to stimulate customer demand. A. 
White, Men and Mining in Warwickshire (Coventry, 1970) p. 57. 
54
 Arbury Estate Records, Griff Colliery, WCRO CR 136/C/633-4. 
 Page | 54 
 
operation was Collycroft on the Bedworth border, where it used the traditional longwall 
extraction up the dip. In 1788 a new centre of operation was established to the north at Griff 
Hollows and it remained there until a further move north to Griff in the 1850’s. 
Edward Inge and John Stanton resurrected Wyken colliery in 1789 when they took a 
lease from Coventry council and further leases from other local landowners. Although they 
invested over £16,000 on the enterprise success was short lived. In 1810 they had a law suit 
brought against them by the neighbouring Hawkesbury colliery, who claimed they were 
extracting coal beyond their boundary. When this was proven, they closed the Bye Pit and 
paid out of court compensation. This coupled with the depression of 1815 led them to sublet 
to James and Hall in 1820. They subsequently sank the deepest shaft in Warwickshire, a 734 
ft drainage shaft, but went bankrupt in the process. Finally in the 1820’s a small colliery was 
established at Wyken that was to prove more successful and lasting. The only other colliery 
of note in the south was Bedworth Charity which took out a lease in 1776, but it used the old 
method of a large number of shallow pits at the outcrop.
55
 
In the central part of the coalfield the main landowners were the Stratford/Geast/Dugdale 
family of Merevale Hall. Richard Geast married the Stratford heiress in 1749 and changed his 
name to Dugdale in 1799. This family owned coal bearing land in Baddesley, Merevale, 
Bentley, Mancetter, Ansley and Nuneaton. In the 18
th
 century they dominated as leasees but 
there is no evidence of direct involvement until they took over the running of Baddesley 
colliery in 1810 and developed it into a lasting medium sized colliery. Other landowners like 
Aston, Ludford and Paget also leased land to those working the Stratford-Dugdale land. John 
Fletcher, a Derbyshire coal master, leased land from the Stratfords at Ansley and Mancetter in 
1729. By 1747 his main centre was at Ansley where he sank a 165 foot engine shaft and 
worked a large number of short life shallow pits along the outcrop. In 1766 he was succeeded 
by Barker who sank a 240 foot engine pit before moving his operations to Nuneaton. Centred 
at Haunchwood this enterprise was larger but still worked shallow pits. Barker went bankrupt 
in 1780 and although Richard Geast blamed this on his management, the new leasee retained 
him as manager. By 1787 he had recovered his fortunes and began leasing Lowsey Meadow 
Colliery (now Bermuda village) in Nuneaton. Between these blocks of land was a colliery 
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leased from the Aston family and run by Alexander Donald. All that is known of this is that it 
had a Bolton and Watt engine in 1797 but it was to develop into Nuneaton Colliery in the 19
th
 
century.
56
 North of Nuneaton there were small mine workings at Oldbury and Mancetter but 
the medium sized Oakover Colliery was not established until the early 19
th
 century. At 
Baddesley there were a number of short life shallow pits from 1729 but it was the arrival of 
the Bamberry Company in 1790 which saw it develop into a profitable medium sized colliery. 
It had a 300 foot engine shaft and a railway to the Coventry canal.
57
 
By the end of the 18
th
 century all three of the major southern collieries of Griff, 
Hawkesbury and Wyken were in simultaneous production, and were joined by a colliery at 
Baddesley in the central area.
58
 These employed the latest steam technology for both 
pumping and winding and had access to the canal system to distribute their produce to a 
wider market. Smaller single shaft butty
59
 run pits that utilised more primitive technology, 
existed alongside of these but left no documentary records. It is difficult to analyse output in 
this period with the lack of a continual series of colliery production figures. Grant estimates 
output by grouping collieries into rank size and using the output for each category and actual 
figures from large collieries if known. He claims output rose from 40,000 tons in 1750 to 
145,000 tons by 1800 and 250,000 tons in 1830.
60
 
Early 19
th
 Century: Expansion across the coalfield 
At the dawn of the 19
th
 century the Warwickshire coalfield was dominated by the four 
collieries of Griff, Hawkesbury, Wyken and Baddesley and had a national reputation as a 
leader in the latest technology.
61
 All the main collieries used similar technology. All pits were 
worked by butties who received a charter per ton of coal brought to the foot of the shaft. 
These were miners who possessed a little capital and employed men and provided the tools to 
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work the coal. It was the owner’s responsibility to sink the shaft and prepare the incline and 
roadways. In 1841 Dr Mitchell described his descent down the mine at Griff. He descended 
what he terms the Slate Colliery by standing in a skip with the agent and ground bailiff: 
As we got near the bottom of the shaft the rush of water within the brickwork was 
distinctly audible. It is allowed to go to the foot of the shaft and then it rapidly 
rushes downwards in a torrent along the side of the mainway to a much lower 
level. 
The shaft bottom is on the side of a hill – ‘steeper than the slated roof of a house’ – which led 
down to the workings. He notes that ‘several years ago’ horses were forced to drag tubs up 
the slope but that now this task is performed by a jig chain run by a steam engine on the 
surface. As the jig chain lowered the skip down the shaft it also lowered empty tubs down the 
incline. At the roadway boys or ponies transported coal from the face to the foot of the incline 
where working in reverse, the jig chain raised full tubs in stages to the surface.
62
 
 
Drawing 2:2 A Typical Colliery of 1842. 
Source: Fretwell Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Four p 105. 
In the early 1830’s Griff Colliery sank two new drainage shafts and in 1836 and 1837 two 
new shafts were sank to the slate coal seam.
63
 It was this colliery that Dr Mitchell chose to 
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descend in 1841 to report the typical workings of the coalfield.
64
 An illustration of this can be 
seen in drawing 2:2 above. In 1810 the Hawkesbury Colliery consisted of eight pits stretching 
from Bulkington Road in the north down to just north of the Hawkesbury canal junction 
where the Coventry canal joined the Oxford canal. By 1833 it is George Wheildon, son of 
Thomas, a 1763 investor in Parrott`s colliery, who owns Hawkesbury Colliery and is 
complaining of an unfair assessment for poor rate at the Foleshill Union.
65
 Thomas Smith, 
author of The Miner’s Guide of 1836, was the agent for Hawkesbury.66 He stated the shafts 
were eight foot diameter and brick lined. The longwall method was used with each seam 
taken separately. Lumps and cobbles of coal were taken with all the slack put into the gob
67
 
except for that which was required to run the engine. He noted that there was a problem with 
gob fires. The usual butty system was employed to run the mine but with full time sinkers. 
Hawkesbury was working an almost continuous twenty foot of coal. An abandonment 
drawing that was dated April 1848 and redrawn as map 2:2, revealed that the mine had two 
collieries either side of the Coventry Canal.
68
 Hawkesbury Colliery shows four shafts, a 
whimsy and offices, and had its own canal basin. Neighbouring Home Colliery was the site 
of Wheildon’s house, and showed three shafts, a whimsy, a foundry, a smithy shop, a 
reservoir and a number of miner’s cottages. 
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Map 2:2 Hawkesbury Colliery 1848 
Source: Taken from NCB map EM 1080.  
Wyken New Colliery was sunk in 1823 under the new ownership of the Whitten family. 
A map of 1829, produced as Drawing 2:3 below, shows the shafts; a drainage shaft with a 
pumping engine and two pickle pot boilers, a downcast for production winding and an upcast 
for ventilation, which was also equipped for emergency production and man riding.
69
 It 
shows an underground railway and a sketch of a pumping engine in one corner. A new shaft is 
being sunk and a heading to link it with Basin pit. Number One is shown to a depth of 465 
feet and Number Two to 510 feet. Coal was extracted by bord and stall, although it later 
converted to the longwall system.The former system developed in the North-East where 
bords or passageways were driven into the coal, pillars of coal were left to support the roof 
and small groups of men worked in areas known as stalls. The latter longwall system 
developed in Shropshire and was popular in the East Midlands. Hewers worked together at an 
advancing or retreating face, allowing the roof to collapse when coal was worked out.
70
 There 
is a brickyard at the Oxford Canal curve. Hadfield notes that the quarter mile private Wyken 
canal ‘was probably built in 1840 as a result of an agreement of 13 November 1829.’71 From 
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the Colliers’ Coal Accounts that run from 1845 to 1852 it is apparent that the colliery 
employed around 120 men.
72
 
 
Drawing 2:3 Wyken Colliery 1829: architectural details from plan CRO Ass 207. 
Source: Fretwell Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Four p 98. 
Baddesley Colliery in the central area of the coalfield came under the direct ownership of 
the Dugdale family in 1810. They sank at least four pits but all underground workings were 
connected and the skip
73
 stopped at different levels to service the working of different seams. 
The first eye witness account is from Dr James Mitchell of the 1841 Childrens’ Employment 
Commission. He describes three Baddesley pits, one employing forty to fifty men, another of 
nearly forty men and a third being sunk. Boys worked from 6 am to 7 pm with half an hour 
for lunch. They were employed guiding horses, sweeping roadways and putting slack into the 
gob. He also describes a unique safety device: ‘There are great iron umbrellas to which are 
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attached chains with hoops, in all these pits over the heads of people as they descend.’74 (See 
Drawing 2:4 below) Fretwell claims that this is the only record of such a safety device being 
used anywhere.
75
 They are certainly not mentioned elsewhere in Warwickshire. 
 
Drawing 2:4 Baddesley Colliery Safety Device. 
Source: Fretwell Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Two p 59. 
In 1810 Wyken Colliery had a law suit brought against them by the neighbouring 
Hawkesbury colliery, who claimed they were extracting coal beyond their boundary. A hand 
drawn map produced for the court case provides an insight into mining at that time.
76
 Below 
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the Inge and Stanton pits at Wyken were a string of single shaft collieries possibly named 
after the butties that ran them: Pickard’s Colliery; Harrisons Colliery; Caggs Colliery; Biggs 
Colliery and Neal’s Colliery. Pickard`s colliery was an ironstone mine and had a foundry on 
site. It was owned by James Pickard, the descendant from an old Huguenot family, whose 
father James had invented a crank used to adopt a Newcomen engine to wind coal as well as 
pump water. James Watt had already solved rotary motion with his first winding engine 
erected at Parrott’s Hawkesbury colliery in 1777. Biggs colliery was closed in 1813 when 
Biggs was killed in a mining accident, but it was later worked by Harris of Craven Colliery. 
Caggs moved to Wilnecote in Tamworth where he established the medium sized Kettlebrook 
colliery in the 1820’s.77 There must be many more of these unrecorded and unremembered 
butty pits of this time across the coalfield. 
At Coventry new collieries developed near the old Wyken site. Victoria Colliery was 
situated inside the northern semi-circular loop of the Oxford canal before it joined the 
Coventry canal at Hawkesbury Junction. Grant stated that Victoria Colliery was established 
before 1833.
78
 The name derives from a nearby farm and it may have been that there was a 
connection to the accession of Queen Victoria who came to the throne in 1837. There were 
three shafts; an upcast to a depth of 349 feet, a downcast production shaft also of 349 feet 
with a single deck cage capable of holding a standard eight hundredweight tub, and a deeper 
drainage shaft. Coal was twenty-three feet thick and Victoria extracted using the longwall 
method along a hundred yard face. The three faces that followed on from each other, 
extracted nineteen feet of coal.
79
 Tom Mann, the first General Secretary of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, was born in a cottage near the pit where his father worked as a clerk. 
Between 1856 and 1860 at the age of ten to fourteen, he worked underground for a miner 
who was dinting
80
 a ventilation road. Stripped to the waist, he crawled on hands and knees in 
the darkness along a passage three foot wide and three foot high, dragging a sledge loaded 
with dirt and coal by a leather thong fastened around his waist. He wrote in his Memoirs: 
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‘Many a time did I actually lie down groaning as a consequence of the heavy strain on the 
line, especially when the road was wet and clayey.’81 It was owned by Thomas Troughton of 
Coventry. In 1870 spontaneous combustion caused an underground fire and stanks, or sealing 
walls, were unable to contain it. When canaries could not survive being taken down the pit 
bottom and the colliery was closed.
82
 
To the south east of Victoria lay Wyken Colliery and a little beyond that, Craven Colliery. 
Named after the Lord Lieutenant of Warwickshire, Lord Craven, the colliery was sunk in 
1837 to a depth of 255 feet. The Mitchell Report of 1841 talks of two recent deaths from 
explosions in the Harris colliery at Wyken.
83
 Hunt lists the owner as M. Harris in 1854 and 
W. S. and J. Harris from 1855. Little is known of M. Harris but his two sons were both born 
in the Black Country, W. S. in Sedgley in 1818 and J. Harris at Bilston, now part of 
Wolverhampton, in 1824.
84
 
At Bedworth a second long life pit was Charity Colliery although it continued to follow 
the old method of sinking shallow pits along the outcrop. Sunk in 1776 by Schofield on land 
belonging to the Nicholas Chamberlaine Charity,
85
 it is shown on the 1795 Yates map as five 
shafts around Rye Piece.
86
 By the 1820’s it had passed into the ownership of Peter Williams 
who sank two shafts at the Galga and in 1839 Charity Number Three. The 1835 Pigot’s 
Directory 
87
 lists Peter Williams as owner of both Charity and Haunchwood Colliery in 
Nuneaton. The Galga closed in the late 1840’s but was replaced by new pits sunk at Coalpit 
Fields and Charity Number Four. All three were working in the 1850’s but White’s Directory 
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of Warwickshire 1850 has the owner as Mrs Caroline Williams, who is also described as a 
blue and red brick tile manufacturer, suggesting that her husband had died. 
There was an increase in mining activity in Bedworth in the 1830’s and the two 
established collieries of Hawkesbury and Charity were joined by two more. Grove Colliery is 
mentioned in the Griff account book of 1832 
88
 and was owned by Thomas Ball Troughton 
who also owned Victoria Colliery in Coventry. When Mitchell visited in 1841 it was stated 
that the three shaft colliery once employed a hundred men but now employed twenty. 
Mitchell interviewed John Lawrence, a miner at Grove. He said the coal was five feet thick 
and brought down by gunpowder after holing a yard and a half. He describes the daily wage 
as ‘3/- and a quart of ale worth five pence, also a candle every night. The candles are sixteen 
to the pound and 12 cwt of coal a month.’89 He described a boy of eight who worked as a 
trapper,
90
 a boy of twelve who guided tubs up the incline, and that some boys at fourteen but 
most at sixteen take up the pick and become a hewer. He had worked eleven days in the last 
fortnight with ‘only one day at play.’ Miners enjoyed bare knuckle boxing and would risk a 
fine to attend. Lawrence noted that the butty would not be fined if there was a stack of coal 
for sale.
91
 Most sales were local landsale, with the occasional boat on the canal. Grove must 
have closed by 1849 as it does not appear in White’s Directory of 1850 and the abandonment 
plan of 1859 simply says ‘long closed.’ Grant lists Mount Pleasant Colliery as opening before 
1838 and Hunt lists it up to 1855.
92
 Fretwell states the owner, William Thomas, leased land 
from Christ Church College, Cambridge, and sank two shafts. The blacksmiths shop was 
situated near the upcast shaft. He also leased adjoining land for a stockyard and timber yard. 
A pub, The Bear and Ragged Staff, was situated in front of the pit.
93
 A third colliery at 
Collycroft appears in the 1841 Report although it is not known when it originated. It was 
owned by William Wilson and situated opposite the Royal Oak pub. Two Collycroft miners 
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from there gave evidence to Mitchell. They stated that there were some boys of seven or eight 
years old working on the bank to carry picks to the blacksmith shop for sharpening, but none 
less than ten years of age in the pit. The men work by the stint
94
 and were paid so much per 
ton depending upon the quality of coal sent up the shaft. There was no problem of firedamp 
but a serious danger of choke damp. ‘Sometimes a man needs three candles and if he cannot 
keep one of them alight, it is time to come away.’95 Later in 1850 the Mine Inspector reported 
the death of a ten year old on his first shift in this mine due to poor ventilation.
96
 At that time 
fifty worked there. Hunt has the colliery listed up to 1857. 
Grant lists an Old Nuneaton Colliery pre 1850. Peter Williams who owned Charity 
Colliery in Bedworth, leased land there in the 1830’s and a sales document of 1844 lists brick 
making and colliery buildings.
97
 There was a foreman’s cottage, four drying sheds, an engine 
house, seven ovens, a blacksmiths shop, a cow shed, two ninety feet deep shafts and fourteen 
acres of reserves. The owner was Thomas Astley, a local landowner, but there is no evidence 
of a successful sale.
98
 
Although the Dugdales dominated the central coalfield they were not the only 
entrepreneurs. North of Nuneaton Oakover leased land in 1801 from the Dugdale family to 
mine at Mancetter. The following year he leased adjoining land from the Ludfords of Ansley 
Hall.
99
 In its day this was one of the largest collieries in the county but it left few written 
records and no visible scar. It had no slag heap which suggests skip winding and the sorting 
of coal underground. Archaeological evidence reveals that it had over forty pits but five 
belonged to the earlier collieries of Fletcher and Barber. It worked the four coal seams of four 
foot, slate, seven foot and rider. A map of 1839 drawn by a Dugdale engineer shows the 
colliery as abandoned but Hunt has it listed until 1856. Thomas Barber was a Nuneaton 
coalmaster who in the late 18
th
 century obtained several leases from small Baddesley 
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landowners. He went bankrupt in 1787 but managed to hold onto one lease to mine four foot 
coal on land near Baddesley Hall which stood on Hill Top. In 1821 Barker’s second son, 
Hugh, sublet to Welshman George Hambury who was later to sink a colliery at Polesworth. 
The two small five feet diameter shafts were ten feet apart. When Mitchell visited in 1841 he 
described a small colliery in the woods employing twelve which had a horse powered gin 
winding engine. Unable to penetrate the children’s accents, he calls it ‘Ombry’ colliery rather 
than Hambury.
100
 The first Post Office Directory of 1845 lists the owner as R. Hambury, 
presumably a descendant of George Hambury. It closed shortly afterwards.
101
 
The northern area of the coalfield began to develop in the early 19
th
 century. From an 
1818 Pigot’s Directory102 we know that two collieries operated in the Tamworth area. The 
two 126 foot shafts of Park Colliery were situated north-west of Wilnecote and north of Two 
Gates and worked the bench seam back up the incline. Later two more shafts, now 300 feet, 
were sunk to the east and the bench coal extracted up to the old abandoned pit bottom of the 
former colliery. No records exist for this colliery but it had closed by 1840. A third Park 
Colliery opened in the mid 1840’s under the ownership of H. O. and W. C. Canning. Two 300 
foot shafts were sunk to the seven feet coal seam but the mine closed in 1856.
103
 Old 
Kettlebrook Colliery was also recorded in the 1818 trade directory and was still in operation 
when Mitchell made his 1841 report on child employment. He describes it as ‘several pits in 
a field near Tamworth.’104 The field at Hambury Farm was then owned by a Miss 
Satterthwaite and the pit was run by a butty Thomas Evans. The shafts were 360 feet deep to 
the seven foot seam with a fire pan sixty feet down for ventilation. A hundred miners were 
employed, twenty of them boys, to work a thirteen hour shift with an hour for lunch. At this 
time they were nearing the end of the life of the pit. They had extracted all the coal up the dip 
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and in an act of desperation, had driven down the dip until stopped by water. They were then 
extracting coal on each side of the heading back up the dip to the pit bottom. Shaft winding 
was by a jig chain using a skip. This is illustrated in Drawing 2:5 below. Skip winding was 
typical in the larger steam powered mines of Warwickshire, although horse whimsies were 
used in smaller coal and ironstone mines. 
 
Drawing 2:5 Skip Winding using a Jig Chain. 
Source: Fretwell Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Four p 108. 
The early nineteenth century had witnessed considerable growth in the Warwickshire 
coalfield. In North Coventry the Wyken Colliery had been joined by Craven and Victoria 
collieries At Bedworth Hawkesbury and Charity collieries had been supplemented by Mount 
Pleasant and Collycroft and seen the rise and demise of Grove Colliery. The town was still 
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described by Mitchell as the centre of the coalfield in 1842.
105
 At Nuneaton Griff still 
dominated and had outlived the mushrooming of Old Nuneaton Colliery. Just north of the 
town was Oakover Colliery now in decline and in the centre of the coalfield Baddesley 
Colliery was joined by the small Hambury Colliery in the woods. The neglected north too had 
two established collieries in Park and Kettlebrook. Yet when the Mine Inspector first reported 
in 1851 Warwickshire was the smallest of the nation’s twelve coalfields producing 255,000 
tons and employing 4,000 colliers. Although this compares with an estimated output of 
145,000 tons in 1800, there was still much scope for expansion.
106
 
1850 to 1890: Gradual Expansion 
An explanation of the steady growth of the coalfield from 1850 to 1890 is made easier by 
the first publication of official statistics for the coal industry. Hunt was an official of the 
Geological Survey based at the Mine Records Office in London. He travelled the country 
collecting abandonment plans and from 1854 through to his retirement in 1881 published his 
annual Mineral Statistics which not only included aggregates of coal production for each 
mining district but a list of mines with their owners. Safety Mine Inspectors were established 
in 1850 and published Annual Reports from 1851 which included their investigations of all 
fatal accidents naming the mine and the owner of that mine. From 1855 the Inspectorate was 
increased to twelve each with their own district and from the 1870’s they began to produce a 
List of Mines in their districts which included the names of owners and managers. From 1882 
the List of Mines became a separate annual publication and from 1888 it became a non- 
parliamentary publication produced by the Home Office. From 1894 it also gave numbers 
employed both underground and on the surface. 
Through the Mine Inspector Annual Reports we are able to chart the steady increase in 
output of the Warwickshire coalfield.
107
 By 1860 production had doubled to 500,000 tons and 
had reached 800,000 tons by 1867. At that time the local collapse of the textile industry led 
production to fall by 25 per cent. It took five years to reach the 1867 level again but steady 
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progress saw the milestone of a million tons reached in 1878. The 1880’s saw a slow rise to 
1,250,000 tons in 1884, 1,500,000 tons in 1888 and by 1890 it was nearly 1,750,000 tons. 
This period was dominated by small to medium sized pits where the ‘big four’ were joined by 
a score or more collieries employing around 300 to 400 colliers. 
Griff Colliery sank Number Four pit in 1851 and this raised production from 29,000 tons 
in 1845 to 52,000 tons by 1855.
108
 It sank the 300 foot Number Five pit to the two yard seam 
in 1870 but as the family refused to allow mining under their Arbury Hall, this was restricted 
to a narrow pillar of coal. In White’s Directory of 1874 Griff was said to employ 260 
colliers.
109
 Further parsimony meant the pits became increasingly dated and in 1882 the 
Newdigate family sold out to a new Griff Colliery Company. 
Hunt lists George Wheildon as owner of Hawkesbury Colliery until his death in 1859, 
and then from 1860 to 1865, the executors of Wheildon. From 1866 to 1873 it is James 
Darlington and company.
110
 From 1874 the mine inspector lists Hawkesbury with 
Speedwell
111
 and New Winnings and from 1876, with Balance and Fly too.
112
 For some 
reason five collieries are listed all owned by Hawkesbury Colliery Company. This diversity is 
not reflected in White’s Directory of 1874. It stated that Hawkesbury had extensive coal and 
ironstone mines on 400 acres of land with two main shafts at a depth of 780 and 840 feet, and 
a workforce of almost 600.
113
 Balance Colliery disappears from the List of Mines in 1885 and 
only Hawkesbury appears from 1886. Abandonment plans for Speedwell in 1885 linked with 
Black Bank and New, and for Fly and New Winning in 1888, would suggest that all five 
collieries mined the traditional Hawkesbury seams of two yard, rider, ell and slate, together 
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with white and black ironstone.
114
 This does not explain why a death was recorded in 
Speedwell pit in January 1869, five years before it appeared in Hunt or the List of Mines. 
Other abandonment plans for Grants Farm in 1877 and Coalpit Fields in 1879 are for the 
poorly documented ironstone mines. In 1888, the year of its closure, the List of Mines has 
Joseph Cunliffe, manager since 1875, as owner and manager of Hawkesbury, then described 
as a ‘white ironstone mine.’ James Cunliffe was the undermanager. It then employed 300 
men. When it comes to the shallower ironstone mines information is more difficult to gather 
and Fretwell and Grant often give different dates of working depending upon different 
snippets of information. Fretwell for example asserts that the old name for Spinney was 
Exhibition Pit which would suggest that it was working in 1851, and had closed by December 
1874.
115
 Grant as a contrast has Spinney working 1880 until 1902, which may indicate a 
reopening of the pit, yet the colliery had closed in 1888 suggesting this was run by 
neighbouring Exhall Colliery.
116
 This confusion is not surprising as even the mine inspector 
does not give the pit name for the five deaths in Hawkesbury ironstone mines in 1862, 1863, 
1869, 1871 and 1872, and indeed in 1873 comments on a death in ‘a Warwickshire ironstone 
mine’ without naming the company or the individual concerned. This is the only occasion 
when this occurs in the Warwickshire reports.
117
 
In 1850 Wyken was a small colliery employing around 120 colliers.
118
 It expanded in the 
1850’s sinking two new pits. Both New Number One and New Number Two were short life 
pits.
119
 New Number One ran from 1856 until the end of 1864, although it was revived from 
September until December 1865 to produce 6 per cent of annual output. New Number Two 
ran even shorter, from 1859 until September 1863 when it had dropped to 16 per cent of 
output. The replacement was Walsgrave Main which emerged in May 1862, exceeded New 
Number One’s production by March 1864 and continued to produce until February 1889. The 
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abandonment plan lists slate coal, ell, rider and two yard seams worked.
120
 The Mine 
Inspector’s report lists Alexandra pit as sinking in 1880, but it was less than one per cent of 
output in 1886, 8.5 per cent in 1887 and still only 26 per cent in 1888. This was however the 
principal source of coal until it declined in 1912
121
 and is listed as being exhausted January 
1914. Full production records exist from April 1860 until February 1878, and from April 
1884 until November 1889.
122
 The average annual production was around 65,000 tons. The 
peaks and troughs of the trade cycle correspond closely with those identified by Mitchell.
123
 
He identifies the national peaks as 1861, 1866-67, 1873 and 1883, and the troughs as 1862, 
1869, 1879 and 1886. The gaps in the evidence makes it impossible to match production 
figures exactly, but Wyken does have peaks in 1867 and a little earlier in 1871, and troughs in 
1863, 1869, 1875 and 1886. Production falls below 60,000 tons in 1862-63 and 1875-77 and 
exceeds 70,000 tons in 1867, 1870-72, 1885 and 1888. The lowest year is the 45,000 tons of 
1875 following the high of 81,000 tons of 1871. Financial return does not always equate with 
production. Sales of over £40,000 are only reached in the boom year of 1873 and £30,000 in 
the two years that sandwich it. Twenty thousand pounds is exceeded 1864-71 and 1875-76, 
but is not reached in the 1880’s despite the fact that production loosely equates with the 
1860’s. Throughout the period account sales averaged 64 per cent and cash sales 36 per 
cent.
124
 
At Baddesley Colliery the sinking of the new Stratford pit in 1851 was the first on the 
concealed coalfield. This was a leap in the dark as the concealed coalfield was not proven 
until Howell’s geological survey of 1859.125 The two seven foot diameter shafts were eleven 
yards apart and sunk to a depth of 922 feet and 1,056 feet. Production began May 1851 and 
by May 1855 they had mined over one million tons. Grant stated that even if up to 50 per cent 
was left underground as unsalable slack, this was a considerable output.
126
 Examining the 
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output figures for Wyken Colliery 1860 to 1889 it can be seen that during that time it 
produced an average annual output of 65,000 tons and an additional 3,500 tons of slack, or 
only 5 per cent of the total.
127
 Grant’s estimate of 50 per cent slack may have been rather 
pessimistic. In 1866 New Pit closed, still retaining the name despite a sinking date of 1834, 
and was turned into a Speedwell drainage pit.
128
 
The four large Warwickshire collieries were now supplemented by a number of new 
enterprises. At Coventry it was two established collieries that existed alongside Wyken. To 
the north of Wyken was the small Victoria Colliery that worked a rich seam twenty feet thick. 
It was forced to close in 1870 when it was unable to contain an underground fire. To the south 
of Wyken was Craven Colliery but although this existed throughout the period, very little is 
known about it.
129
 In 1862 the Harris brothers gained a lease to sink another shaft and a 
mineral railway was built to the Oxford canal. 
130
 Abandonment plans show slate coal 
exhausted in 1902 and the inferior ell coal in 1907.
131
 
At Bedworth the small Charity Colliery began an ambitious programme of expansion 
around 1870. The colliery had been taken over by Addenbrooke in 1862 and in 1870 its name 
was changed to the Bedworth Coal and Iron Company. The year of 1870 did see a massive 
injection of investment including two coalpit shafts at Charity Number Three and six 
ironstone shafts. To this must be added Woodlands Charity Number Five in 1874. The 1871 
change of name indicates the new direction of the colliery and in 1873 the Nuneaton 
Chronicle reported a meeting of the South Midland Institute of Mining and Mechanical 
Engineers at Bedworth to see the new blast furnaces, said to be the first in Warwickshire.
132
 
They had obviously overlooked the furnace erected at Hawkesbury in 1839 and reported by 
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Mitchell, or learnt the lesson of its failure.
133
 The group was taken to see the two fifty foot 
blast furnaces built and fitted by Black Country engineers. It was estimated that they 
produced 200 tons of pig iron a week from coal and iron from Charity’s 800 acre fields. They 
later went down the pit that employed 400 ‘men and boys.’ Like its predecessor the 
experiment in iron making failed and lives on only in the name of Furnace Road. Perhaps the 
unprofitable outlay was just too much for the company and despite a change of ownership in 
1873 due to the death of the owner, Charity Colliery closed in May 1879 with the loss of 500 
jobs.
134
 
Old Exhall Colliery in Bedworth was sunk in 1855 and appears in Hunt without the 
owner’s name. From 1856 until 1863 Hunt lists the owner as Exhall Colliery Company and 
from 1870 as E Wilson.
135
 The main ten foot diameter shaft was sunk to a depth of 855 feet. 
When Howell visited in 1858 he noted that one shaft of less than six months old, had to be 
abandoned because of flooding.
136
 They must have tried to operate with one shaft as in 
September 1961 the manager of Exhall Colliery was prosecuted for having a single bratticed 
shaft which impaired ventilation.
137
 This was certainly not the end of the colliery as the 
Inspector records deaths there in 1862 and 1863.
138
 A new pit, Black Bank, was opened in 
1870 although a sinker was killed in 1869. Black Bank’s shafts were 800 yards north of the 
main shaft and were fifteen yards apart. Both shafts were sunk to 675 feet but the downcast 
production shaft had a nine foot diameter and the upcast ventilation shaft one of eight and a 
half feet. It worked the thick Bedworth coal of two yard, bare, rider, ell and slate which was 
twenty-eight feet thick with some small thin stone partings. White’s 1874 Directory describes 
it as working 200 acres of thirty foot thick coal and employing 300.
139
 The colliery had an 
                                                 
133
 J. Mitchell, Report on the Employment of Children and Young Persons in the mines of the Warwickshire and 
Leicestershire coalfields, and on the State, Condition and Treatment of such Children and Young Persons,. 
Employment of Children Report (London, 1842) p. 89. It closed after 12 months. Warwickshire coal was said to 
be unsuitable for coking. 
134
 L.Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Four (Warwick, c2005) pp. 30-32. 
135
 R. Hunt, Mineral Statistics. (1854 to 1881). 
136
 H. Howell, Geology of the Warwickshire Coalfield (Memoirs of the Geological Survey) (London, 1858) p. 
21. 
137
 Annual Mine Inspector Report: Midland Division. 1862. 
138
 Annual Mine Inspector Report: Midland Division. 1862 and 1863. 
139
 White’s, Directory of Warwickshire. (1874) p. 611. 
 Page | 73 
 
output in 1892 of 450 tons for an eight and a half hour shift.
140
 It employed 500 in the 1890’s, 
rising to 700 by 1902 and reached a thousand in 1909.
141
 
In Nuneaton Griff’s monopoly was shattered by the introduction of five new collieries. 
Haunchwood Colliery was a major rival to Griff. Its single shaft origin in 1851 had an eleven 
foot diameter and was sunk to a depth of 447 feet. A claypit was sunk at the same time. 
Nowell and son sank a further two shafts in 1859. The colliery had its own brickyard that 
produced fire bricks, red bricks and tiles. The Mine Inspector reports the colliery producing 
slate and seven foot coal in the 1870’s but abandonment plans of 1875 and 1882 would 
suggest it also produced ironstone with bench and two yard coal.
142
 Nowell died in 1873 but 
the family connection continued with John Nowell listed by the Mine Inspector as manager 
1876-78 to be succeeded by William Nowell 1879 and throughout the eighties and nineties.
143
 
Yet although a Nowell continued as manager there was a change of ownership in 1881 to 
Alfred Hickman of Wolverhampton. Sir Alfred financed a programme of expansion that was 
to culminate in 1891 with the sinking of the large Tunnel Colliery.
144
 
In 1866 Jacob Stanley had formed a partnership with his brother-in-law Benjamin 
Broadbent of Leicester, and bought two Nuneaton brickyards. The opening of the Midland 
Railway in 1864 linked Birmingham and Leicester and gave the opportunity to sell bricks and 
tiles to expanding cities. When Reginald Stanley arrived, Broadbent Brickworks was 
suffering from a lack of investment and as a gesture of generosity, he bought the firm, 
renamed it Stanley Brothers and made the pair partners. Broadbent left in 1869 and Jacob in 
1878 but the name Stanley Brothers was retained. It was only when he had acquired the firm 
that he discovered how uncompetitive it was. Many brickworks were linked to collieries, who 
used the unsalable coal slack to fire them. Stanley leased land from J. Tomlinson and sank the 
small Swan Lane Colliery which ran from 1872 until 1878. This small enterprise had limited 
mineral rights which did not extend much beyond its surface area and yet it was profitable. 
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Ironically it illegally extracted coal in two places from Nuneaton Colliery, which Stanley was 
to acquire when Swan Lane was exhausted. A surviving Annual Return of 1877, shown as 
Illustration 2:1 below reveals it had three downshafts of 60 feet, 120 feet and 168 feet and an 
upshaft of 90 feet. It was ventilated by a fire bucket in the upshaft which produced an average 
of ninety cubic feet a minute. The Annual Return states that it worked the rider and two yard 
seams but the abandonment plan simply lists blue coal. It employed 154 men below ground 
and 34 above and no fatalities are recorded.
145
 
 
Illustration 2:1 Annual Return for Swan Lane Colliery 1877. 
Grant lists an Old Nuneaton Colliery pre 1850.
146
 The New Nuneaton Colliery existed 
from 1863 until 1899. Hunt lists the owners as Chadwick and company 1863-7; a limited 
company 1868-73; John Rawlins 1874-6 and Stanley Brothers from 1877.
147
 The annual 
Mine Inspector Reports list William Stanley as manager throughout the eighties and nineties 
and that the colliery worked the seven foot and slate seams.
148
 Abandonment plans suggest a 
more varied exploitation listing the closure of a slate seam in 1882, a seven foot seam in 
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1890, both slate and bench in 1896 and rider, two yard, bench and blue coal in 1899.
149
 It was 
not until 1899 that Stanley began a programme of expansion that would convert the colliery 
into a large enterprise. 
In addition to the three large Nuneaton collieries, the two medium sized collieries of 
Ansley Hall and Stockingford survived successfully. Ansley Hall Colliery Company began 
production in 1874. The two thirteen foot diameter shafts were 420 feet and 504 feet deep. 
They reached the rider seam at 204 feet and set the pit bottom at 348 feet, using the rest of the 
shaft as a water catchment sump. The Mine Inspector reports reveal that the colliery also 
mined the ell and seven feet seam and in the early 1880’s was extracting ironstone which 
appeared in the top ten inches of the seam for about an acre. Iron pyrites or 'fools gold' was 
also found in modules in the coal seam and hand screened on the surface.
150
 Ansley Hall was 
considered to be a short life pit. It was limited to working a four acre pillar of rider coal as 
other seams had been worked out by previous collieries. It was approaching the end of its life 
by 1883 and would have closed but for a technical advance. In Warwickshire collieries could 
only extract coal so far down the dip until they were stopped by an accumulation of water. 
Now a small steam pressure pump could be situated in the actual workings and a boiler on the 
surface could supply steam via pipes down the shaft and along the roadway to the pump. This 
allowed workings to be drained however low they went down the dip. In a reconstituted 
Ansley Hall Colliery Company Garside Phillips, who had become manager in 1879, became 
managing director but still very much a working manager.
151
 In 1889 he embarked on a 
programme of investment. The roadway at the downcast, or production shaft, was known as 
the crut. At Ansley it was 325 yards before it hit the coal seam and then an incline roadway of 
twenty-two degrees for 480 yards. It could only use small tubs as these were all a pit pony 
could haul up the incline. Even so there was at least one reported occasion when a pony 
slipped halfway up the incline and was dragged down on its belly by the tubs and had to be 
destroyed. Now the investment programme included a new pit bottom, a new incline to 
reduce the gradient and the introduction of the larger standard eight cwt tubs drawn by an 
endless rope system. This ended the employment of horses underground. There was also new 
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headgear at the downcast shaft together with a new steam engine.
152
 Even so it still only 
employed 400 in 1902 rising to 500 by 1913.
153
 
 
Illustration 2:2 Sale Notice for Stockingford Colliery 1894. 
Source: Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Three p 5. 
The second medium sized colliery was Stockingford. Sometimes referred to as Hartshill 
by the Mining inspector and known locally as Drybread due to its warm working conditions, 
it was owned by Smallman and Company. Hunt lists it from 1873 but Grant has it sinking in 
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1871.
154
 It was a drift mine with four drift tunnels. Little is known about the colliery. The 
Mining inspector has it working the seven foot seam and ironstone in the seventies and just 
rider coal in the late eighties.
155
 An abandonment plan of 1894 lists the mining of bench, 
seven foot, five foot coal, fireclay, coal balls and goblin ironstone.
156
 Smallman sold the 
colliery in 1894. The sales document shown in Illustration 2:2 above, lists 180 acres of 
freehold land, 206 acres of freehold mines, colliery and brickyard plant, two farm houses and 
four cottages.
157
 The new managing director was William Hill from Birmingham and a major 
shareholder was the adjoining colliery of Ansley Hall. In return for his shareholdings Phillips 
released a block of virgin coal that Ansley Hall could not reach without going through 900 
yards of old workings. It was this that gave the colliery a new lease of life.
158
 The List of 
Mines reveals that it employed 400 in 1902 rising to 500 by 1912.
159
 
In the central area of the coalfield Baddesley remained unchallenged but in the north 
there was a major development of new collieries in the Tamworth and Polesworth areas. All 
of these collieries up until 1890 were small and medium sized enterprises employing a few 
hundred men. In and around the Wilnecote area there was Tame Valley Colliery, Wilnecote 
Colliery, Kettlebrook Colliery, Glascote and Amington Collieries, Hockley Hall and Whately 
Collieries and Tamworth Colliery. Around the Polesworth area Pooley Hall Colliery and 
Birch Coppice Colliery developed and south-west of Tamworth, the smaller Dosthill Colliery. 
The Wilnecote district of Tamworth was the main industrial area. The Old Wilnecote 
Colliery was owned by Wood and Greenwood. Probably sunk in the late 1840’s, it had 
reached the end of its mineral rights and closed by the time of Howell’s 1858 geological 
survey.
160
 In that year Wood and Greenwood sank a new pit nearby at Tame Valley. Between 
1858 and 1860 Hunt lists the owners as Greenwood and Sinclair and simply Greenwood and 
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company in 1861. Wood and Greenwood only appear in 1862-63.
161
 In 1863 they were 
prosecuted by the mining inspector for failing to give notice of a fatal gas explosion and 
failing to give notice of the opening of a new colliery. They were fined 21/- for these offences 
and the manager 2/- for failing to provide adequate ventilation and dismissed.
162
 Fretwell 
notes that the colliery was the first in Wilnecote to use cage winding which made it the most 
profitable in the village. He attributes the bankruptcy in the year of the prosecution to a slump 
in the brick trade.
163
 Between 1864 and 1869 Hunt lists the owners as R. and J. Knock before 
it was taken over by George Skey.
164
 Skey was still listed as owner in 1914. He immediately 
closed half the brickworks and began a programme of diversifying manufacturing to the 
production of floor quarries and architectural finials. Such diversity is apparent in a surviving 
advertisement for the firm shown as Illustration 2:3 below. The Ceramic Art of Great Britain 
published in 1878 described Skey’s Wilnecote Works as ranking amongst the most important 
in the kingdom.
165
 However he was reluctant to invest in new technology and the colliery 
became increasingly dated until an injection of government money in World War One.
166
 The 
firm was taken over by Doulton in 1935. The List of Mines shows that it employed 300 in 
1902 and still only 400 by 1911.
167
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Illustration 2:3 An Advertisement for George Skey and Company. 
Source: Kelly’s Directory for Birmingham, 1891. 
To the north-east of Skey’s Wilnecote Works Colliery was Wilnecote Colliery owned by 
Perris and Harrison. The first two shafts were sunk in 1855 to the bench coal seam, where it 
also extracted ironstone and three types of clay. Two new shafts were sunk in 1859 and 
became known as New Wilnecote. One shaft had a large engine house which contained a 
massive and very noisy beam engine.
168
 The abandonment plan of 1879 reveals that it 
produced seven foot coal and fireclay.
169
 
The Kettlebrook Colliery described by Dr Mitchell in his 1842 report, had reopened in 
1850 under the ownership of Mr Dumulo. Dumulo must have died in 1857 as Hunt lists the 
owners as the executors of Dumulo 1858 through to 1880. In contrast the List of Mines has 
the colliery suspended in 1879 and not listed in 1880.
170
 It reopened in 1881 under the 
ownership of William Hambury, who had served as MP for Tamworth 1872-78, but closed for 
the final time in 1885. Of the four pits three were butty pits, so little is known of them. The 
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two shafts of Caggs’ Pit were sunk in 1850 but no dates are available for the single shaft 
Baker’s and Henry’s Pits. Dumulo Pit was sunk in 1860 with its third shaft a large drainage 
pit that served all four pits. They were all connected on the surface by a small gauge mineral 
railway that ran from Caggs’ Pit across country to the canal wharf at Glascote. The colliery 
had to pay wayleave rent for every ton of coal carried by the railway to the landowners, the 
Hambury family. We can only speculate why the family took over Kettlebrook Colliery, but it 
was no stranger to the industry. Grandfather Robert Hambury had owned Hambury Colliery 
in Polesworth and ‘Ombry colliery’ at Baddesley. Kettlebrook colliery was unique in the 
Wilnecote area as it did not have a brickyard, and relied on coal sale for a profit.
171
 The 
abandonment plans show a Caggs smithy seam closed in 1877, a Kettlebrook seven foot coal 
seam in 1882 and a Kettlebrook bench coal seam in 1885.
172
 
Mr Canning who owned the third Park Colliery also established a colliery at Glascote to 
the north-east of Wilnecote as well as acquiring a small brickworks. This colliery and its terra 
cotta works soon became the economic hub of the once quiet village. We know that the 
colliery was in production in 1846 as that year the Mine Inspector investigated the deaths of 
two miners, one a twelve year old boy, in a gas explosion. The following year saw another 
four killed in an explosion. Inspector Galloway concluded that the deaths were due to a 
neglect of ventilation and an obstinate use of naked flame.
173
 It was not that the coal was 
more gaseous at Glascote, but unlike many collieries to the south it used the bord and stall 
method of extraction. With the longwall method the working face had an intake roadway and 
a return roadway that were separated only by the length of the longwall face. Thus the 
ventilation was as intense at the coalface as it was in the intake and return air roadways. With 
the bord and stall method the intake air roadway can be separated from the return roadway by 
as many as twenty or thirty stalls. No matter how many air regulating doors or curtains were 
used to direct the air current to where it was required, it was never as adequate as it should 
be. In 1855 Canning went into partnership with his son-in-law Gibbs and soon established a 
national reputation. As a trade name Gibbs and Canning are perhaps best remembered for the 
ceramic panels used in the Albert Hall and the National History Museum. Canning’s capital, 
business sense and extreme caution were to restrain the engineering enthusiasm of Gibbs. 
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Glascote did have a mineral railway to the Glascote Canal Wharf and another railway to the 
LMWR sidings at Amington, and by 1849 the original skip winding was changed to double 
cage winding.
174
 In a contradictory manner that was to persist, the mine inspector names 
Canning as owner when reporting the two deaths at Glascote Colliery in 1853 and 1854,
175
 
whereas Hunt lists the owners as Gibbs and Company. Both agree that in 1858 the colliery 
came under the ownership of Mr Firestone.
176
 
In 1863 a sister colliery was sunk at Amington on land purchased from Tamworth 
Grammar School, and deliberately sited on the mineral railway that led to the LMWR railway 
sidings. It too used the bord and pillar method of extraction.
177
 The name of the company 
continued to cause confusion. Hunt lists Firestone as owner of Glascote from 1858 through to 
1873 when it becomes the Amington Colliery Company. Glascote is not even mentioned after 
1877 although Hunt continues to report until 1881.
178
 We know production continues as the 
Mine Inspector reports a death there in 1879.
179
 To Hunt Amington does not appear until 
1869 where Firestone is named as owner, changing to the Amington Colliery Company from 
1874 through to the last report of 1881. The Mine Inspector lists Firestone as owner when 
reporting the Glascote deaths of 1859, 1864, 1867 and 1870 and the Amington death in 1870. 
Yet as a contrast to Hunt, at Glascote in 1865 and from 1872 through to 1907, and at 
Amington from 1871 to 1913, the owner is listed as Glascote Colliery Company.
180
 Whatever 
the name of the company, the manager and agent of both from at least 1874 through to 1909 
was Frederick Grayson, to be succeeded in 1910 by his son George. The Mine Inspector 
reports also reveal that in the 1870’s and 1880’s both collieries produced seven foot, rider and 
ironstone. Abandonment plans show that Glascote closed two fireclay seams in 1876 and 
1877, and a rider and ironstone seam in 1879. Amington too abandoned a rider coal and 
ironstone seam in 1886.
181
 Rider was reintroduced briefly from 1911 until 1915 but by 1920 
both collieries worked the three seams of seven foot, double and bench coal, together with 
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iron pyrites. The List of Mines also reveals that the collieries were of a similar size. In 1902 
Glascote employed 221 and still 201 in 1913. Amington was slightly larger employing 289 in 
1902 and 339 in 1913.
182
 
Half a mile or so south of Wilnecote a new company established a colliery at Hockley 
Hall in 1867. The Colliery Guardian 
183
 reported in 1892 that the 900 acres of land, later 
raised to 1,500 acres, was leased from the estates of Robert Peel of Drayton Manor. Number 
One pit, better known as Hole Pit, was only 39 feet to the top of the four foot seam, with 
Number Two pit 214 feet deep to the seven foot seam. The two shafts were connected by an 
underground roadway driven through the unworked measures. A steam engine was erected 
above Number Two to drive a large beam engine but after ten years cracks were discovered 
forty feet down caused by the vibrations. Two new shafts were sunk further down the 
outcrop, one 135 ft to the four foot superior house coal and the second of 360 feet to the 
seven foot steam coal that was sent mainly to London. A third shaft was sunk shortly 
afterwards to act as a drainage shaft. Once in production the two older shafts were closed 
down, but the lesson had been learned. The steam engine was placed thirty yards from the 
shaft to protect them from vibrations and this necessitated the installation of horizontal 
connecting rods and quadrants to transfer the motion from the steam engine to the shaft 
pumping rods. The Colliery Guardian states that the seven foot diameter shafts were lined 
with nine inch bricks ‘but no tubbing in any part of the shafts because of the only slight 
problem of water.’184 Cage winding was used in both shafts, both double decked with each 
deck carrying an eight hundredweight tub. A stationary engine was placed at the bottom of 
the seven foot coal shaft and could haul thirteen tubs by means of an endless rope up the 850 
yard engine plane. The smoke and exhaust steam were released into the upshaft to create the 
ventilation for the underground workings. Hunt lists J. E. Swindles as owner during the 
period 1868-70 and then the Hockley Hall Colliery Company 1871-76. J. Spencer Balfour is 
listed as owner from 1877 and is still there in the 1892 Colliery Guardian article.
185
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Abandonment plans show a four foot seam closed in 1882, a seven foot seam in 1885 and 
bench coal in 1891. White ironstone continued to be produced until the colliery closed in 
1904, although the List of Mines lists only two underground workers in 1902.
186
 Little is 
known of the two shafts to the ironstone seam but there was a strong market for white 
ironstone in Birmingham. Fretwell notes that the sale of ironstone, which was extracted by 
bord and stall method rather than the longwall preferred in the coal pits, kept the colliery 
from experiencing hard times in the lean years.
187
 Diversification was seen not only in the 
ironstone production of the 1880’s, but also a carbonising plant that produced 700 tons of 
coke a week for Staffordshire ironworks and the London domestic market. In addition they 
produced sulphate of ammonia for artificial fertilisers, benzyls for the production of antiline 
colours, creosote for timber preservation and carbolic acid for a variety of industrial 
purposes. There was also a brickyard which produced 250,000 blue and brindled machine 
pressed bricks a week. The very hard and durable blue bricks were used for lining railway 
tunnels, house foundations, roof coping, town footpaths and dock walls, and were in heavy 
demand. 
A sister colliery, Whateley, was opened half a mile south of Hockley Hall in 1873. The 
upcast was 300 feet to the four foot seam and Number One pit was 547 feet to the seven foot 
seam. The 1892 Colliery Guardian article revealed not surprisingly, that the workings were 
similar to Hockley Hall. A haulage engine at the bottom of the four foot seam shaft could pull 
thirteen loaded tubs up a 1,500 yard engine plane as well as providing ventilation. Air 
circulation at Whately was 32,000 cubic feet a minute compared to the 25,000 feet at 
Hockley Hall. The seven foot seam at Whately was the only workings which used safety 
lamps as fire damp was encountered when cutting through faults. Both collieries used the 
longwall system and gunpowder to bring down the coal. Faces were fifty yards long and 
ponies pulled the tubs along the face. At this time Whately was more productive as 500 tons 
were raised in a nine hour shift compared to the 400 tons raised at Hockley Hall. In 1898 new 
screens were built and proudly recorded in the Colliery Engineering Journal. Fretwell 
describes the changes: 
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To these new screens new shaker pans replaced the old gravity sloping chute 
screens. On these old sloping chute screens the coal slid down them by gravity 
and for this reason they were known everywhere as ‘black nail screens’ because 
people working on them were never without lacerated fingers and black nails. 
The new shaker pan screens moved the coal along in eight inch movements that 
were less violent on fingers picking out the rock from the coal.
188
 
Whateley was certified as abandoned with the exhaustion of the four foot seam in 1914 
189
 
but by then the colliery had been reborn by the large Kingsbury Colliery sunk in 1894. 
 
Drawing 2:6 Alvecote Colliery. 
Source: Fretwell Warwickshire Coalfield Volume One p 85. 
The rising coal prices of the early seventies encouraged entrepreneurs to enter the 
industry but not all found lasting success, Alvecote or Tamworth Colliery was situated north-
east of the town (Drawing 2:6 above). Hunt lists Alvecote from 1873 but the Mine Inspector 
only has it sinking in 1874 to the seven foot seam.
190
 The owner was Charles Marshall who 
had leased 700 acres from the Earl of Essex at an annual rent of £300 plus royalties of £20 an 
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acre. Marshall went bankrupt in 1881 and was succeeded by William Ritson who suffered the 
same fate. In November 1884 the Colliery Guardian reported the failure of the Tamworth 
Colliery Company in Birmingham bankruptcy court with liabilities of £7,958 to unsecured 
creditors. The failure was said to be caused by ‘want of trade and capital for further 
development.’191 The Mine Inspector’s report has the colliery in liquidation in 1885192 but 
1886 saw the arrival of the third owner, Richard Chamberlain, who appointed Ridsdale as 
managing director. Chamberlain was based in London but each Christmas he was known to 
visit the villages of Shuttington and Alvecote for a children’s party and the distribution of 
pensions to the miners. In 1907 the 510 feet shafts to the seven foot seam were deepened to 
618 feet to reach the bench seam. The undermanager, James Reeves, who had held the post 
since it was created in 1887, was so impressed by the seam that he described it as ‘like the 
Klondike.’ The name stuck and the bench seam was known as the Klondike seam at this 
colliery.
193
 The List of Mines reveals that this seam contributed to a steady growth in the early 
20
th
 century. Alvecote employed 269 in 1902, 328 in 1907, and 436 in 1913 and had doubled 
to 868 in 1920.
194
 
Like Wilnecote, Polesworth a few miles south-east of Tamworth, was a rich area of 
mining activity. Hambury Colliery was sunk around 1830. Both its shafts, one 300 feet the 
other 450 feet, were sunk to the bench coal seam. It was possibly a butty pit as a map at 
Tamworth Castle refers to one shaft as Moor’s Pit.195 The owner was George Hambury, the 
youngest son of Capel Hambury who owned an iron foundry and coal mines in Pontypool, 
South Wales. George also owned a small colliery at Baddesley employing twelve that was 
visited by Dr Mitchell in 1841. The Polesworth mine is not mentioned in the report, but as the 
Baddesley colliery had a gin winding system, there is a strong possibility that this mine had 
similar technology. This colliery is unique as it somehow managed to extract coal down the 
dip of the coal seam without being stopped by water.
196
 The abandonment plan has survived 
and reveals an enormous area of extraction which reflects the long working life. We do not 
know when George Hambury died but the first Post Office directory of 1845 attributes the 
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ownership then to Robert Hambury. Hunt only lists the colliery in 1854,
197
 but it must have 
been in operation in 1855 as the Mine Inspector reports two deaths there. It had closed when 
Howell visited the area in 1858.
198
 
In 1858 Shaw and his Polesworth partner Caldicott, sank Birch Coppice Galga Colliery. 
Like Hambury’s colliery the two shafts were so far apart that they occupied two different 
surface sites. The original colliery would have had one shaft, but as the workings retreated 
from the shaft bottom, a second shaft was sunk to reduce underground haulage time. Fretwell 
claims that the term ‘galga’ is an old Warwickshire mining term and comes from the Saxon 
word gealga meaning gallows. The term headgear is probably a northern name that reached 
the Midlands in the 19
th
 century when headgear took on their modern appearance.
199
 The 
older term galga continued to be used to describe the older and crude square headgear. We do 
not know when this colliery closed but it must have had a life of around fifteen years. 
Birch Coppice Birchmoor, or Cockspur as it was known locally because it had an unusual 
pit bottom crut
200
 system, was jointly owned by Arthur Morris and Peter Shaw. Both its 
fourteen foot diameter shafts were 810 feet to the seven foot coal seam. An overland mineral 
railway powered by a stationary steam haulage engine, took the coal to the canal wharf at 
Polesworth. In Growth of a Village there is an account concerning a visit to the colliery in 
July 1872: 
The party of five, of whom two were ladies, in charge of the manager George 
Morgan, went down the upcast shaft 220 yards to the seven foot seam where 500 
tons of coal are raised daily, all the coal having to be bought along rails by pit 
ponies to the bottom of the shaft half a mile away. 
They visited a wall of coal about thirty yards long and five feet high. Several men 
were working at the coal face lighted by candles stuck in clay by which they made 
the candle fasten onto the surface of the coal near the holes they are boring. A 
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day’s work for a man is to get out a mass of coal five yards in length by a yard 
and a half deep, the height of the seam being about five foot. 
Small coal is left for the use of engines in the pit. There are no dangerous gases 
so open lights are used. No women are employed in the pit but small boys of 
about thirteen or fourteen years of age go errands and drive horses.
201
 
It is ironic that the account mentions ‘no dangerous gases.’ The second death at the colliery 
recorded in 1873 was from an explosion of firedamp.
202
 A sister colliery was sank at Hall End 
in 1875 and it was this that was to develop into a major Warwickshire colliery. 
There is some confusion regarding the development of Pooley Hall Colliery. Grant has 
established that the enterprise was started around 1846-48 but Fretwell refers to this colliery 
as Polesworth North.
203
 It had two six foot diameter shafts, one that went to the bench coal 
and a 300 feet shaft to the seven foot seam. Hunt lists the owner as Mr Thomas, from when 
he began recording in 1854 and claims that he was the same Mr Thomas that owned Mount 
Pleasant Colliery in Bedworth.
204
 Grant differs claiming it was a Mr W. Thomas at Bedworth 
and a Mr D. Thomas at Pooley Hall.
205
 The discrepancies continue as Hunt has the colliery 
working until 1863 but it was closed when Howell visited in 1858. Fretwell states that a 
second Pooley Hall Colliery Company was established by Daniel Thomas in 1865 when he 
sank a single 450 foot shaft. Hunt does not list a colliery 1864 to 1869, yet the Mine 
Inspector reports two deaths there in 1866 and 1869.
206
 Daniel Thomas was succeeded by his 
son who went bankrupt. The mine then passed to the Polesworth Brick and Tile Company. 
Fretwell noted that: 
The colliery only had a small corridor of mineral rights that permitted them to 
extract coal to the east of the shaft towards the Eastern Boundary Fault. They 
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were never allowed to extract coal under Pooley Hall itself. The result was they 
were mining into faulted ground because numerous small faults radiated out from 
the Eastern Boundary Fault like veins in a leaf.
207
 
Given these geological problems and the fact that a single six foot diameter shaft 
accommodating less than thirty men underground and using skip winding could not raise 
enough coal to be competitive, it closed in 1890. The abandonment plan is dated 1892 and 
lists four foot and smithy coal.
208
 
By 1890 Warwickshire coalfield employed 5,500 men in twenty collieries and produced 
one and three quarter million tons of coal. Most was produced in medium sized collieries 
employing around 400 to 500 colliers and taking advantage of the increased economies of 
scale. However a number of small collieries employing less than a hundred men continued to 
survive alongside them. 
Small Collieries: Extinction and Survival 
Small collieries defined as employing less than a hundred men, still existed throughout 
the late 19
th
 century, some as scavenger collieries taking advantage of temporary coal 
shortages and others as specialist collieries using pillar and bord to extract clay for the brick 
and tile industry. Some were small ironstone mines. These collieries tended to continue the 
use of more primitive technology but were popular with colliers because of their lax 
discipline. There is not a single case of a small colliery prosecuting a miner for breaches of 
the special rules.
209
 Inevitably there was an overlap in what constituted a small mine and the 
bottom end of the medium mine scale. Dosthill and Pooley Hall collieries are obvious 
examples of this. 
Grant lists Mount Pleasant Colliery in Bedworth noted above as opening before 1838 and 
Hunt lists it up to 1855.
210
 It is not known when Collycroft Colliery was sunk but it is 
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mentioned in the 1841 report. It was owned by William Wilson and situated opposite the 
Royal Oak pub. Hunt lists Collycroft Colliery up to 1857 with the owner as Wilson.
211
 
Collycroft re-emerges as a scavenger pit in the boom years of 1873 to 1875 and 1893 to 
1901.
212
 It then shared the same owner, Edward Wilson, and the same manager as Exhall 
Colliery. There is some confusion as to which seams was mined. The Inspector states the slate 
seam and ironstone in the 1870’s but the abandonment plan lists two yard, rider and seven 
foot in 1876 and four foot in 1901.
213
 
In the boom years of the 1890’s there were two short lived scavenger collieries in 
Bedworth. Railway Colliery appears in the List of Mines in 1889 with the brick maker 
William Beasley Heap as the owner. There were seven shallow pits of 60 feet, 66 feet, 66 
feet, 78 feet, 93 feet, 105 feet and 204 feet. Two of the shafts were said to be owned by the 
manager, William Dennis. The land was owned by the Nicholas Chamberlaine Trust and had 
been worked before. An 1849 Report stated that a cranked fan known as a Blow George stood 
where the colliery was situated. It was very old fashioned and used methods long discarded in 
the coal industry. It had a horse gin winding engine and a drainage system that was akin to a 
bucket taking water from a well. One road even went through an old gob and was thus 
impossible to maintain.
214
 Railway Colliery closed in 1891 but in 1892 Mr Heap was fined £5 
with 16/- costs for failing to provide an abandonment plan.
215
 The manager, William Dennis, 
rectified this by producing a hand drawn plan listing slate and lady coal.
216
 E Wooton’s New 
Colliery was situated just north of Railway colliery and had two 180 feet shafts. Grant lists it 
in operation 1890 to 1894.
217
 The abandonment plan shows that it worked a seven feet band 
of seven foot coal with a four inch band of dirt parting it, but closed because it was 
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‘unprofitable.’ It would appear that the successful hat manufacturer with his large factory less 
than a mile from his colliery could not transfer his talents to the coal industry.
218
 
In the Nuneaton area there were a number of brickworks and clay pits which may have 
had mining connections. In 1858 Hunt made the only geological survey of brick and clay in 
Warwickshire. 
219
 He estimated the output as seventy-five million bricks from one hundred 
and nine brick makers at an annual value of £94,375. There were thirty-one in the 
overlapping Bedworth-Coventry area, twenty in Tamworth, eighteen in Nuneaton and five in 
Atherstone. In 1876 James Knox became managing director of Haunchwood Brick and 
Cement Company. He was also to become a director of J W Tileries of Cannock, Barnstone 
Blue Lias Lime and Cement Company Nottingham and Arley Colliery Company. Grant states 
that the Haunchwood Brick and Tile Company existed from 1884 until 1894
220
 but it existed 
beyond those dates and the List of Mines lists its two pits of Haunchwood and Griff up to 
1907. Indeed Griff only signed the special rules in 1898 but was said to be ‘standing’ from 
1905.
221
 Three abandonment plans of 1893 and 1894 reveal that it worked the red clay, 
fireclay, ell, slate, double and seven foot seams. A few other clay pits are listed as exhausted. 
The Midland Tile clay pit lists pipe clay exhausted in 1895 and Nuneaton Red Clay, red clay 
in 1897.
222
 
A 1902 visitor to the Stanley owned Midland Brick and Tile Works left a detailed 
description that helps to illustrate this sister industry. He describes a large village of sheds, 
kilns and offices with roads cut up by heavy traffic. There were three clay pits each mining 
two beds of blue clay sandwiched by a red clay bed: 
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The blue clay is dug from the sides of the pit but the comparatively thin (six foot) 
layer of red clay is now worked by means of headings – long galleries worked 
through the layer with side galleries branching out at right angles.
223
 
Loaded trucks were taken to the mill where clay was ground between massive iron rollers 
before being taken to the shed where it was required. In one shed a group of boys were hand 
moulding plain quarry bricks and laying them in rows on the floor to dry. In another shed 
roofing tiles were machine moulded and pressed with skilled labour adding the ornamental 
finish. In yet another a steam powered machine made drainpipes, and in another workers 
made chimney pots, kneading the clay by hand before filling moulds and finishing with a 
knife on a revolving stand. Finials, described as ‘the ornamental terminations used with 
crested ridge tiles’ and terracotta toilet pedestals were also made in moulds. There were 
thirteen circular ovens and four kilns: 
One of the kilns, which is called from its great size the Wilderness, was being 
drawn during our visit. It contained 9,000 malt kiln tiles and 30,000 bricks. When 
filled with bricks only, as many as 80,000 can be burnt in this kiln at one time. It 
takes a week to burn, another week to cool, while eight days is required to set the 
oven and draw out. The glazing of certain kinds of ware is produced by throwing 
salts into the fire holes.
224
 
The Works employed 400 and provided a reading room that was supplied with daily and 
weekly newspapers, and used for the occasional evening entertainment and Sunday service. 
The Stanley brick and tile works expanded, producing ridge tiles and finials, paving tiles, 
chimney pots, sanitation pipes, glazed sinks and white and coloured glazed bricks. An 
advertisement for the company is shown in Illustration 2:4 below. In 1895 it became a limited 
company with branch works at Burslem in Staffordshire and Willenhall in Coventry. By 1907 
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it had seven brickyards in Nuneaton, 200 acres of clay fields and consumed 60,000 tons of 
slack annually.
225
 This illustrates more than anything else the need to own their coal mines. 
 
Illustration 2:4 An Advertisement for Stanley Brothers dated 1898. 
Source: Stanley Brothers Collection, Nuneaton Library. 
To the north of the county there were also a number of collieries connected to the brick 
and tile industry. To the north-east of Skey’s Wilnecote Works was Wilnecote Colliery owned 
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by Perris and Harrison. The first two shafts were sunk in 1855 to the bench coal seam, where 
it also extracted ironstone and three types of clay. Two new shafts were sunk in 1859 and 
became known as New Wilnecote. The abandonment plan of 1879 reveals that it produced 
seven foot coal and fireclay.
226
 
Skey, the owner of Tame Valley Colliery, was also the owner of Wilnecote Works 
Colliery centred on Peel. As far as Hunt was concerned he only refers to the colliery as Peel 
and George Skey as owning Tame Valley and Peel.
227
 Peel was sunk in 1859 and produced 
coal and clay solely for use in the brick kilns. Both shafts had a seven foot diameter and used 
the old fashioned galga headgear, and winding by means of a skip. Fretwell notes that the 
colliery used the bord and stall method of extraction ‘for very good reason.’ The seven foot 
coal in that area lay in the following sections: coal two feet five inches; white clay one foot 
three inches; coal three feet; white clay three feet; alum shale one foot seven inches and 
fireclay three feet. All of these materials had to be extracted separately and brought up in 
separate tubs. First the two layers of white clay were extracted to be used in certain terra cotta 
manufacture. Next the middle layer of coal was brought up, the top layer being left to form a 
stable roof. When the face had been carefully cleaned of coal slack, the valuable alum shale 
was extracted to be used in sulphuric acid manufacture. Finally, the fireclay was extracted to 
make fire bricks. Fretwell notes that in such a pit experience was at a greater premium than 
youthful strength: 
In the course of a single coal stall advance four different types of roof support, 
each a different length, had to be used. Stallwork here was truly a test of skill and 
for the average miner to have gone into one of these stalls from another colliery 
without training would have been far too dangerous. The older the miner the 
more experienced they tend to be, and it was not uncommon to find face workers 
at this pit who were in their late sixties.
228
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It is noteworthy that the only fatality at Peel was a fifteen year old boy who fell down the 
shaft in 1861.
229
 
With the exception of Peel, all other pits were butty pits. Chapel Pit was sunk in 1870 and 
Corner Pit in 1871,
230
 but there are no dates for the Wheatcroft and James’ pits. The mine 
inspector’s reports of the 1870’s and 1880’s list Peel, Corner and Chapel, along with a New 
Pit which produced coal and clay and a Works Pit that produced black ironstone. These may 
well be the Wheatcroft and James’ pits noted by Fretwell.231 The mine inspector reports Tame 
Valley producing seven foot and smithy coal, Peel bench coal, Chapel seven foot coal and 
Corner black ironstone. Abandonment plans give some clues to production. The year 1885 
saw a spate of closures of the seven foot seam at Chapel, the black ironstone of Works and 
Corner and a smithy and white ironstone seam at Tame Valley. In 1887 a bench coal seam at 
three pits numbered one, two and three were abandoned and in 1903 a double coal seam at 
Tame Valley. When Peel was abandoned in 1910 it produced double, bench coal and fire clay, 
the same materials produced by its successor Beauchamp Pit opened in 1908.
232
 The relative 
size of the two collieries is shown in the List of Mines. Tame Valley employed 284 in 1902, 
327 in 1905 and 401 by 1911. Peel employed fifty-nine in 1902 and fifty-seven in 1910, the 
year of its closure. Its replacement, Beauchamp lists thirty-eight employees in its opening 
year of 1908 and had grown to seventy-eight by 1913.
233
 The Mine Inspector’s Reports 
together with the List of Mines, reveals a managerial dynasty. The 1870’s and 1880’s saw 
Tame Valley and Peel managed by Sinnean Fenn, to be succeeded in the 1890’s by Abraham 
and then Charles Fenn who managed the colliery up to 1913. 
234
 
Although they surrendered the ownership of Glascote Colliery in 1858, Gibbs and 
Canning did own a number of clay pits. Hunt lists them as owners of the Wilnecote Works 
Claypit from 1874 and the Glascote Clay Works from 1878.
235
 Abandonment plans show that 
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Glascote Clay closed a white clay seam in 1882 and a fireclay seam in 1904.
236
 The List of 
Mines only mentions the Glascote Clay Works. In 1902 they employed twenty-nine, but this 
had slipped to twenty by 1913.
237
 Archaeological evidence showed some eleven shafts north 
of the terra cotta works and that two of these dated back to the Averill brickyard of the 
1840’s.238 There are no dates for the nine shafts sunk by Gibbs and Canning. We do know that 
it used the bord and stall method of extraction and mined three different types of clay at three 
different levels. By 1900 they were all connected underground by a maze of different tunnels. 
There were no problems with ventilation, but it was a hot or drybread pit where men worked 
in their shorts.
239
 
A Mr Shaw was the proprietor of a number of Polesworth collieries in the 1850’s. Three 
were short lived single shaft unprofitable ventures. One of these had a variety of names. To 
the Mine Inspector it was Station, to Hunt it was Railway and to Howell and White’s 
Directory of 1860, the local name, Waverton. Its single shaft extracted both four foot and 
slate coal, suggesting that it must have had two different landing stages. It was the first 
colliery to prove the existence of the fault and could not be profitable as it was situated only 
one hundred and fifty yards from it. 
240
 For a century this was known as the Great Polesworth 
Fault and was only later called the Eastern Boundary Fault when it was shown that it 
extended to Bedworth. Hunt lists the colliery from 1857 to 1860
241
 and the Mine Inspector 
records a death there in 1857 from a fall of coal from slip joints.
242
 When Howell visited in 
1858 he insisted that it was about to close but it is recorded in White’s 1860 Directory. 
Howell mentions another H. Shaw single shaft colliery nearby at Butts Lane which had a 300 
foot shaft to the seven foot coal seam. There is no sinking date but it had closed several years 
before his 1858 visit. Howell noted another single shaft colliery which he calls Polesworth 
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East but which the Geological Survey refers to as California Colliery.
243 
It was sunk by a 
partnership of H. Shaw and R. Hambury and is recorded in Hunt in 1855. The manager was 
Mr Skarrett who had been manager of Hambury’s colliery. As Fretwell notes; ‘his map 
making style is unmistakable.’244 This colliery worked the seven foot seam but Howell states 
that the seam has become shattered by a large number of small faults that threw the seam 
down several yards so that it was like working a giant staircase. This made working 
unprofitable and dangerous and it was closed. Polesworth miners called these faults ‘rockies’ 
and as the Rocky Mountains are partly in California, this may have given it its name. 
Thomas Morgan sank Dosthill Colliery south-west of Tamworth and west of Kingsbury, 
in an area that had seen considerable volcanic activity. The two nine foot diameter shafts 
were only forty-eight feet deep. They had a furnace at the bottom of the upshaft for 
ventilation but nothing is known of the winding and pumping machinery. Many of the deep 
seams of the mine were unworkable as they had been metamorphosed by volcanic heat.
245
 
Between the years 1874 to 1878 the Mine Inspector Reports list the owners as Morgan and 
Davies and Hunt inserts the name Peaman for 1875-76.
246
 This shows that Morgan found it 
necessary to take on partners to stay in business. James Davies doubled as the mine manager. 
In 1879 Joseph Pearson took over as owner. In 1882 the two shallow shafts were abandoned 
and replaced by two of thirteen feet diameter 220 feet deep shafts to the east. The mineral 
rights obtained from the Peel estate of Drayton Manor were worked out in 1888 and the mine 
closed. The abandonment plans show an ironstone seam closed in 1885, the seven foot seam 
in June 1888 and the rider and a four foot seam in October 1888.
247
 
By the turn of the century many of these small collieries had disappeared. The specialist 
Peel Colliery survived and a number of clay pits around Nuneaton and Tamworth but the 
ironstone mines had closed by 1890. The movement now was towards deep mines that could 
exploit the virgin seams a thousand feet or more below the surface. The technology was 
available although expensive, to sink through the water laden sandstone on the concealed 
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coalfield and new powerful ventilation fans had been developed to air the mines. The deep 
mine domination of the coalfield was complete by 1913. 
Eighteen-nineties’s: Deep Mines 
Warwickshire coal production increased rapidly after 1890 largely due to the introduction 
of deep mines that utilised the latest technological methods.
248
 In 1890 production stood at 
1,750,000 tons. It reached two million in 1895, three million in 1901, four million in 1907 
and five million tons in 1913.
249
 The rapid change to large collieries can be charted through 
the List of Mines.
250
 In 1902 only 20.7 per cent of Warwickshire collieries employed a 
thousand men but by 1913 this figure had leapt to 59.1 per cent. However many of the new 
collieries experienced severe technical difficulties before production came on line requiring 
increasing injections of capital before success was realised. 
Griff Colliery Company in Nuneaton established in 1882, inherited dated fixed plant 
which under the terms of the lease belonged to the Newdigate family who were difficult 
landlords. In 1891 they began sinking Griff Clara, named after a director’s wife.251 The two 
shafts were twenty-four yards apart. The downcast, Clara, had a fourteen foot diameter and 
the upshaft, Marion, had an eleven foot diameter. The Colliery Guardian of 1892 states that 
in addition to the two sinkings there were five other shafts from 390 feet to 480 feet.
252
 Two 
were for drawing coal, two for pumping and one for ventilation. Water was a serious problem 
and dealing with it cost £13,000 or nearly 30 per cent of the capitalisation cost of Clara. At 
one stage they had to deal with 1,100 gallons a minute from one shaft and 600 gallons from 
another, and pumps ran non stop for seven weeks. When Clara came on line its impact was 
dramatic. Output in 1892 was 150,000 tons, rising to 400,000 tons in 1898 and reaching the 
half million mark in 1902. In 1906 Bainbridge informed a visiting group from the Midland 
Institute of Mining Engineers that when the company began it was producing 250 tons a day 
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but that now it was producing 2,000 tons a day.
253
 After 1904 the colliery lost its title of the 
leading Warwickshire colliery as the List of Mines shows that Stanley’s Haunchwood colliery 
had more employees 1905-1913.
254
 Yet Wale makes the point; 
Griff reached its greatest relative importance in terms of output as well as 
employment as early as the late eighteen-nineties, during the years when Clara 
pit was new. The company was on the other hand still more important in 1914 
than it had been in 1890.
255
 
Haunchwood Colliery in Nuneaton had been owned by Sir Alfred Hickman since 1881. 
Named after a nearby railway tunnel, Tunnel was a mile and a half to the west of the existing 
pit with sinking beginning in July 1891.
256
 The downcast shaft had a fifteen foot diameter and 
was sunk to 216 feet and lined with brick near to the bottom. The upcast shaft had a fourteen 
foot diameter sunk to 480 feet, with bricking for 390 feet then 84 feet of tubbing. The cage 
was designed to carry four tubs in each cage of two decks and the winding engine was served 
by three Lancashire boilers. The manager of neighbouring Griff Colliery sometimes mentions 
other collieries in his annual report. He notes Haunchwood’s ‘very vigorous management’ 
and a run of unfortunate events. After a severe drop in output in 1901, it prospered until a 
severe fire at Tunnel in 1904.
257
 It had recovered by 1906 and in 1909 ‘making more money 
than anywhere else in Warwickshire.’258 In 1910 Melly said Haunchwood was able to do 
better than Griff because of its low working cost and especially high quality coal which 
commanded a higher selling price than Griff could obtain. At the end of 1911 a second 
serious fire at Tunnel closed it for a time.
259
 The List of Mines reflects this by showing Tunnel 
employing 1,563 in 1911, falling to 883 in 1912 and recovering to 1,762 in 1913.
260
 The List 
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of Mines also illustrates the relative importance of the two sister pits. Haunchwood averaged 
around five hundred men employed in the early years of the 20
th
 century and closed in 1914, 
whereas Tunnel despite its difficulties always averaged over a thousand colliers on the 
books.
261
 
The colourful Reginald Stanley
262
 had owned Nuneaton Colliery since 1877. A new 
Nuneaton Colliery was sunk in 1899 and the List of Mines charts its growth to a large 
enterprise, reaching a thousand employees in 1907. In 1899 Stanley had also taken over 
Charity Colliery in Bedworth and until 1907 one manager, with two undermanages, ran them 
both.
263
 Charity had been purchased to bridge the gap between the exhaustion of the old 
colliery and when production from the new colliery came on line but it was decided to sink 
shafts to new deep seams in 1902.
264
 By 1913 Stanley Brothers was one of only three 
Warwickshire coal companies to employ two thousand men.
265
 We know more about this 
colliery as the manager, Swallow, gave an address to Midland mining officials in 1904.
266
 The 
first attempt to sink shafts was thwarted by a heavy water inflow of 12,000 gallons an hour 
which was considered too much to cope with. Nevertheless as the water was ‘excellent 
quality’ it was sold for £6,000 to Nuneaton Urban District Council to become the town’s 
water supply. New shafts were sunk and a six foot rider seam was reached at a depth of 558 
feet, a ten foot slate coal seam at 654 feet and a five foot seven foot seam at 738 feet, but 
given the frequent thinning and disappearance of coal and a difficult floor, this last seam was 
considered too expensive to work. Swallow then analysed the use of the heading machine in 
twenty-three days January-February 1903. In the question and answer session it emerged that 
costs were comparable for machine or hand headings but that the machine was better in 
opening out faces of work and rapidly gaining output, particularly in thick seams. Machines 
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only worked a few minutes each hour because of the need to remove coal and because the 
headings were too small for pipes, ventilation was poor.
267
 
The Newdigate family had divested themselves of their interest in Griff Colliery in 1882 
but they could not resist the high profits that were being made in the 1890’s. Sadly Newdigate 
Colliery was to epitomise all the reasons why they had abandoned the industry. The two 
sixteen foot diameter shafts named Frank and Lilah after members of the family, began 
sinking in May 1897.
268
 Heavy surface water was encountered at 150 feet and 10,000 gallons 
an hour was dealt with by two eight inch pumps, and then held back by coffering. At 636 feet 
they experienced 50,000 gallons an hour going through the Halesowen sandstone and both 
eight inch and ten inch pumps had to be used. The shaft continued to a depth of 1,592 feet 
with a twenty-five foot seam reached at 1,470 feet. The cage was designed to carry tubs of 
the larger twelve hundredweight capacity and could raise a thousand tons a day. A branch 
railway, a mile in length, linked the colliery to the Coventry-Nuneaton Railway. Two men, a 
carter and a sinker, were killed before production began in 1901 and a further twenty-one 
were to die between 1901 and 1913. It was not a profitable pit. Technical problems made it 
liable to spontaneous combustion and in 1904 it was closed by a fire.
269
 A new colliery 
company was formed and a new pit bottom established, 115 feet above the old. Stone drifts 
were driven down to the old roadway and the fire was sealed off. Another fire in 1914 led to 
the formation of yet another company but the colliery was not a success until the 1920’s.270 
The List of Mines has Newdigate working two yard, rider and slate seams. It employed 932 in 
1902 and an almost identical 937 in 1913.
271
 After its inauspicious start Newdigate Colliery 
continued production until 1987. 
At Exhall Colliery in Bedworth water was also a problem and the Colliery Guardian 
reported in 1887: 
A work of extreme difficulty, namely the lifting of one million gallons of water 
from the shaft of Exhall Colliery, Warwickshire, and preventing by means of huge 
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iron castings its further inflow, has been crowned with success after an outlay of 
many thousands of pounds and efforts extended over several months. The mine 
contains large beds of the finest Warwickshire coal.
272
 
The danger of flooding also affected neighbouring Hawkesbury Colliery and while the work 
was being carried out, both collieries suspended work losing three hundred jobs in each. This 
must have contributed to the terminal decline of Hawkesbury which never reopened but it 
allowed Exhall to grow. The colliery had an output in 1892 of 450 tons for an eight and a half 
hour shift. It employed five hundred in the 1890’s rising to seven hundred by 1902 and 
reached a thousand in 1909.
273
 
Two new collieries were developed in the south, both with Scottish owners, although 
neither reached large colliery status until the 1920’s. To the east of Coventry was the green 
field site of Binley Colliery.
274
 The owners were Merry and Cunningham, Glasgow coal and 
iron masters. William McKee was manager from its sinking in 1907 until he retired in 1935. 
He was a native of Glasgow and had been manager of a colliery near Paisley for ten years 
before moving to England. One of his first tasks was to cut railway siding to the main line to 
bring in heavy equipment for the sinking of the two 813 feet shafts. They also had to build 
Binley village to house the miners.
275
 The List of Mines shows that they signed the special 
rules in 1908 and began producing the two yard seam in 1910. Numbers employed increased 
from thirty-eight in 1907 to one hundred in 1909, two hundred in 1911 and three hundred and 
sixty-five in 1913.
276
 It did not develop into a major colliery until the 1920’s and closed in 
1963. Coventry Colliery was situated to the west of Bedworth in the village of Keresley. It 
was owned by the Warwickshire Coal Company whose offices were in Lanarkshire.
277
 This 
was the successor to the Wyken Colliery Company and indeed Liddel, who was the manager 
of Wyken when it closed in 1910, became the manager of Coventry colliery when it began 
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exploratory diggings in 1911.
278
 The List of Mines shows a slow increase in manpower from 
one hundred and thirteen in 1912 to two hundred and forty-two in 1913 but it did not begin 
production until 1918. By 1920 it employed four hundred and fifty and was working the slate 
seam.
279
 The two twenty-one foot diameter shafts commenced in May 1912 and were finally 
completed in October 1917. An undated British Coal publication entitled Coventry Colliery 
published in the 1980’s states; ‘The shafts, which passed through water bearing strata, were 
brick lined to a depth of 146 metres (479 feet) after which they were concrete lined to a depth 
of 663 metres, (2,175 feet) making them the deepest workings in the area.’280 The 1918 
weekly production of 500 tons was to rise to 5,000 tons by 1930. In 1919 a railway branch 
line was built, and like Binley, the company built a mining village at Keresley Newlands 
where the terraced houses were afforded the luxury for the time of indoor toilets. Coventry 
Colliery closed in 1993.
281
 
In the central area a number of collieries moved onto the concealed coalfield to exploit 
the virgin coal. The first was Hall End, part of Birch Coppice Colliery, sunk to 825 feet in 
1875 to the seven foot coal seam. One shaft had a sixteen foot diameter but the other was a 
fifteen foot elliptical shape as it was intended as an upcast furnace ventilation shaft. It was 
owned by J. Morris, F. Morris, C. Morris and Mrs E. Ranson, the granddaughter of Peter 
Shaw, but retained the trade name of Morris and Shaw. In 1875 a small gauge mineral railway 
was built from the colliery via Birchmoor to the canal wharf at Polesworth and in 1878 a 
standard gauge railway was also built south to join the Baddesley Colliery branch line to 
Kingsbury where it joined the Midland Railway. A brickyard was also built at the colliery in 
1879. An underground stationary steam engine drew tubs up an incline on a haulage rope, but 
after the 1882 Baddesley Colliery disaster that was caused by an underground engine all 
collieries that worked such an engine began to feel uneasy. It was not until 1909 that an 
endless rope haulage system driven by compressed air was installed. Air was pumped down 
the downcast shaft in steel pipes sealed together inside the shaft. Compressed air enabled 
them to modernise tasks such as drilling on the coalface, in headings and on rips. On the 
surface the compressed air allowed them to replace the old shaker screens with more efficient 
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screen conveyers. These were not conveyer belts but a series of metal plates fixed onto a 
square linked chain. By 1902 Hall End was the largest mine in Warwickshire and was one of 
only two mines to employ over a thousand men.
282
 It was to retain this premier position until 
1913 when it was superseded by Kingsbury and the Nuneaton colliery of Tunnel. It was then 
one of eight mines to employ over a thousand men.
283
 Production came to a standstill 
however in 1910 after lightning struck the wooden headgear and started a fire on the grease 
and oil that had dropped onto the woodwork.
284
 Because of the Law of Egress of 1863, only 
thirty men were allowed to work in a mine that had only one operational shaft. This was the 
result of the Hartley Colliery disaster when the beam of a pumping engine fell into the shaft 
destroying the lining and over two hundred lives were lost as there was no other shaft by 
which they could escape. In 1910 the List of Mines shows Hall End employing 1,200 
underground, with 386 supporting them on the surface.
285
 To be allowed only thirty men 
underground was just enough to perform routine maintenance, pumping and repair work. 
Birchmoor had closed in 1899 but plans were made to reopen one of the shafts. They also 
began sinking a shaft at Wood End in 1911. Both Birchmoor and Wood End – called Hall End 
Number Three – opened in 1914. A small gauge mineral railway was laid from Wood End to 
Birch Coppice to enable all Wood End coal to be screened there. Haulage was achieved by 
means of an endless rope with the engine house in the sidings at Birch Coppice and a large 
fan was placed at Wood End making it the upcast shaft of the entire Birch Coppice mine 
complex.
286
 
In 1894 the Hockley Hall and Whately Colliery sank a third colliery two miles south-
west of Whately at Kingsbury with the intention of working the rider and bare coal seams. 
The shafts were deliberately located near the Kingsbury to Baddesley colliery mineral 
railway spur built in 1878. At that point the bare coal lay at 624 feet and the coal measures 
dip to the east at an inclination of one in fourteen. Both shafts were sixteen feet diameter and 
165 feet apart. The sinking proved to be particularly difficult and merited an article in the 
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 List of Mines 1902. 
283
 List of Mines 1913. 
284
 For a description of this see Nuneaton Observer, 10 June 1910. The month to repair the damage cost £2,000. 
285
 List of Mines 1910. 
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 L. Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume One (Warwick, c2005) pp 174-96. 
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Federation of Mining Engineers journal of 1897.
287
 A sinker was killed in 1895 suffocated by 
black damp gas, and necessitated the erection of two large fans to air the shafts before work 
could continue. Water was encountered at 135 feet and 195 feet and special sinking pumps 
had to be purchased to cope with the inflow of 60,000 gallons an hour. Unfortunately it was 
not until after the roadways and coalface had been established that it was discovered that the 
shafts had been situated in an unproductive area. The coal from the first two coalfaces ran out 
to be replaced by shale and bind. A ‘washout’ had occurred back in the carboniferous era 
when an ancient river had washed away the coal bearing deposits and replaced them with 
alluvial material. Whately Colliery had previously encounted the washout which they 
described as a ‘dumb fault’, meaning a fault that did not conform to any logical explanation. 
However the ninety-three yard washout at Whately had widened to three quarters of a mile at 
Kingsbury. A bore hole survey revealed that at Kingsbury the washout split into three 
channels forming two islands and it was on the eastern island that Kingsbury shafts had been 
sunk. As commercially extractable coal was over half a mile away, this added to costs.
288
 
Despite this inauspicious start Kingsbury soon developed into one of the premiere 
Warwickshire collieries. By 1905 the Mine Inspector reports attributes fatalities not to 
Hockley Hall Colliery but to the newly named Kingsbury Colliery Company.
289
 In that year 
the List of Mines records Whately employing 321 with Kingsbury over three times that at 
995. By 1913 Whately still employed only 374 but Kingsbury had doubled in size to 1,874 
miners to become the largest colliery in Warwickshire.
290
  
Pooley Hall Colliery had closed in 1890 but a new two shaft colliery was sunk in 1896 by 
a syndicate of owners. This well capitalised colliery became a large enterprise with its own 
brickworks that manufactured heavy bricks from carboniferous clod that would otherwise 
have been thrown on the slag heap.
291
 A seven foot seam was abandoned in 1901 but bench 
coal was always produced, supplemented by rider through 1905-7 and double coal 1905-6 
and 1911-13. Pooley Hall employed 387 in 1902 rising to 457 in 1911, 509 in 1912 and had 
                                                 
287
 J. Kendrick, ‘Sinking Operations at Kingsbury Colliery, Warwickshire’, Federation of Mining Engineers 
Journal 13 (1896-97) 259-76. 
288
 L. Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume One (Warwick, c2005) pp. 1-11. 
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 Annual Report of Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1905. 
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 List of Mines 1905 to 1913. 
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 L. Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume One (Warwick, c2005) pp. 96-119. 
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doubled to 1,374 in 1920. Indeed in 1913 it was the third largest colliery in the northern 
coalfield behind Kingsbury and Hall End.
292
 
Sunk in 1902 to a depth of 957 feet, Arley Colliery signed the special rules in July 1903. 
Its owner was Charles Knox. The List of Mines shows that the colliery extracted the two yard, 
and sometimes the slate seam. It employed around five hundred and fifty until 1908, rose to 
eight hundred and eighty in 1909 and exceeded a thousand in 1910.
293
 Situated deep in the 
heart of the concealed coalfield in an area noted for agricultural rather than mining 
employment, Arley needed to provide homes for its growing workforce. The school was 
expanded in 1908 from sixty to two hundred pupils with the cost of £750 met by local 
subscriptions.
294
 Old Arley expanded in 1916 but the new village of New Arley was 
constructed in 1924. The colliery provided water, electricity and the ambulance for the four 
hundred and fifty houses which were served by a village green, pub, village hall and 
recreation ground. The incomers were from the Black Country, South Wales, Lancashire, 
Northumberland and Durham and even the Forest of Dean.
295
 
By 1913 the List of Mines showed Warwickshire with eight collieries employing over a 
thousand colliers. 
296
 These were Kingsbury 1,870, Tunnel 1,760, Hall End 1,650, Nuneaton 
1,300, Arley 1,280, Griff Clara 1,280, Exhall 1,140, Baddesley 1,050 and Newdigate just 
below with 940. If combined with their other collieries three companies employed over two 
thousand men. These were Haunchwood with 2,300, Kingsbury with 2,250 and Stanley 
Brothers employing 2,200. With nearly two thirds of miners employed in the new deep pits 
Warwickshire could be classified as a modern if relatively small, expanding coalfield. 
However a number of these new mines like Arley, Binley and Coventry would not achieve 
full production until the 1920’s. This era of expansion was accompanied by an increase in the 
number of fatalities, even if that increase was a relative decline when compared to the 
numbers employed. The next chapter will investigate the causes of deaths in the mines and 
how these changed during the period of study. 
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 List of Mines 1905 to 1913. 
293
 List of Mines 1903 to 1913. 
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 Arley Colliery contributed £175 to this. Nuneaton Observer, 4 September 1908. When they then tried to sack 
the head teacher for poor discipline and lack of pupil progress she escaped dismissal citing the disruption of the 
building programme and shortage of teaching staff. Nuneaton Observer, 30 October 1908. 
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Chapter Three: Death on the Warwickshire coalfield 
Who is to blame for a death in the workplace? Is it the victim due to their 
carelessness or failure to follow the correct procedure; is it the company for failing to 
put adequate safety regulations in place, or is it the State for failing to protect its 
working citizens? Or is it a mixture of the above? The coal industry of the 19
th
 century 
had a reputation for danger and many talked fatalistically of the blood on the coal 
being a necessary cost of its extraction.
1
 Mining fatalities tended to grab the headlines 
like airplane crashes of today, but just as such crashes do not typify airline safety, 
mining disasters do not condemn the coal industry. The Registrar General’s Annual 
Report on Births, Deaths and Marriages, published from 1860, reveal that mining 
fatalities were always below that of general labourers, agricultural labourers and the 
building trade, and from the 1880’s, below the national average.2 Miners were a select 
body of men, paid a premium for their hard physical work and those who could not 
demonstrate the required level of fitness and strength were excluded from the elite 
position of hewer.
3
 Nevertheless death was no stranger to the industry. As Benson 
notes: ‘Between 1868 and 1919 a miner was killed every six hours, seriously injured 
every two hours and injured badly every two or three minutes.’4 
This chapter begins with an examination of the impact on the industry of the 
establishment in 1850 of a Mine Inspectorate with the responsibility to record each 
fatal accident and present an annual report to parliament. The following five sections 
reflect the categories chosen by the Inspectors to record fatalities. Although falls of 
coal accounted for around forty per cent
5
 of all deaths in the industry and were the 
                                                 
1 This is common in coroner’s inquests concerning falls of coal. For example the inquest into the death 
of a Wyken Colliery deputy from slip joints the report stated no blame on the management, the 
deceased or those that worked around him but a ‘sad consequence’ of the nature of the work. Nuneaton 
Observer, 8 November 1878. In 1891 Inspector Stokes mirrored these sentiments saying ‘they paid the 
penalty of a dangerous occupation.’ Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division. 1891. 
2 
R. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three 1830 to 1914 (Oxford, 1986) p. 
584. 
3 
A hewer cut coal at the coal face. 
4 
J. Benson, British Coalminers in the 19
th
 century (Dublin, 1980) p. 47. 
5 
Percentages are taken for the industry as a whole reported in the Annual Reports 1872 to 1913. The 
Act of that year required a precision that was lacking in earlier reports. 
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largest single cause, they lacked the drama of an explosion as they tended to affect a 
single collier on each incident. Shaft deaths, which were around ten per cent of the 
total, were of declining importance as the period progressed. Most falls down the 
shaft, roughly half the totals of shaft deaths occurred in the first twenty years of 
reporting and were largely eliminated by the introduction of lifting fences and the 
move from skip to cage winding.
6
 Underground haulage deaths were almost twenty-
five per cent of the Warwickshire total and some ten percent above the national 
average.
7
 This can partly be explained by the additional danger of working on a steep 
incline but the mean age of death of only twenty years compared to the thirty-two 
years for falls of coal reflects the youth of many oncost workers. Warwickshire deaths 
from gas explosions and explosives were below the national average. Gas explosions 
accounted for seven per cent of Warwickshire deaths with a further two per cent from 
suffocation and two per cent from explosives. Deaths at the surface reveal that the 
county suffered roughly half the national figure of fourteen per cent, most of which 
were banksmen being crushed by wagons. Why this figure should be so much lower 
than elsewhere in the coal industry is more difficult to comprehend. Section seven 
examines the minor factors that contributed to fatalities. Despite Warwickshire’s 
perennial problems with drainage, there was only a single case of death from flooding 
and a similar small number of machinery fatalities. The few sundry deaths and deaths 
from natural causes both increase from 1900 suggesting an increased awareness of 
these rather than a new phenomenon. Section eight explores the difficulties of 
obtaining figures for non-fatal accidents prior to the adoption of a standard system of 
reporting in the early 20
th
 century. Section nine charts the emerging awareness of 
occupational disease that the medical profession in this period of coalfield expansion 
appeared powerless to address. In the final section the figures for Warwickshire are 
then compared with the national statistics for the industry as a whole. On lives lost for 
each ton of coal raised Warwickshire emerges as the most dangerous of the Midland 
                                                 
6 
A skip was an open container used to transport men and equipment in the shaft. A cage was a covered 
enclosure that performed these tasks. 
7 
The increased mechanisation of underground haulage in the late century meant that in the first decade 
of the 20
th
 century national haulage deaths were closer to 20 per cent, nearer the Warwickshire mean. 
See B. Duckham ‘Reduction of Accidents’ in introduction to 1969 edition R. Galloway, A History of 
Coal Mining in Great Britain (London, 1882). 
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District, but when it is compared with the national figures for lives lost per thousand 
employed, it is below the national average and therefore a relatively safe coalfield. 
The reasons for this will be explored below. 
Reporting Fatalities in the Coal Industry 
Table 3:1 Deaths on the Warwickshire Coalfield 1851 to 1913 
Year Total Numbers of Deaths Mean Deaths per Year 
1851-1860 
1861-1870 
1871-1880 
1881-1890 
1891-1900 
1901-1910 
1911-1913 
64 
68 
60 
76 
73 
134 
54 
6.4 
6.8 
6.0 
7.6 
7.3 
13.4 
18 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851-1913 
Before the mid 19
th
 century there was no systematic collection of fatalities in the 
coal industry and John Sykes’ locally compiled lists of deaths from disasters in the 
North-East were presented to an 1835 Select Committee as the only available 
statistics of fatalities.
8
 The more usual single death was hardly deemed worthy of 
mention with the respected viewer John Buddle,
9
 who ran Lord Londonderry’s 
collieries in the North-East, able to record in the company book; ‘no accident of 
consequence has occurred except a man being killed.’10 The Chief Constable of 
Oldham reported to the Children’s Employment Commissioner that so many were 
killed in the mines that it was customary to dismiss a reported fatality as ‘only a 
collier,’11 and in South Wales the coroner did not bother to hold an inquest on a miner 
until he had five of six cases to dispose of together.
12
 Such a view could not survive 
                                                 
8 
C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 
2010) pp. 40-6. The 1835 Select Committee was the first government investigation into mining 
accidents. See Report of the Select Committee on Accidents in Mines (1835) 603. 
9 
ODNB: John Buddle (1773-1843). 
10 
J. Buddle, place book, Londonderry papers, DCRO D/Lo/B 311 p. 14. 
11 Children’s Employment Commission (1842) LX111 1334-5. See also M. Pollard, The Hardest Work 
Under Heaven: the life and death of the British coal miner (London, 1984) p. 105. 
12 
B. Job, 'The British Mine Inspectorate 1851 to 1913: Its Development and Effectiveness with 
particular reference to colliery explosions’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Keele 1992) p. 299. 
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the publicity that surrounded the publication of the 1842 Report
13
 and in 1850 it 
became a statutory duty to report all mining fatalities in the Annual Mine Inspector 
Reports. Table 3.1 shows there were 550 deaths of Warwickshire miners between 
1851 and 1913, an average of 8.73 a year. Of these 537 were in coal mines, two in 
clay pits and eleven in attached ironstone mines. Table 3.2 reveals that these occurred 
in forty-two different collieries.
14
 Caution needs to be employed in any attempt to 
compare collieries. Baddesley figures includes the single Warwickshire disaster of 
1882, when nine men suffocated in an underground fire and twenty-three would-be-
rescuers were killed in a gas explosion. The top nine on the list were in operation 
throughout the period, whereas others like Hob Lane and Station survived but a few 
years of exploitation. Hawkesbury had a number of separate collieries in the boom of 
the 1870’s, yet all owned by the same company and working the same area. The 
neighbouring colliery of Griff, working a similar acreage, never gave its pits colliery 
status. Similarly Glascote and Amington were always classed as separate collieries yet 
possessed the same owner, whereas Haunchwood kept its large sister pit Tunnel, 
under one colliery umbrella. 
  
                                                 
13 
In the Quarterly Review, June 1842 R. Fergusson commended the Report for letting the public know 
the ‘true condition of the mining population’ and ‘forcing by the weight of opinion some amelioration.’ 
p 159. The Morning Chronicle, 10 May 1842 described it as ‘a volume of travels in a remote and 
barbarous country.’ Lord Ashley recorded in his diary the debt to this publicity and that the public were 
‘doing wonderfully.’ G. Best, Shaftsbury (London, 1964) p. 86. 
14 
Only 36 collieries are listed here. Some closed and reopened later but were classed by the 
Inspectorate as a new colliery. 
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Table 3:2 Deaths in Warwickshire Collieries 1851 to 1913 
Deaths Colliery Deaths Colliery Deaths Colliery 
66 
47 
43 
38 
32 
31 
30 
27 
26 
21 
21 
19 
Baddesley 
Griff 
Birch Coppice 
Hawkesbury 
Charity 
Haunchwood 
Wyken 
Nuneaton 
Exhall 
Newdigate 
Victoria 
Glascote 
16 
14 
14 
13 
10 
9 
8 
8 
7 
6 
4 
4 
Alvecote 
Amington 
Stockingford 
Ansley Hall 
Wilnecote 
Tame Valley 
Arley 
Pooley Hall 
Whateley 
Craven 
Polesworth: Shaw 
Kettlebrook: Dumulo 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Binley 
Collycroft 
Polesworth: Hambury 
Bedworth: Thomas 
Hob Lane 
Hockley Hall 
Nuneaton Clay 
Nuneaton New 
Kettlebrook: Hambury 
Peel 
Station: Shaw 
Ironstone Mine 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports: Midland Division 1851 to 1913. 
In 1850 four Mine Inspectors were appointed for the whole of Britain, rising to 
six in 1852.
15
 In 1855 this number rose again to twelve and Warwickshire was placed 
in the four county Midland Division.
16
 These twelve mining divisions were to last 
until the reorganisation of 1910.
17
 Each annual report listed deaths under the headings 
of gas explosions, shaft deaths, falls of roof and side, miscellaneous underground and 
surface deaths. From 1856 the Reports attempted to analyse each death and draw any 
conclusions in proffered advice. The Annual Report presented to parliament consisted 
of the twelve divisional reports with aggregated data to produce national statistics and 
an introduction that synthesized the Inspectors’ concerns and recommendations. In the 
following analysis the fatality followed by a year refers to the Midland Mine 
Inspector report from that year.
18
 Miners’ trade unions constantly criticised the 
Inspectorate for failing to take a more proactive role in accident prevention by visiting 
                                                 
15 
The first Inspectors were J. Blackwell; M. Dunn; J. Dickinson and C. Morton. Blackwell resigned in 
1851 to be replaced by H. Mackworth. In 1852 they were joined by two more; W. Lancaster and T. 
Wynne. For biographical details see B. Job, 'The British Mine Inspectorate 1851 to 1913: Its 
Development and Effectiveness with particular reference to colliery explosions’, (Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Keele 1992) pp. 39-45. 
16 
This was the four counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Warwickshire. 
17 
The Divisions were Scotland (West and East); the North-East; Cumberland; Lancashire and Cheshire; 
North Wales; Yorkshire; Midlands; North Staffordshire; West Midlands; South Wales and the South-
West. Map of areas B. Job, 'The British Mine Inspectorate 1851 to 1913: Its Development and 
Effectiveness with particular reference to colliery explosions’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Keele 1992) p. 49. 
18 
The Inspector for Warwickshire was Charles Morton (1850-55); John Hedley (1855-64); Thomas 
Evans (1865-86); Arthur Stokes (1886-1909); William Walker (1909) and Hugh Johnson (1910-13). 
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and inspecting more collieries before accidents had occurred,
19
 but even when they 
were given an assistant Inspector from 1872, they lacked the manpower for more than 
sample inspections of a small number of collieries.
20
 In 1900 Inspector Stokes 
reported that he had travelled 15,950 miles by road and rail, had spent 288 days away 
from home and had attended 53 inquests. His two deputies reported similar 
schedules.
21
 It is difficult to imagine how this workload could be increased without 
additional manpower. 
Deaths from Falls of Coal 
Table 3:3 Deaths from Falls of Coal in Warwickshire Collieries 1851 to 1913 
Colliery Numbers Colliery Numbers Colliery Numbers 
Griff 
Birch Coppice 
Nuneaton 
Haunchwood 
Baddesley 
Charity 
Newdigate 
Hawkesbury 
Wyken 
27 
21 
16 
15  
14 
14 
14 
11 
11 
Glascote 
Kingsbury 
Stockingford 
Amington 
Exhall 
Victoria 
Alvecote 
Tame Valley 
Ansley Hall 
9 
8 
8 
7 
7 
6 
5 
5 
4 
Whateley 
Wilnecote 
Arley 
Pooley Hall 
Collycroft 
Binley 
Craven 
Station:Shaw 
 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
 
 Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1951 to 1913. 
Between 1851 and 1913 221 Warwickshire miners were killed in roof or side 
falls, of coal. This equated to 40.18 per cent of the total number of deaths and was the 
greatest cause of mining fatalities. This is comparable with the national figure of 
42.80 per cent.
22
 Table 3.4 shows that deaths rose with production and that those 
deaths were concentrated between the ages of twenty-one and forty, with a mean age 
of thirty-two. The Mine Inspectors Reports began listing the occupations of those that 
died from the mid 1870’s. This data shows that hewers, described as stallmen, getters, 
holers and headers, comprise 56 per cent of the total deaths with loaders accounting 
for another 12 per cent. Thus approximately two-thirds of deaths from falls of coal 
                                                 
19 
See for example R. Page Arnot, The Miners: Years of Struggle: a History of the MFGB from 1910 
(London, 1953) pp. 38-41 and 48. 
20 
A. Bryan, The Evolution of Health and Safety in Mines (Letchworth, 1975) pp. 54-62. 
21 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division. 1900 p. 39. 
22 
Warwickshire figures calculated from Annual Reports of the Inspectors of Mines 1851 to 1913. 
National figures are taken from the same source 1873 to 1913. 
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were suffered by face workers. Those involved in mine maintenance, described 
mainly as datallers and daymen, made up another 20 per cent of the total.
23
 From two 
official reports of 1889 and 1905 Church calculated that face workers in the Midland 
Division comprised 62 to 68 percent of underground workers and mine maintenance 
workers 11 to 12 per cent of the total.
24
 Proportionally speaking it was slightly more 
dangerous to work on mine maintenance than at the face. One explanation could be 
that the daymen were less experienced than the permanently employed and higher 
paid stallmen. 
  
                                                 
23 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1873 to 1913. 
24 
R. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three 1830 to 1914 (Oxford, 1986) pp. 
212-14.  
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Table 3:4 Deaths from Falls of Coal 
(a) Total Number of Deaths (red line indicates mean per year) 
 
(b) Ages 
 
To compare the dangers of differently sized coalfields, mining inspectors used the 
expedient of comparing the number of deaths with the tonnage of coal raised. By this 
measure Inspector Headley in 1857 found Warwickshire the worst of his four charges, 
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with twice the deaths of Derby and Nottingham, and three times the deaths of 
Leicestershire.
25
 In 1857 nine were killed in Warwickshire raising 400,000 tons, one 
every 45,000 tons. In Derby and Nottingham forty-two were killed raising 3,600,000 
tons, one every 85,000 tons and in Leicestershire four killed raising 700,000 tons, one 
every 175,000 tons. He identified the three main reasons for this as the dangerous 
character of the roof, the highly inclined seams that dipped from six inches to twenty-
six inches a yard and averaged out at twelve inches, and that as the seam was 
intersected with numerous joints and with the slope, large masses of coal frequently 
rolled out suddenly at the face. Headley concluded his report by stating that: ‘The 
danger from accidents by falls of coal and roof is consequently greater than 
elsewhere.’26 These small faults with a throw27 of a few inches, were known as slips, 
and encountered at every colliery on a daily basis. Fretwell, a Warwickshire deputy 
and mining archaeologist, noted: 
Slip faults caused no economic problem for any colliery, but in the days 
before mechanical mining, they were extremely dangerous for the 
individual miner. This was because slip faults were the equivalent to a 
break in the strata. Therefore any pit prop set to support the roof, could 
not hold the roof on both sides of the slip fault. Due to the pressure of 
work and the time allowed to do it, some miners did not always set extra 
roof supports but simply set the amount prescribed by the Mines and 
Quarries Act.
28
 
Experienced hewers could spot slip faults as they sometimes, but not always, 
produced a stereotypical wet area while the roof a few yards to either side was dry. 
Deaths were common. In 1901 slips caused deaths at Tunnel, Wyken and Griff Clara. 
Bumps, the consequence of the unstable character of the roof, caused deaths at 
Charity in 1907, Stockingford in 1909, Griff No 4 in 1910 and Newdigate in 1914.
29
 
                                                 
25 
Annual: Report of the Inspector of Mines Midland Division 1857. 
26 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1857. 
27 
A throw was a break in the strata resulting in a change in the direction of the coal measures. 
28 
L. Fretwell, The Warwickshire Coalfield Volume One (Warwick, undated c2005) p. 111. 
29 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1901, 1907, 1909, 1910 and 1914. 
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Sometimes an ominous sound in the roof was a prelude to a fall and in 1907 an Exhall 
miner unable to flee took refuge under an upturned tub and was rescued unhurt five 
hours later.
30
 Inspector Stokes could lament in 1891 that; ‘in a large number of falls 
no blame could be attached, and miners simply paid the penalty of a dangerous 
occupation.’31 
Despite this acceptance of danger, inspectors continually made the call for an 
increased observance of safety measures. In 1856 Hedley talks of miners being ‘so 
neglectful of lost lives,’32 and in 1875 Evans asks why ‘many experienced colliers are 
so incompetent.’33 Such a view was voiced as early as the first Select Committee to 
investigate Accidents in Mines in 1835 which attributed some accidents to; ‘a wanton 
neglect of ordinary caution and a recklessness of danger in defiance of common 
discretion.’34 This entrenched practice of risk taking by experienced miners will be 
addressed in Chapter Four.
35
 Stokes in 1892 stressed that ‘Miners should be reminded 
that economy of either timber or labouring setting the same, ought never to be 
considered when circumstances arise which render danger to life or limb even 
remotely possible.’36 In 1875 Evans listed the main causes of preventable deaths as 
holing without sufficient sprags (the short pit prop), working under a roof after being 
cautioned of its danger, passing in front of coal already holed and the sprags knocked 
out, and going into working places after the shot has been fired without properly 
examining the roof. All could be summarised as increased vigilance in a dangerous 
                                                 
30 
Nuneaton Observer, 8 February 1907. 
31 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1891. 
32 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1856. 
33 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1875. The risk taking of miners will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
34 
Report of the Select Committee on Accidents in Mines (1835) 603 V1. 
35 
For example in 1900 an experienced Griff Colliery stallman fatally ignored safety procedures to 
bring down coal. At the Inquest the coroner concluded that ‘he endeavoured to be too clever by doing 
things quicker than anybody else.’ Nuneaton Observer, 20 July 1900. 
36 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1892. 
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environment.
37
 Stokes codified four precautions to limit deaths by falls in a circular 
dated August 1899,
38
 which was sent to all owners, agents and managers of mines: 
1. A supply of suitable timber kept ready for use in each working plane. 
2. Increased supervision by mine officials and stricter enforcement of rules. 
3. A ringer and chain used to withdraw timber. 
4. Systematic timbering and spragging of the working place. 
Free timber had traditionally been the responsibility of the owner, and Stokes 
talks of ‘little complaint in my district.’ 39 It would appear that this was not a problem. 
Only in 1852 was a death, at Charity Colliery, attributed to ‘lack of timber.’40 Thirty 
men led by butties, worked the mine, and a visit of the bailiff or steward to inspect 
safety and conditions was only made once a month. Mine officials, the undermanager 
and the deputy, were responsible for the supervision of safety standards. This sub-
contracting butty system prevailed throughout the early 19
th
 century in 
Warwickshire
41
 and it was a temptation of men paid by the stint to cut corners on 
safety. The Special Rules 
42
 of 1888 required a visit by an official every shift and the 
1899 circular speaks of the beneficial results of inspecting every two and a half hours. 
The 1888 Special Rule 71 stated that timber should not be withdrawn without a ringer 
and chain.
43
 This allowed the collier to stand some feet away under a securely 
supported roof and withdraw timber with safety. Despite such rules men would still 
stand under an unsupported roof and knock out timber with a hammer. At Hall End in 
1890, Whateley in 1896, and Wyken in 1905,
44
 this lax method of extracting timber 
                                                 
37 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1875. 
38 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1899. 
39 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mine: Midland Divisions. 1899. 
40 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: 1852. 
41
The butty system is discussed in Chapter Five. 
42 
General Rules were established by the Act of 1855. These were rules of good practice that were made 
compulsory to all mines. There were no general rules for extracting coal because of wide variations in 
coal seams in different coalfields, so these were part of Special Rules drawn up in each District to take 
cognisance of local conditions. 
43
 In 1909 as part of the Royal Commission a committee to inquire into falls of coal recommended that 
the removal of timber by a ringer and chain should be adopted by all ‘as used in the Midland coalfield.’ 
This suggests that it was not a universal practice. Nuneaton Observer, 22 October 1909. 
44 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1890, 1896 and 1905. 
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was attributed as the cause of death. Even using a ringer and chain could not eliminate 
all danger. At Ansley Hall in 1909 a dayman used a Sylvester ringer and chain to 
withdraw sprags but the prop on which it was placed was pulled out and the resulting 
fall of coal killed him and injured another.
45
 The systematic timbering and spragging 
of the working place was impossible to prescribe. In 1892 Stokes noted that miners 
should consider ‘the nature of the roof, the system of working coal, the customs of the 
district and so varied instructions as should relate to the peculiarities of the particular 
mine.’46 A minimum of six feet had been recommended by Headley as early as 
1856,
47
 but given the special peculiarities of the Warwickshire coal seams,
48
 final 
judgement had to rest with the hewer. Yet even Johnson, the leader of the 
Warwickshire Miners’ Association, questioned this in 1890 as being too prescriptive 
suggesting that they ‘could often at safety be used at greater distances.’49 The courts 
however would accept no excuses. In 1891 two experienced Griff stallmen had left an 
area without sprags claiming that as the colliery was standing for three days they 
would remove the fallen coal on their return. This was a violation of General Rule 72 
which stated that no stall should be left in an unsafe condition and the men were fined 
£1:3:0.
50
 At Hall End in 1887, Charity in 1895, Birch Coppice in 1896 and Tunnel in 
1900, men died because of ‘insufficient sprags.’51 
  
                                                 
45 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1909. 
46 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1892. 
47 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1856. 
48 
The Warwickshire seams were on a dip that averaged at 30 degrees. 
49 
Nuneaton Observer, 25 April 1890. 
50 
Nuneaton Petty Sessions, Nuneaton Observer, 27 March 1891. 
51 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1887, 1895, 1896 and 1900. 
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Shaft Deaths 
Table 3:5 Shaft Deaths in Warwickshire Collieries 1851 to 1913 
Colliery Deaths Colliery Deaths 
Hawkesbury 
Glascote 
Victoria 
Haunchwood 
Nuneaton 
Baddesley 
Griff 
Wilnecote 
Wyken 
Exhall 
Alvecote 
11 
6 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
1 
Bedworth: Thomas 
Craven 
Hall End 
Kingsbury 
Newdigate 
Peel 
Polesworth: Hambury 
Polesworth: Shaw 
Pooley Hall 
Tame Valley 
Whateley 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913. 
Between 1851 and 1913 fifty-six miners were killed in shaft accidents, some 
10.18 per cent of the total and comparable with the national figure of 9.09 per cent.
52
 
Table 3.6 shows that there was no correlation between age and shaft deaths, but there 
were no ages given in the ten shaft deaths reported between 1851 and 1855. The 
causes are categorised as a fall down the shaft, seventeen; a fall part way down or 
working in the shaft, ten; crushed or caught by the cage, nine; a fall from the cage, 
seven; something falling down the shaft, seven; and a cage fall, six. One man was 
killed in all cases with the single exception of November 1910 when a rope break and 
subsequent cage fall at Nuneaton Colliery led to the death of three miners.
53
 The 
circumstances surrounding a fall from a cage were not always given, but at Wilnecote 
in 1871 a 30 year old miner ‘had a fit’ and at Glascote in 1879 a 20 year old fainted 
and fell when taking an injured boy up the shaft.
54
  
  
                                                 
52 
Warwickshire figures are taken from Annual Reports of the Inspectors of Mines 1851 to 1913. 
National figures are taken from the same source 1873 to 1913. 
53 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1910. Inquest, Nuneaton Observer, 11 
November 1911. 
54 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1871 and 1879. 
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Table 3:6 Shaft Deaths 
(a) Total 
 
(b) Ages 
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No deaths were caused directly from overwinding
55
 but at Baddesley in 1855 five 
miners were being drawn up the shaft when an engineman was distracted by a 
talkative man in the engine house. As the cage was drawn up to the pulley a boy took 
fright and jumped out of the cage, falling down the shaft.
56
 Unfortunately the 
regulation banning others from the engine house when the winding engine was in 
operation was not yet in force.
57
 Deaths from falling objects included two pumps, a 
broken block, a brick and lumps of coal. Indeed at Glascote in November 1864 and 
again in December, miners were killed by falling coal.
58
 A sad death occurred at 
Wyken in February 1902 when a forty-six year old horse keeper was crushed by a 
descending cage while collecting water for his horse from a pipe at the bottom of the 
shaft.
59
 The most inexplicable occurred at Hawkesbury in 1865 when a fourteen year 
old boy paid the price of trying to jump onto a moving cage.
60
 
Table 3.6 reveals that 48 per cent of deaths had occurred in the first fifteen years 
of reporting. During this period the main problem was the failure to fence shafts and 
the lack of guides
61
 inside. In 1856 Mr Hedley took up his appointment as Mining 
Inspector of the newly created four county Midland Division. He noted that sixteen 
miners had been killed in shaft accidents (three in Warwickshire), and that eight 
deaths had occurred in collieries where there were no guides and where fences were 
only put around the pit top when the colliery was not at work. He concluded the 
provision of fences would have saved three lives, one in Warwickshire.
62
 In 1856 a 
Griff banksman had a fit, and with no fencing, fell down the shaft.
63
 Fencing alone 
could not prevent death highlighted by the Haunchwood miner who in 1857 climbed 
                                                 
55 
Overwinding is when the cage fails to stop at the landing and is drawn towards the pulley.  
56 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1855. 
57 
General Rules were only introduced in 1855. They rose from 7 in 1855 to 15 in 1860, 31 in 1872 and 
39 in 1887. Exclusion of men from the engine house was a later consideration. See A. Bryan, The 
Evolution of Health and Safety in Mines (Letchworth, 1975) pp. 40-5. 
58 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1864. 
59 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1902. 
60 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1865. 
61 
Guides held the cage steady when ascending or descending the shaft and were rails to assist the 
movement of tubs at the surface. 
62 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1856. 
63 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1856. 
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over the fence to place a bottle in the skip, slipped and fell.
64
 The provision of guides 
may have prevented deaths in 1856 when a Victoria miner fell whilst pushing a full 
tub of coal and in the newly sunk Peel pit in 1861 where a labourer fell pushing an 
empty tram because the lifting fences were incomplete.
65
 In response to such deaths 
colliery practice changed and in 1863 Inspector Hedley could report that the 
‘universal practise of applying lifting fences had proved beneficial in preventing such 
accidents.’66 Consequently only three of the seventeen cases of falling down the shaft 
occurred after this date. This was aided by the move from skip winding to cage 
winding. Skip winding was when an open metal container known as a skip was used 
to lower and raise everything from men to ponies down the shaft and raise the coal 
that was produced. A boy would push a trolley over the shaft and step on to the 
platform to unfasten the hook. Drawing 3:1 below clearly illustrates the potential for a 
misfortune. The danger of falling was reduced with the introduction of covered cages 
which also gave some protection from falling objects.
67
 Now the boy could simply 
pull off the tub on guide rails. 
 
Drawing 3:1 A Drawbridge over a Skip. 
Source: Fretwell The Warwickshire Coalfield Volume One p 129. 
                                                 
64 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1857. 
65 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1856 and 1861. 
66 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division. 1863. 
67 
In 1860 the General Rules made it compulsory to have a cover for a skip or a cage. 
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The quality of wire ropes was questioned in 1858 by Inspector Hedley: 
On examining several broken ropes, I have found them composed of a few 
good tough wires, the greater part being very inferior...There being so 
much uncertainty in wire ropes, many owners and managers contemplate 
abandoning their use altogether.
68
 
It was again highlighted in 1893 when Inspector Stokes reported that in the Midland 
division in the last three years there had been thirteen rope breaks, all when no men 
were in the cage and thus no loss of life. In investigating rope breaks he asserted that 
the life of the winding rope was the most important factor: ‘More break from 
weakness due to internal corrosion than being worn out.’69 Although he could not 
state a time for the life of a winding rope, he advised that most managers fix a 
maximum of two to two and a half years,
70
 periodically recap the rope to alter the 
point of pick upon the pulley wheel and test the quality of the rope at the end next to 
the cage. This was good practice as ‘The outside wear or breakage of wires can be 
seen if carefully examined but the internal deterioration a rope may be undergoing 
cannot be seen.’71 In 1910 these words were to be tragically prophetic. Nuneaton 
colliery had a 250 yard up-cast of twelve feet six inches diameter and ran two double 
deck cages. Before the night shift they had tested the rope and guides running the cage 
up and down the shaft. They then lowered a tub of tools and two cages of men. The 
third cage of six men lowered to eighty yards when a rod of one of the guide ropes 
fractured and sloughed or ‘hedgehogged,’ stopping the descent.72 The engineman, 
who did not know that anything was wrong, repeatedly signalled the onsetter,
73
 who 
naturally did not return the signal as there was no cage. Pressured by a deputy, the 
young onsetter eventually returned the signal and the engineman lowered another six 
                                                 
68 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division.1858. 
69 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1893. 
70 In 1900 a rope break killed a Griff Colliery deputy. At the Inquest the coroner’s jury decided that 
despite the engineer’s willingness to repair and reuse the rope four years and eight months was too long 
for usage. Nuneaton Observer, 26 October 1900. 
71 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mine: Midland Divisions 1893. 
72 
A strand of wire had escaped the guides and formed a ball of wire as the cage continued to descend. 
73 
Onsetter supervised traffic into and leaving the pit bottom. 
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man cage. The eighty yards of slack was quickly taken up, lifting the cage off the 
hedgehog. This broke the D link and the cage fell back on the hedgehog and then to 
the bottom. Three men were killed and three injured. The four year old guide rope was 
examined daily by a man riding on the cage and examined by an enginewright and 
carefully callipered two weeks before the accident. Signs of wear were considered 
safe as it was assumed that any wear was even, but when the grease was removed, 
wear was on one side only.
74
 At the inquest the coroner commissioned an expert to 
examine the broken rope and he stated that the life of a rope was between five and ten 
years with the manager of the colliery confirming that seven years use was the usual 
time before replacement.
75
 It would appear that Inspector Stokes’ recommendation of 
two to two and a half years of employment was an optimistic proposal. 
Faulty signalling was a major cause of the Nuneaton tragedy. The onsetter was 
fully aware that he should not have answered the engineman’s signals, but was 
swayed by intimidation or deference to authority. He was cited by the coroner’s jury 
but left the district before he could be accused of manslaughter.
76
 On four occasions 
the enginemen responsible for fatalities due to signalling mistakes were accused of 
manslaughter by the coroner, but acquitted later at Warwickshire assizes. These deaths 
occurred at Glascote in 1870, Whateley in 1878, Alvecote in 1891
77
 and Kingsbury in 
1905.
78
 At Kingsbury the onsetter who worked on contract, had gone to the surface to 
collect money to pay the men, and left a substitute in charge. As a twenty-nine year 
old miner pushed a tub onto the cage, it started and he was crushed between the cage 
and a girder. His decapitated body, together with two full tubs, fell seventy yards into 
the sump.
79
 The coroner’s jury could not apportion blame due to a conflict of 
                                                 
74 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1910. 
75 
Inquest, Nuneaton Observer, 11 and 18 November 1910. 
76 
An Inquest was held into every death in the mine and the Inspector had a statutory duty to attend. The 
findings of the jury were included in the Annual Report. 
77 
Inquest Nuneaton Observer, 28 April 1891. 
78 
Annual Report of the Inspector of mines: Midland Division 1870, 1878, 1891 and 1905. 
79 
A sump was an area below the landing stage used to collect water. 
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evidence. The engineman insisted that he had received the signal, whilst the man at 
the bottom of the shaft testified that none was sent.
80
 
Underground Haulage Deaths 
Table 3:7 Haulage Deaths in Warwickshire Collieries 1851 to 1913 
Colliery Deaths Colliery Deaths 
Wyken 
Charity 
Baddesley 
Birch Coppice 
Hawkesbury 
Griff 
Alvecote 
Victoria 
Exhall 
Ansley Hall 
Haunchwood 
Kettlebrook 
13 
12 
11 
11 
9 
8 
7 
7 
6 
5 
5 
5 
Stockingford 
Amington 
Craven 
Newdigate 
Nuneaton 
Kingsbury 
Wilnecote 
Arley 
Glascote 
Polesworth 
Tame Valley 
Whateley 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913. 
Between 1851 and 1913 one hundred and twenty-three men were killed due to the 
haulage of coal, some 24.17 per cent of the total. This figure was gleaned from the 
general category of miscellaneous underground and is considerably higher than the 
national average of 14.64 per cent. It is interesting to note the change of name of 
underground coal carriers. Twice in the early 1850’s they are referred to as corves by 
Morton, but with the arrival of Hedley as inspector, the name changes to trams. From 
the mid 1860’s Evans and then Stokes invariably call them tubs and that term shall be 
used here.
81
 The greatest cause of fatalities was the sixty individuals who died from 
injuries having being run over on the incline or engine plane. To this may be added 
the seven who were just ‘run over.’ Thirty-two were crushed by tubs, nineteen from 
riding in tubs, eleven from the chain breaking on the incline and two killed by horses. 
In addition one died from being hit with the endless rope
82
 and another from being hit 
by a door pushed open by a tub. We can see from Table 3.8 that as with deaths from 
                                                 
80 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1905. 
81 
Morton 1853 and 1854; Hedley 1859 and 1863, Evans from 1866.Annual Report of the Inspector of 
Mines:  
82 
The endless rope was a system of moving tubs underground by utilising steam power from a 
stationary engine. The inquest revealed the man lost both legs cut off by the rope ‘like a saw.’ Inquest, 
Nuneaton Observer, 17 May 1905. 
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falls of coal, haulage deaths rose with production. This particular tragedy was more 
likely to affect the younger miner
83
 with the mean age of death being only twenty 
years, and the modal age equally (fourteen deaths in both cases) just fourteen and 
sixteen years. 
Table 3:8 Underground Haulage Deaths 
(a) Total 
  
                                                 
83 
The reasons for this will be addressed in Chapter Four. 
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(b) Ages  
 
Youth paid the price for inexperience. Many deaths were of young horse drivers, 
not long in the mine and prone to disobedience. Despite the special rules, many boys 
would ride on tubs which could and did result in them being crushed when they fell 
off or entered a narrow space. Fourteen of the nineteen killed this way were between 
the ages of thirteen and nineteen. The two horse related deaths affected drivers. At 
Hawkesbury in 1885 a seventeen year old driver was kicked by his horse, and at 
Alvecote in 1895 a boy of only thirteen died when he was unable to control his 
runaway.
84
 Poor work practice may also have contributed to a number of preventable 
deaths. In 1889 Inspector Stokes warned that horses should work in shafts to have 
some control over their chains, but at Wyken in 1890; Hall End in 1891 and Wyken 
again in 1892, sling gears led to the death of men and horses.
85
 The Inquest on the 
sixteen year old Hall End driver of 1891 rued the necessity of ‘guiding horses by 
striking them on their flanks as drivers have no other means of exercising control.’86 
Drawing 3:2 below illustrates this hazardous custom of transporting full coal tubs by 
                                                 
84 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1885 and 1895. 
85 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1899, 1890, 1891 and 1892. 
86 
Nuneaton Observer, 24 April 1891. 
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the simple expedient of attaching chains. Tiredness through excessive working may 
have also been a factor in the death of two boys, aged seventeen and eighteen and 
both at Hall End, who in 1896 and 1897 were working double shifts.
87
 The company’s 
search for profits and the lure of additional wages combined to sanction this 
dangerous practice. In 1907 a fourteen year old at Exhall Colliery claimed that he was 
sixteen in an attempt to work overtime and this deceit was a factor in his death.
88
 
Immaturity is the only explanation for the behaviour of a sixteen year old Alvecote 
miner in 1889, who believed he could stop full tubs with his knee in front and his foot 
against the stop block.
89
 
 
Drawing 3:2 Horse in Sling Gears. 
Source: Fretwell The Warwickshire Coalfield Volume One p 24. 
Over half the deaths from haulage, some 53.38 per cent occurred on the incline 
plane. This was the steep slope of thirty degrees and several hundred yards, that 
miners and tubs had to ascend to the bottom of the shaft from the roadway. Manholes 
                                                 
87 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1896 and 1897.This could also apply to 
experienced men. In 1900 a 41 year old Griff dataller was killed working a double shift. Nuneaton 
Observer, 12 October 1900. In 1911 a Griff banksman died after working three consecutive shifts. He 
had worked the Tuesday day shift; grabbed two hours sleep, then worked the night shift and after a 
break of an hour began again on the Wednesday day shift. At the inquest his wife claimed that he did an 
extra shift every week and a witness claimed that ‘he did not appear jaded or tired.’ Nuneaton Observer, 
31 March 1911. 
88 
Boys had to be sixteen to work overtime. Inquest, Nuneaton Observer, 1 February 1907. 
89 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1889. 
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were provided periodically where miners could take refuge from passing trains of 
tubs.
90
 Of the seventy-one deaths only eleven specifically mention chains or couplings 
breaking when tubs are ascending or descending. The greatest number of deaths in 
one incident occurred at Wyken in 1889 when three were killed. After descending the 
shaft, miners had to go down a steep incline of eight hundred yards to reach the 
workings. Men had to walk, but officials were allowed to ride, and when riding, take 
men with them. An official let six men ride with him, but the wire rope broke and the 
tub went off the rails four hundred yards from the top of the incline. The hook had 
been made of inferior iron and the blacksmith testified that he had relied upon the 
maker’s name rather than his professional judgement.91 Runaway tubs were inevitably 
the greatest cause of death. At Charity in 1874 and Alvecote in 1894, the failure to 
place stop blocks led to the incline man to be charged with manslaughter,
92
 but again 
these charges were dismissed at the Warwickshire assizes.
93
 Surprisingly another 
cause of death of experienced miners was walking in front of tubs down inclines. 
Reports of this, where miners were killed after being overpowered by the increasing 
weight and velocity of the tubs, included Ansley Hall in 1875; Wilnecote in 1877; 
Glascote in 1891; Craven in 1893; Baddesley in 1904; Hall End in 1907 and 
Newdigate 1909.
94
 
  
                                                 
90 
The General Rules of 1860 made it compulsory to provide manholes every twenty yards. 
91 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1889. Inquest, Nuneaton Chronicle, 21 
September 1889. 
92 
At Stockingford Colliery in 1892 an incline man escaped the charge of manslaughter as the coroner 
believed he was ‘not possessed of reasonable intellect’ and instead blamed the management for 
employing him. Nuneaton Observer, 18 March 1892. It was traditional to employ boys of eighteen to 
work the jig engine on the incline plane. 
93 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1874 and 1894. 
94 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mine: Midland Division 1875, 1877, 1891, 1893, 1904, 1907 and 
1909. 
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Deaths from Gas Explosions and Explosives 
Table 3:9 Warwickshire Deaths from Gas Explosions and Explosives 1851 to 1913 
Years Gas Explosions Explosives 
1851-1855 
1856-1860 
1861-1865 
1866-1870 
1871-1875 
1976-1880 
1881-1885 
1886-1890 
1891-1895 
1896-1900 
1901-1905 
1906-1910 
1911-1913 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
1 
24 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
1 
2 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913. 
Dangerous gas was present at a number of different coal seams. Miners referred 
to the main gases as choke damp and fire damp. Choke damp is the accumulation of 
carbon monoxide which led to asphyxiation and suffocation. Fire damp is the 
presence of combustible gases like methane which led to explosions. Between 1851 
and 1913 fifteen Warwickshire miners died from suffocation, some 2.72 per cent of 
the total. A further thirty-nine died in gas explosions, some 7.09 per cent, dropping to 
2.9 per cent if the twenty-three deaths from the untypical Baddesley disaster of 1882 
are omitted. Another eleven or two per cent were killed using explosives.
95
 Even 
when considering the Baddesley disaster, deaths from gas explosions was 
considerably less than the national average of 14.02 per cent, and reflects 
Warwickshire’s geological advantage of possessing relatively fewer gassy seams. 
Ventilation of the mines is not just obtaining large quantities of air, but its 
distribution and direction of the air current into the working places. In the early 19
th
 
century mines were small and ventilation was primitive, with the principle imperfectly 
understood. Where there were two shafts, a furnace was placed at the bottom of the 
                                                 
95 
Figures tabulated from Annual Report of the Inspector of Mine 1851 to 1913. 
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upshaft
96
 to pull the air through, and where there was one shaft, a firepan was hung on 
the side of a latticed or divided shaft. In some cases natural ventilation was used, and 
in Warwickshire, this led to fatalities. At Hawkesbury in 1850 a ten year old boy 
suffocated during his first night underground. Inspector Morton discovered that 
although fifty miners worked there, there was no furnace and the air was so bad, it 
was difficult to keep a candle burning. He concluded that the; 
contraction of the air roads was not caused by an unexpected and 
temporary breaking down of the roof, but was the result of long continued 
dilapidation and want of regular repair.
97
 
The owner employed a more knowledgeable agent to improve the ventilation of the 
mine. In 1853 a few miles south of Hawkesbury at an ironstone mine of Victoria 
Colliery, a spontaneous combustion from a gob fire generated a mix of gases known 
locally as ‘fire stink.’ Its vapours were not explosive and candles would burn in it with 
a pale blue halo around the flame. Its smell of; ‘unpurified coal dust produced a pain 
in the head, weakness in limb, dimness of sight, followed by prostration, insensibility 
and death.’98 About a dozen people were rendered helpless and two died. Despite the 
known poor ventilation, the butty had ordered the men to stay in the pit and wait for 
the gases to disperse. Two furnaces were later erected. The dangers of single shaft 
mines caused concern, and in 1861 the manager of Exhall Colliery was prosecuted for 
having a single latticed shaft. The case went to arbitration and James Darlington, a 
Wigan mining engineer and later owner of neighbouring Hawkesbury Colliery, 
recommended replacing wood lattices at the bottom of the furnace shaft for fifteen 
yards with iron, stone or brick brattices, and keeping it clear of soot.
99
 By 1864 
Inspector Evans reported that no colliery in the Midland district was wholly 
dependent on a bratticed shaft for ventilation.
100
 The next reported gas related deaths 
                                                 
96 
In a typical colliery the downshaft was used for manriding and production, and the upshaft for 
ventilation. 
97 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines. 1850. 
98 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines. 1853. 
99 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1861. 
100 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1864. 
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were the nine who suffocated in the Baddesley disaster of 1882. This will be 
addressed below. In 1895 two sinkers at the new Kingsbury Colliery died when they 
were lowered into gas, and in 1913 a Pooley Hall miner died when he lost his way and 
entered old workings.
101
 
Gas explosion fatalities were dominated by the Baddesley disaster of 1882. The 
thirty-two deaths suffered may appear relatively insignificant when compared to other 
coalfield tragedies that claimed the lives of hundreds.
102
 It nevertheless had a 
profound impact on the Warwickshire coalfield and forced many to critically re-
examine the technology they employed in their mines. 
The new Stratford pit at Baddesley had been sunk in 1851 and drained by a 
Speedwell pit. The deep working suffered continuous seepage of water and this was 
collected in a sump at the bottom of the incline. Wooden buckets transferred this 
water up the incline where it could be emptied into the Speedwell water level and then 
pumped from the mine. The buckets leaked and spilled water onto the incline causing 
damage to the roadway and necessitating expensive repairs.
103
 It was evident that an 
alternative method of removing surplus water had to be found. Gillett, the consultant 
mine engineer, suggested an upright boiler placed next to a pumping engine be 
positioned in the return airway. Manager Parker estimated that the pump would only 
be needed for seven hours a week, the time calculated to remove the weekly seepage 
of 4,200 gallons. In deference to safety Gillett insisted that the area above the boiler 
should be clad in brickwork to protect the roof from fire, that a culvert should run 
from the boiler up the airway and that hot ashes should be systematically removed 
from the pit. A local Atherstone bricklayer was chosen to lay the foundation. In his 
evidence to the Inquiry he stated that manager Parker said repeatedly that ‘his hands 
were tied regarding this issue but he would have the arching done after the 
                                                 
101 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1895 and 1913. 
102 
For comparison the worst accident in England was in 1866 at the Oaks Colliery near Barnsley which 
claimed 399 lives. The worst in the UK was at Universal Colliery at Senghenydd in Glamorgan, Wales 
that claimed 438 lives in 1913. The worst recorded mine disaster was in 1942 in Honkeiko Colliery in 
Manchuria, China where 1,549 miners died. 
103 
Gillett evidence to the Inquiry. Reported Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland 
Division. 1882 and Nuneaton Observer, 3 June 1882. 
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opportunity to reduce the water level.’104 The boiler was installed on 14 April 1882 
and predictably the unprotected roof caught fire. Miners would stop to observe this on 
their way to work 
105
 but when this was reported to Parker he did little more than 
provide a hose pipe. Gillett visited the mine with Parker and the agent Mr Podmore on 
26 April when he discovered that the boiler had been in continuous use and that his 
orders for arching had not been carried out.
106
 He did little more than offer his 
protestations and for this he was condemned in the official Inquiry, the two reports of 
Arnold Morley MP
107
 to the House of Commons in 1882 and 1884
108
 and during the 
court case brought against him by members of the Dugdale family at Birmingham 
Assizes in 1885.
109
 
With tragic inevitability the events unfurled. The eight men and a thirteen year old 
boy of the night shift of Monday 1 May 1882 descended the incline at 8-30 pm. 
Around 9 pm Deputy Charles Day discovered deep smoke in the upshaft and sent 
news to manager Parker who called for assistance from the Nuneaton Mine Engineer, 
Reuben Smallman. Smallman led a rescue party down the pit at 10 pm using a cloth 
brattice to force the smoke back down the incline but this group was forced back 
around 5-30 am by gases creeping round the screen. A second rescue group descended 
around 6 am but were rocked by an explosion at 8-30 which sent a fireball up the 
incline. The survivors, all badly burnt, ascended the pit only to find that three of their 
number were missing, necessitating a third rescue. It was only when all would-be-
rescuers were on the surface that they began to die from their horrific burns. On the 
                                                 
104 
Congreave evidence to the Inquiry, in Arnold Morley MP Report Number One (House of Commons 
11 December 1882). 
105 
Thomas Shilton worked the early shift the day of the explosion. He passed the boiler, which was not 
working, on his way out and stopped to view the fire in the roof. ‘It was a round piece of burning coal, 
not flaming but red hot.’ He did not report it as ‘it was known by everybody.’ Nuneaton Observer, 8 
August 1884. 
106 At the second Inquest of 1884 an engineman said he overheard Gillett say ‘If you don’t mind we 
shall have the place on fire.’ Nuneaton Observer, 25 July 1884. 
107 
Arnold Morley MP, PC (1849-1916) was a barrister and the Liberal member for Nottingham from 
1880. 
108 
See A Morley, MP,QC Report Number One (House of Commons, 11 December 1882) and Report 
Number Two (House of Commons, 25 September 1884), Nuneaton Chronicle, 15 August 1884. 
109 
C. Parton, Parker’s Fire Engine: the Baddesley Pit Explosion 1882 (Nuneaton, 2009) pp. 52-5. 
Gillett was fined £6,000, Nuneaton Chronicle 15 August 1885. 
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Wednesday morning a meeting of the Mine Inspector, his assistant and the 
management from Ansley Hall, Bedworth Charity, Hawkesbury, Amington and 
Pooley Hall collieries agreed that it would be useless to attempt further rescue and the 
decision was made to seal the pit.
110
 
 
Illustration 3:1 A Baddesley Funeral Card traditionally sent to friends of the bereaved. 
Source: Fretwell Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Two p 92. 
The Inquest was opened at Atherstone town hall on 4 May.
111
 The bodies of the 
night shift were still in the mine and as the pit was sealed, there was no way to inspect 
the area. The cause however left little doubt, exemplified in the dying words of a 
rescuer reported by his father, ‘All this is through Parker’s fire pumping engine.’112 
Gillett complained of Parker’s failure to follow his instructions and miners 
corroborated the fire in the roof. Assistant Inspector Stokes stated that he only heard 
about the underground boiler after the accident and had last inspected the mine 
several months ago. An accident in the feed pipe of the boiler on 30 April led to it 
being shut down, but the fire in the roof was left unattended and uninspected for two 
days. Inspector Evans criticised the decision to place the boiler underground and 
concluded that the ‘using of a boiler down the incline was more particularly 
                                                 
110 
Atherstone Herald, 6 May 1882. Nuneaton Observer, 6 May 1882. 
111 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division. 1882. 
112 Evidence of Eli Smith’s father to the Inquest, reported Nuneaton Observer, 13 May 1882. 
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dangerous in this district where spontaneous combustion occurred so readily.’113 In 
1992 Job agreed that even today the decision to site the boiler underground ‘would be 
seen as a remarkable decision because of the potential danger (but) the situation was 
aggravated by appallingly bad mining practice.’114 They tentatively reopened the pit 
in November 1882 but although they recovered three bodies and removed the 
carcasses of eleven horses, the presence of choke damp and a raging fire down the 
incline hindered progress.
115
  
With the recovery of seven of the nine bodies in 1884 a second Inquest was held. 
The Inquiry laid the blame squarely at the doors of the management, overturning the 
earlier verdict of ‘accidental death.’ The Coroner was particularly critical of 
management practice. Charles Day, the heroic deputy who had received the gold 
Albert Medal
116
 for his contribution to the abortive rescue attempts, was illiterate and 
only gave verbal reports to manager Parker. From studying these records he 
concluded that several days’ reports had been written together and that there was no 
mention of Day’s professed concerns about the fire in the roof. The Coroner then 
quoted from the general rules supposedly in force in every colliery: 
The underviewer, or his properly appointed deputy, shall every morning 
before the miners descend, examine with a safety lamp the working places, 
levels, roads, and works of the mine that are in actual use and shall leave 
a mark or signal at the entrance and face of each working place to show 
that it has been examined and record the results of such examination in 
the book provided for the purpose.
117
 
                                                 
113 
Inquest, Nuneaton Observer, 3 June 1882 and Annual Report of Inspector of Mines Midland 
Division 1882 p. 104. 
114 B. Job, ‘The Mines Inspectors and the accidents at Glasshouse Common Ironstone Mine 1865 and 
Baddesley Colliery 1882’, Bulletin of the Peak District Mines Historical Society 11.5 (Summer 1992) 
235. 
115 
Nuneaton Observer, 24 November and 1 December 1882. 
116 
The Albert Medal, named after Prince Albert, was instituted in 1866 for life saving at sea and 
expanded to include life saving on land in 1877. It was replaced in 1949 by the George Cross. 
117 
Nuneaton Chronicle, 15 August 1884. This refers to a General Rule of 1872. 
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It was unlikely that these procedures had been followed prior to the disaster. The 
Coroner’s Jury reported: 
We are of the opinion that John Parker, the manager, and Mr Gillett are 
culpably negligent for not taking every precaution for the safety of the 
mine and that it was an error in judgement in placing the engine and the 
boiler there at all. Neither did the underviewers or enginewrights do their 
duty in properly reporting the frightful conditions of the pit and we are of 
the opinion that the management of the pit was disgracefully carried 
out.
118
 
Arnold Morley MP informed the House of Commons in his Report that ‘practically it 
does not differ much from a verdict of manslaughter.’119 
Gillett was there to be assailed by universal condemnation and Parker, who had 
died in the attempted rescue, received the posthumous censure of the Coroner’s Jury. 
The owner, William Stratford Dugdale, who had shared Parker’s fate, emerged 
unscathed. Born in 1828 into a family of landowning coalowners, he graduated from 
Balliol College, Oxford in 1850 and was called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn in 1858.120 
At the time of his death he was chairman of the Atherstone Board of Guardians and 
the Bench of Magistrates at Atherstone Petty Sessions. As a practising lawyer William 
Dugdale left the running of his colliery to his manager, John Parker, but Parker was 
aware that Baddesley Colliery had been making a slight loss for a number of years. 
This may help to explain his comments cited above, to the bricklayer building the 
foundations of the boiler that his ‘hands were tied’ when it came to building a 
protective arch. It may also explain why the conduit was built of wood and not steel 
like that in the neighbouring Speedwell pit. How far the pressure upon him was 
explicit or just implied will never be known. The colliery had a reputation for 
parsimony and was described by Garside Phillips, manager of Ansley Hall, as ‘an old 
                                                 
118
 Inquest following the recovery of five of the nine bodies, reported by Nuneaton Observer, 8 August 
1884. Repeated by A. Morley MP,QC Report Number Two (House of Commons 25 September 1884) 
and Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1884. 
119 
Arnold Morley MP,QC Report Number Two (House of Commons, 25 September 1884) . 
120 
Obituary, Coventry Herald, 12 May 1882, funeral, Nuneaton Observer, 19 May 1882. 
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fashioned devil’s arse of a pit.’121 Yet although Parker’s actions may be explicable, 
they cannot be defended, even if he paid the ultimate price for managerial 
deficiencies. What is inexplicable is how deputies failed to monitor a smouldering fire 
from routine inspection in an area of known danger. 
A technical point has never been adequately addressed. Fretwell notes that if 
intersecting doorways had remained closed, smoke should have been confined to the 
return air roadway only and men working down the incline should have been able to 
walk back without discomfort up the intake air roadway.
122
 Even with the doors open 
air should have taken a short cut through the open doors and intersecting roadway to 
the return air roadway and all ventilation beyond that area ceased. What actually 
happened was the fire at the bottom of the incline in the return air roadway was acting 
like a furnace shaft and drawing the air around the workings preventing it making a 
short cut through the open doors and intersecting roadway. Fretwell concluded that; 
‘the fire itself established a new independent ventilation system.’ 123 The heat from 
the fire expanded the air and with additional smoke and gases from the burning coal, 
it greatly increased the volume of air and gases coming up the return roadway. No one 
was blamed for opening the doors that condemned the men working underground, and 
if the doors were opened by an unknown explosion, no one should be. The only 
people who could have solved the mystery were those who ventured down when the 
pit reopened in April 1884. They left very graphic descriptions of the discovered 
bodies covered in mould but no mention of the condition of the restricting air 
doors.
124
 
  
                                                 
121 
From the Mitchenson Papers, quoted by Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Two (Warwick, 
2005) p. 253. Mitchenson was a later manager of Baddesley Colliery. 
122 
L.Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Two (Warwickshire, 2005) pp. 343-5. 
123 
L.Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Two p 345. 
124 
John Ross was identified by his wife and buried April 1883. His body was then positively identified 
from the footwear on another body recovered August 1884. This illustrated the difficulties of 
identification. Nuneaton Observer, 20 April 1883 and 22 August 1884. 
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The closure of the colliery had an immediate impact on the two hundred and 
ninety-eight men that worked there.
125
 An appeal was launched and, assisted by 
newspaper reports, public donations reached £5,000 by the end of the month.
126
 It was 
decided that each widow would receive 5/- a week with an additional 2/6 per child up 
to a maximum of 15/- a week. In 1883 the Relief Fund Committee reported that then 
had paid out over a thousand pounds to Baddesley miners, widows and orphans and 
£65 for bibles to every surviving rescuer or to their family. They still retained £5,625 
in the fund.
127
 A workers’ representative on the committee complained that although 
doctors were paid £143 from the fund, no money was paid to the impoverished father 
of the boy who had been killed.
128
 The trustees jealously guarded the funds and when 
the last claimant died there was still some £3,900 left.
129
 Harry Horton, an ex-
Baddesley miner, was sceptical about the fund: 
There was a disaster fund but not much of it got through to those that 
needed it. When the last dependant died Old Dugdale wanted to hand the 
money over to the British Legion for a club with a plaque on it saying who 
had died but the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) objected and 
somewhere or other the money just disappeared.
130
 
Fretwell may solve this mystery. He states that when the trust was forcibly dissolved 
in 1978 the money was forwarded to the Baddesley branch of the NUM. Not knowing 
what to do with the nearly four thousand pounds the six members of the committee 
together with two lodge members who happened to be passing, shared out the money 
between them. He laments: ‘They appeared to be completely oblivious of the law of 
misappropriation of charity funds. One cannot help thinking that the village heritage 
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Atherstone Observer, 6 May 1882. 
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Nuneaton Chronicle, 26 May 1882. 
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Nuneaton Observer, 22 June 1883. 
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Nuneaton Observer, 29 June 1883. The father had broken his arm and with his son dead the family 
had no income. 
129 
Coventry Evening Telegraph, 3 January 1978. 
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Quoted in J. Lovell, 'Analysis of a Mining Disaster: Baddesley 1882’, (Unpublished BA dissertation, 
University of Birmingham 1997) p. 39. 
 Page | 138 
 
would have been better served had this money been spent on a memorial to those 
killed in the disaster.’131 
The virtual disappearance of gas fatalities after this date should not lead to the 
assumption that gas explosions had been eliminated. In 1913 Inspector Johnston lists 
twenty-seven Warwickshire non-fatal gas explosions since 1884. Baddesley was 
thankfully not revisited, but there were three further explosions at Alvecote, Exhall 
and Kingsbury; two at Glascote, Peel and Wyken; and one at Ansley Hall, Amington, 
Arley, Griff Clara, Hockley Hall, Newdigate, Nuneaton, Pooley Hall, Tame Valley, 
Tamworth, Tunnel and Whateley.
132
 Most Warwickshire collieries were open light pits 
that used candles for illumination. The use of safety lamps was proscribed in any 
seam where gas was present and around 20 per cent of the prosecutions of 
Warwickshire miners were for violations of the usage of safety lamps.
133
 Haunchwood 
Colliery was a safety lamp pit and in an interview with the Nuneaton Observer in 
1893 the manager revealed that they had not fired a shot in three years.
134
 The fear of 
explosions therefore had a profound impact on mining practice. 
Ventilation improved markedly in the last years of the century as fans became 
widely adopted. Although experiments with mechanical ventilation are recorded in 
South Wales in 1849, the rapid adoption of fans dated from the invention of the 
Guibal in 1862, quickly followed by the Schiele and the Waddle.
135
 The only survey 
of fans occurred in 1900 but was on a district not coalfield basis. The Midland 
Division had 137 fans with diameters ranging from two feet six inches to forty-six 
feet. The larger Guibal and Waddle fans dominated, with forty-nine and forty-five 
respectively, or over 68 per cent. There were twenty Capell; nine Schiele; five 
                                                 
131 
L. Fretwell, Warwickshire Coalfield Volume Two (Warwick, c2005) p. 398. A centenary exhibition 
was held at Baddesley Colliery in 1982 to commemorate the disaster and this attracted 4,000 visitors. 
At that time Baddesley Colliery was awarded the South Midland Area National Gold Award for Safety. 
Nuneaton Evening Tribune, 5 May 1982 and Tamworth Herald, 7 May 1982. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midlands and the South District 1913. 
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See the section on prosecutions in Chapter Six. 
134 ‘Winning Black Diamonds in Stockingford’, Nuneaton Observer, 19 May 1893. 
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 See R. Galloway, A History of Coalmining in Great Britain (London, 1882) pp. 247-56. Galloway 
does not record the Blow George mechanical device used at Charity Galga Colliery in 1849 in 
Bedworth. 
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Chandler; two Johnson and a single Rammel and a Pelzar model.
136
 A ventilation 
survey of 1905 gave figures for each of the Midland coalfields. Natural and furnace 
ventilation had disappeared from Warwickshire and 97.39 per cent were provided by 
fans, with the remaining 2.61 per cent from steam. In 1909 the incoming president of 
the local branch of the National Association of Colliery Managers attributed the recent 
national disappearance of fire damp explosions not to the adoption of modern safety 
lamps or permitted explosives but to ventilation fans that gave a more equal 
distribution of the air current.
137
 The table of 1905 measured cubic feet of air per 
minute passing into the mine, but when this was translated to cubic feet per person 
underground, Warwickshire was seen as the lowest. Warwickshire had but 69 cubic 
feet per person, compared to 107 in Leicestershire, 145 in Nottinghamshire and 149 in 
Derbyshire.
138
 The reason for this reduced ventilation may reflect practice based on 
the county adage that ‘ventilation breeds gob fires.’ Indeed there may be some value 
to these words. Figures are only available for the expanded thirty-one coalfields in the 
Midlands and South District from 1910. Warwickshire had six spontaneous 
combustion fires in 1910; two in 1911; nine in 1912 and five in 1913. This was 
certainly higher than the neighbouring counties of the Midland coalfields, but is 
dwarfed by comparison with South Staffordshire, which had fifty-six fires in 1912 
and one hundred and one in 1913.
139
 Underground fires could be frightening and 
costly. In 1902 in an unnamed Warwickshire pit, miners were repairing a roadway that 
passed through an old gob fire. Men filled hot material into tubs and were supposed to 
water it and remove it from the mine. Due to carelessness some tubs were left in a 
siding and these started a roadway fire that required the area to be damned up. Four 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1900. 
137 Mr Hall’s presidential address to the South Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire branch 
of the National Association of Colliery Managers, Nuneaton Observer, 18 June 1909. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1905. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midlands and the South District 1910 to 1913. Gob fires 
caused by spontaneous combustion were practically unknown in the coalfields of the North-East and 
South Wales but relatively common in the thick coal seams of Warwickshire and South Staffordshire. 
Professor Redmayne dismissed the earlier view that they were caused by the presence of iron pyrites 
and instead advanced the theory that the ‘porosity of the coal was largely responsible’ as it allowed for 
the rapid absorbsion of oxygen. See ‘Discussion Hidden Coalfields and Thick Coal’, Transactions of 
the Federated Institute of Mining Engineers 34 (1907-08) 861. In 2013 a spontaneous combustion fire 
led to the closure of Daw Mill, the last Warwickshire colliery. Guardian 7 March 2013. 
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horses were lost and three men temporarily rendered unconscious.
140
 Surface fires 
could be just as dangerous. At Haunchwood in 1910 sparks from the boiler chimney 
set fire to the wood casing at the top of the upcast shaft resulting in the destruction of 
the headgear. The headgear of the downcast shaft a short distance from it, only 
survived by what was described as ‘heroic efforts.’ If they had not succeeded, the men 
trapped underground would have died from carbon monoxide poisoning.
141
 
 
Illustration 3:2 A Fire at Hall End Colliery 1910.
142
 
Source: Nuneaton Library. 
Table 3.9 also lists the small number of fatalities from explosives. Two occurred 
at Nuneaton, and one each at Amington, Ansley Hall, Arley, Binley, Hall End, 
Hawkesbury, Nuneaton New, Tunnel and Wilnecote. All refer to gunpowder, with the 
exceptions of Hawkesbury 1880 which mentions dynamite, and Arley 1907 which 
talks of Mondel powder.
143
 Details are given for only seven: two cases of dropping 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1902. Similarly a gob fire at Tunnel in 
1904 led to the death of 11 horses although no men were injured. Nuneaton Observer, 17 June 1904. 
141 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1910. An engine room fire at Griff 
Number 4 in 1907 caused by an electrical fault destroyed the building causing £1,000 worth of damage 
and the men had to be raised from another pit. Nuneaton Observer, 2 August 1907. 
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For a description of the fire see Nuneaton Observer, 10 June 1910. Said to be caused by sun on the 
oil sodden timber, the £2,000 worth of damage would take a month to repair. 
143 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1880 and 1907. In 1901 there was a 
death of a quarryman from a gelignite explosion attributed to the fact that the explosive was frozen and 
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candles onto powder, two cases of premature explosions; two cases of not retiring to 
safety before the shot was fired, and one case of a storeman being badly burned when 
opening a fifty pounds gunpowder box. From the early 19
th
 century shot firing had 
been carried out by workmen using gunpowder, but it was not until 1872 that the use 
of explosives and shot firing came under legislation. They certainly made up for lost 
time, as by 1900 Inspector Stokes could claim that this area had ‘…probably received 
more attention than any other department of mining.’144 The penalties for any 
infringement could be considerable. In 1891 the Nuneaton Observer recorded the 
prosecution of the manager of Hockley Hall Colliery at Nuneaton Petty Sessions for a 
violation of the Explosives Act. Any building had to be licensed to store more than 
thirty pound of gunpowder but Superintendent Hannah discovered 489 pounds in 
stores where oil was also kept. Ignorance of the law was no defence and the colliery 
was fined £51 and the powder was confiscated.
145
 In 1884 Inspector Evans had listed 
five of the most preventable causes of blasting accidents. These were the careless use 
of candles; dropping sparks into loose powder; drilling out a misfired shot; not 
allowing sufficient time to retire to a place of safety, and returning too soon to a 
supposed misfired shot.
146
 In his 1898 report Inspector Stokes gives a lengthy 
discussion of blasting regulations and describes good practice. He recommended that 
all explosives be kept in a magazine at the colliery;
147
 he outlined the correct way to 
charge a shot; gave the virtues of clay dust as a stemming material; stated a minimum 
cable length for shot firing of twenty-five yards; made the usual call without any 
practical advice that shot firers should take adequate cover when setting off 
explosions; gave the correct way to remove a misfired shot and made the apparently 
                                                                                                                                            
should have been according to the instructions printed on the label ‘softened in winter.’ Nuneaton 
Observer, 4 December 1901. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mine: Midland Divisions 1900. 
145 
Nuneaton Observer, 27 February 1891. 
146 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1884. 
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It was customary for miners to purchase the gunpowder they required and keep it at home. They 
were certainly not allowed to keep it in the mine as two Griff miners discovered in 1891. They left 
cartridges of powder in a locked box which was a violation of General Rule 18. Nuneaton Observer, 30 
January 1891.Three more Griff miners were fined in 1901 for a similar offence. Nuneaton Observer, 22 
November 1901. 
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necessary statement that if a colliery was unhappy with the number of misfired shots 
it should change its supplier.
148
 
There were also improvements to fuses and detonators. In Warwickshire where 
gunpowder prevailed, ‘jermans’ were popular. Made with newspaper saturated with 
saltpetre and filled with gunpowder, the end was turned up to supposedly allow the 
shot firer sufficient time to get clear before burning within reach of the gunpowder. 
Inspectors recommended the safer double tape gunpowder fuse 
149
 but the squib 
remained popular as the tape fuse created a great deal of smoke which impaired 
ventilation. Speaking at a 1904 Inquest related to the death of a Tunnel Colliery 
stallman from a premature squib explosion, the coroner dismissed this defence of 
retaining the squib by musing that in twenty-five years of experience he had never 
attended an inquest where the tape fuse was the cause of the accident.
150
 There was a 
growing demand for a safe flameless economical explosive. The main danger in 
blasting was the production of a flame of high temperature which could ignite gases in 
the vicinity of the shot, or by raising dust, create a flammable situation.
151
 Indeed in 
1894 a Royal Commission on Explosions from Coal Dust in Mines published a report 
limiting gunpowder in gassy or dusty mines, and recommending instead the use of 
patent high explosives. They recommended that dust should still be reduced by spray 
jets at intervals along the haulage roadway supplied by water under pressure, to 
replace the erratic tub system where water was splashed between rails.
152
 Yet the use 
of water was unsatisfactory as it inevitably caused damage to roadways. In 1908 Mr 
Garforth, a former president of the employers’ Mining Association of Great Britain, 
began conducting experiments into the use of stone dust to smother coal dust 
explosions at a reputed cost of £10,000.
153
 Today this is standard practice in every 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1898. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1893. 
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Nuneaton Observer, 8 July 1904. 
151 Coal dust as a cause of explosions was highly controversial and was pioneered in the 1880’s by 
Inspector William Galloway. He was hounded out of the Inspectorate and became Cardiff University’s 
first Professor of Mining in1890. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1894. Spraying water was unpopular as 
it caused damage. Today inert stone dust is deposited to neutralise the danger from coal dust. 
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Nuneaton Observer, 25 September 1908, Report 1 October 1909. 
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colliery but its adoption took time. The danger from coal dust was emphasised by 
Professor Cadman
154
 of Birmingham University in 1909 when he stated that ‘coal 
dust was as dangerous as gunpowder.’155 Experiments at the university had shown that 
‘it could be easily ignited by an ordinary candle or the bursting of an electrical 
fuse.’156 In the same month Inspector Johnson of South Staffordshire cautioned a 
meeting of Midland mine engineers that they should weigh carefully the use of any 
electrical apparatus in any fiery or dusty mine.
157
 
In mines using safety lamps, many moved to firing by electricity. Two methods 
were used, namely low and high tension. Low tension was fired by a current of 
electricity passing through fine platinum wire bringing it to red heat, which fired the 
priming, which fires the fulminate of mercury at the bottom of the detonator. With 
high tension an electric current passes between the ends of two firing wires which are 
so close together that it causes a spark. Stokes made his preference known as early as 
1893: 
The simplicity and certainty of firing by a low tension system of electrical 
blasting commends itself to all who have adopted its use. The electrical 
fuse can safely be tested by a galvanometer before being taken into the 
mine and little fear need be entertained that the operation will be troubled 
with misshots. The weight of the firing apparatus need not prevent its 
general use. 
158
 
It would appear that Warwickshire ignored this glowing endorsement. In 1890 the 
coalfield had fired 924 shots per day, over two thirds by the old fashioned jermans, 
with the remainder fired by gunpowder fuse: 628 to 296. 
159
 In a second survey of 
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Cadman replaced Redmayne when the latter was appointed HM Chief Inspector of Mines. 
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Professor Cadman to the Warwickshire Mining Students ,Association Nuneaton Observer, 1 October 
1909. 
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Professor Cadman at the prize giving of the Warwickshire School of Mining, Nuneaton Observer, 1 
October 1909 
157 
In his presidential address at the 42
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 annual meeting of the South Staffordshire Institute of Mining 
Engineers, Nuneaton Observer, 15 October 1909. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1893. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1890. 
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1900 the number of shots for the year was given. Electrically fired shots were only 
53,661, or 13 per cent of the 405,458 fired. Of these electrically fired shots, 71.6 per 
cent used the high tension and only 28.3 per cent the recommended low tension.
160
 
Yet by 1912 there had been a fundamental change in shot firing in the Warwickshire 
coalfield. In his evidence to the Squib Committee Garside Phillips stated: 
At about one half of the collieries high explosives and electric firing are 
used and at the remainder compressed powder (gunpowder) fired in some 
cases by means of squibs, others by means of double tape fuse. 
The bulk of the collieries are open light (candle) pits and up to quite 
recently squib firing was the rule at most of these pits , some of whom 
have ceased this system since the issue of the New Explosives Order 
only.
161
 
This is a clear illustration of government legislation driving forward safety. At 
Phillip’s Ansley Hall Colliery squibs were still used but not the handmade jermans of 
yesteryear. Following an accident to a stallman twenty-five years previously Phillips 
had contacted Brock’s, the firework makers, and they now professionally produced 
three kinds of squib made to his specifications. The colliery fired about a hundred a 
day and a misfire was unheard of.
162
 
There were two forms of firing batteries. The primary was always live and fired 
when the wires made contact with the terminal. The magneto battery, known locally 
as ‘beethovens,’163 was dead and a handle had to be turned to generate electricity. The 
inspector made his views known in the 1907 report on the death of an Arley deputy. 
He had nearly completed the coupling of a second shot of twelve ounce mondel 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1900. 
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Garside Phillips: Evidence to the Squibs Committee: to inquire into the squibs for the purpose of 
firing shots in naked light mines. (11 December 1912.) 280. This refers to Explosives in Coal Mines 
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Garside Phillips: Evidence to the Squibs Committee: to inquire into the squibs for the purpose of 
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powder in a stone heading when it exploded. A boy had been left in charge of the 
battery and, tampering with the wires, had pushed one into the firing plughole. Stokes 
says: 
I have frequently condemned the use of primary batteries for shot firing. 
They are always alive like a loaded gun ready to be fired either wilfully or 
accidentally, whereas the magneto battery is always dead and requires 
charging before it can fire a shot.
164
 
There is no evidence that the primary battery was phased out in our period of study. 
Table 3:10 Tons of Coal Produced Per Shot 
Year Warwickshire Leicestershire Nottinghamshire Derbyshire 
1898 
1900 
1905 
6.8 
7.4 
6.8 
6.2 
6.8 
7.0 
23.5 
23.2 
20.1 
19.6 
16.3 
16.9 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1898, 1900 and 1905. 
 An increase in the number of available explosives meant the collieries had to 
make an informed choice of which to use. When Inspector Stokes made his 1899 
recommendations, he recognised the importance of local knowledge. For ripping 
roads or blasting open roadways, any will do: 
When however we come to the coal face the matter of selection is a work 
of skill and experience, for coals are so varied in their physical properties, 
that an explosive which does well in one seam of coal may be very 
unsuitable for another.
165
 
The 1896 Blasting Regulations Act listed ten permitted patented explosives, rising 
to seventeen in 1898 and fifty-eight by 1906.
166
 These made small headway in the 
county. Table 3:10 shows the coal produced per shot in the Midland Division. In 1890 
Warwickshire had used 924 shots a day, all gunpowder. By the 1900 survey 
                                                 
164 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1907. At the Inquest the boy steadfastly 
maintained that he had not touched the wires but the Inspector demonstrated that the explosion could 
not have occurred any other way. Nuneaton Chronicle, 5 April 1907. 
165 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1899. 
166 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1896, 1898 and 1906. 
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gunpowder still dominated with 80.7 per cent of shots fired and bulldog gunpowder, a 
close substitute soon to be banned and replaced by bobbinite, 5.8 per cent more. Anvis 
was 6.6 per cent of shots, bellite 6.3 per cent, gelignite 0.1 per cent, carbonite a mere 
0.04 per cent and ‘various’ 0.46 per cent.167 The continued use of gunpowder may 
have something to do with the fact that patent explosives made a greater headway in 
the other two counties, but it may more simply be explained by inertia in work 
practice or the nature of the coal beds. Both Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire tended 
to work the deeper seams. However, in his evidence to a 1912 Squib Committee 
Garside Phillips attributed this unequivocally to ‘the nature of the coal and that as a 
rule it is fast to the roof.’168 
 
Illustration 3:3 An Advertisement for the permitted explosive, Bobbinite. 
Source: Nuneaton Observer 21 January 1910. 
  
                                                 
167 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1890 and 1900. 
168 
Garside Phillips: Evidence to the Squibs Committee: to inquire into the squibs for the purpose of 
firing shots in naked light mines. (11 December 1912). 280. 
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Surface Deaths 
Table 3:11 Occupations of Surface Fatalities described in the Mine Inspectorate 
Reports 1851 to 1913. 
Occupation Numbers Occupation Numbers Occupation Numbers 
Banksman 
Screenman 
Labourer 
Engineman 
Blacksmith 
11 
7 
6 
3 
2 
Carpenter 
Bricklayer 
Cutter 
Dataller (daymen) 
Stoker 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Shunter 
Locomotive driver 
Carter 
Truckman 
Waggoner 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Source: Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913 
Some underground workers did not regard surface workers as proper miners, 
since they did not descend the pit. Surface workers included young boys being 
acclimatised to the colliery before becoming oncost workers and old miners who 
because of age or infirmity could no longer cope with the work underground. There 
were also skilled tradesmen like smiths, carpenters and engine wrights, but as more 
machinery was placed underground fitters and electricians were required there to 
install and service them. The first annual return of 1873 placed surface workers as 22 
per cent of the national coal industry workforce and Church notes that it was to 
remain at that level through to 1913. Two official sets of statistics for 1889 and 1905 
reported that surface workers were 18 per cent and 17 per cent respectively for 
Warwickshire, rising to 20 per cent on both occasions for the Midland area. Church 
explains this by the increasing mechanization of surface transport as locomotive 
engines replaced carters, and that the screening and washing of coal had also been 
partly automated.
169
 Garside Phillips disputed this low figure claiming in his 
inaugural meeting as president of the Warwickshire Mining Students Society in 1899 
that Warwickshire needed a surface workforce of around 25 per cent because it 
subdivided coal more to gain a better price.
170
 
Between 1851 and 1913 forty-three Warwickshire miners died in surface 
accidents, some 7.82 per cent of the total deaths with a mean age of thirty-nine. That 
means that over 92 per cent of deaths occurred underground. This was roughly half 
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R. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three 1830 to 1914 (Oxford, 1986) pp. 
209-12. 
170 
Nuneaton Observer, 19 May 1899. 
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the national average of 13.98 per cent.
171
 Both figures however reveal that surface 
work was less dangerous than working underground. Of these Warwickshire deaths 
thirty-two or 74.7 per cent were crushed by wagons. Four were killed by machinery. 
Two enginemen died, one falling into the gears of his winding engine, the second 
falling into revolving drums of a tail rope haulage system driven by two steam 
engines. The other two died because they were trying to cut corners and perform tasks 
without turning off machinery. An Exhall stoker was hit by the crank of his winding 
engine, oiling it while the engine was in motion, and an Arley banksman had his arm 
torn off picking stone from a moving belt.
172
 Three died from falls; one from a pit 
frame, a builder from a scaffold and one from falling timber in a storeroom. Two died 
in the boiler explosion noted above, a carter was kicked by a rearing horse and one 
man was electrocuted. Table 3:11 reveals the rich diversity of occupations of those 
that worked on the surface although the subtle distinction between the shunter and the 
locomotive driver may be difficult to comprehend.
173
  
  
                                                 
171 
From Annual Reports of Mine Inspectors 1872 to 1913. Why Warwickshire should be significantly 
lower than the national figure will be discussed below. 
172 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1887 and Midlands and the South 1912. 
173 
In mining the shunter was the man employed to move wagons around the site ready for distribution. 
He worked with and was not necessarily the locomotive driver. 
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Table 3:12 Surface Deaths 
(a) Total 
 
 
(b) Ages  
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Surface deaths began to mount from the 1890’s largely due to the increased 
mechanization of surface transport. Inspector Stokes warned as early as 1886 that too 
many were being crushed by wagons.
174
 As this accounted for three quarters of all 
surface deaths he was right to highlight this problem. He recommended that coupling 
and uncoupling should be performed with a coupling pole which would negate the 
need to go between the buffers or under the wagons. Similarly men pushing wagons 
with their shoulder at the buffer of the wagons were unaware of slow moving wagons 
approaching from behind. Here it was recommended that they should use a pinch bar 
at the wheel, or stand outside the rail and push at the side of the wagon.
175
 Additional 
danger was presented by small gaps between the screens and the wagons. To give but 
two examples, in 1889 an Amington screen man was crushed between wagons and 
screen when other wagons ran forward, and in 1913 an Ansley Hall shunter had his 
head crushed when he was dragged through an eight inch gap.
176
 As always there is 
the inexplicable. In 1898 a fifty-six year old Griff banksman went to lower three tubs 
of a train of sixteen down an incline roadway on the pit bank. After taking the locker 
off the first, the whole train moved and he stepped in front in a foolhardy attempt to 
stop it.
177
 A contributory factor to the number of surface deaths may have been the 
lack of local medical facilities. In 1891 a Stockingford shunter driver was crushed by 
wagons and sent by train to Birmingham General Hospital. In its report of the Inquest 
held at Birmingham the Nuneaton Observer commented that ‘this demonstrated the 
necessity for a cottage hospital in Nuneaton.’178 
It is difficult to explain the reduced surface death rate in Warwickshire in 
comparison with other coalfields. In 1890 the Nuneaton Observer reported an inquest 
on a fifteen year old boy crushed by wagons. He had moved one wagon down an 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1886. 
175 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1886. 
176 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1889 and 1913. Inquest, Nuneaton 
Observer, 26 September 1913. 
177 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1898. Inquest, Nuneaton Observer, 17 
January 1898. 
178 
Nuneaton Observer, 27 February 1891. A cottage hospital was established in Nuneaton in 1893. Yet 
in 1902 a Baddesley stallman was badly burnt by a premature explosion and had to be sent to 
Birmingham General Hospital. Nuneaton Observer, 11 April 1902. 
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incline and the rest of the train had followed. On examination of the witnesses the 
coroner’s jury discovered that brakes were only on one side of the wagons and that it 
was not a breach of colliery rules to leave wagons on the lines or in sidings without 
applying the brakes. In an attempt to curtail this dangerous practice the jury 
recommended that all wagons should have a brake on both sides and those brakes 
should be fastened when wagons are left on the lines on in sidings. It was also noted 
that it was against the law to employ a fifteen year old on this task and the Griff 
Colliery management was censured and fined.
179
 But the Mine Inspector failed to 
comment on the jury’s findings. Twice in the 1880’s inquests on surface workers that 
had merited reporting in the Nuneaton Observer failed to be included in the Annual 
Report.
180
 This may reflect under-reporting but this begs the question how far this was 
simply a Warwickshire phenomenon. 
Table 3:13 charts the growing significance of surface deaths as a proportion of 
total fatalities. They begin to mount from the 1880’s and in the years before the First 
World War reach their highest level of 17 per cent, then above the national average of 
14 per cent. This increase reflects the move to larger collieries and the widespread 
adoption of steam locomotives to transport surface wagons. This had occurred much 
sooner in the larger coalfields of the North-East and South Wales and as Warwickshire 
was relatively late in implementing these changes they may have unwittingly saved 
the lives of many banksmen. In 1902 only 20.7 per cent of Warwickshire collieries 
employed a thousand men but by 1913 this had leapt to 59 per cent.
181
 By that time 
Warwickshire surface deaths were more in line with those nationally. 
  
                                                 
179 
Nuneaton Observer, 23 May 1890. 
180 
Nuneaton Observer, 16 January 1880 an Ansley Hall shunter driver was caught by wagons and died 
the next day from a ruptured liver and gall bladder. 1 September 1882 a Stockingford blacksmith was 
caught by the wheel of a machine and died next day from a ruptured liver. Neither death features in the 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mine. Of the six deaths that I have unearthed not reported by the 
Inspector four were surface workers. 
181 
List of Mines 1902 and 1913. 
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Table 3:13 Surface Deaths as a percentage of Warwickshire fatalities 
Years Numbers Percentage 
1851-1860 
1861-1870 
1871-1880 
1881-1890 
1891-1900 
1901-1910 
1911-1913 
2 
5 
1 
8 
8 
12 
17 
1.5 
4.5 
2 
8 
11 
8 
17 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913 
Other Causes of Mine Fatalities 
Other causes of fatalities included flooding, machinery accidents, electrocution 
and disease. Water was a constant danger in Warwickshire
182
 but only one death 
resulting from flooding was ever recorded. This occurred at Polesworth colliery in 
1855. It was a recently sunk pit and five men were digging a drift during the night 
near the bottom of the pit. They had ignored water seeping from the roof and sides 
when a sudden burst rushed in. One man drowned, but the rest managed to float until 
they were rescued. There were no maps of the old workings, and it was recommended 
by Inspector Morton that when approaching known or suspected old workings, miners 
should use safety lamps and horizontal boring rods to guard against sudden irruption 
of gas or water.
183
 In 1905 a Newdigate Colliery hewer was making a bore hole when 
water suddenly broke through and in the ensuing panic he rushed into a tub that 
paralysed him. At the inquest it was revealed that the water was not a danger and that 
he would have survived had he simply stood still. This was classified as a tub accident 
but water was the contributory factor.
184
 
Steam powered boilers were used to pump water from the mines and power the 
winding engine. Working with machinery has inherent dangers. The only boiler 
fatalities occurred at Polesworth in 1856, when two were killed, one a thirteen year 
old boy. It was an old hay stack boiler with four stays from top to bottom. Two of the 
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For example in 1912 Stockingford suffered from a flooding of the mine from water from old 
workings. In the report it was stated that this had occurred in 1896 and 1906 too. Nuneaton Observer, 
19 April 1912. 
183 
Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: 1855. 
184 
Inquest, Nuneaton Observer, 3 February 1905. 
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stays had failed at the bottom cotter holes so that only two worked, yet the engineman 
had failed to report the defect. The pressure of eight pounds per square inch was too 
great, and the bottom blew out.
185
 Three further boiler accidents are reported. At 
Exhall in 1886 two workers were hurt when a boiler that had run short of water 
exploded, and at Haunchwood in 1892 a stoker was burnt when gas fired as he stirred 
a slack covered fire.
186
 The Exhall men were particularly fortuitous as the explosion 
destroyed the boiler house, the blacksmith’s and carpenter’s shops, and blew the front 
off the manager’s house causing damage of up to £10,000. Yet the only reported 
fatality from this explosion was a rabbit in a nearby field felled by falling bricks.
187
 In 
1900 a boiler explosion at Charity Colliery slightly injured three and resulted in the 
pit being closed two days for repairs. A subsequent Board of Trade Inquiry revealed 
that the thirty year old boiler although cleaned every two months had overheated 
because water had been used from the pit rather than the usual reservoir in a dry 
period and the usual half inch of sludge had increased threefold.
188
 Underground 
machinery also brought danger. At Glascote in 1853 and Hawkesbury in 1854 men 
were crushed by a steam engine.
189
 At Victoria in 1865 and Hawkesbury in 1870 
enginemen died falling into machinery. Also in 1870 a fourteen year old boy working 
at Hawkesbury Speedwell died falling into machinery at the pit bottom.
190
 
Between 1900 and 1913 seven died from electrocution, four at Exhall, and six of 
these occurred underground. The first Midland district fatality was a Wyken deputy in 
1900. When he leant over a small 2½ horse power motor that drove a ventilation fan, 
his bare arm came into contact with the terminals and he gave a cry. The assistant 
electrician who was with him, turned off the current and ran three hundred yards for 
help, but no attempt was made to revive him. Stokes’ practical advice was; 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1856. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1886 and 1892. 
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Nuneaton Observer, 19 February 1886. 
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Nuneaton Observer, 8 February 1901. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: 1853 and 1854. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1865 and 1870. 
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…turn off the switch but at the moment of contact broken, a man might 
receive 1,000 volts owing to indirect current in the master and therefore 
fatal. It is better to pull him away by his clothes, remove tight clothing 
from neck and chest, and apply artificial respiration for at least an hour 
or until a medical man arrives.
191
 
In the same year a pony was electrocuted and an electrical fire was caused by a faulty 
switch. The first survey to show the spread of electricity took place in 1905, but it 
covered the whole Midland Division and did not differentiate Warwickshire. It listed 
183 continuous current generators running from 50 to 600 volts, and 26 alternative 
current generators from 100 to 1100 volts. There were 116 motors on the surface, 
ninety-five driving various machines, fourteen pumping and seven hauling. 
Underground there were 269 motors, one hundred and fifteen hauling, ninety-nine 
pumping, fifty-three coal cutting, one air compressing and one drilling.
192
 The first to 
list Warwickshire separately was the expanded Midland and South Division in 1912. 
Of Warwickshire’s twenty-nine mines, eighteen were electrified, some 62.07 per cent. 
Only Derbyshire, whose eleven mines were all electrified, has a higher percentage. 
The third and fourth placed Kent and North Staffordshire coalfields are 42 per cent 
and 41 per cent respectively. When one looks at the average horse power per mine 
that used electricity, Warwickshire with 334 is fourth, behind the 426 of North 
Staffordshire, the 486 of Gloucestershire and the 1,349 of Kent 
193
 Attempts to 
address safety issues related to electricity were not always welcomed. In a 1908 
inquest on a Stanley Colliery miner electrocuted from a cable that had been damaged 
by a fall of coal, the inquest jury recommended thicker insulating cables. This 
prompted an editorial in the Nuneaton Observer: 
It is easy for those gentlemen bound by no financial consideration to find 
remedies for every industrial accident under the sun but they must not be 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1900. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1905. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midlands and the South 1912. 
 Page | 155 
 
allowed to push their ideas at the expense of those that provide the means 
of labour.
194
 
Table 3:14 Sundry Deaths 1851 to 1913 
(a) Total 
 
(b) Age 
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Nuneaton Observer, 9 October 1908. 
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Before the rise of antibiotics 
195
 a simple scratch could result in septicaemia and 
death resulting from the infection. In 1907 Inspector Stokes voiced his opposition to 
attributing the result of ‘trivial accidents’ to the list of mine fatalities196 but the growth 
in medical knowledge was against him. After the 1897 Workers’ Compensation Act 
there was also an incentive to claim an accident in the hope of payment. For example 
in an inquest of 1902 on a seventeen-year-old boy who had obviously died of 
consumption, the mother attempted to claim that death was the result of an unreported 
injury in the mine some six months before.
197
 There are seventeen deaths that were 
deemed to stem from accidents at work. Table 3.14 shows that fifteen of these were 
reported after 1900, which would suggest that cases before this period went 
unrecorded.
198
 Three deaths were from septicaemia (blood poisoning) the result of a 
pinched thumb, a scratch on the arm and a fall on the knee. There were two cases of 
tetanus (lockjaw) resulting from pinched fingers and a hit head on a steel girder, and 
two of peritonitis (appendix) from lifting a derailed tub and a fall. There was one case 
of meningitis (inflamed brain) from a hit head, and one case when an injured chest led 
to a combined attack of sepsis, meningitis and pleurisy. There was cancer resulting 
from cracked ribs; pneumonia from a ‘slight injury;’ haemorrhage from a ruptured 
blood vessel; ruptured kidneys following a fall; a pulled stomach from lifting a 
derailed tub; a sprained wrist from lifting a load; scalds and shock from a fall into a 
steam and oil reservoir and the strange 1869 case of the fifteen year old Pooley Hall 
pony driver who died after being ‘accidentally kicked by another lad.’ The number of 
days before death varied from one to seventy-eight, with a mean of twenty-five and a 
medium of twenty. 
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Before the 20
th
 century the treatment of infections was limited to various plant moulds. Antibiotic 
affects were first observed by Pasteur in 1877 and penicillin discovered by Fleming in 1927 and 
produced commercially in the 1930’s. 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1907 p.10. 
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Nuneaton Observer, 31 January 1902. The coroner stated that Mine Inspectors complained of the 
increase in such cases that took up their valuable time. 
198 
Some continued to slip through. In November 1911 a Griff Colliery filler was injured in a roof fall 
and spent two years in and out of hospital before dying of septicaemia in November 1913. He had 
received compensation since the accident but there was no Mine Inspector at the Inquest and it was not 
recorded as a coalfield fatality. Inquest Nuneaton Observer, 14 November 1913. 
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In addition to these deaths a further fifteen fatalities were said to be due to natural 
causes. Five were from heart attacks, with another from pericarditus (inflamed heart). 
There were two cases of septic infection (blood poisoning) and one of rheumatic fever 
(joints); meningitis (brain); pleurisy (lungs infection); synope (fainting) and in 1903 
the suicide of a thirty-two year old Kingsbury engineman who hanged himself.
199
 
Little evidence is given by the Inspector why an 1890 Tame Valley holer died 
following a fall, or a 1904 Exhall loader who died after an argument with a colleague 
over a tub. In the latter case the man had claimed injury, but the coroner’s court found 
no evidence of this and returned a decision of natural causes.
200
 
A final mention must be made of four deaths not at the colliery but involving 
colliery transport. All involved individuals being run over, two at Baddesley and two 
at Griff. These include a Griff boatman in 1896; a Baddesley header on his way to 
work in 1902, and two employees of the London North West Railway, who were 
killed at Baddesley in 1902 and Griff in 1905.
201
 In the Griff case of 1905, piles of 
slack had been deposited next to the line and because there was no space for the 
shunter to pass the inquest jury found the colliery at fault.
202
 In 1913 at Baddesley 
another railway worker was killed by the colliery engine which was shunting full 
trucks from the pit yard to the line yet this was not classified as a colliery accident.
203
 
Non-Fatal Accidents 
In his autobiography, the Northumberland miner’s leader Thomas Burt MP wrote 
of the mining community where he lived and worked in the 1850’s remembering that 
‘he had never seen so many crutches, empty jacket sleeves and wooden legs.’204 Such 
observation could have been obtained from any mining community in our period of 
study but statistical confirmation was only forthcoming in the 20
th
 century. In the 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1890 and 1904. 
201 
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Nuneaton Observer, 10 February 1905. 
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The man had his leg severed and died at Birmingham General Hospital. The Birmingham Inquest is 
recorded in the Nuneaton Observer, 27 June 1913. 
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T. Burt; From Pitman to Privy Councillor: an autobiography (London, 1924) cited in R. Church, 
History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three (Oxford, 1986) p. 195. 
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inter-war years, Supple discovered that although miners were 5 per cent of the 
working population they accounted for around 25 per cent of work related injuries in 
the UK.
205
 McIvor found that in the 1950’s, miners were 60 per cent of all Workers’ 
Compensation claimants and that by the 1970’s they were 85 per cent of all UK 
recipients under the National Insurance Industrial Injuries Act.
206
 
In the case of fatalities in the mining industry we have the accuracy of the annual 
Mine Inspector Reports, backed by statutory power to impose penalties for those who 
did not comply. However non-fatal accidents were recorded infrequently and 
depended upon the whim of the manager. Prior to 1895 there was no standard accident 
form and some managers used a printed form of their own devising or simply a sheet 
of waste paper. The introduction of a special accident form in 1895 throughout the 
Midland Division led to an increase in the number of reports: fifty in July, one 
hundred and twenty-nine in August and three hundred and twenty in November. 
Inspector Stokes concluded: 
It shows that not more than one in seven of accidents which necessitates a 
man being away from work seven days, were being reported under the old 
conditions of the interpretation of the word ‘serious,’ and indicates the 
necessity for a workable clearly defined standard in which all owners and 
management must conform.
207
 
His call went unanswered. In 1905 he reported on an inquest held during the year in 
connection with a large unnamed mine in the Midland district, which showed 
accidents causing one month’s absence between 1 July 1898 and 20 September 1905 
in detail. Of eighty-eight accidents from falls of coal, twenty-three were reported; four 
shaft accidents, one reported; one hundred and five miscellaneous underground 
(mainly haulage,) nine reported; and twenty-six surface accidents, three reported. 
Thus of two hundred and twenty-three accidents in the colliery, only thirty-six or 16 
per cent were reported to the inspector. This is comparable with his earlier report 
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which gave a ‘one in seven’ conclusion of 1895, and it is no wonder that he regarded 
the published statistical information relating to non-fatal accidents as; ‘interesting 
information without statistical value.’208 
Table 3:15 Non-Fatal Accident figures recorded in the Annual Report 
Year Number of Accidents Year Number of Accidents 
1875 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
36 
35 
43 
36 
41 
51 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1893 
49 
53 
55 
56 
69 
43 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913. 
The Annual Reports sometimes published the figures for Warwickshire and these 
are recorded in Table 3:15. However given the conclusion of Stokes noted above, 
perhaps these should be multiplied by seven to give a more realistic figure. In real 
terms this means that accident rose from around 250 a year in the early 1880’s to near 
400 by 1900. Only in 1885 does the Inspector give a district breakdown of the period 
of disability and the degree of injury. This is shown in Table 3:16 below. Some 
interesting detail can be gleaned from this even if it is ‘without statistical value.’ The 
report of 92 per cent of injuries sustained underground does fit with the Warwickshire 
average.
209
 An incredible 44.8 per cent of those injured required at least three months 
absence from work. Some 61 per cent of injuries were lacerations and contusions, yet 
22 per cent of injuries were ‘unknown.’210 
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Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1905. 
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As noted above, 7.82 per cent of fatalities occurred on the surface thus 92.18 per cent of deaths 
occurred underground. 
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Table 3:16 Non-Fatal Accident in the Midland Coalfield in 1885 
(a) Period of disability 
Period of Disability (Days, including Sunday) Below Surface 
7 days or less 
7-14 days 
14-30 days 
30-90 days 
91-182 days 
Over 182 days 
Uncertain but over 91 
Permanently disabled 
Total 
98 
254 
308 
204 
86 
92 
496 
2 
7 
19 
24 
41 
3 
6 
30 
0 
1,540 130 
(b) Degree of Disability 
Degree of Disability Below Surface 
Lost part of right hand 
Lost part of left hand 
Lost part of leg or foot 
Fracture of limbs or bones of trunk 
Fracture hand or foot 
Loss of sight, one or both eyes 
Injuries to head or face 
Burns or scalds 
Lacerations, contusions 
unknown 
Total 
7 
10 
1 
101 
13 
3 
101 
5 
954 
345 
1 
2 
0 
11 
3 
0 
9 
3 
71 
29 
1,540 129 
 Source: 1885 Mine Inspector Report: Midland Division. 
The ambiguous concept of ‘serious personal injury’ finally took shape in the 1906 
Notice of Accidents Act. The notification of any accident that necessitated seven days 
absence for the first time brought mines in line with factories and workshops and 
allowed comparison.
211
 It is only in 1910 when Warwickshire became part of the 
expanded Midland and Southern region that non-fatal accidents are given in detail. 
These are shown in Table 3:17. Between 1910 and 1913 Warwickshire had an annual 
average of 101 accidents injuring 108 people.
212
 This figure is only a doubling of 
reported accidents and not the predicted seven fold advance asserted by Inspector 
Stokes. As these figures should be following national guidelines, it may well be that 
Stokes’ assumption was pessimistic. Yet in 1910 W. Harvey, the MP for North 
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This Act also led to an increase in the number of accidents reported from 6,333 in 1906 to 8,613 in 
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Derbyshire, had raised in the House of Commons that there was a discrepancy 
between the number of reported accidents and those receiving relief: 
If you take the whole of the permanent relief funds in this country which 
pay relief on the certificate of a doctor that an accident has taken place 
and a man is unable to follow his work, it works out that one of every six 
who goes down in the mines meets with an accident every year.
213
 
In 1910 Warwickshire reported 115 injured in accidents. If Harvey’s calculations are 
correct, it should have been around 2,600.
214
 
Table 3:17 Warwickshire Non-Fatal Accidents 1910 to 1913 
 
Occupational Illness 
The Mine Inspectorate campaigned to reduce the number of accidents in collieries 
to improve safety, but was slow to apply a similar urgency to the effects of 
occupational diseases which patently affected the health of so many that went down 
the pits. Occupational disability was the result of chronic exposure rather than an 
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acute single misfortune. The incapacitating effects of miner`s asthma and black spit 
were both reported by the Children’s Employment Commissioners of 1842 in some 
detail 
215
 and as early as 1852 Inspector Mackworth called unsuccessfully for a 
medical inspector to work alongside the safety inspectors.
216
 
Two debilitating diseases were recognised before 1913. Nystagmus was the result 
of working in poor light and tended to decline when electricity began to replace safety 
lamps. Its symptoms were uncontrollable oscillations of the eyeballs, dizziness and 
headaches and usually forced sufferers to quit the pit.
217
 Nystagmus usually took 
some years to develop and generally affected older miners. The second was the result 
of working in damp conditions and having to kneel or lie to work narrow seams. This 
caused rheumatism, arthritis and most common, the ‘beat’ or joint injuries resulting in 
inflammation of the knee, elbow or wrist.
218
 The term was coined from the intense 
throbbing of the injury. Working from new cases arising under the Workers` 
Compensation Act,
219
 McIvor states that the national annual averages between 1908 
and 1912 were 944 cases of nystagmus and 1,974 cases of the beat.
220
 Nystagmus 
reached a peak of recorded cases in the 1920’s and then declined due to the 
introduction of superior electric lighting. Cases of ‘the beat’ did not peak until the 
early 1950’s and then declined with the adoption of medical centres, a specially 
designed knee pad and most importantly, the use of machinery to cut coal replacing 
human endeavour.
221
 
Black spit, the consequence of inhaling coal dust, was known from the 1830’s but 
medical opinion was divided. Some believed that dust helped clear the lungs and 
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some went as far as prescribing the inhalation of coal dust as a cure for the nation’s 
killer, tuberculosis or TB.
222
 A Doctor Haldane professed this as late as 1927.
223
 
McIvor asserts that ‘the notion that miners succumbed to a particular type of lung 
disease was rejected by most doctors in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century.’224 Indeed in a 
Lancet article of 1911 Professor Louis of Newcastle-upon-Tyne postulated that the 
‘possible cause’ of lung disease was miners walking home in damp and dirty clothing 
and used this as an argument for the introduction of both changing rooms and 
compulsory pit head baths.
225
 Other work related illnesses were later acknowledged 
such as silicosis, a respiratory disease caused by the inhalation of stone dust, accepted 
in 1918; pneumoconiosis, the inhalation of coal dust, recognised in 1942; emphysema 
and bronchitis in 1994 and osteoarthritis or ‘miners knee’ in 2009. 
Most miners would have observed their father’s and grandfather’s developing 
respiratory problems as they aged and accepted that their turn would inevitably come. 
Perhaps they could then move to a lighter job away from the face or on the surface or, 
in some cases, assistance from the Permanent Relief Funds when work was no longer 
possible. Even by 1913 the relatively slow scientific research into occupational illness 
meant that miners could not expect support from the medical profession. 
Warwickshire Fatalities and the British Coal Industry 
We now need to compare Warwickshire with the UK mining industry as a whole. 
Between 1873 and 1913 some 49,740 miners died in accidents in the mines. 
Warwickshire’s 305 deaths in this period is less than one percent of the total, which 
alone gives some indication of the county’s relative importance.226 There were 21,299 
deaths from a fall of roof or side, some 42.80 per cent of the total. This is very close 
to the Warwickshire figure of 40.18 per cent. Nationally the annual deaths were 
always over 400 and reached 500 in 1873, 1883-84, 1891, 1900, 1903-07 and 1912, 
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and reached 600 in 1908-11 and 1913. There were 7,284 deaths from haulage, some 
14.64 per cent of the total, and considerably less than the Warwickshire figure of 
24.17 per cent. Haulage deaths only fell below a hundred in 1878 and were above 200 
in 1902, 1904 and 1906 through to 1913. In this respect they mirror the rising 
Warwickshire haulage deaths as production increased. There were 6,978 deaths from 
explosions, some 14.02 per cent of the total and double the Warwickshire figure of 
7.09 per cent. There is little pattern in the figures for fatalities from explosions. It falls 
to a low of 14 deaths in 1903 and a high of 586 in 1878, and is 501 in 1910 and 499 in 
1880. There were 4,521 shaft deaths, some 9.09 per cent and close to the 
Warwickshire figure of 10.18 per cent. As with Warwickshire, this is a declining 
problem. It only exceeds 200 in 1873 and 1875 and is below a hundred 1885-90, 
1894, 1896-1901, 1903-06, 1908-10 and 1912. There were 5,171 surface deaths or 
13.98 per cent of the total, almost double that of Warwickshire’s 7.82 per cent. 
Numbers only fell below a hundred on six occasions between 1878 and 1887 and 
reached a high of 159 in 1903 and again in 1910. It would appear that as with haulage 
fatalities, deaths on the surface increased with production. Warwickshire therefore 
mirrored the national average death rates in the shaft and falls of coal, was relatively 
less dangerous in gas explosions and deaths on the surface, but perhaps reflecting the 
need to work on an incline, was more dangerous working underground haulage. 
The Warwickshire coalfield did expand significantly during the 19
th
 century. 
Grant in his thesis The Spatial Development of the Warwickshire Coalfield attempted 
to chart this increase and compare it to the situation nationally.
227
 In 1854 
Warwickshire produced just 255,000 tons of coal, a mere 0.4 per cent of the UK 
output of 65 million tons. By 1913 Warwickshire produced five million tons, 1.8 per 
cent of a UK output of 287 million tons. Grant identifies three phases of development. 
As the smallest UK coalfield in 1854 it had a greater scope for development and given 
impetus by the development of railways, the period 1854 to 1867 saw a 10 per cent 
growth rate compared to the UK average of 3.8 per cent. The sudden decline of 1868 
was due largely to the local collapse of the weaving trade reflected in the 27 per cent 
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decline in coal production compared to a 10 per cent fall in coal carried by rail. The 
second phase 1868 to 1892 saw a modest growth of 5 per cent, still double the UK 
average of 2.3 per cent. This is surprising as it includes the rapid expansion of the 
early 1870’s when coal prices rocketed due to a national shortage of coal. The number 
of collieries increased as local entrepreneurs opened scavenger pits like Collycroft, 
Hawkesbury and Swan Lane as the scarcity now made them profitable. Many closed 
when the price bubble burst. Grant omits the great strike year of 1893 and in the third 
phase 1894 to 1913 Warwickshire had a growth rate of 5.2 per cent compared to the 
UK average of only 2.2 per cent. This is the period traditionally seen as the golden era 
of the Warwickshire coalfield. Table 3:18 reveals the rapid increase in employment 
from this time and this was reflected in output. Coal production had reached a million 
tons in 1878, two million in 1895, three million in 1901, and four million in 1907 and 
was over five million tons in 1913. There were only six true deep mines in 1890 but 
this had risen to twelve by 1913 with another two sinking. From 1894 the annual List 
of Mines gives employment figures for individual collieries and this can be used as a 
surrogate for the dearth of local production statistics. In 1902 only 20.7 per cent of 
Warwickshire collieries employed a thousand men but by 1913 this had leapt to 59 per 
cent. From employing barely 6,000 men in 1890 it employed 19,000 by 1913. The era 
of modern deep mining had arrived. 
Table 3:18 Employment on the Warwickshire Coalfield 
Year Number Employed Year Number Employed 
1854 
1889 
1891 
1894 
1897 
1900 
1901 
1902 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
11,000 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1909 
1911 
1912 
1913 
 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
19,000 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913 
A simple perusal of the graphs produced above would appear to suggest that 
deaths increased as the coalfield expanded, particularly after the rapid expansion from 
the 1890’s, but did the attempts to reduce fatalities succeed? There are two ways to 
measure this. Inspector Headley as noted above, measured the dangers of the four 
coalfields of the Midland Division by the tonnage of coal raised per life lost. A second 
way is to measure the death rate as a percentage per thousand employed. Both 
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methods should reveal the relative success of safety measures throughout the 
development of the Warwickshire coalfield during this period.  
Table 3:19 Tonnage of Coal Raised Per Life Lost on the Warwickshire Coalfield and 
Midland Division 
 
 
Table 3.19 compares the tonnage of coal raised for each life lost on the 
Warwickshire coalfield with the four county Midland Division as a whole. On every 
occasion Warwickshire raised less coal that the Midland Division, reflecting the 
perceived increased danger in mining there. It was less than half the Midland Division 
in 1856 to 1860 and again 1876 to 1885. It then almost gained parity before a decline 
in the first decade of the 20
th
 century. There were twelve years when Warwickshire 
raised less than 100,000 tons for the life of a miner, eleven between the years 1854 to 
1870, and the last, the lowest of 30,000 tons, in the Baddesley disaster year of 1882. 
In only fifteen years were more than 300,000 tons raised, the first time in 1879 but all 
the rest after 1891. In only four years were 400,000 tons exceeded. These were the 
650,000 tons per life in 1894, 541,000 tons of 1895, the 495,000 tons of 1899 and the 
425,000 tons in 1897. All occurred in the 1890’s, the safest decade for the 
Warwickshire miner. Indeed the record year of 1894 records only three deaths, 
equalling the figure set in 1866 and 1879. These figures therefore show a rapid 
improvement in the early 1860’s, largely due to the decline in shaft deaths. Deaths 
remained relatively static until another rapid improvement in the late 1880’s. The 
1882 disaster prevented this happening earlier. The twenty-eight deaths of 1876 to 
1880 doubled to fifty-eight in the period 1881 to 1885 but the increase in production 
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kept tonnage per death comparable. The last improvement of the 1890’s then saw a 
decline from 1900 due mainly to a doubling of deaths from coal falls to around six a 
year, the doubling of underground haulage deaths after 1905 and the improved 
reporting of sundry deaths. 
Table 3:20 Comparative Death Rates per Thousand Employed 1873 to 1913 
 
Table 3.20 compares the death rate per thousand employed on the Warwickshire 
and UK coalfields. With the exception of the 1880’s Warwickshire is always below 
the national level. It mirrors the national increase in death rates in the first decade of 
the twentieth century although beginning slightly earlier, and the decline after 1910. If 
we examine the figures in more detail the national figure is over two deaths per 
thousand employed eight times in the 1870’s and 1880’s, the last time in 1885. It then 
stays at one per thousand, but never below one, through to 1913. It falls to a low of 
1.2 on eight occasions 1897 to 1900, 1902 to 1904, and 1906, and reached 1.1 in 1911 
and 1912. It does not fall below one per thousand men employed until 1920. As a 
contrast Warwickshire reached two deaths per thousand employed four times in the 
1880’s, the last time in 1889 and rocketed to 8.75 in the Baddesley disaster year of 
1882. From 1890 it is one per thousand on eleven occasions and below one thirteen 
times. It falls below one in 1891, 1894 to 1899, 1901, 1903, 1905 and 1906, and 1911 
to 1912, and reached its lowest of 0.428 in 1894. The 1890’s emerges as 
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Warwickshire’s safest period as it is below one per thousand in seven of the ten years 
compared with only four times in the first decade of the twentieth century. It may 
have been the most dangerous of the four county Midland Division but it was 
relatively safer than other British coalfields. 
Table 3:21 An International Comparison of Death Rates per thousand employed (1905 
to 1911) 
Country Death Rate Country Death Rate 
Canada 
USA 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
4.11 
3.62 
3.32 
2.18 
1.94 
Britain 
Austria 
Australia 
India 
Belgium 
1.35 
1.25 
1.14 
1.13 
1.00 
Source: Adapted from F. Gibson, The Coal Mining Industry of the UK, the various 
coalfields thereof and the principal foreign countries of the world (Cardiff, 1922) p. 
229. 
Table 3:21 gives an international comparison of the death rates per thousand 
employed in different countries in the early 20
th
 century. Our two main competitors, 
the USA and Germany, are both significantly higher than Britain and in the original 
table of thirteen countries that Gibson studied only four have superior death rates. 
This may indicate that Britain had made greater advances in mine safety than many 
other countries but a note of caution must be added. France includes the 1906 
Courrieres disaster
228
 which claimed 1,230 lives and if that was excluded France’s 
figure would fall to 1.07. Other countries like Japan were in the infancy of data 
collection and there may be under reporting of fatalities.
229
 
Both the tonnage of coal raised per death and the number killed per thousand 
employed reveal that Warwickshire experienced a decline in the death rate in the 
1890’s but, reflecting the national trend, that this was followed by a slight increase in 
the first decade of the 20
th
 century, before it eventually returned to a downward trend 
after 1910. The relative dangers encountered working in the Warwickshire coal 
industry changed in the period of reporting. Deaths from falls of coal reached a low of 
30 per cent in the 1880’s but the move to larger deeper pits meant that it leapt to 45 
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per cent 1901 to 1910 and was 46 per cent 1911 to 1913.
230
 Surface deaths also 
increased in this later period, only reaching double figures in the 1890’s before 
touching 17 per cent in the period 1911 to 1913. Underground haulage deaths 
remained remarkably consistent, measured at 29 per cent in the 1860’s and was still 
26 per cent in the period 1901 to 1910 before dipping to 17 per cent 1911 to 1913. As 
a contrast shaft deaths peaked at 29 per cent in the 1850’s second in importance to 
falls of coal, but then steadily declined falling to single figures in the 1880’s and had 
fallen to a low of two per cent 1911 to 1913. 
Yet although the dangers may have changed the movement from the 1880’s was 
in a downward direction. Barry Job has concluded that: ‘By 1872 the miner was half 
as likely to be killed at work as he was in 1851, by 1888 the risk was a third and by 
1898 a quarter.’231 The aim of this study is to identify the contribution to this decline 
from the miners themselves, the coalowners and the State. The next chapter will 
investigate the input of miners to this downward trend. 
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Chapter Four: The Miners 
What influence has an individual over the safety of their working environment? 
McIvor has noted that the more control a worker has over that environment the safer 
that workplace will be.
1
 Yet in the 19
th
 century miners possessed little power to 
influence safety, constrained as they were by the way they were employed and the 
lack of a premium placed upon intelligence. Attempts to establish influence by joining 
together into trade unions was strongly resisted and even when they were established 
safety was a secondary consideration to pay and working conditions. 
The miner was initially engaged by a butty, a fellow miner and not the owner of 
the mine, and continued employment depended upon adherence to their orders.
2
 This 
subcontracting system had evolved to allow the owner to overcome the problem of 
underground supervision. The owner tended to supply the fixed capital of sinking the 
shaft and providing winding, ventilation and drainage, although Church discovered 
that West Midland butties sometimes did this.
3
 The butties or chartermaster employed 
the men and did the coal cutting, haulage and winding, providing the tools, tubs, pit 
props and horses.
4
 The system dominated in the Midlands but had died out in the 
North-East where trained viewers ran the pits. Such viewers regarded the butty system 
as wasteful and inefficient;
5
 an opinion echoed by the newly appointed Mine 
Inspectors of 1850.
6
 A butty`s primary aim was to maximise the difference between 
what he was paid by the owner for coal and what was paid out for men and tools to 
gain that coal, with safety consideration neglected. Miners hated this exploitative 
system but it declined particularly after the 1872 Act that required certified managers 
to run the collieries. However it re-emerged as the ‘little butty’ system based around 
stallmen who employed small numbers of men when hewing coal. It existed in the 
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Midlands in the years before the First World War
7
 and Goffee found it flourishing in 
the Kent coalfield in the 1930’s.8 
When safety regulations began to trickle down from above, dissemination was 
hindered because literacy and indeed intelligence, were not considered as 
prerequisites for the industry. The Midland Inspector for mines noted in 1857 that if 
boys were to stay at school until the age of fifteen ‘few if any would be disposed to go 
into the mines to work.’9 Similarly in 1882 an inquest into the Baddesley disaster 
discovered that the hero deputy, Charles Day, was illiterate and had given only 
unverifiable verbal reports to the manager.
10
 Both problems were to decline with the 
introduction of compulsory schooling in 1880 and written exams for new mining 
officials in 1872. The youth of many underground haulage workers was a significant 
factor in fatalities where young boys, some barely into their teens, were unable or 
unwilling to comprehend the importance of safety advice and died as the result of 
youthful bravado.
11
 In the late years of the century an individual could turn to the 
assistance of the newly established trade union,
12
 but again they were restricted by the 
priorities of a union concerned with pay and hours of work, and the relative strength 
of membership in the individual colliery. Despite such limitations this chapter will 
attempt to discover the influence of the miner to improve safety in mines. 
Section one defines who the miners were. Because of the heterogeneity of 
description offered by the Inspectors in their Annual Reports this study has simplified 
grouping into the three main tasks performed by colliers; namely the extraction of 
coal at the face, the oncost haulage of coal to the shaft and the preparation and 
distribution of coal to customers at the surface. Section two examines the dangers 
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encountered at the face and what miners could do to reduce them. What emerges is 
the significance for workers’ safety of prevailing assumptions amongst miners over 
what constituted proper masculine behaviour. Section three analyses the dangers of 
oncost work where the geological necessity of working on a steep incline made 
Warwickshire significantly more dangerous than other coalfields. The inadequate 
training offered to the large number of young people employed on these tasks 
contributed to the high incidence of accidents. Section four enquires into the dangers 
facing surface workers where Warwickshire emerges as considerably safer than 
elsewhere. However, with three quarters of the deaths resulting from the movement of 
coal wagons, the target for concern was more easily identified. Section five draws on 
the work of Benson and others that destroyed the myth of the feckless miner that 
failed to provide for his family in times of adversity. It charts through field clubs, 
trade union insurance schemes, permanent relief societies, insurance companies and 
government legislation the attempts of miners to mitigate the chance of misfortune. 
Section six explores the role of the miners’ trade union in campaigning for 
improvements in safety with particular reference to the Warwickshire Miners’ 
Association. Section seven concludes with a summary of the findings. The subtle 
collusion of management with miners’ attempts to cut corners on safety is identified 
and the trade union campaign evaluated, together with avenues of missed 
opportunities. Nevertheless the miners’ concern with safety cannot be denied even if 
the impact of the union as a pressure group is unquantifiable. 
The Miners 
Who exactly were the miners? In a strict sense the term collier refers to those who 
worked at the coal face and miner to those who worked underground but there were 
many shades of usage.
13
 For the mine inspectors it was all who worked for the colliery 
both underground and on the surface. With the exception of the first six years of 
reports, Mine Inspectors gave a description of the occupation of fatalities and this 
reveals a rich diversity of employment as shown in Table 4:1. To make sense of such 
heterogeneity the divisions used in the Wyken Colliery Colliers Coal Accounts 1846 
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to 1852 
14
 which used getters, turnmen and banksmen, or their modern equivalents of 
face worker, underground haulage and surface workers are adopted. These are the 
three main tasks of the colliery, namely cutting the coal, its oncost underground 
haulage to the shaft, and its preparation for despatch to customers on the surface. 
Table 4:1 Job Descriptions in the Annual Reports for Warwickshire Miners 
Generic (Total 159) 
No Description 51 
Collier 60 
Miner 34  
Ironstone Miner 11 
Clay Miner 3 
 
Face (Total 139) 
Stallman 71 
Getter 10 
Holer 16 
Header 7 
Loader 32 
Filler 3 
Surface (Total 25) 
Banksman 15 Browman 2 Screenman 8 
Management (Total 21) 
Owner 1 
Agent 1 
Solicitor 1 
Manager 1 
Underviewer 2 
Deputy 15 
Maintenance (Total 40) 
Sinker 9 
Shaftsman 1 
Onsetter 3 
Pit Bottom Attendant 1 
Door Boy 3 
Rope Boy 4 
Road Man 15 
Repairer 4 
Oncost (Total 79) 
Horse Keeper 4 
Pony Driver 31 
Trammer 16 
Train Boy 1 
Haulage 1 
Hanger On 2 
Coupler 2 
Clipper 2 
Corporal 2 
Hitcher 1 
Putter 1 
Incline Man 16 
Tradesmen (Total 11) 
Storeman 1 
Bricklayer 2  
Carpenter 3 
Mason 1 
Blacksmith 2 
Electrician 1 
Contractor 1 
Transport (Total 10) 
Carter 2 
Truckman 1 
Waggonman 1 
Shunter 4 
Locomotive Driver 2 
Machinery (Total 20) 
Engineman 8 
Engine Wright 3 
Engine Fitter 2 
Stoker 3 
Electric Motor Man 2 
Electric Motor Driver 2 
General Underground (Total 46) 
Dataller 26 
Daymen 15 
Labourer 3 
Spare Boy 1 
Charge Hand 1 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1851 to 1913. 
In the early years of the 19
th
 century the public outside the mining districts knew 
little about miners or their methods of working. As Kirby notes contemporary 
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‘authoritative accounts’ could be wildly misleading.15 William Pyne in his 1806 
encyclopaedia provided a description: 
There are many families who live underground and only visit the regions 
of day occasionally. They have regular markets below to which dealers 
descend to supply them with the articles of subsidence and clothing which 
they want.
16
 
William Cobbett
17
 visited the North-East coalfield in 1832 and reported that; 
’thousands of men and thousands of horses continually living underground, children 
born there and who sometimes never see the surface at all, though they live to a 
considerable age.’18 John Wilson, a pitman MP and leader of the Durham miners, 
noted in his autobiography that; ‘there was a generally held opinion that the coals 
were dug out of the earth by a class of people who were little removed from barbarism 
and whose home was down in the eternal darkness.’19 Such myths were still apparent 
in the mid 19
th
 century. 
Yet miners, in particular the hewers, were considered by others, and indeed 
considered themselves, the elite of the working class.
20
 The hard physical nature and 
accompanying dangers of their trade meant that they received higher wages and thus a 
higher standard of living than those in other occupations. In the 1842 Employment of 
Children Report the Bedworth surgeon described miners as ‘fighting cocks’ and built 
like ‘dragoons.’ He said, ‘As a proof that the employment of the collier is very 
healthy, I may state that when ribbon weavers from distress have gone down to work 
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in the collieries, they have improved in their appearance and become strong and fit.’21 
A similar favourable comparison was given to the miners of Yorkshire, yet Lancashire 
miners were depicted as ‘thin and gaunt… with a stooping shambling gait.’22 In 1948 
Zweig conducted a four month survey of mining communities and described the 
typical miner as short, stocky and muscular with a tendency to bow shaped legs from 
walking in a confined space and characteristic blue scars on hands and face.
23
 Such a 
condition did not always elicit sympathy and during the strike of 1893 which saw 
Warwickshire miners attending soup kitchens and children begging in the streets,
24
 
one anonymous letter to the Nuneaton Chronicle commented that; ‘when men have 
been accustomed to dining on port wine and turkey, and to ride in first class carriages 
as were our miners, it must be very grievous to come down to the fare of the common 
man.’25 
Historians of mining communities have tended to follow two very different 
approaches and methodologies. The Demographic School pioneered by the 
Cambridge Group 
26
 in the 1970’s and apparent in the work of Anderson, Friedlander 
and Haines,
27
 stressed the analysis of quantifiable demographic data, particularly the 
census but supplemented with parish records, trade directories and the publications of 
official government agencies. The Sentiments School demonstrated in the work of 
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Shorter, Vincent and John,
28
 put aside the reliance on statistical data in favour of 
literature, oral testimony and autobiographical evidence. 
Given such differing approaches it is not surprising that two competing 
stereotypes have emerged. The Demographic School has fostered what may be termed 
the orthodox view. The settlement that emerges in this scholarship is a remote village 
or town dependent upon the monoculture of the pit,
29
 one characterised by rows of 
insanitary, overcrowded tied terraces alongside public houses, chapels a shop and a 
school. To Simon writing in 1887 they were nothing more than ‘foul, priviless, ill 
watered, unscavenged overcrowded lairs.’30 Ridgeway depicts the mythical miner 
forced to exist in such squalor as; 
a drunken, thriftless, reckless worker, married at an early age to a woman 
lacking even the basic rudimentary knowledge of domestic economy or 
child care, both victims of their status and environment and passive 
recipients of the advice and bounty of a well meaning middle class.
31
 
Non-working subservient wives attempted to raise their large families despite the high 
infant mortality rate,
32
 socialised their sons for the pit and their daughters for a 
domestic role, and earned a little extra by renting rooms to in-coming economic 
migrants in search of a collier’s pay. Certain problems are apparent in accepting this 
view. The picture of the settlement came largely from outsider observation and that of 
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the household is drawn from an over dependence on two primary sources, namely the 
Registrar General’s Report of 1884-85 and the Survey of Fertility and Occupation of 
1911. Furthermore, pioneering researchers have tended to take their examples from 
the relatively homogeneous colliery communities of the North-East and South Wales 
and their findings may not be applicable to other coalfields. There is also a tendency 
to see the collier as part of a distinct cultural group and this may ignore what Stearns 
terms the ‘shared relationships, attitudes and common outlook of the working class as 
a whole.’33 Despite the thoroughness of this time-consuming work one must also bear 
in mind Higgs’ warning of ‘building elaborate quantitative mansions on shifting 
archival sands.’34 
The alternative stereotype created by the Sentiments School is almost 
diametrically opposed to the orthodox view. What emerges from this different 
perspective is a caring family trying to overcome their oppressive environment, with a 
strong belief in a good home, well turned out and disciplined children, and the 
importance of neighbours, kin and social aspirations. However, even convinced 
proponents of this view recognise that surviving evidence is both patchy and 
subjective. Vincent studied 104 working class biographies, but only six of these were 
by or about women.
35
 Women are therefore seen through the eyes of sons or 
husbands, and although a matriarchal dominance of the home emerges to 
counterbalance the economic predominance of the male, there is little about child 
rearing or female intellect or aspiration. These subjective statements reveal much 
about attitudes and feelings but they tend to stress the writer’s childhood, are silent on 
details of personal life and sanitise memory for perceived suitability for publication or 
self-esteem. Subjectivity is their strength and their weakness but they must be read as 
separate works and generalisations avoided from such phenomenological evidence. 
The stereotypical miner from the North-East and South Wales mostly lived in 
isolated mining villages but this was generally not the case in Warwickshire. Only 
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Bermuda village built by the Griff Colliery Company in 1893 existed during our 
period of study. New Arley built for Arley Colliery, Piccadilly built for Kingsbury 
Colliery, Galley Common for Haunchwood Colliery, Binley village for Binley 
Colliery and Keresley village built for Coventry Colliery were all developed after 
World War One with the exploitation of the concealed coalfield in the rural west and 
south. The only alternative industrial occupation was silk ribbon weaving and this 
went into terminal decline following the slump of 1868.
36
 Church and Outram note 
that Emerson Bainbridge of Bolsover Colliery ‘was a leading mine engineer whose 
anti-union stance earned him a national reputation.’37 His model village at Creswell in 
Derbyshire contained 280 houses with gardens, a playground and bandstand, with 
rents taken from wages and unacceptable behaviour liable to lead to eviction. A joint 
committee of officials and workmen ran sports, drama, the band, social evenings and 
organised seaside outings with the mine manager running the Boy’s Brigade and his 
wife the Girl’s Bugle Brigade. To Church and Outram this ‘amounted to a strategy for 
discipline.’38 Bainbridge was a director of Griff Colliery that built Bermuda Village 
also in the 1890’s. The seventy houses built by colliery craftsmen using colliery 
produced bricks cost £87 each, and the rows of eight to ten houses were two up two 
down in the centre with larger three up and three down accommodation at each end 
reserved for colliery officials. Miners depended upon these officials for their earnings 
and had to modify their behaviour and that of their children if they were not to suffer 
economically when they returned to the pit. Manager Melly noted in the company 
minute book: ‘I think on the whole it is a comfortable colliery village and most of the 
rough ones who got in at first when we wanted tenants have been turned out.’39 The 
village had a Mission Room used by mothers, the Sunday school and visiting 
Wesleyan lay preachers, a Reading Room, skittle ground, allotments, a sport and 
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gardening club.
40
 Miners could enjoy these superior facilities but the guiding 
paternalistic hand of the management was a constant presence. 
 
Drawing 4:1 Bermuda Village by Laurence Fretwell, a resident there. 
Studies of mining communities in the 1970’s by Friedlander and Haines both 
identified the characteristics of earlier marriage and larger families, with Friedlander 
hypothesising that this was a conscious decision as a form of life assurance suited to 
the special occupational characteristics.
41
 Such settlements offered limited 
occupational opportunities, little female employment and the certainty that wages 
would fall with physical ability. Church suggests that both authors exaggerated the 
differences especially in urban and mixed coalfields and that by the 1870’s colliery 
districts were not so marked by a male and youthful population. Purely occupational 
factors assumed increasing significance especially in urban areas where increasing 
employment opportunities resulted in smaller families.
42
 Census returns reveal that 
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Warwickshire miners lived alongside those of other occupations and those miners 
were always a part of and not apart from a larger working community.
43
 Bedworth 
was the centre of the Warwickshire coalfield and in the 1881 census, where mining 
families outnumbered textile workers’ families by a ratio of three to one, textile 
families had a marginally larger family size than mining families, yet both were below 
the national average.
44
 Such local evidence contradicts the idea that miners were 
distinct from the rest of the working class, although this was postulated in the two 
main demographic sources available to historians of this period. The 1884-85 
Registrar General’s Report claimed that miners had the lowest age of marriage of nine 
occupational groups 
45
 and the 1911 Census of Fertility and Occupation attributed the 
large families of miners to their genetic inferiority: 
The most fertile sections of the population are entirely made up of 
coalminers and labourers, except for one skilled trade – ship platers and 
riveters. This like many other of the most fertile occupations involves 
heavy manual labour. Broadly speaking, there seems to be an inverse 
relationship between brainwork and fertility but this is no doubt open to 
more than one interpretation.
46
 
Although the citation above allows for possible alternative explanations for family 
size, it equates unskilled coalmining as a form of underground labouring. 
The following analysis will rely heavily upon the Annual Reports of the Mine 
Inspectorate 1851 to 1913. Local newspapers tend to give barely a line or two to a 
death in the pits and when they do expand their coverage they report the Inquest, also 
contained in the Inspector’s Report, verbatim.47 Nevertheless newspapers are useful in 
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exposing the fallibility of such reports as in the 1880’s alone the Nuneaton Observer 
reported the inquests of at least three men killed in the mines who were not included 
by the Inspector as Warwickshire fatalities.
48
 Inspectors had a statutory duty to attend 
Inquests but this did not always occur. In August 1869 the Warwickshire coroner 
adjourned an Inquest on a Charity miner killed by fire damp with the comment that 
although he would usually be prepared to conduct an inquest on a miner without the 
presence of the Inspector this was an exception. The following year he held an Inquest 
on a Hawkesbury miner killed by a fall of coal without the attendance of the Inspector 
and this was not recorded in the Annual Report.
49
 Although Inspectors were 
technically able men who were aware that their reports would be presented to 
parliament as factual statement, they would endorse the employers’ perspective that 
most accidents were largely caused by the carelessness or laziness of workers.
50
 No 
one voiced the contrary trade union view that accidents were caused by pressure to 
maximise production for capitalist employers.
51
 When Inspectors therefore discuss the 
concept of blame for an accident, the reality may not be as simplistic as their 
statements imply. 
Dangers at the Face 
Miners at the face suffered the main dangers of roof fall and the problem of 
bringing down the coal with gunpowder. Gospel has noted that: 
Machinery for pumping, ventilation and the transport of coal both 
underground and over ground had been invented and widely utilised in the 
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19
th
 century, whereas the technology of coal getting at the face hardly 
changed .. arguably until the widespread adoption of machine mining 
during the inter-war period.
52
 
Throughout the period of study coal was mined with pick and crowbar and more died 
at the face than anywhere else in the colliery. Mine Inspectors reported over 220 
deaths in Warwickshire between 1850 and 1913 from ‘fall of coal,’ but provide 
analysis for only a third. The difficult Warwickshire geology accounted for eighteen 
deaths from slips and five from roof ‘bumps.’ A further six deaths were the result of 
props giving way, once from being pushed out by a roof fall and another from sprags 
becoming soft from water peculation. Props were knocked out accidentally on eight 
occasions, half by tubs coming off the rails, and another three deaths were the result 
of miners bringing coal down with crowbars and dislodging the props. The most 
dangerous task, accounting for twenty-three deaths, was the setting and removal of 
sprags. These were the small pit props used when undercutting coal. Only in seven 
cases was the fault of the miner highlighted, three times for not using a ringer and 
chain and twice for returning to coal that had failed to fall once the sprags were 
removed. Miners were also cited in fourteen cases for failing to set sufficient sprags 
but inexperience was mentioned only once, when in 1913 the inquest on a twenty-two 
year old Griff getter of two years, concluded that he was not knowledgeable enough 
to remove steel girders behind a retreating longwall face under a bad roof.
53
 There 
were remarkably few deaths from the use of gunpowder. For example in the single 
year of 1890 Warwickshire used 924 shots a day and worked for 250 days in the year, 
thus making around 250,000 shots.
54
 Yet throughout the period there were only eleven 
deaths from explosives. Details are given for only seven: two cases of dropping 
candles onto powder, two cases of premature explosions; two cases of not retiring to 
safety before the shot was fired, and one case of a store man being badly burned when 
opening a 50 lb gunpowder box. 
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What could a hewer have done to reduce accidents? Mine Inspectors were not 
averse to apportioning blame to the carelessness of the miner, and it is perhaps telling 
that in so many deaths they simply record a fall of coal. The 1888 update to general 
rules covering all mines, and special rules to take account of local differences, led the 
Midland Division to produce one set for the three counties of Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire, and another for Warwickshire,
55
 taking 
cognisance of that county’s peculiarities.56 Inspector Stokes could lament in 1891 that 
‘in a large number of falls no blame could be attached, and miners simply paid the 
penalty of a dangerous occupation.’57 When blame was identified owners were quick 
to prosecute men for breaches of the rules.
58
 Mine Inspectors began reporting these 
from 1892 and from 1895 listed the name of the company allowing Warwickshire to 
be disseminated from the whole. Between 1895 and 1913 there were 208 such 
prosecutions, an average of sixteen a year. Timbering offence accounted for 20 per 
cent, disobeying orders 13 per cent and explosives offences another 12 per cent. 
However distressing to the individual miner, it reinforced the message to adhere to 
safety regulations. Yet in two cases where men died due to ‘insufficient sprags’ the 
area had been inspected and passed by a deputy. An experienced eye was required to 
spot potential slips in the strata and to make the adjustment to timbering, and this 
could not be proscribed by a text book or regulation. Perhaps the fact that Inspectors 
attributed blame in so few cases is an indication that most deaths were unavoidable. 
Yet it is hard to condone the actions of the two experienced Hall End Stallman who in 
1890 tried to remove props without a ringer and chain and in 1900 chose to work 
under overhanging coal without setting sprags.
59
 It was not ignorance that cost them 
their lives but a misplaced overconfidence in their own ability to survive the gamble. 
It is true that a man paid by the amount he produced rather than the hours that he 
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worked may cut corners and that this had to be discouraged, but it is debatable that 
legal penalty was an effective tool. 
Miners could agitate through their trade unions to reduce hours and increase pay 
and thus reduce this temptation, but it was difficult to regulate against a masculine 
environment where pride in individual prowess was measured against the 
performance of others. In his 2007 study of Dust Disease in British Coalmining 
McIvor declared that the workplace culture could act ‘as a drag anchor’ against 
attempts to improve safety.
60
 In a 2003 study Weyman, Clark and Cox attempted to 
develop a model to explain coal miners’ risk taking. They concluded that the three 
main factors were time constraints, the management attitude to mine safety and the 
self-confidence of the miner to deal with risk.
61
 Although this study sprang from 
miners’ attitude in the 21st century, it is easy to see how it would apply to workers of 
an earlier era. Then they were motivated by piece rates rather than bonuses, but their 
management were also measured by performance criteria and men worked in teams 
where their ability to face and overcome known danger would receive more than just 
monetary reward. The death of a twenty-seven year old, experienced Tunnel Colliery 
stallman in 1900 exemplified the problem. He ignored safety in an attempt to bring 
down coal speedily and the coroner concluded that ‘It was a piece of bravado; he was 
trying to be too clever by doing things quicker than anybody else.’62 A hewer could 
best serve his interests by learning from the experience of those who worked around 
him, and understanding why regulations, drawn up with the input of fellow miners, 
had been introduced, but the ethos of the mine would militate against this. 
Dangers of Haulage 
The main dangers facing the underground haulage worker were the difficulty of 
working on an incline and the youth of many of the pony drivers. The geology of the 
Warwickshire coalfield defined how coal was to be mined. In the mid 19
th
 century a 
jig engine powered by steam lowered the cage down the shaft and at the same time 
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lowered empty tubs down the steeply sloping incline plane, which was often longer 
than the shaft. As the cage was raised, it pulled full tubs up the incline. An endless 
rope system later replaced this.
63
 Men were not allowed to ride the tubs unless invited 
to accompany a colliery official like a deputy. Miners walked the incline and had 
manholes provided periodically where they could take safety from any passing train 
of tubs. Boys and later pony drivers, transported coal tubs along roadways from the 
face to the foot of the incline plane. Horses were taken underground at the age of four 
and worked there their whole lives which could be up to the age of twenty.
64
 Some 24 
per cent of Warwickshire deaths occurred transporting coal underground compared to 
only 14 per cent nationally, and most were on the incline plane. Runaway tubs killed 
sixty-two on the incline, eleven from breaking chains or ropes, and a further thirty 
were crushed in the roadways. In addition five were killed walking in front of tubs, 
nineteen from riding in tubs and nine working with horses.
65
 
Bedington has studied the growth and awareness of health and safety at work in 
the nineteenth century.
66
 She claims all studies tend to reveal that some employment 
sectors are more prone to accidents than others and although a variety of variables are 
considered, the most telling factor was age. Findings indicated that during workers’ 
teens and early twenties the number of accidents was high. This reduced in their late 
twenties and there were more slight reductions until the forties when accidents began 
to increase until the end of working life. Different researchers attempted to isolate the 
rate of production, the degree of intelligence or the incidence of fatigue, but all were 
drawn back to the impact of age and in particular inexperience, attributing to the 
young a greater tendency for inattention, indiscipline and a disregard for danger. Even 
if some employers allowed boys to spend their first year on the surface
67
 they would 
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then descend to the dangerous world of oncost haulage. In 1903 7.2 per cent 
nationally and 7.8 per cent in the Midland District were under the age of sixteen.
68
 
What could an underground haulage worker have done to reduce accidents? A 
duty of care was necessary when working in a confined space with heavily laden tubs 
being moved, often on a slope. The chance of a runaway tub due to mechanical or 
human error was a constant possibility and a failure to react instantly to danger could 
be fatal. It does appear churlish for the Mine Inspector to criticise the 1900 Wyken 
miner killed by ascending tubs on an incline ‘only three yards from a manhole’69 or 
the sixty-six year old Exhall repairer who in 1911 chose to ‘rest in an inappropriate 
place’70 when a runaway tub appeared around a corner. That moment of hesitation or 
failure to see the imminent danger of a situation is easy to spot in many reports.
71
 One 
has less sympathy perhaps with those who tried to defy the laws of physics. Five died 
walking in front of tubs down the incline, only to be overcome by the weight, and 
although one was a thirteen year old boy, the rest were experienced men in their 
twenties. The danger of riding in tubs in low ceilinged roadways had been outlawed 
by the Special Rules
72
 yet nineteen were to die in this manner, fourteen of them 
teenagers. This predominance of youth rises even higher if one omits the three oldest 
fatalities who were riding legally with a colliery official on the incline when the wire 
rope broke. Youth can only be the explanation for the sixteen year old Alvecote miner 
who in 1889 thought he could stop a full train of tubs with his knee in front and his 
foot against the stop block.
73
 Of the nine horses related deaths five were from the use 
of sling gears or chains, which unlike shafts, gave the pony and driver little control. 
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Yet here again six of the deaths were teenagers. This predominance of youth in 
underground haulage is reflected in their mean death rate of only twenty years old 
compared to the mean of thirty-two for falls of coal. 
Mining families were keen to have their children contribute to family income as 
soon as possible and owners were happy to oblige them. It was government legislation 
which raised the required age for those employed underground, often to the chagrin of 
parents and owners alike.
74
 Miners did little to reduce youth employment apart from 
advising sons to seek alternative employment when economic conditions allowed.
75
 
Sons followed fathers into the pits and familial advice must have been a major 
resource of safety.
76
 
Dangers at the Surface 
The main dangers facing surface workers were from working with machinery and 
the transport of coal around the site in preparation for despatch to customers. In 1840 
coal was sorted underground with the waste being deposited in the gob or goaf, the 
area left by extracted coal. The arrival of cage winding allowed coal to be sorted in 
the superior light at the surface and the waste deposited in the characteristic slag 
heaps that surrounded a colliery. This allowed for a greater differentiation of coal 
targeted at specific markets. The diversity of Charity Colliery coal can be seen in an 
advertisement in the Nuneaton Chronicle in 1877.
77
 It lists best rider coal for 
households; hard coal and ell for steam; cobbles for cottages; scrubbed cobbles and 
kibbles for bakers; nuts for smiths and best, second and third slack for boilers and the 
brick trade. Surface deaths in Warwickshire were 7.8 per cent of the total or half the 
national average of 14 per cent. Screening coal was not dangerous although in the 
days of shaker pans the injury known as ‘black finger’ was inevitable. Deaths tended 
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to occur to those who worked the machinery. An Exhall stoker was hit by the crank of 
his winding engine oiling it while the engine was in motion, an Ansley Hall 
engineman had his leg torn off when he slipped while fitting a belt and an Arley 
banksman had his arm torn off picking stone from a moving belt.
78
 Of the forty-three 
surface deaths thirty-two or 74.7 per cent were run over or crushed by wagons. Here 
was the main danger where locomotives shunted loaded trucks around the site, and 
not just to colliery employees. In 1896 a Griff boatman was crushed by wagons at the 
canal wharf nearly a mile from the pit head.
79
 
The mine Inspector’s report lists four teenagers’ deaths, two aged fourteen and 
two fifteen years old described as a labourer, a screen boy and two banksmen.
80
 It also 
contained three over the age of sixty described as a cutter and two blacksmiths, one of 
whom was aged seventy.
81
 What is surprising is that the mean age of death was thirty-
nine and the medium forty-one, indicating that half the deaths were over the age of 
forty.
82
 This compares with the mean age of twenty for oncost work and thirty-two for 
falls of coal. 
What could a surface worker have done to reduce accidents? Banksmen were 
aware that while working on trucks they had to watch their back yet at Haunchwood 
in 1896, Charity in 1899 and Kingsbury in 1903 men were crushed by wagons 
approaching them from behind.
83
 On two occasions the locomotive drivers or shunter 
were cited. In the 1911 death of a Wyken screenhand the shunter was fined £1 for 
failing to give enough notice of his approach
84
 and at Haunchwood in 1912 the 
coroner’s jury on the death of a banksman run down crossing the rails, officially 
censured a shunter, who only narrowly escaped prosecution.
85
 As always we have the 
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inexplicable. In 1898 an experienced Griff banksman thought he could stop an empty 
train of sixteen tubs moving down an incline by placing his body in front of it;
86
 in 
1901 a fourteen year old labourer decided to take a short cut across the rails ignoring 
approaching trucks
87
 and in 1904 another Griff banksman decided to pass through a 
narrow opening where loaded trucks were being lowered.
88
 Many of the deaths 
involving machinery could have been avoided by the simple expedient of stopping 
machines to perform necessary maintenance. The high incidence of banksmen 
crushed by wagons approaching them from behind could have been reduced by 
simply applying the brakes to those that were not required. As not all wagons had 
brakes on both sides, and shunter drivers could quite legally leave trains of wagons on 
the lines without setting the brakes on those wagons, it could be argued that it was the 
responsibility of the management to address this rather than it being left to the 
initiative of the individual miner.
89
 Like their underground colleagues, surface 
workers needed to be aware of the potential dangers that surrounded them, but as 
Warwickshire surface deaths were half the national average it could be argued that 
they displayed more of that care than colliers elsewhere.
90
 
Accident Insurance 
Even if a collier followed every imaginable safety proscription there was no 
guarantee that they would escape injury in the mine. Indeed employers were to argue 
in the courts that the premium on wages recognised the risk of working underground 
and that by accepting a position, employees accepted the risks they were taking.
91
 
Their physique honed from the hard physical nature of their employment meant that 
miners were often easily recognisable in the general population and led some, like the 
1841 Bedworth surgeon cited above, to consider mining a healthy occupation. McIvor 
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questions this: ‘Working in the pits helped create the masculine body whilst holding 
the potential to emasculate with physical (and hence earning) capacity, undermined by 
traumatic injury and long term chronic illness and incapacity.’92 It is not known how 
many miners were disabled before 1913. Benson estimates a hundred non-fatal 
accidents requiring thirty days off work to each fatality.
93
 Louis, working on figures 
from the mining Permanent Relief Funds, confirms this hundred to one conclusion 
and adds that disability numbers were twenty times the official figures given in annual 
Mine Inspector Reports.
94
 Church estimates that one in every fifty accidents resulted 
in permanent disability.
95
 Despite a prevailing contemporary view to the contrary,
96
 
there is widespread evidence that colliers took these risks very seriously indeed. 
From the early 19
th
 century there were sick and accident clubs known as field 
clubs, for medical attention and domestic support during enforced absence from work. 
Both miners and owners subscribed, but workers only benefited as long as they were 
employees of the colliery. The situation in Warwickshire was described in the 1842 
Employment of Children Report. Mitchell records the evidence of the manager of 
Griff Colliery, Nuneaton and miners from Grove Colliery, Bedworth, who both stated 
that fines for unauthorised absence were paid into the field club. Griff colliery 
retained a doctor who was paid ten guineas a year when there were a hundred miners 
employed, a sum that was raised to fifteen guineas as the numbers had increased to a 
hundred and fifty.
97
 Field clubs flourished. Benson has calculated that in the Midland 
Division half the miners belonged to pit clubs in 1860 falling to 40 per cent by 1880. 
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Nationally the figure falls from 60 per cent in 1860 down to 38 per cent in 1880 
98
 as 
pit clubs were replaced by Permanent Relief Societies. Many owners saw it as 
beneficial to run field clubs as it helped discourage labour mobility and many made it 
a condition of employment that employees should subscribe to schemes that offered 
medical and financial benefits.
99
 Because the owners exercised a position of control, 
and were reluctant to provide accounts of how subscriptions were spent, there was a 
suspicion that funds were used illegally. There were always grumbling complaints 
exemplified in the 1870 claim that West Midland butties had appropriated pit club 
funds which they ‘spent in riotous living.’100 However, Benson asserts that the main 
failing of owner-dominated pit clubs were not managerial but structural: 
However altruistic the reason for establishing a club and however 
scrupulously administered, the actuarial foundations on which such 
schemes were organised made it difficult if not impossible to provide 
subscribers with an adequate source of relief.
101
 
An individual colliery fund could not hope to cope with a major disaster and if a 
colliery suffered bankruptcy the fund was lost too. 
Despite the stream of miners’ complaints Benson argues that the benefits of pit 
clubs should not be overlooked. Owners often made a financial contribution as well as 
donating the fines imposed on workmen. If a miner was killed most clubs paid a death 
grant of two or three pounds and some provided coffins. In Warwickshire for 
example, the Griff Account Book lists for 1833 ‘£1.5/- for coffins for a man and 
boy.’102 In the case of non-fatal accidents most provided some form of medical 
assistance and a weekly payment of between 5/- and 8/-, usually for a year. This was 
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considerably higher than the possible parish relief of around 3/- which tended to be 
offered as outdoor relief.
103
 
The new trade unions established in the 1860’s and early 1870’s established some 
kind of accident insurance for their members. This was partly a reaction against the 
unpopular inflexible pit clubs with their compulsory deductions and also the 
sometimes brutal administration of the Poor Law Guardians.
104
 Some even saw the 
schemes as a way to encourage and sustain support.
105
 At the first demonstration of 
the Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire Miners Association in 1873 a banner depicted a 
widow saying to the Board of Guardians that as her husband belonged to the 
Association, she would not have to ‘obey the dictator’ and ‘sell off her furniture.’106 
Benson discovered that of the seventy-seven English trade unions of which evidence 
survives, 60 per cent organised accident insurance in the second half of the 19
th
 
century.
107
 Of these 49 per cent organised fatal accident funeral payments, 42 per cent 
non-fatal accident insurance of weekly payment for temporary and sometimes 
permanent disablement, and 22 per cent provided provision for widows and orphans. 
The Warwickshire and Leicestershire Miners’ Association was one that paid widows 
6/- a week for life and children 1/6 a week until they reached the age of twelve.
108
 A 
further 16 per cent offered a comprehensive package which covered the three fields of 
fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and widow and orphan provision. 
Sadly many were just paper promises. Bold plans made in the heady boom years 
of the early 1870’s quickly turned to ashes as employers tried to claw back wages in 
response to the economic downturn and trade unions dissipated their funds in futile 
strikes against this. Membership haemorrhaged and the unions collapsed or raided 
their accident funds to find strike pay.
109
 Such policies were never based on sound 
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actuarial advice. As early as 1865 the South Yorkshire Miner’s Council had advised 
their members against raising benefits ‘as no lodge can with safety pay more than six 
shillings for sick and eight shillings for accidents per week with a contribution of 
sixpence a fortnight.’110 In 1877 this same union was warning its members that they 
must remember their primary goal and ‘not dwindle into nothing more than a 
benevolent institution.’111 By 1880 Benson calculates that the proportion of coal 
miners insuring with trade union funeral funds was just under 10 per cent, the 
proportion insuring with the Prudential Insurance Company was nearly 15 per cent 
while the proportion insuring with the Permanent Relief Funds had then reached 32 
per cent.
112
 
Voluntary accident insurance offered by commercial companies became 
increasingly popular. This was made more accessible by the weekly collection of 
premiums.
113
 One company, the Prudential Assurance Company, soon came to 
dominate. In 1887 The Miner detected ‘a feeling among the industrial classes that it is 
a good thing to insure their lives with the Prudential,’114 and that by the turn of the 
century insurance with ‘the Pru’ ‘had become virtually a universal habit.’115 Benson 
discovered from extensive research into the records of the Prudential that in 1885 25 
per cent of colliers were insured doubling to 50 per cent by 1900.
116
 
The origin of the Permanent Relief Funds was in the failure of other sources of 
relief available to the victims of accidents in mines. Benson noted: 
The catalyst for the foundation of the permanent relief fund movement was 
the series of major disasters that struck the industry from the early 1860`s 
onwards. The Northumberland and Durham Miners’ Permanent Relief 
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Fund (1862), the North Staffordshire Coal and Ironworkers’ Permanent 
Relief Fund (1869), the Lancashire and Cheshire Miners’ Permanent 
Relief Fund (1872) and the West Riding of Yorkshire Miners’ Permanent 
Relief Fund (1877) all came into being in this way.
117
 
The anomaly was that although victims of disasters were generally provided for by 
public subscription, those who lost their lives in the more usual single death accidents 
received no such support. As the first of the big four societies Northumberland and 
Durham set the standard of management structure that others were to adopt. For the 
payment of two to four pence a week and sometimes a joining fee, ordinary members 
were entitled to 4/- to 10/- a week if injured at work and if killed their family received 
a funeral grant, a widow’s benefit of 5/- a week and orphans’ benefit of 2/- a week.118 
Honorary members, who were not entitled to benefits, could join by paying a fee or in 
the case of colliery owners, a percentage of workers payments. The movement made 
rapid strides. By 1890 Benson discovered that there were almost as many permanent 
relief fund members as there were trade union members.
119
 
The Permanent Relief Societies soon developed a reputation for administrative 
efficiency. Benson states: 
Unlike the majority of their competitors the societies concentrated on one 
cause of coalfield distress, (industrial accidents) they kept their 
management costs low, they applied their rules strictly and impartially, 
they avoided bankruptcy and they honoured the commitments they entered 
into.
120
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Yet they did not escape criticism in the early years.
121
 Some miners believed that the 
Permanent Relief Societies should also embrace sickness pay and pensions but this 
was resisted. There were difficulties in applying the rules to common law wives and 
illegitimate children and complaints that they were too quick to remove disabled 
miners from their books. However the ‘permanent’ in their title assured miners that 
unlike field clubs and trade union schemes, relief would not tend to cease when it was 
most required.
122
 For Benson the major reason for the movement’s success was the 
support it received from both sides of the industry. ‘Employer-employee collaboration 
was at the core not just of the movement’s rhetoric but also of its establishment, its 
management, its expansion, its permanence and its day to day activities.’123  
Trade unions were initially suspicious of the collaborationist nature of the 
movement and criticised the ‘undemocratic’ nature of a management structure that 
gave considerable power to honorary members. They opposed the creation of 
permanent relief societies when trade unions ran their own accident insurance 
schemes but when the economic difficulties of the late seventies forced unions to 
abandon their schemes, they became avid supporters. Employers too were wary of the 
collaborationist approach with some finding it difficult to understand the difference 
between a permanent relief fund and a trade union. Gradually suspicion turned to 
support. Benson comments; ‘Employers began to recognise that a reputation for 
generosity might enhance rather than undermine their broader economic, social and 
cultural power.’124 From providing venues where the permanent relief society could 
meet miners, some employers went on to provided financial support in the form of a 
percentage of employee contributions and by stopping subscriptions at source, they 
reduced administration costs. Miners often resented the compulsory nature of such 
deductions and some even went on strike against it. Nevertheless this was surely 
preferable to the alternative when lapsed payments could mean a family was denied 
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assistance when it was most in need. Some owners recognised the advantage of 
having colliery managers on fund management boards as they could preserve funds by 
transferring injured miners to lighter jobs. Benson concedes however that most 
owners made no contribution to the permanent relief societies. Some were wary of the 
societies ‘political motives,’ others mirrored the early trade union fears of too high 
administrative costs, and still more were reluctant to contribute to a fund where they 
could not control the management. Yet Benson concluded that; 
employers, like their employees, came to regard the societies not as an 
extension of the trade union movement, but as independent bodies 
characterised by – and benefiting from – the employer-employee 
collaboration which they espoused and epitomised.
125
 
It was not until the 1880’s that two fatal accident relief societies were formed in 
the Midlands area.
126
 The first, the Midland Counties Miners’ Permanent Relief Fund 
formed in 1879, had 1,157 members and a balance of £301 at the 1880 AGM. It had 
ten branches and reported two fatal accidents leaving two widows and two children, 
four members permanently injured and 245 minor accidents requiring one to twenty-
six weeks absence. A second larger society, the Midland District Miners’ Fatal 
Accident Relief Society, was founded June 1883. The balance sheet in December 
recorded 9,300 members, and sixteen fatal accidents leaving eight widows and 
twenty-three children who received between 7/6 and £1 a week. This society had 
received £1,952 from the Hartley Colliery Relief Fund and had a balance of £2,478. 
Hartley Colliery near Newcastle-upon-Tyne had been the scene of a horrific accident 
in 1862 when the engine beam snapped and fell down the single shaft, destroying it 
and blocking all means of escape. Five were killed in a cage then ascending the shaft 
and 215 suffocated underground. Public sympathy was overwhelming and £70,000 
was raised, much more than could possibly be needed by the bereaved families and 
the surplus was invested and used for other mining widows and orphans. By 1892 
Inspector Stokes reported that the Midland Counties Miners’ Permanent Relief Fund 
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had 5,384 members and the Midland District Miners’ Fatal Accident Relief Society 
had 21,505 members, each paying a penny a week. Together they supported 127 
widows and 294 children.
127
 Warwickshire however was slow to participate. In a letter 
to the Nuneaton Observer dated May 1887 the Warwickshire miner’s leader promoted 
the Midland District Miners Fatal Accident Relief Society, stating that only 
Hawkesbury Colliery had joined.
128
 Following meetings led by the Secretary of the 
Relief Society, Bedworth Charity Colliery joined the society in June and Pooley Hall 
Colliery in October.
129
 The following June Johnson was still bemoaning that these 
were the only three colliery participants.
130
 A decade later the WMA took the step of 
establishing its own Warwickshire Permanent Relief Fund administered by the union. 
For access to accident, sickness, widows and orphans pay and hospital tickets to the 
Coventry, Nuneaton and Tamworth hospitals and the Birmingham and Leicester eye 
infirmary full members paid ten pence a week, half members seven pence a week and 
five pence for those under the age of sixteen.
131
 
The 1897 Workers’ Compensation Act 132 entitled miners or their families to 
redress if they were killed or injured by accident, but no uniform system was adopted 
in the Midland District. Inspector Stokes noted in 1900 that: ‘In some parts a number 
of mines have joined, in some individual owners took the risk and in others owners 
insured against fatalities and bore the risk for non-fatalities.’133 Stokes had calculated 
that it would cost a farthing on the price of a ton of coal to cover both fatal and non-
fatal accidents but as 70 per cent of accidents did not require two weeks absence, they 
were not covered by the act. This figure is open to question. As noted in Chapter 
Three, there was no accepted definition of what constituted a non-fatal accident until 
the 1906 Notification of Accidents Act defined it as requiring seven days absence 
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from work. Yet in 1910 the MP for North Derbyshire had raised in the House of 
Commons that there was a discrepancy between the number of reported accidents and 
those receiving relief: 
If you take the whole of the permanent relief funds in this country which 
pay relief on the certificate of a doctor that an accident has taken place 
and a man is unable to follow his work, it works out that one of every six 
who goes down in the mines meets with an accident every year.
134
 
In 1910 Warwickshire reported 115 injured in accidents. If Harvey’s calculations are 
correct, it should have been around 2,600. 
It could be argued with some justification, that field clubs and friendly societies 
were concerned with the results and not the cause of accidents. However, a contrary 
view would be that the growing support for the relief societies from the 1880’s reveals 
that an increasing number of miners were not prepared to let their families suffer the 
lottery of misfortune, and that their premiums are the tangible proof that they 
understood the link between the cause and consequence of accidents. 
Trade Unions 
Perhaps the only influence an individual miner could have to reduce accidents 
was through the collective power of their trade union. The first call for government 
intervention was a joint demand from Staffordshire owners and miners in 1834 to ban 
safety lamps that failed to reach a prescribed standard.
135
 A Select Committee was 
established and safety lamps were tested by London University but no action was 
recommended as it was felt that safety should remain the responsibility of the 
owner/manager.
136
 In 1842 the MAGB was established in Wakefield. By 1844 it had 
70,000 members, an estimated third of the national workforce. Some 65 per cent were 
in the dominant North-East with the rest from Yorkshire and Lancashire, with 
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representatives from Staffordshire, Wales, Scotland and Leicestershire.
137
 This 
embryonic trade union campaigned for a Mine Inspectorate with the necessary 
technical knowledge to approve the safety of underground workings and the power to 
enforce their findings. In 1844 a meeting of 20,000 Durham miners petitioned 
parliament for inspectors who would check ventilation, ropes and machinery 
138
 and 
in his 1849 evidence to the Select Committee, the Jarrow miners’ representative 
proposed Inspectors who could impose on the spot fines.
139
 The Miners’ Association’s 
tendency to link safety with pay and conditions hindered its success and it collapsed at 
the end of the decade.
140
 
Trade Unions re-emerged in the 1860’s and supplemented their traditional call for 
more power for Mine Inspectors 
141
 with a legal campaign to penalise those employers 
with poor safety records with sizeable claims for compensation. Here they came up 
against an intransigent legal system and Bartrip notes; ‘High Court precedents 
blocked or threw doubt on one possible legal ground after another.’142 Employers 
claimed that those in dangerous jobs received a premium in wages that constituted 
acceptance of the risk. The myth of ‘common employment’ meant that workers were 
responsible for their own actions and could not sue a fellow worker, then defined as a 
manager.
143
 It was also commonly believed that most accidents were caused by 
worker neglect and that contributory negligence nullified claims. Finally it was 
thought that excessive compensation following, for example, a mine explosion, could 
cripple a company and be detrimental to British industry. Add to this an 
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unsympathetic legal system that fought to protect the sanctity of contract law, and it is 
not surprising that most compensation claims failed.
144
 
The Trade Union Congress was formed in 1868 and by 1874 had an affiliated 
membership of one million. In that year two miners’ leaders were elected as Liberal 
Members of Parliament; Alexander MacDonald, the Scottish miners’ leader, was 
elected for Stafford and Thomas Burt, the North-East miners’ leader, for Morpeth in 
Northumberland.
145
 MacDonald had established the Miners’ National Association in 
1863, described by Church as a pressure group supporting legislative reform.
146
 He 
was an eloquent speaker and that rarest of creatures, a former working coal miner 
with a university education.
147
 The TUC campaigned for reform of the law and argued 
that it negated an employer’s incentive to monitor safety: 
It even makes it his interest not to examine too minutely into the way in 
which his work is carried on lest he should be held to have personally 
interfered and to have become personally liable.
148
 
After years of debate involving government inquiry, union lobbying, employer 
hostility, failed parliamentary bills and targeting of candidates in elections, the 
Employer’s Liability Act was passed in 1880. It did not turn out to be the panacea that 
unions had hoped for. Around 25 per cent of employers simply ‘contracted out’ 
ameliorating the loss of worker rights by increasing contributions to accident relief 
funds. Bartrip noted a positive correlation between high accident rates and high levels 
of contracting out.
149
 In South Wales which had the worst accident record and 
Lancashire and Cheshire which was significantly above the national average, almost 
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all employers contracted out. To the trade union’s chagrin, in other areas employers 
simply turned to insurance to ensure heavy damages did not fall upon a single 
enterprise. The newly created Employers Liability Assurance Corporation made no 
merit rating to reward employers with good safety records, nullifying the TUC aim to 
penalise the bad.
150
 After a decade of its existence George Campbell of the Central 
Association of the Miners Permanent Relief Societies gave evidence to a Select 
Committee on the working of the Act.
151
 Statistics showed no difference in accidents 
in those that did or did not contract out. Those employers that contracted out did not 
save money as they paid more than they would have under compensation. He also 
found little evidence that workers were forced into contracting out as, like employers, 
they believed that litigation soured relations and that high legal cost ate into any 
compensation awarded. Evidence from the long-running German scheme revealed 
that in only 20 per cent of accidents could employer negligence be established 
suggesting that most accidents would not be covered by employer liability. Not 
surprisingly Bartrip found that most workers opted for the small but assured payments 
in event of accident rather than the larger more uncertain figure obtainable under the 
Act.
152
 
Throughout the 1890’s trade unions continued to campaign against contracting 
out and an insurance scheme that they perceived allowed employers to neglect 
safety.
153
 Their primary concern was not compensation but penalising employers with 
poor safety records by hitting them where it hurt most, in their bank balance. The 
move to establish adequate compensation for all was left to others, and the prevailing 
opinion came to rest on a system of insurance. The 1897 Workers’ Compensation Act 
was the first to apply the principle of no fault compensation. It designated parameters 
by stating who was eligible, initially excluding seamen and agricultural labourers, and 
how much compensation was to be paid based on previous earnings. Payments were 
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negotiated between the two parties or settled by arbitration, with the courts deciding 
disputes over matters of law. It was not a system of State insurance but according to 
Bartrip; ‘an imposed public solution on private interest.’154 The wording of the Act led 
to many court cases and the influx of insurance companies that challenged the 
supremacy of ELAC, led to rate cutting that meant many survived on the edge of 
solvency and would put pressure on claimants to accept small lump sum payments. 
Yet despite its shortcomings, MPs now sought to extend and amend the Act rather 
than seek its repeal, and trade unions became more focussed upon improving 
compensation. At the 1900 Annual Conference of the MFGB the secretary of the 
WMA gave the county figures for the previous year. There had been seven killed with 
the families of the six men receiving on average £188 and the boy’s family £75.155 
There were 606 reported accidents which led to three court cases, one of which was 
won, one lost and one the subject of an appeal. All the rest were settled out of court. 
The five permanently injured men received between 13/- and 15/- a week with other 
accident victims between 8/- to 20/- a week.
156
 In 1913 at an Arley Lodge miners’ 
meeting it was reported that during the last fourteen years half a million pounds was 
paid to Warwickshire miners in compensation.
157
 
One aim of the first Warwickshire trade union established in 1872 was ‘keeping 
its own sick, maintaining its own injured and burying its own dead.’158 The union had 
been established in a period of rapidly increasing coal prices where owners were 
content to share some of their bounty as increased wages. The economic downturn of 
1874 saw owners keen to claw back those wage increases and expensive and 
ineffectual strikes in 1874, 1875 and 1876 depleted union funds and led to the 
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suspension of payments to widows and the sick in 1877. Subsequently members 
deserted the union and it collapsed with debts of £400 in 1880.
159
 
In 1885 a second union was established with William Johnson appointed a full 
time agent in 1888.
160
 Johnson was characterised by his close – some said too close – 
relationship with employers and his willingness to negotiate rather than resort to 
industrial strife. As early as 1890 the leader of the Warwickshire Employers 
Association was commending his ‘wise and moderate counsels offered to the men.’161 
The policy was successful and in 1890 the Nuneaton Chronicle could report that the: 
Warwickshire miner can claim the distinction of having achieved the eight 
hour day without agitation or parliamentary interference. The times 
worked at the seventeen mines in the county averages 7 hours 40 minutes, 
and as a further 20 minutes is occupied in reaching the coalface, the full 
eight hour day is secured.
162
 
Johnson denied this but admitted the eight hour day was close. In 1891 the Tamworth 
Herald could quote the secretary of the Bedworth Lodge of the union that it was 
‘heaven on earth for all Warwickshire miners.’163 This ‘heaven’ did not survive the 
economic depression of 1893 when employers demanded a national reduction of 25 
per cent in wages. The industrial dispute that resulted exhausted union funds, but 
unlike its predecessor the men did not abandon the union and it survived intact.
164
 
Johnson’s moderation was apparent even during the strike when he was called to 
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defuse a potential violent situation outside the working Nuneaton Colliery.
165
 When 
men called for winding men to come out and stop all pit maintenance Johnson refused 
stating they had a good relationship in Warwickshire between the masters and the men 
and he would not ‘hit below the belt.’166 The union shared the general economic 
recovery from 1895 and in 1900 the WMA could claim that it achieved old age 
pensions for all over seventy ten years before the Liberals introduced it nationally in 
1908. Although negotiations began in 1898
167
 the first pensions were not paid out 
until 1902.
168
 In that year pensions were also negotiated for the sick and injured. In 
1899 the union opened a purpose built Central Office in Bulkington Lane, Bedworth. 
At a cost of £2,000 the building in an acre of land had an office for the General 
Secretary, a general office, a strong room and a thirty-five foot square assembly room. 
There was living accommodation for Johnson and out offices, toilets and a shed in the 
yard at the rear. The land at the rear was said to be large enough for 10-20,000 people 
and at the opening ceremony thirteen lodges brought their banners and bands to hear 
speeches from national miners’ leaders.169 In 1900 Johnson had stood as the Liberal 
candidate against the Conservative MP for Nuneaton, Sir Francis Newdigate. He lost 
but was successful in the 1906 rerun of the contest. A mine union official had replaced 
a mine owner in parliament.
170
 
William Johnson was a controversial figure. He had never worked as a miner
171
 
and this led to difficulties when negotiating with employers. There was no parity in 
wages across the Warwickshire coalfield and miners in the north were receiving 
concessions that their fellow miners in Bedworth and Nuneaton could only dream of. 
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Fretwell attributes this to the fact that owners in the south tended to work more 
closely together and it was therefore more difficult to gain concessions from an 
individual company.
172
 At Birch Coppice and Baddesley collieries in the north miners 
had a Clause Ten added to their contracts allowing face workers who were taken off 
face work to do other jobs, to continue to receive face work rates rather than the lower 
daymans’ wages. While negotiating contracts at Birch Coppice Johnson unwittingly 
lost the miners this valuable Clause for an extra six pence a day and as a result the 
face workers lost around 3/9 a week.
173
 This hardly endeared him to miners in the 
north and when it was discovered that the union had never employed a chartered 
accountant to audit their accounts, untrue rumours circulated in the Tamworth area 
that Johnson was a shareholder at Birch Coppice Colliery
174
 and more seriously, that 
he had embezzled union funds. The WMA was forced to sue for slander in 1908 but 
although they were awarded £1,000 in damages, the judge criticised the union for its 
lack of financial management.
175
 This is unfair as Johnson claimed that ‘there was 
scarcely a union in the country that had its books audited by a chartered accountant’ 
and when the idea had been mooted the men had rejected it in the vote.
176
 He had 
acted as auditor for the MFGB commenting in his report to the Congress of 1900 how 
well the books were kept.
177
 The minute book of the WMA reveals that the union had 
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a treasurer and auditor annually elected by the men and that a sub-committee 
regularly examined the books of the various lodges and brought to book any that were 
unsatisfactory.
178
 Nevertheless rumbling discontent continued and this came to the 
surface after the four week national stoppage of March 1912 when the WMA was 
unable to provide full strike pay for the last week of the strike. Johnson had suffered a 
heart attack in late March and was absent for six months recovering.
179
 He was unable 
to defend himself against the growing number of reform movement meetings of June 
and July where there was vociferous criticism of the ‘Bedworth officials’ and 
demands for closer scrutiny of union funds. By September the union had conceded 
that both the association books and that of the lodges would be audited by chartered 
accountants.
180
 
Johnson was also criticised for nepotism in employing his son as his secretary.
181
 
Fretwell believed that he was dyslexic and needed this assistance although difficulties 
with reading were not admitted at the time. As evidence for this he remarks that on a 
number of occasions Johnson ‘misread’ notes sent to him while negotiating with 
employers.
182
 It is difficult to fully accept this interpretation. His ‘misreading’ of notes 
could be attributed to the fact that Johnson felt that he was more aware of what was 
possible in negotiations than the men he represented. He was a prolific writer of 
letters to the newspapers and in 1889 published a series of ten lengthy articles on 
'Machinery verses Humans' in the Nuneaton Chronicle.
183
 He also attended the 
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Annual Conference of the MFGB and numerous Conciliation Board meetings with 
employers but there is no evidence that his son accompanied him.
184
 By 1911 Johnson 
was in his sixties and ‘not as young as he used to be.’ He was MP for Nuneaton, a 
county councillor for Bedworth and served on the executive of the MFGB. The WMA 
had grown from four thousand to seventeen thousand members and administered its 
own permanent relief society. It would appear reasonable that the union should then 
employ both the treasurer and an assistant general secretary as officials
185
 and that 
Johnson should require an assistant ‘paid for from my own private income’ for 
support in these duties.
186
 
At the national level although Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire 
had their Associations, Warwickshire was part of the Midland Federation which 
included Staffordshire and Shropshire. In the decade before he became an MP 
Johnson worked for the MFGB as an administrator. Between 1896 and 1905 Johnson 
served on the Credentials Committees of the Annual Conference, Special Conferences 
and the International Miners Conference on twenty-two occasions.
187
 The Credentials 
Committee was responsible for listing the areas represented, the delegate’s names and 
their number for each area, the numbers in the trade union and the number employed. 
In addition he served on Business Committees that decided what was to be discussed 
on three occasions and was a teller of votes twice.
188
 He was also part of delegations 
to petition Government ministers or negotiate with employers at the Conciliation 
Board 
189
 and although he rarely made an oral contribution, he was not just there to 
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make up the numbers. When he spoke it was to clarify technical detail as in a 1904 
Board of Conciliation meeting when fearing a reintroduction of the sliding scale, he 
succeeded in having the wording changed to say that price was not the sole factor in 
determining wages.
190
 His pernickety nature could go too far as in the Annual 
Conference of 1905 where he felt it necessary to point out to Conference a two pence 
error in the auditor’s report.191 When he did make a conference speech it usually 
revealed his moderate stance. In 1897 he spoke against a proposal for the miners to 
adopt an overtly socialist position;
192
 in 1898 he railed against employers contracting 
out of the Workers’ Compensation Act;193 at the 1901 International Conference he 
gave half-hearted support to the resolution to nationalise mines which was 
traditionally passed unanimously, by describing it as ‘impossible;’194 in 1904 he 
seconded a proposal to end the Scottish wage dispute by using the intervention of the 
English and the Welsh Conciliation Boards as a moderating counter to the ‘brute 
force’ shown by the Scottish employers, to gain public support;195 at the 1904 Annual 
Conference he suggested an end to the impasse of the Eight Hour Day by gaining it 
‘fifteen minutes at a time’196 and in 1905 he spoke against the Coal Tax which had led 
to cheap South Wales coal flooding the Midland District and depressing wages.
197
 
In his speeches cited above Johnson was not an inspirational orator but there was 
one exception. He spoke passionately for the need for old age pensions, particularly 
after the introduction of the Workers’ Compensation Act of 1897 which led some 
employers to dispense with the service of older miners thought more prone to 
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accidents.
198
 In 1901 he informed the Annual Conference of a Warwickshire Pension 
Scheme which in three years had amassed a fund of £5,000 and planned the following 
year to pay out old age pensions and sick pay of 5/- a week to those that produced a 
doctor’s certificate. His proposal that the Federation should consider such a scheme 
for all miners was withdrawn after fears that this would undermine the national 
campaign for a pension, and that a similar scheme introduced in Northumberland and 
Durham had failed.
199
 At the 1903 Annual Conference, Johnson seconded the 
resolution for an old age pension for all by giving details of the Warwickshire Scheme 
which had begun payments in July 1902.
200
 Between sixty and seventy men over the 
age of sixty were receiving 5/- a week and ‘were at liberty to do any light job that did 
not compete with a local worker.’201 The Executive Minutes of the WMA reveals that 
the scheme required refinement. A note in a meeting of September 1905 commented 
that some men had incorrectly received a pension without paying into the fund and 
that ‘too many look upon the union as a relief society which it is not.’202 It was 
resolved that men could not receive a pension when in receipt of compensation,
203
 two 
old age pensions were suspended until it could be discovered exactly what extra work 
they were performing 
204
 and those six months in arrears with their payments became 
ineligible to receive a pension.
205
 In 1905 the Sick Branch of the Permanent Relief 
Society was restricted to those below the age of forty
206
 and a 1912 claimant was 
refused when it was discovered that he had attended a doctor at one o’clock on a 
Sunday morning in a drunken state.
207
 Yet the union was prepared to grant £2 for a 
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widow that remarried in 1905 and to provide orphan money for two children in 
1907.
208
 It also made a grant of £100 to the Coventry Hospital Building Extension 
Fund, £5 to the Nuneaton Ambulance Society and spent £20 on an invalid carriage 
that could be used anywhere in the district.
209
 It may not have been a relief society but 
the WMA took tangible steps to provide a welfare cushion for its members.
210
 
In 1906 Johnson stood as the Liberal candidate for the Nuneaton constituency and 
the Liberal supporting Nuneaton Observer gave him a lengthy column to answer his 
critics. The previous year had been a poor one for miners as they suffered a 10 per 
cent reduction in wages in January
211
 and some twelve hundred Warwickshire men 
had lost their employment. There had obviously been some grumbling complaints of 
the failure of the union to resist these reductions and Johnson talked of the need for 
unity and to bring any grievances to their lodges and not foster division. He attributed 
half the job losses to bad trade but the rest to blunders of management described as 
‘capitalist incompetence and inefficiency.’ With the exception of a few older men 
most had now found work. In an attempt to justify his leadership of the WMA he gave 
a detailed breakdown of expenditure for 1904. The union had spent £3,000 on out of 
work pay; £2,000 on sickness and accidents; £1,000 on ninety old age pensioners; 
£800 to the Miners’ Federation and to help other trade unions; £700 for medical 
attention; £2-300 for widows and orphans; £200 for death allowances and £200 on 
legal fees to fight for compensation.
212
 The high ‘out of work’ payments suggests that 
this was not a typical year but it nevertheless gives an insight into the working of the 
Warwickshire union. 
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Two national disputes, the 1908 call for the Eight Hour Day and the 1912 
campaign for a Minimum Wage, both reveal the favourable condition of the 
Warwickshire miner. In 1909 a Bedworth miner complained to the Tamworth Herald; 
‘We did not want the eight hour day. I now have to work longer hours for less 
money.’213 The Annual Conference of the MFGB had since 1889 passed the yearly 
resolution for a call for an Eight Hour Day from bank to bank. They also published 
the list of MPs who voted on the annual measure presented to parliament.
214
 In 1900 
Sir Alfred Hickman, MP for Wolverhampton and owner of the Haunchwood Colliery 
in Nuneaton, spoke against the bill in a period of coal shortages. He stated that in 
Warwickshire hewers worked six and a half hours at the face and loaders seven and a 
half hours, with the former receiving 5/2 to 10/- shillings a day and the latter 4/10, and 
both half a ton of coal every twenty-four days.
215
 Voting cut across party lines with Sir 
Alfred voting against the Bill, his fellow Conservative MP and owner of Newdigate 
Colliery in Bedworth, Francis Newdigate, voting in favour of it, and the Liberal MP 
Emerson Bainbridge, owner of Griff Colliery Nuneaton, joining Sir Alfred in the 
lobby.
216
 The bill was lost but no one questioned Hickman’s assertion that 
Warwickshire miners were both well paid and worked under superior conditions. 
The Eight Hours Day became law on July 1 1909 with all Warwickshire pits at a 
standstill. The two issues in dispute was the time allowed for snap
217
 and the shaft 
journey to and from work. The employers demanded fifteen minutes snap time while 
the WMA called for twenty minutes. In his usual conciliatory way Johnson 
recommended that where collieries agreed to the twenty minutes men should return to 
work and that if employers agreed to the men descending in the master’s time then 
they would ascend in theirs. But he had misjudged the mood of the men and in lodge 
after lodge they voted to remain on strike until a twenty minute snap time was agreed 
across the county. Stanley Brothers had typically agreed to the twenty minutes break 
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but when one hundred and thirty at Nuneaton and forty at Bedworth decided to return 
to work, they were confronted by crowds of thousands who were not prepared to limit 
their disquiet to verbal abuse. Many of the Nuneaton working miners were beaten and 
at Bedworth they were chased across fields and thrown into the canal. At Ansley Hall 
miners had voted to work the fifteen minutes snap and when a hostile crowd massed a 
pitiful group of wives and children armed with broom handles and pick staves 
gathered at the pit head to ‘protect’ their men. There was no violence but the Ansley 
men agreed to join the county stoppage. Sir Alfred Hickman, leader of the 
Warwickshire Coalowners’ Association, complained that their competitors in 
Cannock, Staffordshire and Derbyshire had approved the fifteen minutes snap time 
and that Warwickshire was alone in its opposition. Nevertheless after two weeks the 
owners conceded the ‘temporary’ grant of twenty minutes snap and referred the 
dispute to the Board of Trade for arbitration. The men then returned to work with the 
exception of Griff, Charity, Newdigate and Exhall collieries. Here the dispute was 
more over the new system of working which affected double shift work but as the 
men had only worked seven hours they had been accustomed to a thirty minutes snap 
break. After another vote all but Exhall returned to work. In August Winston 
Churchill, President of the Board of Trade, awarded the Warwickshire men their 
twenty minutes snap.
218
 
Similarly in 1911 the Daily News’ Industrial Correspondent reported that in 
Warwickshire; 
an atmosphere of prosperity and contentment which is in striking contrast 
to the poverty and unrest prevailing in the mining districts of Staffordshire 
and Worcestershire. The secret of course lies in the more favourable 
geographical position of the coalfield and its markets are not restricted. 
The principle of the national minimum wage for which miners elsewhere 
agitate, has already been conceded here .. The owners in Warwickshire 
have granted the very thing for which the National Federation is 
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contending. I believe they are the only coalowners in the country to do 
so.
219
 
He was mistaken as Taylor has discovered that areas of Staffordshire had been granted 
similar conditions of work after a stoppage.
220
 In 1911 there were a series of Special 
Conferences leading up to the national strike for a minimum wage. At a January 
Special Conference on Abnormal Working Places Johnson informed the meeting that 
Warwickshire had already solved it, not by ‘advocating a national strike but meeting 
the colliery proprietors in their own offices and getting the terms.’221 He admitted that 
they had spent £12,000 fighting two collieries that had opposed the deal in 1910
222
 but 
that now they had a written agreement for 7/- a day.
223
 In Warwickshire hewers earned 
on average between 10 to 14/- a day although some could earn as much as a pound a 
day and that as ‘we have to be reasonable’ the scheme operated over a period of a 
fortnightly earnings. He gave details of how the scheme worked in a June Special 
Conference. It was the checkweighman who decided if money had to be made up and 
informed the manager. If there were any problems Johnson contacted the Employers’ 
Association ‘and they compel them.’224 When at a November Special Conference a 
South Wales delegate complained that nothing had been achieved ‘except in 
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Warwickshire where it is said something great has been accomplished through the 
generosity of the employers,’ Johnson quipped ‘and the leadership.’225 
Yet although Johnson continued to receive vociferous criticism of his leadership 
from a section of the miners culminating in a breakaway North Warwickshire Miners’ 
Association being formed in 1909,
226
 his skills earned him the respect of both the 
mine owners and the general public. The Nuneaton Chronicle reported his 1894 
comment: ‘The employers always treat me like a gentleman. No miner’s agent in the 
country is better treated than I am by the employers.’227 Indeed in 1913 his 
moderating influence was recognised with the award of an OBE. In 1910 the MFGB 
had appeared to adopt an overtly socialist stance.
228
 Johnson simply ignored this. He 
had been pressured to join the Labour Party group in the House of Commons in 
1910
229
 but together with his fellow Liberal colleague for Nottingham was expelled in 
1914 for failure to follow party policy.
230
 This was not surprising as back in 1897 he 
had made one of his rare speeches to the Annual Conference of the MFGB against a 
Scottish proposal for the Federation to adopt a more Socialist agenda
231
 and in 1911 
he was one of four MPs cited by the Labour Party for not following the constitution in 
                                                 
225
 MFGB Special Conference Minimum Wage (14-15 November 1911) p. 58 MRC MSS429MFGB 
4/8. Such a view was not shared by all Warwickshire miners and when it was explained to the men 
Arley lodge voted against it. Nuneaton Observer, 1 December 1911. 
226
 The divisions in the union took shape in 1906 over the failure of the WMA to professionally audit 
their funds. In 1907 there was an inter-union dispute between the WMA and the Association of 
Enginemen and Stokers, the former claiming that their members had been poached and the latter 
claiming a lack of support for an enginemans’ strike. Nuneaton Chronicle, 6 September 1907. As 
Johnson was then a Liberal MP the Conservative supporting Chronicle gave considerable space to 
Johnson’s critics and it was this that was to develop into the North Warwickshire Miners’ Union. See 
Nuneaton Chronicle, 1, 8, 15 March 1907. The Tamworth and District Association was formed 
September 1909 with 120 of the 1,400 miners in the area. Nuneaton Observer, 3 September 1909. By 
1912 they had grown to 2,000 members Nuneaton Observer, 28 June 1912. 
227
 Nuneaton Chronicle, 1 May 1894. 
228
 In 1910 Robert Smillie, the Scottish miner’s leader and avowed socialist, became president of the 
MFGB. 
229
 At their Annual Conference of 1907 the MFGB voted to affiliate to the Labour Party by 248 votes to 
172. It is notable that all four of the Midland District coalfields voted against this. Annual Conference 
(1907) Report p. 97. MRC MSS429MFGB 4/6. 
230
 R. Gregory, The Miner and British Politics 1906 to 1914 (Oxford, 1968) p. 37. Reported in the local 
press, Nuneaton Observer, 10 March 1914. 
231
 Annual Conference Report of the MFGB (1897) pp. 61-62 MRC MSS429MFGB 4/2. 
 Page | 215 
 
the election of 1910.
232
 Yet Fretwell comments that his later inaction received local 
acclaim: 
The Warwickshire coal owners suddenly began to thank God that here in 
Warwickshire the miner’s union was run by Johnson. The result was that 
suddenly Johnson began to receive praise from the oddest quarters, not 
only from the Coal Owners Association but from church leaders, the 
Chamber of Commerce and even Rotary Clubs and the Masons. All began 
to pour praise upon him. It was as if suddenly Johnson was the hero of the 
day. In fact the only people that were not praising Johnson were the 
miners.
233
 
Johnson retired in February 1918 and died in July 1919 age seventy.
234
 His departure 
led to a reunification of the two Warwickshire unions and the abandonment of the 
close links to the Liberal Party. 
Despite the fact that for much of their existence they had to battle the threat and 
then the reality of a breakaway union at Tamworth in the north who resented the 
supposed domination of the union by Bedworth at the centre,
235
 the WMA was a 
successful trade union that worked amicably with owners. Without the need for 
prolonged industrial conflict they achieved pay and working condition that the 
National Federation would have to fight for. Yet trade unions were reluctant to take 
action over dangerous or unhealthy conditions. Youth employment for example was 
known to be a significant factor in underground accidents. At the 21
st
 International 
Miners’ Conference held in Brussels in 1910 the German delegation led their yearly 
Employment of Children resolution demanding that no boy should be employed at a 
colliery until the age of fourteen and not allowed underground until they reached 
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sixteen. The Germans called upon Great Britain to ‘take a decisive stand and help 
forward the international movement’ but yet again without a Conference mandate the 
British and French meekly abstained in the vote.
236
 When the matter was raised in the 
Annual Conference of 1911 held at Southport the delegates voted against it retaining 
the age of fourteen for underground employment.
237
 McIvor complains that safety 
issues were marginalised ‘for the sake of increased wages and they (trade unions) 
failed as a countervailing force.’238 Miners did have the right under the Act of 1888 to 
pay for their own inspection of a mine but there is no evidence that Warwickshire 
miners took up this prerogative. This is regardless of the fact that it was made clear at 
the annual MFGB Conference that if the men elected their representative they could 
apply to the Federation to receive the payment.
239
 
Miners, Unions and Mine Safety 
There may appear an assumption in what is written above that at least as the late 
19
th
 century progressed miners were protected by a body of safety legislation and in 
some fatalities it was their neglect of these rules that made them culpable in their own 
deaths. This supposition rests on the belief that the mine officials enforced these 
standards and that it was greedy miners, driven by pecuniary advantage, who ignored 
them. Mine Inspectors who witnessed opposition from men who thought that new 
safety measures would limit their earning capacity, would certainly endorse this. 
Parliamentary representatives of the coalowners who spoke against the increasing 
exclusion of young children from mines cloaked their opposition in a supposed 
defence of coal mining families to sustain a living wage through the supplement of 
child earnings.
240
 Yet while it is possibly true that most workers seek to maximise 
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income
241
 and that a hewer needed to complete his stint to ensure regular 
employment, it would be naïve to believe that standards of safety were always 
rigorously enforced. In discussing management structure Church and Outram state 
that the overman’s duty was to visit daily all parts of the mine whereas a deputy was 
in charge of a particular district. ‘In theory the overman’s responsibility was to 
encourage effective production while the deputy`s responsibility was for safe 
working. In practice there was an overlap.’242 No over officious deputy could afford to 
overlook the costs of production. McIvor and Johnston interviewed a sizeable number 
of miners, some of whom had experience that predated the Second World War. One 
claimed that the minimum distance recommended between props soon became the 
maximum and that a miner would be reprimanded for exceeding this on grounds of 
supposed safety. Another when chided by a Mine Inspector that he was not following 
prescribed rules, stated that it was pointless telling him, and he should direct his 
comments to the overman and deputy observing some paces away. McIvor concluded 
that miners rationalised risks, noting ‘how they balanced health and safety against the 
pressure of productivity as well as pressure from their peers.’243 The male-dominated 
ethos of the pit may have helped to cultivate a cavalier approach to safety in the 
mines, with men also willing to take chances to increase production. In this, they may 
also have had the tacit support of officials. 
Similarly the stereotype of the feckless miner, who did little to protect his family 
and in times of trouble threw himself upon the poor law Board of Guardians or 
charitable contributions, has also been questioned. The Miners` Journal commented 
in 1857: 
It is the first duty of every man to make provision for his family and upon 
no one of the labouring classes is this more incumbent than upon miners, 
for their lives, to use a technical phrase, are doubly hazardous; yet 
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according to the official returns they would appear to be far behind the 
rest of the population in providing for themselves and families against 
accidents.
244
 
Benson has argued that this view prevailed among contemporary commentators and 
‘it was widely believed even among the mining community itself that few men even 
took the trouble to insure themselves voluntarily.’245 Yet all evidence contradicts this. 
Benson has shown that as the late 19
th
 century progressed more and more miners were 
insuring themselves with trade unions, with commercial insurance companies 
particularly the Prudential, and with permanent relief societies. He charts the steady 
growth of membership of these three agencies from 40 per cent in 1875, to 60 per cent 
in 1880, 85 per cent in 1885 and that by 1890 the policies held exceeded by 30 per 
cent the total number employed in the English mining industry. At the end of the 
century 30 per cent of colliers paid three pence a week to trade union burial funds, 50 
per cent subscribed between a penny and three pence a week to the Prudential and a 
further 50 per cent paid around four pence to the permanent relief societies. In 
addition 15 per cent paid between a penny and three pence to collecting clubs while 
another 15 per cent paid four to six pence a week to affiliated bodies. All miners paid 
a penny a week to what Benson terms a ‘local unregistered society,’ some paid to 
district medical aid societies, and some to regional and national schemes like the 
Miners’ Provident Association or the National Association for the Relief of Miners. 
An unknown but substantial number subscribed to trade union non-fatal accident or 
widow and orphan funds and many more to the Prudential Assurance Company’s 
commercial rivals. Benson concluded that the average miner paid the not insubstantial 
sum of between six to eight pence a week towards accident insurance, equivalent 
perhaps to 20 per cent of the cost of their housing. 
246
 Not all were voluntary. A South 
Wales miner noted in his autobiography his ‘signing on’ at a colliery north of Neath 
before the First World War: ‘He wanted me to sign an agreement to have a lot of my 
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pay deducted. State insurance, hospital, doctor, district nurse, library, artificial limb 
fund, blind institute, band and a few more all came in for their coppers.’247 
The role of Trade Unions in mine safety is problematic. Their campaign for Mine 
Inspectors with considerable power of enforcement continued from the 1840’s with 
limited success. It was impossible for a small inspectorate with a legal responsibility 
to focus upon fatalities, to make any meaningful inspection of each working district in 
every mine in their area of responsibility. Many inspectors simply did not want this 
task fearing owners would use it as an excuse to abrogate their responsibility for 
safety. Given the lack of political will, it was unlikely that parliament would sanction 
an expensive army of officials to undertake this role. The local man charged with 
enforcing safety regulations was the deputy but this official was regarded as an 
instrument of management control rather than an advocate of worker safety. A more 
fruitful line of approach may have been to pursue the appointment and duties of a 
deputy to ensure worker input into safety policy. With the formation of the TUC 
miners became fixated on achieving safety by penalising poor employer records with 
heavy compensation payments in the courts. Yet again this policy was ineffective as 
unsympathetic law courts tended to side with the employer maintaining the fiction of 
equality between the two parties in a contract even when it was apparent that the 
worker was in a disadvantaged position. Litigation inevitably soured relations 
between employer and employee and was unproductive as a tool to encourage 
safety.
248
 Apart from maintaining an awareness of safety issues, trade union strategy 
for reform would appear to be inappropriate. An exception to this was the campaign 
for an Eight Hour Day that the MFGB consistently pursued from their creation in 
1888. In 1890 William Johnson met the two Warwickshire MPs to solicit their support 
in the upcoming parliamentary debate. He claimed that most accidents occurred at the 
close of the day’s work and attributed this to ‘physical and mental exhaustion.’ Both 
Conservative MPs readily agreed to this in the case of face workers but could not be 
persuaded that it applied to all workers in the colliery.
249
 From the 1890’s the Mine 
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Inspectorate included the time of the accident in their Annual Report but as they did 
not relate this to the number of hours the victim had worked Johnson’s claim cannot 
be corroborated.
250
 It nevertheless appears a truism that tired men are more prone to 
accidents than those fresh to work. At the local level the WMA was demonstrably 
successful in negotiating superior pay and conditions for its members but it never 
attempted to form a joint consultative committee or understanding with coalowners to 
attempt a similar approach to safety. 
Miners were certainly aware of the dangers of their trade. Their increasing 
contributions to various accident schemes as the century progressed are a testament to 
this. Their trade union campaigns in parliament and in the courts reported in the press, 
successfully kept the dangers in the public eye and a succession of Select Committees 
and Royal Commissions ensured that these were documented. Their sheer numbers 
and spatial concentration ensured that their views received political consideration and 
the great strikes of 1893 and 1912 prompted the unprecedented government 
intervention in industrial disputes. But that was as far as any government would go. 
Their demands that the State should assume responsibility for the safety of each seam 
in a colliery was unrealistic and even when nationalisation in 1947 made the State 
their employer, it did not result in an end to industrial conflict. Yet as a pressure group 
trade unions had contributed to the improvements in mine safety even if that influence 
is unquantifiable. 
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Chapter Five: The Owners 
What responsibility has an employer for the safety of their workforce? Today this 
question appears superfluous. Many industrial societies have a body of health and 
safety legislation, enforced by the state through an inspectorate, regulatory control 
and the criminal law. In the late 19
th
 century such legislation was in its infancy as it is 
in emerging industrial societies of today and miners were forced to rely on the 
paternalism of an individual owner who viewed safety with one eye on the financial 
cost. William Dugdale, the Warwickshire landowning barrister and owner of 
Baddesley Colliery, was prepared to risk and indeed sacrifice his life in the futile 
rescue attempt to which he could offer no practical support, to save nine trapped 
miners in his employ. Yet the inquest revealed that it was largely his penny pinching 
business acumen that had caused the tragedy.
1
 It is not surprising that colliery owners 
have generally not received a favourable characterisation in the historiography of the 
British coal industry. 
Section one will define who the mine owners were. There is parsimony of source 
material for this but the negative stereotype of the grasping capitalist prevailed 
throughout the 19
th
 century and into the next. Section two examines the butty system 
of mine management which dominated in the Midlands coalfields. This was 
developed by owners in an attempt to overcome underground supervision but was 
disliked by miners who believed that butties cheated them out of their earnings and by 
the Mine Inspectorate who thought the system negated attempts to improve safety. As 
part of this study was to assess if the mode of ownership had any significant influence 
on the reduction of mining fatalities, the next three sections will scrutinise the 
Warwickshire collieries owned by landowners, those owned by mining companies and 
those run by mine engineers. Nationally both landowners and colliery companies 
employed professionals to run their mines but as mine engineers were those 
professionals, the collieries they controlled may have displayed an increased 
awareness of safety. Section six analyses mean annual death rates from the groups 
selected and the types of fatalities that occurred there. This examination reveals that it 
                                                 
1
 The Baddesley disaster of 1882 is discussed in Chapter Three. 
 Page | 222 
 
was the size of the enterprise rather than the mode of ownership that was the most 
significant factor. 
The Owners 
Who exactly were the coalowners? Unlike the miners, coalowners have been 
largely ignored by historians.
2
 Any mining venture required accumulated capital to 
sink the shaft, build the roadways and buy the necessary pumping and ventilation 
engines. Church and Outram
3
 noted that nationally coalowners were largely 
descended from coal owning families, those whose families had been involved in 
colliery management consultancy or in some cases, ironmasters. In his 1986 study 
Church concluded that 39 per cent of the fathers of coalowners were themselves 
coalowners, 13 per cent were viewers/colliery managers, 13 per cent iron masters and 
10 per cent engineers 
4
 When he examined the founders of colliery companies the 
most frequent description in articles of association was coalowner or colliery 
proprietor but there were marked regional differences. In the North-East 44 per cent 
used this description, falling to 26 per cent in the East Midlands and only 9 per cent in 
the fragmented ownership of the West Midlands. Similarly iron masters established a 
quarter of all companies in Scotland but were only 9 per cent in the East Midlands.
5
 
As the 19
th
 century progressed improvements in technology demanded an increase in 
capital to run the deeper more efficient mines yet this was not accompanied by a 
radical change of corporate structure and organisation. According to Church, the ‘19th 
century pattern of family enterprise, partnership and private companies characterised 
the industry until 1947. Large scale public companies with shares were exceptional 
before 1914 and the industry still relied on internally generated finance and the 
owner-manager.
6
 Yet even in the last decade of the 19
th
 century it was possible for an 
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amateur to open a coal mine. In Warwickshire Fretwell comments that at Bedworth 
Railway Colliery the manager was Mr Dennis who was not a qualified mine manager 
but possibly a butty. This was perfectly legal as the colliery must have employed less 
than thirty miners underground.
7
 As they mined an area previously worked by Charity 
Galga Colliery some fifty years before, it is perhaps fitting that the technology 
adopted was akin to a bygone age with what passed as a pumping system comparable 
to a bucket in a well.  
The motives of coalowners have been viewed with suspicion by both historians 
and contemporaries and can perhaps best be illustrated by the extraordinary events 
that culminated in an explosion of coal prices in 1873.
8
 In February the new president 
of the North-East Institute of Mining and Mechanical engineers stated in his inaugural 
address that ‘the consumption of coal increases at a rate which could not possibly 
last.’9 He complained of the shortage of labour and of the need to economise and 
increase mechanical power. The Times of 10 February gave a list of the wages of 
various colliery occupations and concluded that the 15 per cent wage increase agreed 
by the owners could not account for the increase in the price of coal. They pointed to 
the increased demand from the Durham iron trades. The countrywide outcry against 
the coal shortage took different forms. In Nottingham a crowd of 10,000 led by a 
brass band, carried an empty grate and banners reading ‘Starvation! Beware of 
coalowners at the next election.’10 At Cambridge the mayor proposed a public 
subscription to provide coal for the poor at 1/- a cwt.
11
 At a manufacturers’ meeting in 
Manchester they proposed the formation of a Mutual Coal Supply Association with 
capital of a million pound to purchase or lease collieries to provide coal for the textile 
workers of Lancashire and Yorkshire.
12
 A London based Coal Reform League saw the 
solution in central government intervention. They would petition for government run 
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 We have the production and sales ledgers for Wyken Colliery in Coventry. In 1871 the mean selling 
price of a ton of coal was 6/9, rising to 9/2 in 1872, and 14/8 in 1873. It did not reach 6/- in the 1880’s. 
Financial ledgers, CRO 285/4/3; 4/4; 4/5; 4/6 and 4/7. 
9
 Sir William Armstrong quoted in Nuneaton Chronicle, 8 February 1873. 
10
 Nuneaton Chronicle, 1 March 1973. 
11
 Nuneaton Chronicle, 6 April 1973. 
12
 Nuneaton Chronicle, 10 May 1973. 
 Page | 224 
 
markets at selected railway termini; a duty on coal exports; regulation of railway 
freight rates and even more idealistically, for the government to ‘reconcile the 
struggle between capital and labour to ensure a natural working of the laws of demand 
and supply.’13 The government response was to set up a House of Commons Select 
Committee on Coal in April and when it reported in July it exonerated masters and 
men and laid the blame for the shortage at the door of the insatiable demand of an 
increasing iron trade. It concluded; 
…we believe that no combination of workers or owner could permanently 
affect the market price of coal, that the intervention of parliament with the 
coal trade would produce no useful or beneficial result; and that it would 
be unwise to place an export duty on coal.
14
 
In the spirit of the age it rejected intervention but its conclusions were not shared by 
all. In October Professor Levi 
15
 of King’s College London gave a public lecture. He 
pointed out that wages had increased by 62 per cent but pit head prices had risen 500 
per cent, and it was ‘the owners who were making hay while the sun shone.’16 The 
suspicion of coal owner duplicity survived. Official reports could lay the cause of the 
price rises in coal at the door of the iron industry but to the common man it was the 
coalowners who were prospering at their expense. 
This negative view of coalowners persisted throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century. As early as 1842 The Times suggested that coalowners ‘should be taught that 
money making is not the whole duty of man’ and that profits should not be derived 
from ‘a barbarous and indecent system that disclaims any other law than that of 
productiveness.’17 Thompson described the popular perception of employers in South 
Wales as one of grasping, callous individuals, motivated solely by self-interest and 
financial gain: 
                                                 
13
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Coalowners in particular have been demonized as heartless, self-serving 
tyrants determined to extract the highest possible profit from their 
collieries no matter what the consequences for their workers and with no 
regard for the communities in which their enterprises were situated.
18
  
Although he accepts that many deserve the contempt that has been heaped upon them, 
he suggests that the caricature ‘conceals as much as it reveals.’ Some owners 
displayed a paternalistic approach to their work force and a philanthropic attitude to 
the community where they gained their wealth. In his 1992 comparative study of the 
coalfields of South Wales and Nottingham Gilbert concludes that it was the 
Nottinghamshire owners’ tradition of paternalism and less combative approach to 
industrial relations that contributed to the county reputation of industrial 
moderation.
19
 Thompson concurs with this conclusion stating that a; 
space was left by employers (in South Wales) through their relative failure 
to make adequate social provision or to make much of a contribution to 
the public sphere, and this space was filled by the labour movement.’20  
Yet Nottingham paternalism could come with a heavy price tag. Waller charted 
the establishment of new green field site collieries around Mansfield after the First 
World War. The provision of housing at ‘the pit gates’ was considered as an essential 
part of capitalisation costs and could account for between a third and a half of total 
expenditure.
21
 Such heavy investment was jealously guarded and dismissal would 
lead to almost immediate eviction. Not all incoming migrants could accept this 
controlling influence where active trade union participation or any sexual impropriety 
would lead to the forfeiture of employment, and the village company policeman had 
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the right to inspect houses for cleanliness, ensure gardens were cultivated, prevent 
anyone walking on their front lawns and the ownership of pets. Any misdemeanour 
from an unkempt garden to an unruly child could lead to a miner being summoned to 
the manager’s office and a warning issued.22 This pervading influence of the colliery 
manager is corroborated by Sir Richard Redmayne who was a colliery manager in the 
North-East in the 1890’s. He had to ‘look after’ three schools, inspect 947 cottages 
and keep them in good repair, supervise the colliery farm covering more than a 
thousand acres and chair the meetings of two parish councils.
23
 
Warwickshire shared many of the characteristics of Nottinghamshire. As the study 
of Warwickshire coalowners below will reveal many provided health care for their 
employees and they were instrumental in establishing the first hospital in the 
coalfield. Some donated land for parks and funded libraries, reading rooms, schools 
and workers’ institutes. Others provided facilities for various cultural activities for 
sporting, horticultural and musical pursuits and built churches and community centres. 
A few were MPs with many more serving their local communities as councillors and 
magistrates. Their motives may not have always been altruistic with Warwickshire 
owners Skey and Stanley following a religious agenda and Melly seeing the provision 
of amenities as a means of social control.
24
 Yet Warwickshire owners never received 
the approbation of the national stereotype. Particularly in the expanding coalfield 
from the 1890’s, many possessed the money to display their philanthropic attributes 
and Warwickshire miners received the monetary rewards and working conditions that 
other coalfields would have to fight for. 
The Butty System 
Coalowners worked in an industry where changes to geological structure or 
seasonal variation in demand could have a serious impact on profits. They could not 
personally supervise their workforce and needed a system of indirect control to ensure 
that mines were worked to the best economic advantage. As early as 1800 it was 
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established practice in the north of England for the owner to employ a mining 
engineer, known as a viewer in the North-East, to provide expert mining knowledge 
and give commercial and financial advice. Large Warwickshire landowning coal 
entrepreneurs like the Dugdale and Newdigate families had employed such northern 
experts when they moved into direct production,
25
 but in the south the butty system 
prevailed.
26
 Mitchell describes this in his 1841 Report on Child Employment. Many 
owners; 
work their coal mines on their own account, employing an agent who has 
general supervision over the whole concern, the working of the mine, the 
payments to be made and the sale of the coals. Under him is a ground 
bailiff who goes down frequently into the mines and see that the butties 
work in the mine fairly so as to get out all the coals that can with safety be 
removed. Pits are worked by butties who receive a charter per ton on coal 
brought to the foot of the shaft, weighed after being brought up. Butties 
employ and pay the men and boys.
27
 
In this full butty system the owner was generally responsible for providing the 
fixed capital of sinking the shaft and providing winding, drainage and ventilation and 
cutting and maintaining roads. The butty or charter master
28
 was responsible for 
getting the coal, employing the men, coal cutting, haulage, erecting pit props and 
filling gobs, and providing tools, tubs and horses. The butty had an incentive to push 
production at the expense of safety and tragedy sometimes resulted. In 1853 at 
Victoria Colliery in Coventry there was a build up of gases known locally as ‘fire 
stink’ and when the butty refused to allow the men to vacate the mine, a dozen were 
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rendered unconscious and two died. Inspector Morton attributed this as he had the 
death of a ten year old boy at Hawkesbury Colliery in 1850, to a long neglect of 
adequate ventilation.
29
 If they were injured there was little point in a miner seeking 
redress against the mine owner as he was not their employer
30
, and the butty was but a 
fellow working man.
31
 Miners hated this system and this was manifested in a number 
of strikes against it. An example of this was the 1896 strike at Griff Colliery. At Griff 
Number Four, the four faces were run by four butties who were paid by the amount of 
coal produced. They employed and paid the getters and fillers. Following the strike it 
was the company that employed the men and it was then that shared the contract.
32
 
This system declined, partly because of miner hostility but also because of the 
increasing financial calls on butties by improved technology needed in deeper pits.
33
 
From the 1870`s the little butty system became more prevalent.
34
 Although all 
workers were now on the owner’s books, many were employed by subcontractors 
known as stallmen. Once employed a man could not be sacked without the consent of 
the manager.
35
 Stallmen, sometimes working in pairs, rarely employed more than five 
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or six men. There was less hatred for this system as men could aspire to become 
stallmen and because of the large number, it was easy to leave an unpopular man. The 
only Warwickshire colliery to leave detailed records from annual reports and minutes 
of board meetings is the Griff Colliery Company established in 1882.
36
 The 
management was under the control of Edward Melly, a mine engineer who acted as a 
link with his fellow directors on the board and the day to day running of the pits. He 
was assisted by a manager and two assistant managers. Each working plane 
underground was in charge of a stallman, a sub-contractor paid per ton of coal cut. In 
1897 stallmen were about 20 per cent of the underground workforce at Griff. At 
neighbouring Ansley Hall Colliery an old miner claimed each stall had four stallmen, 
three holers, two packers and two fillers. If the stall did not pay the stallman lent the 
money from the colliery to pay the men and paid it back from future profits.
37
 Owners 
were slow to realise that it was not in their interest to leave their pits in the control of 
a butty with infrequent supervision from a non-specialist ground bailiff. The 
establishment of legally enforced General and Special Rules in 1855 gave them an 
improved incentive to appoint a permanent manager but it was the lure of potential 
profits that drove the changes. Midland Inspector Evans informed the Royal 
Commission in 1879 that ‘the new large mines could not have been run by the mine 
management previously in place.’38 Owners had far too much capital invested in the 
new deeper miner to allow them to be run by an uneducated butty. 
Between 1850 and 1913 Hunt
39
 and the Mine Inspectors list some thirty-nine 
colliery enterprises in Warwickshire. A study of ownership data shows how some 
local proprietors at Dosthill and Charity increased capital access by changing to a 
partnership or private limited company. It also charts the influx of outside capital like 
Sir Alfred Hickman from Wolverhampton at Nuneaton Colliery; the Griff Colliery 
Company from the East Midlands and Glasgow coal and iron masters at Binley 
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Colliery. To study ownership effectively it is necessary to divide them into identifiable 
groups and concentrate on exemplars from each.
40
 The first may be termed the 
landowners and was dominated by the enterprises of the Newdigate family of Griff 
Colliery in Nuneaton in the south and the Dugdale family of Baddesley Colliery near 
Atherstone in the central coalfield. The second group were the companies run by a 
board of directors and to gain a geographical perspective we shall examine Whitten of 
Wyken Colliery in Coventry; Hickman of Haunchwood Colliery, and Stanley of 
Nuneaton Colliery, both in Nuneaton, and Morris and Shaw of Birch Coppice Colliery 
and Skey of Tame Valley Colliery, both near Tamworth in the north. The third group 
are from a mine engineering background, mostly one man or small partnerships 
enterprise, and include Addenbrrooke of Charity Colliery in Bedworth; Melly of Griff 
Colliery, Smallman of Stockingford Colliery and Garside Phillips of Ansley Hall 
Colliery, all in Nuneaton. Unlike the first two groups mine engineers would have a 
more direct management style that had only to answer to their financial backers, but 
as they tended to work the smaller and medium sized mines, any perceived 
differences in fatality rates could be problematic. Evidence is scarce and what follows 
is based upon newspaper obituaries and isolated sources in constructing a reading of 
the culture of Warwickshire coalowners.
41
 
The Landowners 
The main Warwickshire landowning coalowners were the Newdigates of Arbury 
Hall in Nuneaton and the Dugdales of Merevale Hall in Atherstone. The Newdigates 
arrived at Arbury in 1586 and had a long tradition of exploiting the coal reserves on 
their Arbury estate. In 1835 the estate passed to Charles Newdigate (1816 to 1887) 
who also owned an extensive estate of Harefield Park at Uxbridge in Middlesex.
42
 
Educated at Eton, King’s College London and Christ’s College Cambridge, he was a 
career politician and from 1843 to 1885 he was Conservative MP for North 
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Warwickshire. In those forty-two years he spoke regularly in the House of Commons 
but his main interests appeared to be in defence of Protestantism and Protectionism. 
He spoke only briefly on coal mines, twice in 1860 against a proposed clause to limit 
coal owner magistrates to adjudicate disputes in the mines, and in favour of banning 
payment of wages in public houses, and in 1868 in a debate on appointing worker 
inspectors to assist the Mine Inspectorate, he rejected the need for legislation and 
endorsed any decision the Home Secretary decided to make.
43
 His nephew, Francis 
Newdigate (1862 to 1936) who inherited Arbury in 1893, followed him as a 
Conservative MP first at Nuneaton 1892 to 1906 and then Tamworth 1909 to 1917.
44
 
He too was a professional politician later serving as Governor of Tasmania and then 
Western Australia. This was also a family tradition as Charles had been governor of 
Bermuda in the 1840’s.45 Charles Newdigate appeared to have little active interest in 
his collieries at Griff. The agricultural depression from the mid 1870’s led to a fall in 
estate income 
46
 and in 1882 he chose to leave the industry and lease his mines to the 
newly formed Griff Colliery Company. Francis Newdigate returned the family to 
direct production in 1899, giving his name to the colliery and his forename to the 
downshaft, which resulted in the men referring to the colliery as ‘Frankies.’ Yet like 
his uncle he left the running of the colliery to his professional management team. Just 
as Charles Newdigate was reluctant to invest in his coal mines the new Newdigate 
Colliery suffered from under capitalisation and was on its third colliery company by 
1914. Melly recorded in the Griff Minute Book his belief that that the inauspicious 
start to Newdigate Colliery was due to an unwillingness to invest coupled with poor 
management.
47
 Similarly because of their profession, the Newdigates spent a great 
deal of time away at London or visiting their other estate. 
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In his 1887 obituary in the Nuneaton Observer Charles Newdigate was described 
as a Christian philanthropist and ‘a man with whom one could easily differ but not 
easily dislike.’48 He was an old style Tory who never considered himself a 
Conservative, but took his duties as a local squire very seriously. His estate spanned 
the industrial parish of Coton and the agricultural parish of Astley and he provided 
free schools for both. The Daily News called him a ‘political and religious fanatic’ yet 
a popular landlord who reduced rents in times of depression and provided 
unpublicised charity to those in need.
49
 It was even believed that he sometimes 
maintained uneconomic pits merely to provide work for ‘his colliers.’50 
The Stratford family purchased the Merevale estate in 1649.
51
 The land passed to 
the Dugdale family but the Stratford surname continued to be used. Unlike the 
Newdigates they were content to lease their coal bearing land and did not get directly 
involved in production until 1810. They however mirrored the Newdigates’ political 
beliefs by becoming Conservative MPs for the county. Dugdale Strafford Dugdale 
(1773 to 1836) was MP for Warwickshire for 29 years from 1802 to 1831. His son 
William Stratford Dugdale (1801 to 1870) followed his father and became MP for 
North Warwickshire 1832 to 1847. His son William Francis Stratford Dugdale (1829 
to 1882) went against this tradition and earned his living as a barrister and served as a 
local magistrate. He was to die in the Baddesley disaster of 1882.
52
 His lawyer 
nephew, John Stratford Dugdale (1835 to 1920) briefly revived the tradition by 
serving as Conservative MP for Nuneaton 1886 to 1892.
53
 The main expenditure on 
Baddesley Colliery was the sinking of Strafford Colliery in 1851 but the colliery then 
became increasingly dated. It had a reputation for parsimony and was described in a 
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letter to Reuben Smallman following the disaster by Garside Phillips, manager of 
Ansley Hall, as ‘an old fashioned devil’s arse of a pit.’54 The need to economise is 
perhaps reflected in the census which reveals that the number of servants employed at 
the hall fell from eleven in 1861 to nine in 1871 and eight in 1881.
55
 
Yet although the manager and consultant mining engineer were condemned for 
the Baddesley tragedy the owner emerged with a clear reputation. This was not simply 
because he had lost his life in the abortive rescue attempt. The 300 colliers were 
aware that the enterprise was not making a profit and yet production had been 
maintained. Following the 1882 Baddesley disaster which closed the colliery for a 
year, there was serious economic hardship in the surrounding villages. This led to the 
sinking of two new collieries. The first was a foolhardy venture at Baddesley 
Common which was sunk in an area where two seams had already been worked by 
earlier collieries. It began operating in 1884 but had to be abandoned when water 
broke in from earlier workings. The second was near the site of an earlier Mancetter 
colliery. Like its predecessor it had a shaft and a drift tunnel, and the coal and 
ironstone it produced was carried on the same mineral railway built in the 1830’s.56 
Yet unlike the first Mancetter colliery this was to last a decade but by then Baddesley 
Colliery had revived. The decision to work these additional pits was influenced by 
social as well as economic motives. 
Both landowning families left the running of their mines to professionals and 
although they served as MPs they did not use their position to advocate the 
coalowners’ cause or even present themselves as experts on the coal industry. They 
both developed large collieries in the period of expansion before the First World War
57
 
and both collieries had a reputation for prosecuting men for breaches of the rules.
58
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With the exception of this recourse to the law courts, neither family can be said to be 
advocates of improved mine safety and indeed the Dugdale’s frugality was a factor in 
the Baddesley disaster. The landowning coalowners displayed some paternalistic 
regard for those in their employ but failed to make a tangible contribution to mine 
safety. 
The Newdigates ran Griff Colliery for thirty-one years when fatalities are 
recorded and suffered twelve deaths, an annual death rate of 0.344. Their Newdigate 
Colliery which they ran with others in three different companies suffered twenty-two 
deaths in sixteen years, an annual death rate of 1.375 or four times the level of Griff. 
Together these collieries had a death rate of 0.666. The greatest cause of death for 
both collieries was fall of coal, accounting for eight of the Griff deaths and thirteen of 
the Newdigate deaths, a total of 62 per cent. Baddesley Colliery ran throughout the 
period and suffered sixty-six deaths in sixty-two years, the highest number on the 
Warwickshire coalfield. The annual death rate was 1.060. The greatest cause of death 
was gas dominated by the 1882 disaster when twenty-three died in an explosion and 
nine suffocated underground, but to these must be added the three earlier gas 
explosion deaths of 1859, 1866 and 1872. There were fourteen deaths or 21 per cent 
from falls of coal and eleven underground haulage deaths, another 16 per cent, six on 
the incline plane. Only nineteen died in the thirty years after 1882, an annual death 
rate then of 0.633.
59
 
Colliery Companies 
The second group of coalowners were the companies. These ranged from small 
one man operations employing less than one hundred men, to medium sized collieries 
employing around 400 often dominated by one man, to large enterprises of over a 
thousand men ran by a board of directors.
60
 The section takes account of both 
geographical location and the size of the enterprise. At Coventry the Whitten family 
ran the medium sized Wyken Colliery for around seventy years. At Nuneaton Sir 
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Alfred Hickman was an absentee owner who commuted weekly from Wolverhampton 
to his Haunchwood Colliery and successfully transformed it into a large enterprise of 
over a thousand employees worth a quarter of a million pounds. Reginald Stanley 
came to Nuneaton via the goldfields of the American west, and after first acquiring his 
brother’s brick yards, he went on to gain Nuneaton and Charity Collieries as well as 
the Nuneaton Engineering Company where he developed the Stanley Header 
machine. In Tamworth there was George Skey who ran the small specialist Peel 
Colliery together with the medium sized Tame Valley Colliery. Finally just south of 
Tamworth was the Morris and Shaw owned Birch Coppice Colliery, a large concern 
that grew from the many and various entrepreneurial ventures of the Shaw family. 
James Sibley Whitten (1810 to 1884) the owner of Wyken Colliery, came from an 
old Coventry family. He was a Liberal and non-conformist and served on the 
Coventry City Council from 1836 to 1858, and was elected as mayor in 1846.
61
 His 
obituary notes that he promoted the St John’s Ambulance Association, and was a 
trustee of the Mechanics Institute, the Coventry Building Society and both Sir 
Thomas White’s and Smith’s Charities.62 As the colliery leased the land from Sir 
Thomas White’s Charity there may have been a slight conflict of interest there. He 
moved into his Moat House residence in 1856 and was still there at the 1881 census 
where he is described as a colliery director and farmer of 256 acres, employing 
sixteen men, two boys and six women. The farm could be owned by Wyken Colliery 
as the colliery farm account reveals that Whitten was billed for wheat, flour, hay, corn, 
potatoes, pigs, poultry, butter and eggs.
63
 Fretwell notes that he was the colliery 
manager for a time so he was more than just a financial director.
64
 His son, Thomas 
Sibley Whitten succeeded him as manager and owner until his death from a pill 
overdose in 1898. 
Wyken Colliery provided houses and a school for its workmen. The building 
possibly took place in 1858 as in that year there was an outlay of £197 recorded in the 
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ledgers. Of this £91 went on labour, £26 on bricks, £25 on timber, and £3 on iron with 
£33 on sundries. After this date maintenance reached a high of £56 in 1860 which 
may have included additional buildings and a low of £6 in 1866. For an average mean 
outlay of £23 they received an income of £51, and in the decade following their 
erecting, the colliery covered all cottage building and maintenance costs and made a 
total profit of £101.
65
 They also provided a school for miners’ children which ran in 
1867 at a cost of £119. White’s 1871 Directory describes Wyken School as ‘a neat red 
brick structure in the Elizabethan style of architecture, containing accommodation for 
350 children; the average attendance is 130.'
66
 On the unfounded assumption that 
there was an equal division of the sexes, the master and mistress each had a class of 
sixty-five pupils. The directory also lists a Wyken Colliery Industrial Company Co-
operative Society among the nine grocers in the village. If one adds to this that a 
Colliers Coal Account ledger exists from 1845 to 1852 that suggests that miners 
received a coal allowance to supplement their income, it is apparent that the company 
had a substantial welfare programme. 
67
 
Wyken Colliery existed throughout the period of study and suffered thirty deaths, 
an annual death rate of .0.484.
68
 Falls of coal, the greatest cause of miner deaths 
usually around 40 per cent of the total, were only eleven or 27 per cent of the Wyken 
fatalities. One in 1874 was the only death in a Wyken ironstone mine. Most were 
caused by slip faults, small breaks in the coal strata, sometimes difficult to recognize 
and requiring more than the minimum number of props to support the roof. Blame 
was attributed to miners on two occasions. In 1907 a stallman fell knocking out a prop 
and in 1906 another illegally used a hammer to remove a prop rather than the safer 
ringer and chain method prescribed in the Special Rules which allowed the collier to 
stand some feet away under a supported roof.
69
 There were three shaft deaths. In 1861 
a sinker was hit by a falling pump due to a broken chain, in 1883 a carpenter fell from 
                                                 
65
 Financial ledgers, CRO 285 6/1, 6/2, 6/3 and 6/4. 
66
 F. White, Directory of Warwickshire (1871) pp. 661-3. 
67
 A coal allowance was usual throughout the coalfield with Tamworth miners receiving 12 cwt a month 
and miners from the south 10 cwt. Nuneaton Observer, 28 September 1900. 
68
 All figures calculated from Annual Mine Inspector Report: 1851 to 1913. 
69
 Annual Mine Inspector Report: Midland Division 1906 and 1907. 
 Page | 237 
 
a scaffold while repairing the shaft and in 1902 the sad case of a horsekeeper filling a 
horse bucket from a pipe at the bottom of the shaft when he was crushed by a 
descending cage.
70
 There were thirteen deaths from underground haulage, eight of 
which occurred on the incline. The incline was a slope of some thirty degrees which 
ran down several hundred yards from the pit bottom to the roadways that led to the 
face. Runaway tubs were always a possibility although manholes were provided 
periodically for miners to take refuge. In 1889 the worst Warwickshire haulage 
disaster occurred when three miners were killed when the hook attaching their tub to 
the wire rope broke and it plummeted to the bottom.
71
 Youth was also a factor in 
haulage deaths 
72
 as three were only fourteen years old. In 1861 a trammer boy
73
 was 
killed on the incline and in 1893 and again in 1895 a door keeper and horse driver 
were crushed by tubs.
74
 It was against the rules to ride in tubs but in 1896 an 
experienced thirty-one year old holer paid the penalty for disobedience. Two deaths 
were directly attributed to Wyken reluctance to adopt modern oncost practice. In 1890 
and again in 1892 men died because horses worked in sling gears.
75
 Sling gears were 
chains, which unlike shafts, gave the horse little control when pulling a train of tubs. 
There was one death in the ‘miscellaneous underground’ category when in 1900 a 
Wyken deputy had the dubious distinction of being the first in the Midland Division 
76
 
to die from electrocution. His assistant ran off to find help yet if he had stayed, 
removed the deputy from the power source and offered artificial respiration, the man 
would have survived.
77
 There were only two deaths on the surface, in 1911 and 1913 
and both involving screenmen.
78
 In the first a man was knocked off a tub by a shunter 
and crushed. The shunter driver had failed to give adequate warning and was later 
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fined £1 for the offence. The second incident also involved a locomotive as a night 
shift worker was run over when he took a short cut on his break.
79
 
In 1881 Nuneaton Colliery was taken over by Sir Alfred Hickman (1830 to 1910) 
of Wolverhampton. He was born in Tipton in the Black Country where his father was 
an iron master and colliery owner. Fretwell claims that as the second son he was 
destined for a military education and as a lieutenant in the Fourth Dragoon Guards 
took part in the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War 
80
 but this is not corroborated 
by his entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.
81
 Both sources agree 
that after severing the partnership with his elder brother he bought Spring Vale Blast 
Furnace in Bilston in 1867. A new Bessemer steel making process licensed in 1879 
removed phosphorous in the slag and was a great improvement on the original 1856 
process. Impressed with the experiments he conducted Hickman bought three and in 
1884 formed the Staffordshire Steel and Ingot Company with a steel works next to his 
Bilston blast furnace. In 1897 he amalgamated the steel works and blast furnace into a 
single company, Alfred Hickman Limited. It was to guarantee supplies that he 
acquired Haunchwood Colliery in Nuneaton and ironstone quarries near Banbury. He 
sold slag from his blast furnace to railway companies for ballast, to farmers for 
fertilisers and to the newly formed Tarmac Company for road construction. In 1904 he 
provided land and capital for Tarmac to build a plant in Bilston and in 1905 became 
chairman of the company. He played a leading role in the Staffordshire Ironmasters 
Association and Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce but also played a national 
role serving as president of the British Iron Trades Association and as a member of the 
MAGB.
82
 When he died in 1910 his estate was valued at a million pounds with 
Haunchwood Colliery valued at £280,000. His family continued to own the colliery 
up to nationalisation in 1947. 
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Like the Warwickshire landowning coalowners Hickman served as a Conservative 
MP for his native Wolverhampton in 1885 to 1886 and from 1892 to 1906. He was 
rewarded with a knighthood in 1891 and made a baronet in 1903.
83
 Unlike his 
Warwickshire counterparts he played a major role in parliament as a leading 
spokesman for Black Country businessmen, particularly highlighting the difficulties 
resulting from high railway freight charges. He was a member of a Board of Trade 
Committee of 1900 and the Tariff Commission of 1904. He was also interested in the 
welfare of workers and unsuccessfully introduced a bill to grant workers loans to buy 
their homes. His obituary notes that before the passing of the Workers’ Compensation 
Act in 1897 he introduced a liberal compensation scheme for injured workers and 
even a short lived profit sharing scheme for his employees.
84
 He was a Staffordshire 
magistrate and long-time chairman of Wolverhampton Football Club but also enjoyed 
the life of a country gentleman being a member of the Albrighton Hunt and renting a 
Scottish estate for shooting and fishing. His obituary states he was popular amongst 
his Wolverhampton workforce, evidenced by the fact that he was not only the town’s 
first Conservative MP but for twenty years he helped make it a party fortress. 
There were fifteen deaths at Hickman’s Haunchwood Colliery and a further eight 
at Tunnel, an annual death rate of 0.712.
85
 Falls of coal accounted for twelve deaths or 
44 per cent and the four haulage deaths were another 15 per cent. In only one fall of 
coal was the miner cited, a 1900 Tunnel stallman who had set insufficient timber. Two 
of the haulage deaths were deputies killed by runaway tubs on the incline and one a 
seventeen year old pony driver illegally riding in tubs. Of the two miscellaneous 
underground deaths one was a twenty-two year old Haunchwood collier who in 1889 
crushed a finger and later died of ‘erysipelas’86 and in 1913 a sixty year old Tunnel 
labourer who slipped carrying a forty-eight pound box of candles and fell onto his 
knee, dying of septicaemia twenty-six days later. Of the three surface deaths two 
involved locomotives and one a labourer pushing at the buffers when other wagons 
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approached from behind and crushed him. Tunnel pit existed for twenty-two years of 
the period under study and suffered eight deaths, an annual death rate of 0.365. As a 
contrast the similarly sized Newdigate Colliery existed for sixteen years and suffered 
twenty-two deaths, an annual death rate of 1.375.  
Another major Nuneaton colliery was led by Reginald Stanley (1837 to 1914). 
Although he was later to become a national figure in the coalmining industry, his 
early life reads like something out of an adventure novel.
87
 Born in Cornwall, the son 
of an itinerant Methodist preacher and educated in Glasgow, he left for the USA in 
1857 at the age of nineteen. He made his way from New York to St Louis and had a 
variety of jobs, ending up in the lumber camps of the Mississippi. In 1862 a Sioux 
Indian uprising killed five hundred and for two years he fought Indians and travelled 
with a party of trappers to the foothills of the Rocky Mountains. In 1864 he joined a 
party of prospectors to travel to the newly discovered goldfields of Montana. When 
they arrived they found that all the land was claimed, staked, worked and guarded. A 
companion Palmer, an ex-Cornish tin miner with some knowledge of geology, 
suspected that the gold bearing layers continued along the escarpment of hills and 
outcropped in a valley three miles away. They named the valley Last Chance Gulch 
and it was later to become the site of the state capital Helena.
88
 After a few months 
they hit a rich vein of gold and for the rest of his life Stanley wore a gold ring made 
from the first nugget. The goldfields were plagued by bands of outlaws, claim 
jumpers and protection racketeers and Stanley joined the army of vigilantes who 
hunted them down. He was appointed the first Recorder and worked with a Judge 
Lynch, who given the lack of alternative punishments, became notorious for ordering 
the death penalty for violations of camp law. By 1866 at the age of twenty-eight he 
was part owner in a gold mine with $7 million in gold dust and employing seventy 
men. The partners secretly sold the mine and made a perilous journey to Philadelphia 
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where they exchanged the gold for currency. In 1867, his fortune made, Stanley 
returned to England. 
In 1866 Jacob Stanley and his brother-in-law had bought two Nuneaton 
brickyards but the firm was in financial difficulties when Reginald Stanley returned 
from America. As an act of generosity he bought the firm and renamed it Stanley 
Brothers. The original owners soon left while retaining a financial interest but the 
name was retained. It was always a family firm with one nephew managing his 
colliery, another managing his engineering works, yet another, a patent agent and 
consultant engineer, supervising the firm’s many inventions and an artist brother as a 
designer in his brick and tile works. Stanley soon realised that it was a disadvantage 
for a brickyard not to be attached to a colliery and have access to the unsalable slack. 
He acquired the small Swan Lane Colliery in 1872 and the medium sized Nuneaton 
Colliery in 1877. In 1899 he embarked on an ambitious programme of expansion at 
both Nuneaton Colliery and the newly acquired Charity Colliery in Bedworth
89
 and by 
1913 Stanley Brothers was one of only three Warwickshire colliery companies to 
employ over two thousand men.
90
 
In 1880 Stanley took over the engineering company of Hall and West and 
renamed it Nuneaton Engineering Company. It produced equipment for the brick and 
tile trade and the colliery and its inventions were many.
91
 In 1871 it developed a steam 
press for malt kiln tiles that had a world reputation. It also introduced a kitchen press, 
various brick and tile machinery, and in September 1888 Stanley gave a 
demonstration of his new coal heading machine to a party of eighty from the 
Midlands Counties Institute of Mining Engineers at Nuneaton Colliery.
92
 The brick 
and tile works also expanded, producing ridge tiles and finials, paving tiles, chimney 
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pots, sanitation pipes, glazed sinks and white and coloured glazed bricks. In 1895 it 
became a limited company with branch works at Burslem in Staffordshire and 
Willenhall in Coventry. By 1907 it had seven yards in Nuneaton, clayfields of 200 
acres and consumed 60,000 tons of slack annually.
93
 At that time Stanley`s fortune 
was on the decline. His obituary in the Nuneaton Chronicle notes that he had suffered 
a financial loss in the Boer War from ‘a dislocation in trade’ from the export of 
heading machines to the Transvaal, and the ‘depreciation in securities which 
followed.’94 The company began to make a loss and in 1908 he was ousted as 
chairman and thwarted in his attempts to establish a rival company.
95
 He was forced 
to resign in May 1909 and suffered a stroke in December.
96
 He died in 1914 and was 
buried next to his wife. His gravestone reads; ‘Founder and first recorder of Helena, 
capital of Montana, USA.’ His buffalo coat with its fine Indian beadwork is on display 
at the British museum. 
Stanley was a millionaire when he returned to England and did not need to work 
but could not deny his entrepreneurial spirit. He had married a French Canadian and 
although they had no children, they adopted two girls. His wife died in 1898
97
 but 
despite his wealth the 1901 census reveals that he employed but three servants; a 
cook, a housemaid and a parlour maid.
98
 His twelve bedrooms Manor Court home 
was in six acres of landscaped gardens. He was a devout Methodist and in 1886 
rebuilt the Nuneaton Wesleyan Chapel at a personal cost of £3,600 and The Gate 
temperance hotel.
99
 He represented Chilvers Coton ward as a Liberal councillor and in 
1894 built the Liberal Club with a coffee room, non-alcoholic bar, billiards room, two 
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bowling greens, a smoke room, reading room, stage and assembly room.
100
 Stanley 
had a reputation as a good employer refusing to join the Warwickshire sliding scale 
scheme of 1880 and continued working in the 1893 strike as he did not enforce wage 
reductions.
101
 He also provided amenities for his employees. At his brick and tile 
works that employed 400 the firm furnished a reading room supplied with daily and 
weekly newspapers, and used for the occasional evening entertainment and Sunday 
service.
102
 His particular passion was to establish a hospital for the town and from 
1893 until his stroke in 1909 he was chairman of the Nuneaton Cottage Hospital 
Committee.
103
 He became a magistrate in 1893
104
 and also served on the Board of 
Guardians which administered the Poor Law in the town.
105
 Like Hickman he was an 
entrepreneur with wide industrial interests and although he was concerned in 
providing welfare for his workers
106
 coated with Methodist flavouring, there is no 
evidence that he made specific comments on mine safety. 
There were no deaths in the small Swan Lane Colliery which ran from 1872 to 
1878 and only four in the medium sized Nuneaton Colliery of 1877 to 1899. The 
creation of an expanded Nuneaton Colliery in 1899 led to a rapid increase in fatalities 
and twenty-four were to die between 1899 and 1913. He also took over and expanded 
Charity Colliery in 1899 and a further six deaths are recorded there. A total of thirty-
two died in Stanley’s forty-one years as a coalowner, an annual death rate of 0.780.107 
In the early years the annual death rate is only 0.148 but leaps to 2.000 in the years of 
colliery expansion. There were seventeen deaths from fall of coal, some 47 per cent of 
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the total. Blame is attributed on four occasions, one from a stallman’s stumble that 
knocked out a prop and three from setting insufficient sprags. There were six 
underground haulage deaths, three from runaway tubs on the incline, four crushed by 
wagons at the surface and four killed in the shaft, three from a 1910 Nuneaton 
Colliery rope break.
108
 Two Nuneaton miners died from explosives. In 1902 a 
storeman died from burns after opening a 50 lb box of explosives and in 1904 a 
stallman from a premature explosion of a squid.
109
 There were two miscellaneous 
deaths. In 1908 a Nuneaton roadman was electrocuted and the 1910 Charity colliery 
filler that hit his head on a steel girder and died from tetanus fourteen days later.
110
 
Two differently sized companies existed in the Tamworth area to the north run by 
George Skey and Peter Shaw. Skey was born in Bewdley in Worcestershire in 1819 
into a prosperous Quaker family. In the 1861 census he describes himself as a 
coalowner and iron merchant, modifying the description in 1871 to coalowner and 
merchant. The census records that he and his wife employed four servants, a cook, 
two housemaids and a coachman.
111
 His Wilnecote Works had a national reputation 
and a surviving advertisement of 1880 lists stoneware pottery; sanitary ware including 
sewage pipes and sinks; architectural and ornamental terracotta and buff, blue and red 
ornamental bricks. It also includes sulphuric acid, alum and sulphate of ammonia for 
sewage works etc. There is a depot at Wolverhampton, another at London St Pancras 
and two London show rooms at Berners Street and Oxford Street.
112
 Skey’s Quaker 
upbringing influenced his welfare provision for his workers. Mabel Smith writing in 
the Tamworth Herald notes that: 
Moral guidance of the workers was not neglected and social evenings 
(with no alcohol) were started at the new Parish Hall which was built 
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especially for Skey’s. Young people were encouraged to attend bible 
classes in the chapel in the work’s yard. For many years this was used as 
a Sunday School and later as offices.
113
 
Although he was a magistrate in both Staffordshire and Warwickshire there is no 
evidence of Skey serving on the local council. He retired in 1894 and relocated to his 
native Worcestershire. 
There were only four deaths in the Skey owned Tame Valley Colliery and three in 
the Wilnecote Works Colliery centred on Peel, an annual death rate of only 0.105.
114
 
Three were from falls of coal; two occurred in the shaft and the two Wilnecote deaths 
from haulage and on the surface. It certainly deserved its reputation as a safe pit, 
despite Skey’s equally deserved repute as an astute and frugal businessman. 
The Shaw family had a strong tradition of coal mining enterprise in the Birch 
Coppice and Polesworth areas in the North of the coalfield. In the 1850’s a Mr Shaw 
ran a number of small pits in Polesworth and the medium sized colliery of Gauby 
Knob. From the 1860’s he developed the Birch Coppice Colliery which together with 
its sister pit of Hall End, was to develop into the largest colliery in the county.
115
 
Shaw had a tradition of working with different partners including Caldicott, Hambury 
and Morris but although a major contributor to the development of the northern area 
little is known of him. 
As it is difficult to know which member of the Shaw family owned the various 
earlier collieries, 
116
 we will concentrate here on the Birch Coppice Colliery owned by 
Morris and Shaw. There were twelve deaths in the Birch Coppice Colliery and a 
further thirty in the Hall End sister pit, an annual death rate of 0.980.
117
 Falls of coal 
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was the main cause with five at Birch Coppice and sixteen at Hall End, a total of 50 
per cent. Blame was attributed on four occasions, two for insufficient sprags and two 
for failing to use a ringer and chain to withdraw timber. There were twelve 
underground haulage deaths or 28.5 per cent. Nine of these involved teenagers 
between the ages of twelve to eighteen and here blame was applied more liberally. 
Three were illegally riding in tubs and a further two had disobeyed special rules. 
Excessive hours were the cause of the deaths of two teenage drivers who were both 
working a fifteen hour shift, one after thirteen days of employment. Two more pony 
drivers died because Hall End persisted in using sling gears and horses pulling tubs 
with chains had less control than those working in shafts. There were four 
miscellaneous deaths. A sixty-six year old collier died after being hit by iron pyrites 
thrown into a wagon; a fifty-nine year old horse keeper died of a haemorrhage ‘while 
performing his duties’; a thirty-nine year old dayman died ten days after lacerating his 
thigh and a twenty-seven year old stoker died of scalds after falling into a pit of oil 
and steam. In 1873 an explosion of fire damp claimed a life and in 1883 a header was 
killed when his shot prematurely exploded. There were two surface deaths, both at 
Hall End. In 1883 a beam of wood fell on a banksman and in 1909 an engineman 
slipped and fell into the revolving drum of his engine.
118
 
A striking dissimilarity between the landowners and the company leaders’ examined 
above is that the latter group had a more direct input to their collieries development 
and did not look upon them as just a financial investment. There is increased evidence 
of welfare provision for workers particularly in the companies run by Whitten and 
Stanley, but again there is no evidence that the way they ran their companies 
contributed to a reduction in mine fatalities. Indeed Birch Coppice and Wyken 
Colliery’s reluctance to adopt modern oncost haulage practice led to preventable 
deaths. 
Mine Engineers 
The third group of owners were mine engineers. These men were directly 
involved with the management and running the mines. W. Addenbrooke owned 
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Charity Colliery in Bedworth and turned the small enterprise into a modern coal and 
iron company. William Garside Phillips ran the small Ansley Hall Colliery and 
Reuben Smallman the equally small Stockingford Colliery, one of the few drift mines 
on the Warwickshire coalfield. Edward Melly ran the medium to large Griff Colliery 
Company. Although a working general manager, he had a seat on the board and a 
great say in the economic development of the colliery. 
Around 1858 the small William’s Charity Colliery closed but a new Charity 
Colliery emerged in 1861 under the leadership of the mine engineer W Addenbrooke. 
Fretwell claims that the Addenbrooke family originated from Stoke on Trent and had 
moved to Bradley in the Black Country in 1799 to mine coal and produce iron. Legal 
problems with the lease forced the family to look for opportunities elsewhere and with 
the partnership of family member accountant James Pidcock and the financial backing 
of Lord Fisher of Packington, Bedworth was chosen.
119
 It may be the fact that Charity 
also possessed a number of small ironstone mines that was the deciding factor as in 
1870 the company changed its name to the Bedworth Coal and Iron Company. In 
1871 they built two modern fifty foot high blast furnaces constructed by Bradley 
workmen. These were fired by gas manufactured by coking sheds on site with the 
surplus gas used to fire boilers of a foundry built next to the furnace. The furnace also 
used iron slag previously rejected as waste.
120
 Nephew Gordon Addenbrooke 
managed the colliery with a Mr Milward managing the furnaces, foundry and 
brickworks. This bold venture faulted in 1872 when Addenbrooke suffered a stroke 
and with Pidcock already dead, the company was sub-let with Gordon Addenbrooke 
remaining as manager. The new owners inherited a modern colliery with recently sank 
coal and ironstone mines and a newly installed underground haulage rope system to 
replace the ponies yet it collapsed in 1879 with the loss of 500 jobs. The furnaces 
were closed down but the foundry was later utilised by Stanley Brothers to produce 
their coal cutting machines. It is interesting to speculate if the enterprise was 
fundamentally flawed or whether it was the removal of the innovative mine engineer 
creator that condemned it. Addenbrooke was a skilled coal and iron master with a 
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proven record in the Black Country but Hawkesbury Colliery had attempted to 
introduce iron production to the Warwickshire coalfield some thirty years before and 
suffered a similar fate.
121
 The local press attributed the failure simply to bad timing 
claiming that the ‘higher quality of iron for which Bedworth ore was suitable was 
driven out by cheap steel.’122 A new process in Middlesbrough to remove sulphur 
from inferior ores meant that they could be converted into steel that was now cheaper 
than the best iron and steel became an increasingly popular substitute. 
There were eleven deaths during Addenbrroke`s tenure at Charity, three at 
ironstone mines. The annual death rate was 0.687.
123
 Five of the deaths were from 
falls of coal, four from underground haulage, one from a gas explosion and one from 
lockjaw, the consequence of a pinched thumb. 
North of Bedworth in Nuneaton two skilled mine engineers ran small to medium 
sized collieries. William Garside Phillips (1849 to 1927) was born in Hyde near 
Manchester.
124
 The son of a miner he went to work in the pit from the age of nine and 
spent fourteen years there. Through hard work and ability he rose to gain his 
manager’s certificate and in 1879 took over the almost bankrupt Ansley Hall Colliery. 
When Outram studied the leading coalowners during the 1926 lockout he was the 
only one to rise from such humble origins.
125
 Garside Phillips was a colourful 
character.
126
 Known as “Big Billy” to his men, he knew them all by name and could 
out swear any. In times of emergency he would strip to the waist to work alongside 
them and would expect his deputies and overmen
127
 to do the same. He had the 
idiosyncrasy of referring to miners by military rank. Prior to the endless rope system, 
the old stableman was the ‘horse sergeant’ and those who worked the new haulage 
system were not ‘doggies’ but ‘corporals.’ As he had risen by self-improvement, he 
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wished the same for others and in 1899 helped establish the Warwickshire Mining 
Students Association.
128
 Not only was he president
129
 he also gave lectures and 
sponsored the building of a new mining school that opened in 1896. He was also 
president of the Warwickshire Coalowners’ Association and gave evidence to the 
Select Committee on the Eight Hour Day
130
 and represented Warwickshire owners 
during the 1926 lockout. He was chairman of the Wages Board, county representative 
of the MAGB, and a president of the Midland Institute of Mining Engineers.
131
 He 
was active in the Nuneaton Conservative Association and the Ansley Anglican church 
and was a magistrate and chairman of Atherstone Board of Guardian and Rural 
District Council. He was also a vice-chairman of Nuneaton Gas Company and the 
knowledgeable chairman of the Ansley Farmers’ Discussion Club. His sons followed 
the family tradition with Joseph Phillips succeeding him as manager of Ansley Hall in 
1905 and C. Phillips becoming manager of Eastwood Colliery in Nottingham.
132
 
Phillips was liked and respected by his men He has risen from their ranks, could 
and would perform the tasks that they performed and addressed them by their 
Christian names. Despite being the leader of the WCA the trade union stated that ‘he 
was noted for his straight dealing with his men and his word was to be relied upon.’133 
This does not mean that he was not without his critics. One Ansley Hall miner recalls 
that he was well-known for his frugality in running the pit, once denying an 
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engineman the oil to run his engine and on another occasion complaining when 
someone had oiled a squeaking pulley as he liked to hear the noise to know the engine 
was running.
134
 Yet his advocacy and sponsorship of the education of miners was 
perhaps his most tangible contribution to mine safety. He lived in a wing of Ansley 
Hall with the rest of the house as a colliery social club and institute containing a well-
stocked library.
135
 The colliery had a cricket team, bowling green and tennis club 
136
 
and an Ansley Floral and Horticultural Society whose annual celebration became a 
major event in the village calendar. In 1907 the Atherstone News described the ninth 
annual meeting as an exhibition of fruit, vegetables and flowers as well as horses, 
cattle and sheep, with a professional singing comedy duo, fireworks display, brass 
band and dancing until nine in the evening.
137
 The Ansley Church of England School 
opened in 1873 with twenty-six pupils on roll and was enlarged in 1896 to cater for 
two hundred recognising the expansion of the colliery.
138
 The exact contribution of 
Garside Phillips to these amenities is not known but his commitment to his colliers 
and his community is undoubted. How welcome the pioneering steel cottages he built 
his workmen in the 1890’s are not recorded.139 
The owner of Stockingford Colliery was Reuben Smallman (1834 to 1900), who 
was a noted engineer with a national reputation. Born in Walsall, the son of a colliery 
manager, he became the mine engineer for Wyken Colliery where he married the 
owner’s daughter.140 He obtained finance for Stockingford Colliery from George Skey 
of Tame Valley Colliery, William Hambury of Glascote Colliery and Lord Fisher of 
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Packington. He was the consultant mining engineer for a number of local collieries,
141
 
leader of the WCA
142
 and president of the Institute of Mining Engineers. He was 
awarded the gold Albert Medal for his role in leading the abortive rescue attempt in 
the 1882 Baddesley Colliery disaster but as his obituary in the Nuneaton Chronicle of 
1900 reported; ‘he has unfortunately suffered very much since from the serious 
injuries he had sustained.’143 He continued as chairman of the Board of Examiners for 
the Midland Mining District which tested prospective managers and under managers. 
His invention of the Smallman clip revolutionised the endless rope system which 
prior to this had to be stopped so that tubs could be attached and released by 
spanners.
144
 When the Smallman clip handle was pushed down, the lips of the clip 
closed and locked onto the moving rope and when the handle was raised, the lips 
would part. They were sold in boxes of twenty-five throughout the world and proved 
to be an international success. It was not until the early years of the 20
th
 century that 
the USA, Germany and Belgium produced their imitations. The clip continued to be 
produced at Stockingford until 1960. Fretwell claims that he was also one of the first 
in 1871 to advocate that stone dust be placed on the floors of coal mines to minimise 
the effects of explosions by smothering the flames. This is standard practice in every 
coal mine today.
145
 Similarly Church notes that the first coal heading machine was 
produced by Stanley and in use at his Nuneaton Colliery.
146
 The Stanley Heading 
Machine was made at the Bedworth foundry, assembled at Stanley’s Stockingford 
Works, and named after the manufacturer but the idea for a heading machine driven 
by a rotating disc came from Smallman. 
It could be argued that Smallman made a significant contribution to reducing 
mine fatalities. His advocacy of the application of stone dust reduced potential deaths 
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from explosions and the modern machine cutting of coal eventually removed miners 
from the source of the greatest cause of fatalities namely falls of coal. Yet he was 
ostracised by his fellow coalowners and none attended his funeral. They believed him 
partly responsible for the Baddesley disaster by introducing Gillett to the Dugdales 
who had recommended using an underground steam engine to drain their mine. That 
this system worked well in his Stockingford Colliery, neighbouring Nuneaton Colliery 
and many in Gillett’s native Derbyshire was immaterial.147 Gillett had been 
condemned by the Inquiry and the fact that an owner had died somehow made it more 
than an ‘ordinary’ disaster. In their report of his funeral the Nuneaton Chronicle went 
to great lengths to excuse the absence of the Mine Inspector, but as the Dugdale 
family sent a wreath, it can be assumed that they at least did not hold him culpable.
148
 
There were fifteen deaths at Ansley Hall and thirteen at Stockingford Colliery. 
Ansley Hall had an annual death rate of 0.384 and Stockingford 0.325.
149
 At Ansley 
Hall a third of the deaths were the result of falls, two of which died despite using a 
ringer and chain to remove props. Another third died at underground haulage three on 
the incline plane. Four were crushed on the surface and in 1913 a stallman died after 
dropping a candle into his powder box. At Stockingford falls were more prevalent, the 
seven deaths accounting for 54 per cent of the total. The only blame was directed at a 
thirty-nine year old stallman for setting insufficient sprags yet the area had been 
passed by a deputy who was later censured by a coroner’s jury and downgraded to a 
dataller or dayman. 
150
 Again a man died removing props with a ringer and chain. 
There were five underground haulage deaths, four on the incline, and in 1899 a 
blacksmith was crushed by trucks at the surface. The worst accident occurred in 1872 
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when three miners aged fourteen; fifteen and sixteen were killed when illegally riding 
tubs up the drift tunnel when the coupling broke.
151
 
By the 1880’s pits at Griff were in need of new capital and the Newdigate family 
then preferred a guaranteed income to the risk of enterprise. In 1882 they granted a 
thirty-five year lease to a new Griff Colliery Company for minimum annual royalties 
of £1,500. The two principal shareholders were Andrew Knowles of Lancashire and 
Emerson Bainbridge who had interests in the North East and East Midlands and they 
appointed Edward Melly (1857 to 1941) as their manager. Melly became an important 
individual in his adopted town.
152
 Born to a wealthy family of Liverpool merchants, 
he went to school at Rugby before training to be a mine engineer at Sheffield. He was 
only twenty-five when he became the first manager of Griff Colliery Company later 
becoming a director and then managing director of the company. He was president of 
both Nuneaton Borough Football Club and the Nuneaton Operatic and Dramatic 
Society. He was also a member of the hospital board, a Liberal borough councillor 
and mayor 1908 to 1910 and again in 1926. Hospital provision appeared to be a 
particular interest of his. He made donations to help found the Cottage Hospital in 
1893
153
 and acted as its financial secretary, and in 1916 leased Weddington Hall to 
establish a Red Cross Hospital there and largely paid for the equipment to make it 
operational. During the war he was also honorary secretary and president of the local 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.
154
 In 1890 he donated 
Pingle Fields as a public park and in 1907 the year Nuneaton became a borough, he 
sold the town Riversley Park named after his Liverpool home. He then donated £600 
to build the town a museum and art gallery there and from when it opened in 1917 
until his death he was honorary curator. He died in 1941 at the age of eighty-four in an 
air raid that destroyed his house and also killed his wife. 
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The existence of the Griff Minute Book gives us some insight into Melly’s 
thoughts. In 1903 he reported proudly that the Griff tonnage mined per fatal accident 
was twice the Warwickshire average, four times that of South Wales and 40 per cent 
above the Midland average. His motives were not purely altruistic as ‘the disruption 
to output
155
 and consequent increase in costs had to be minimised.’156 His business 
acumen had benefits to the workforce. Once anticipating a strike he stockpiled coal 
and sold it at inflated prices during the resulting shortage. The profits that were made 
financed the electrification programme of 1912.
157
 However it would be churlish to 
attribute his efforts to the profit motive alone. His personal motto was ‘a good 
reputation is better than a gold belt’ and his donations and service to Nuneaton bear 
testament to this.
158
 
There were thirty-four deaths at the Griff Colliery Company in its thirty-one years 
existence up to 1913, an annual death rate of 1.096.
159
 Falls of coal dominate with 
eighteen or 53 per cent of the total. Blame was attributed on only two occasions. In 
1909 a dayman had been told by a deputy to put up props by a slip and fatally 
neglected to do this. In 1913 the death of a twenty-two year old getter was laid at the 
door of management. Working under a faulty roof with a slip along it, his task was to 
remove the girders behind a retreating longwall face. He failed to perform this using a 
ringer and chain and went to check what next to attempt when the roof fell. At the 
inquest the coroner criticised the management for giving this dangerous job to a man 
of only two years’ experience.160 There were six underground haulage deaths, four 
crushed by tubs and two run over on the incline. There were also six deaths at the 
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surface and blame was more liberally applied. In 1894 the death of a shunter driver 
was attributed to ‘fly shunting being done against the rules.’161 There were also two 
strange deaths of experienced banksmen. In 1898 a fifty-six year old banksman 
thought he could stop a train of sixteen tubs descending an incline by standing in front 
of it and in 1904 a fifty-four year old banksman was determined to pass through an 
opening while wagons were being lowered into it.
162
 Other deaths included a dataller 
killed by exhaust steam, a deputy killed by a cage fall when the steel rope broke, 
another deputy killed by the fire damp he ignited and the sad case of an incline 
attendant who returned too early to work following an accident and died of sepsis 
meningitis and pleurisy.
163
 
Comparisons and Conclusions 
From the above analysis of Warwickshire coalowners it is possible to draw some 
tentative conclusions. Both landowners and one company leader were Conservative 
MPs. As a contrast Whitten and Stanley from the colliery companies and Melly of the 
mine engineers were local councillors affiliated to the Liberal Party. All the large 
companies made welfare provision for their workers even if their motives were 
sometimes suspect. Stanley and Skey fostered a religious approach to leisure and 
Melly followed the company policy of using housing as a means of enforcing 
economic discipline. Most evidence of welfare comes from the southern area of the 
coalfield but this does not necessarily indicate a less paternal form of management in 
the north. Although the frugality of Skey was legion, Morris and Shaw were once the 
largest Warwickshire colliery company and it may be the lack of surviving data that 
restricts a fuller analysis. It was the mine engineers however that had the greatest 
impact on mine safety by their commitment to education. Garside Phillips led the 
campaign to educate miners and Smallman the curriculum for mine managers in the 
Midland District. 
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Table 5.1 shows the comparative annual death rates of the selected Warwickshire 
coalowners. What is apparent is that it is the size of colliery and not the mode of 
ownership that is significant. The Warwickshire coalfield employed but 4,000 men in 
1854 and was still only 5,000 in 1889. The following years saw the rapid expansion of 
the coalfield and by 1913 19,000 were employed. Two thirds of these colliers were 
employed in the newly sank deep mines and it is there that the death toll mounts. 
There are four large collieries that have an annual death rate of over ten a decade.
164
 
The Stanley Company’s expanded Nuneaton Colliery from 1899 had twenty deaths a 
decade. The two landowners also figure on the list with Newdigate Colliery suffering 
thirteen deaths a decade and Dugdale’s Baddesley Colliery ten. The mine engineer 
Melly who oversaw the expansion of the Griff Colliery Company also had a rate of 
ten a decade. The companies that suffered between six and nine deaths a decade were 
the large Morris and Shaw’s Hall End Colliery which had seven, Hickman’s large 
Haunchwood Colliery combined with its sister colliery at Tunnel which also had 
seven, six in the post disaster Baddesley Colliery which developed in the 20
th
 century 
into a large colliery, and six in the medium sized Addenbrooke’s Charity Colliery. 
Seen separately Hickman’s medium sized Haunchwood Colliery had four deaths a 
decade whereas the larger Tunnel pit had only three. Strangely Stanley’s large Charity 
Colliery had only four deaths a decade yet his Nuneaton Colliery developed at the 
same time heads the list. Others to achieve below five deaths a decade was the four of 
the medium sized Wyken Colliery, the three of the two medium to small mine 
engineer run collieries of Ansley Hall and Stockingford, three of the early medium 
sized Newdigate Griff Colliery and two to Morris and Shaw’s medium size Birch 
Coppice Colliery. Skey’s small Wilnecote Colliery and Trent Valley Colliery have a 
combined death rate of only one a decade and justify their reputation as safe pits. 
  
                                                 
164
 All figures tabulated from Annual Mine Inspector Report: 1851 to 1913. 
 Page | 257 
 
Table 5:1 Comparative Annual Death Rates of Warwickshire Coalowners 
  Deaths Annual Death Rate 
Landowners 
Newdigate 
1851-1882 Griff 12 0.344 
1897-1913 Newdigate 22 1.375 
1851-1882 and 1897-1913 34 0.666 
Dugdale 
1851-1913 Baddesley 66 1.060 
1883-1913 post disaster Baddesley 19 0.687 
Companies 
Whitten 
1851-1913 Wyken 30 0.484 
Addenbrooke 
1863-1879 Charity 11 0.633 
Hickman 
1881-1913 Haunchwood 15 0.468 
1891-1913 Tunnel 8 0.363 
1881-1913 Haunchwood and Tunnel 23 0.712 
Stanley 
1872-1878 Swan Lane 0 0.000 
1877-1913 Nuneaton 28 0.777 
1900-1913 Charity 6 0.461 
1872-1913 all 34 0.829 
Skey 
1859-1913 Wilnecote Works 4 0.074 
1870-1913 Tame Valley 3 0.070 
1859-1913 all 7 0.129 
Morris and Shaw 
1858-1899 and 1911-1913 Birch Coppice 12 0.250 
1875-1913 Hall End 30 0.790 
1858-1913 all 42 0.763 
Mine Engineers 
Garside Phillips 
1874-1913 Ansley Hall 15 0.384 
Smallman 
1871-1913 Stockingford 13 0.309 
Melly 
1882-1913 Griff 34 1.096 
A general rule would appear to be the larger the colliery the more the deaths that 
could be expected. The table does throw up some interesting anomalies. Why should 
Stanley’s Nuneaton Colliery suffer so many deaths when his Charity Colliery was less 
than a quarter of these? Why should Hickman’s large Tunnel pit performance be so 
good compared to neighbouring Nuneaton and Griff collieries? Despite their 
involvement in the worst Warwickshire tragedy, landowners appear to be exonerated. 
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The post disaster Baddesley Dugdale performance was better than a number of 
companies and although the Newdigate`s relatively good figures at Griff were 
destroyed by their later venture into mining, their successor at Griff suffered a similar 
appalling death rate when they expanded the colliery, despite being led by an 
experienced and knowledgeable mine engineer Finally why should the performance of 
the medium sized Birch Coppice Colliery be significantly superior to other similarly 
sized contemporary collieries? 
Mine Inspectors saw it as their remit to identify the cause of fatalities and 
apportion blame in the hope of preventing a similar tragedy occurring. The greatest 
cause of deaths were falls of coal yet in this area they were often content to simply 
describe the incident or condemn the geological factors of slips and bumps. Table 5.2 
shows a breakdown of deaths in the collieries studied. In the expanding Nuneaton 
Colliery from 1899 falls were 44 per cent of deaths; at Newdigate Colliery this rose to 
60 per cent; at the post disaster Baddesley Colliery it was 47 per cent; at Hall End 
Colliery it was 55 per cent and at the Griff Colliery Company, 55 per cent. Only at the 
Stanley owned Charity Colliery is the 25 per cent deaths from falls less than the 
Warwickshire average of 40 per cent for a large colliery. It would appear that there 
was an increasing danger in working the deeper seams of coal and by 1913 this was 
nearly a half of all Warwickshire fatalities. In only three collieries did underground 
haulage deaths exceed those from falls of coal. These were the Stanley Charity 
Colliery and the two medium sized collieries of Ansley Hall and Wyken, all with a 
favourable death rate of under five a decade. It is therefore those collieries that were 
able to minimise deaths from falls of coal that were rewarded with a lower death rate. 
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Table 5:2 Breakdown of Deaths in selected Warwickshire Collieries 
Colliery Total Fall Shaft Haulage MU Gas Explosives Surface Sundries 
Baddesley 66 14 3 11 1 35  1 1 
Griff 46 26 3 8 1 1  6 1 
Griff (Newdigate) 12 8 2 1    1  
Griff (Griff Col Co) 34 8 1 6 1 1  6 1 
Charity 33 14  12  2  2 1 
Charity (Addenbrooke) 11 5  4  1   1 
Charity (Stanley) 8 2  5     1 
Wyken 30 11 3 13 1   2  
Nuneaton 29 15 4 4 1  3 2  
Nuneaton (Stanley all) 28 15 4 4 1  2 2  
Nuneaton (Stanley exp) 25 11 4 4 1  2 2  
Newdigate 23 14 1 3 1   3 1 
Stockingford 14 8  5    1  
Ansley Hall 14 4  5   1 4  
Wilnecote Works 3  1 1    1  
Tame Valley 9 5 1 1  2    
Key: MU Miscellaneous Underground, non-haulage. 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1951 to 1913 
What blame can therefore be laid at the door of the mine owners? A fatality in the 
mine would not only cause economic dislocation to production but the resulting 
investigation could raise the possibility of legal penalties and from its publication in 
journals like the Colliery Guardian, the moral censure of their peers. Smallman for 
example was ostracised by many Warwickshire owners following the Baddesley 
disaster despite his heroic attempts at rescue.
165
 As the consultant mine engineer for 
the colliery he had introduced the Dugdale’s to Gillett from Derbyshire and was seen 
to share some moral responsibility for the erection of the underground pump. Few 
owners attended his funeral in 1900. In 1903 Melly proudly reported to his board of 
directors Griff’s good safety record claiming that in tonnage raised per death they 
were twice the county average and four times better than South Wales. 
166
 He was not 
averse to commenting on neighbouring collieries and declared the problems 
experienced at Newdigate Colliery was due to an unwillingness to invest in it and 
poor management up to 1905. The parsimony of William Stratford Dugdale in not 
bricking the area above a newly installed engine and providing a wooden rather than 
steel conduit to remove exhaust smoke was a significant cause of the Baddesley 
disaster, together with the criminal negligence of his mine officials who failed to 
monitor a known smouldering fire despite routine inspection. The refusal to allow 
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horses to work in shafts rather than the simple chains to pull tubs caused preventable 
deaths at both Wyken and Hall End collieries. But George Skey of Tame Valley and 
Peel had an equal reputation for frugality yet his collieries had the best safety record 
of those studied. Coalowners walked a difficult path. If they leant towards safety at 
the expense of income, profits could suffer. If they inclined towards income at the 
expense of safety, they could fail for a different reason. The exemplars above reveal 
that there were some prone to the latter course but there is not enough evidence to 
condemn coalowners as a whole. 
Despite the evidence of paternalism and philanthropy noted above, Warwickshire 
coalowners were typical Victorian businessmen who ran their collieries to make a 
profit. Even Garside Phillips, the advocate of miner education, could display irritating 
penny pinching in denying an engineman the necessary oil to run his engine. Yet the 
discussion of the role of trade unions in Chapter Four confirmed that Warwickshire 
miners received superior pay and working conditions to many in other areas including 
the neighbouring counties of the Midland Division. Sir Alfred Hickman MP revealed 
to the House of Commons in 1900 that Warwickshire colliers were working an Eight 
Hour Day some eight years before an act was passed to extend this to miners 
nationally.
167
 Similarly in the union campaign for a minimum wage in 1911 the 
General Secretary of the Warwickshire Miners Association made known to a 
conference of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain that Warwickshire had already 
negotiated one. It was the checkweighman who decided if money had to be made up 
and informed the manager. If there were any problems he contacted the Employers 
Association ‘and they compel them.’168 At a November Special Conference of the 
MFGB a South Wales delegate complained that nothing had been achieved ‘except in 
Warwickshire where it is said something great has been accomplished through the 
generosity of the employers.’169 It is evident that the Warwickshire trade union was 
fortunate in being able to negotiate with employers that did not display the 
intransigence exhibited by their counterparts in other areas. 
                                                 
167
 Parliamentary Debates: Sir Alfred Hickman House of Commons (28 February 1900) cc 1300. 
168
 Special Conference: South Wales Dispute; New Mines Bill and Abnormal Places (13-14 June 1911) 
MRC MSS429MFGB 4/8 William Johnson p. 99. 
169
 Special Conference Minimum Wage (14-15 November 1911) MRC MSS429MFGB 4/8 p. 58. 
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Good practice developed in a colliery through the auspices of the masters or the 
men had no guarantee of being adopted by collieries elsewhere. This required the 
compulsion that only a government could provide. It is to the development and shape 
of State intervention that we must turn to in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Six: The State 
How far should the State involve itself with the welfare of its working citizens? 
The abuses of laissez-faire capitalism came under increasing scrutiny in the early 19
th
 
century from the beacon of publicity. Reports of mining disasters and the appalling 
working conditions in the coal industry, debated in parliament and recorded in the 
press, galvanised a movement for reform that culminated in the 1842 Coal Mines Act. 
This act prohibited the employment underground of women and boys less than ten 
years of age, and restricted those working winding engines to over the age of fifteen. 
By 1850 provision was made for the appointment of inspectors of mines to examine 
and report on mines to parliament. Although Page Arnot asserts that the powers 
granted were so limited as to be meaningless,
1
 it nevertheless established the principle 
of inspection, and the right of the State to legislate for the safe conduct of the industry. 
Slowly a Mine Inspectorate emerged. The Act of 1850 set the number of inspectors as 
six and demanded the keeping of accurate mine workings maps and the notification of 
any fatality. In 1855 Inspectors were doubled to twelve, and a standard of safety was 
embedded in the introduction of seven General Rules, relating to ventilation, the 
fencing of shafts, signalling, and the working of winding engines and boilers. In 
addition each colliery was required to draw up and have approved its own Special 
Rules that reflected their individual working requirements. These General Rules were 
increased periodically to reflect the evolving science and technology of the industry, 
rising to fifteen in 1860, thirty-one in 1872; thirty-nine in 1887, before being replaced 
in 1911 with an elaborate code of general regulations, and the power given to the 
Secretary of State, to amend and add to them without further legislation. This chapter 
analyses this contribution of the State to improvements in mine safety. 
Mills in her recent study, has presented a negative view of State intervention: 
Behind the assumption of progress portrayed in the historical literature 
lies a story of missed opportunity and indifference by the British 
                                                 
1
 R. Page Arnot, The Miners Years of Struggle: a History of the MFGB from 1910 (London, 1953) p. 
35. 
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government that resulted in large numbers of men dying unnecessarily in 
the pursuit of the nation’s mineral wealth.2 
The government only responded to perils faced by workers in the coal industry when 
faced with sustained and persistent demands for remedial action. In the 1840’s the 
visible problem was explosions in mines. To protect themselves from criticism they 
appointed scientists to investigate and report and only when voluntary measures had 
failed did they become directly involved. The early Mine Acts were tentative steps 
rather than bold advances. The Mining Journal dismissed the 1850 Act as ‘a sop’3 and 
described the situation in 1855 as ‘absolutely disgraceful to the government and 
derogatory to the dignity of the office, and any measure which upholds and continues 
it will meet with deserved reprobation.’4 The succession of Select Committees and 
Royal Commissions that followed were again attempts to deflect criticism by 
gathering information, without any guarantee of subsequent action. In the last quarter 
of the century the government did become more proactive supporting scientific 
investigations into the causes of mine explosions and in 1902 establishing a 
committee to study the safe use of electricity when it remained a minor cause of 
fatalities. Nevertheless when it was not facing calls for intervention as with the 
declining ironstone industry or the invisible cancer of occupational disease, Mills 
asserts that ‘the government adopted an attitude of indifference towards the welfare of 
labour.’5 
Section one asks the question why the State decided to intervene in the running of 
the coal industry in the 19
th
 century. Despite its limitations all attempts at explanation 
are centred on a 1958 theory postulated in a short article by MacDonagh. This has not 
prevented historians applying different weight to the various factors that have been 
put forward. Section two examines the Mine Records Office which was the first 
concrete example of intervention. Even so it was the dominating personality of Robert 
                                                 
2
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 
2010) p. 243. 
3
 Mining Journal, 27 July and 17 August 1850. 
4
 Mining Journal, 27 January 1855. 
5
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 p. 244. 
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Hunt who shaped which direction that intervention should take. Section three 
examines the creation of a Mine Inspectorate and the difficulties it encountered in 
establishing its authority and influence. Section four chronicles the meagre attempts at 
fostering the education of mine workers so that they could comprehend the increasing 
awareness of mine safety. In Warwickshire it was not until 1891 that a Warwickshire 
School of Mines was established. Section five charts the development of professional 
mine managers to run mines. From their inception the Mine Inspectorate, mostly 
appointed from the northern coalfields where viewers held sway, were appalled that in 
the south uneducated butties were allowed to run the pits. It was not until 1872 and 
1887 that mine managers and then undermanagers were required to obtain 
qualifications in competency. Section six examines the role of the law courts in 
enforcing mine safety. The establishment of general and special rules from 1855 
meant that miners and in theory, owners could be prosecuted for infringements but it 
was not until the publication of statistics in the 1890’s that we can analyse 
Warwickshire in any detail. Section seven looks at the development of mine rescue 
which only received official support in the early years of the 20
th
 century. Section 
eight analyses the limitations to State intervention. 
Why State Intervention? 
The origin of State intervention has been seen in the Tory belief in social 
responsibility
6
 and the radical philosophy of Utilitarianism which saw a need to 
provide the greatest good for the greatest number.
7
 Liberal historians from Boyd in 
1879 to Bryant in 1975 have viewed the development of mining health and safety as 
an inevitable chronology of progress led by great men.
8
 In 1958 MacDonagh 
postulated a new approach which viewed history as a process which was not affected 
                                                 
6
 See J. Hart, ‘Nineteen Century Social Reform: a Tory Interpretation’, Past and Present 31.1 (July 
1965) 39-61. This grew from ‘noblesse oblige’, the view that social position brings with it 
responsibilities to those less fortunate. 
7
 A. Dicey, The Debt of Collectivism to Benthamism: lectures on the relationship between law and 
public opinion in England during the 19
th
 century (London, 1905) challenged by J. Brebner, ‘Laissez-
faire and State Intervention in 19
th
 century Britain’, Journal of Economic History V111 (1948) 59-73 
and J. Aydellote, ‘Conservative and Radical Interpretations of early Victorian Social Legislation’, 
Victorian Studies (December 1967) 225-36. 
8
 R. Boyd, Coal Mine Inspection: its history and results (London, 1879); A. Bryan, The Evolution of 
Health and Safety in Mines (Letchworth, 1975). 
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by individuals or ideology.
9
 The Government intervened only when obliged to do so 
by events that were ‘intolerable to society.’ It proposed a legislative solution but 
endangered interests brought political influence to bear and forced compromise which 
according to Mills; ‘culminated in emasculated law insufficient to remove the original 
abuse but with the potential for widening state regulation.’10 Mine Inspectors with 
experience of having to uphold an inefficient law, would then make proposals to 
remove the defects one at a time. His analysis does loosely fit the early years yet this 
five stage model which specified stages of reform from identifying the problem to 
bureaucratic solution has been criticised by Parris in 1960 for its concepts of 
‘intolerability’ and ‘History as a process.’11 Parris claimed the MacDonagh model 
only fitted his specialist area of emigrant regulation and reiterated the claim that the 
philosophy of Utilitarianism underpinned any theory of a revolution in government.
12
 
How far the State and industry knowingly sacrificed health for profit is a matter of 
conjecture. Unlike deaths from explosions, occupational illness was less visible to 
society and given the scope of medical knowledge at the time, no obvious solution 
was apparent. When experts disagreed as in the role of coal dust in explosions, 
corrective legislation was inevitably delayed. Mills adds a number of further 
influences upon the Government including the extent of public sympathy, the degree 
of trade union pressure, the positive response of the workforce and the current 
economic performance of the industry.
13
 
 
 
  
                                                 
9
 O. MacDonagh, ‘Nineteen century Revolution in Government: a reappraisal’, Historical Journal 1:1 
(1958) 52-67. 
10
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 
2010) pp. 4-6. 
11
 H. Parris, ‘Nineteenth Century Revolution in Government: a reappraisal reappraised’, Historical 
Journal 3:1 (1960) 17-37, reprinted P. Stansky (ed.), The Victorian Revolution: Government and 
Society in Victorian Britain (New York, 1973) pp. 29-57. 
12
 For a clear review of the arguments see E. Paul, ‘Laissez Faire in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Fact or 
Myth?’, Literature of Liberty 3.4 (1980) 5-38, reprinted by Library of Economics and Liberty 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/LtrLbrty/fplLNB.html. 
13
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 
2010) pp. 1-6. 
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Table 6:1 Main Parliamentary Papers on the Coal Industry 
1835 Report from the Select Committee on Accidents in Mines 
1842 Children’s Employment Commission 
1845 
Report on the Explosion at Haswell Colliery and on the Means of Preventing 
Similar Occurrences (Lyell and Faraday) 
1846 Report on the Explosion at Jarrow Colliery (Playfair) 
1849 Report from the Select Committee on Dangerous Accidents in Coal Mines 
1850 Report on the Working of Collieries (Blackwell) 
1850 Report on the Ventilation of Collieries (Phillips) 
1852 
Report from the Select Committee on the Causes and Frequency of Explo-
sions in Coal Mines 
1852-3 
Report from the Select Committee on the Causes of the Numerous Accidents 
in Coal Mines and the Best Means for their Prevention 
1854 
Report from the Select Committee on the Causes of the Numerous Accidents 
in Coal Mines and the Best Means for their Prevention 
1865 
Report from the Select Committee on the Operation of the Act for the Regu-
lation and Inspection of Mines and the Complaints of Miners 
1871 Report on the Truck Commission Act 
1871 
Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Several Matters Relating 
to Coal in the United Kingdom 
1873 
Report from the Select Committee on the Present Dearness and Scarcity of 
Coal 
1881 
Report of the Royal Commission on Accidents from Explosions and Other 
Causes in Mines 
1890 Reports of the Royal Commission on Mining Royalties 
1894 Report of the Royal Commission on Explosions from Coal Dust in mines 
1903 
Reports of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Subject of the Coal Re-
sources of the United Kingdom 
1904 Report of the Departmental Committee on the Use of Electricity in Mines 
1907 
Report of the Departmental Committee to Inquire into the Possible Econom-
ic Effects of a Limit of Eight Hours to the Working Hours of Coal Miners 
1907 Report of the Royal Commission of Mines 
1908 Report of the Departmental Committee on the Truck Acts 
1909 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Causes and Means of Preventing 
Accidents 
The development of State intervention is relatively straightforward to chart and is 
summarised in Table 6:1. In less than fifteen years the Government had moved from 
restricting child labour and commissioning reports from respected scientists, to 
imposing good practice in General and Special Rules. From the Act of 1872 the 
principle of intervention was embedded and a more proactive stance was taken to 
update the coal industry in line with technological and scientific advances, 
exemplified by the 1894 Act that addressed the role of coal dust in colliery 
explosions. In the early years of the 20
th
 century there was a spate of committee 
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reports and a Royal Commission which resulted in tackling the problem of the use of 
electricity before it became an issue in mine safety and an Act of 1910 that completely 
overhauled the Inspection of mines. By 1913 the government had established a Safety 
Research Board whose work would have a dramatic influence on mine safety in the 
inter-war years. 
Yet the relative importance of factors that led to this intervention has proved to be 
more problematic. The widening of the franchise can be seen from the 1832 Act that 
established an electorate of around 650,000. This rose to two million or 40 per cent of 
the male population in 1867 and nearly six million or 60 per cent in 1885, and with 
the adoption of universal male suffrage in 1918, about twenty-one million.
14
 Any 
government needed to take cognisance of this increasing and more literate electorate 
served by national and local newspapers
15
 as exemplified by the 1885 Act when the 
Conservative government was forced through fear of public disorder to introduce 
measures far more radical than initially proposed. The role of the trade unions in 
fostering an awareness of safety issues has been discussed in Chapter Four. 
Particularly after the election of two Lib-Lab mining MPs in 1874 they continually 
petitioned parliament for reforms although the legislation that was passed rarely 
satisfied their optimistic expectations.
16
 There were always more coalowner MPs than 
miner MPs throughout our period of study
17
 and Mills claims that the Home Office 
was selective with expansion of the law and avoided issues that could lead to friction 
with owners.
18
 The 1862 Hartley Colliery disaster
19
 revealed the need for collieries to 
                                                 
14
 Adapted from F. Craig, British Electoral Facts 1832 to 1887 (London, 1989). 
15
 In the north of the Warwickshire coalfield was the Tamworth Herald and in the south the Nuneaton 
Observer and the Nuneaton Chronicle. Such weekly newspapers reprinted stories from the national 
dailies like the Times. 
16
 An example is the 1880 Employers’ Liability Act which they hoped would penalise employers with 
poor safety records. Many employers simply contracted out while others turned to insurance to cover 
potential damages awards and the insurance companies did not base premiums on records of safety. 
17
 R. Gregory, The Miners and British Politics 1906 to 1914 (Oxford, 1968), has shown that between 
1885 and 1910 there were 24 coalowners in the House of Commons. In contrast there were 6 miner 
MPs from 1885 and 12 more from 1900 to 1909. pp. 15-16. 
18
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 
2010) p. 126. 
19
 Hartley Colliery 1862, a beam from a winding engine snapped and fell into the single shaft where 
204 miners had no means of escape and died from suffocation. 
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have two shafts and legislation was quickly passed
20
 but the 1867 Royal Commission 
Report was not followed by legislation until 1872.
21
 Any government needed to weigh 
the views of the trade unions, the coalowners and their own officials the mine 
inspectorate before embarking upon a legislative solution to a perceived problems, but 
they also had to note how those views were being received by their electorate. 
The first practical State involvement in the coal industry could hardly be termed 
as intervention. The government merely agreed that a new Mining Records Office 
would accept the plans of abandoned mines if owners wished to deposit them there. 
However the appointment of a new Keeper of Mining Records in 1845 who 
interpreted his role in a much more proactive way was to transform its importance. 
Mining Records Office 
An 1835 Select Committee ‘to enquire into the nature, cause and extent of those 
lamentable catastrophes which have occurred in the mines of Great Britain,’ 
recommended a better system of ventilation, the use of safety lamps, accurate plans of 
the workings, education for miners, mine visits and that owners ‘did not neglect their 
responsibilities.’22 There was no recommendation for legislation but coalowners did 
take up the call for the recording of plans for mines. Particularly in the North-East 
where there had been extensive deep working of coal seams, it was a constant danger 
that miners would break into old workings and suffer a deadly inundation of gas or 
water. Perhaps more important to entrepreneurs, they could sink a shaft only to 
discover that seams had been worked out by an earlier colliery. The Geological 
Survey had been established in 1835 with a Museum of Practical Geology attached to 
exhibit rocks and minerals which had an application of geology to industry.
23
 In 1840 
the government agreed to the request of the Newcastle based British Society, a group 
                                                 
20
 The need for an upcast and downcast had been made in 1935 but then ignored. Report of the Select 
Committee on Accidents in Mines (1835) 603 V.11. 
21
 For coalowners views on legislation see Parliamentary Debates (1872) 21 June cm 183-90; 25 June 
cm 508-27; 2 July cm 663-4. 
22
 Report of the Select Committee on Accidents in Mines (1835) 603 V.1. 
23
 C. Thompson, Plans of Abandoned Mines: History of Custody (1964) paper published by Your 
Archives, website of the National Archives, and H. Woodward, The History of the Geological Society 
of London (London, 1907). 
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of coalowners, MP`s and professors of geology, to establish a repository of 
abandonment mine plans at the newly established Mining Record Office at the 
museum. In 1845 Robert Hunt was appointed Keeper of Mining Records. He 
expanded the activities of his office by travelling round to the mining districts to 
encourage owners to deposit plans. They developed such a trust that owners were also 
prepared to release production and sales figures that would allow the creation of 
regional aggregates without revealing individual performance to possible competitors. 
Hunt’s annual Mineral Statistics first appeared in 1853, mainly concerned with 
metalliferous mining.
24
 He produced coal mining statistics from 1854 and continued 
producing his annual volume until he retired in 1881. He also included a list of mines 
with their owners arranged according to Inspectoral districts. The Coal Mine Act of 
1850 had made the making of plans a statutory duty and the act of 1872 made it 
compulsory to deposit plans of abandoned mines at the new Mining Records Office at 
the Home Office. From 1872 through to 1882 there were two mining records offices, 
collecting the same information. It is a tribute to Hunt’s charisma that mine owners 
continued to supply him with information that they now had a statutory obligation to 
give to the mining Inspectorate. His Mineral Statistics continued to be produced while 
the Inspectorate merely retained the data obtained by them for internal use. Only from 
1884 did the statistics appear in the Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines, 
produced by the same men who had worked under Hunt. It had been coalowners who 
had petitioned for the compulsory keeping of plans of underground working and that 
abandonment plans be deposited in a central depository. State legislation had ensured 
that this good practice was universally adopted but the contribution of Hunt whose 
personality persuaded owners to part with sensitive information must not be 
undervalued. 
The contribution of Hunt was recognised at the time. In 1854 he was elected a 
member of the Royal Society and in 1855 a member of the Royal Statistical Society.
25
 
Yet he was fully aware that he was a pioneer in a new field and in later additions of 
the Mineral Statistics he amended totals upwards to compensate for earlier under 
                                                 
24
 The ODNB: Robert Hunt (1807-1887) states that the Volume One of the Geological Survey was in 
1846 on copper and tin mining in Cornwall but 1853 was the first national survey of minerals. 
25
 ODNB: Robert Hunt (1807-1887). 
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reporting. Church suggests that that these corrections did not go far enough and that 
perhaps 8.5 per cent needs to be added to annual production figures.
26
 The reasons for 
this are understandable. It took time to gain the trust of owners and some six million 
tons were not reported in Lancashire and South Wales. Before 1864 he reported coal 
sales rather than coal production and this omitted around four million tons of colliery 
consumption in the North-East alone. There were idiosyncratic local measurements 
like the Staffordshire boat load that was difficult to interpret and not even a nationally 
agreed figure of how many hundredweight a ton should consist of. Not surprisingly 
many historians believe accurate production figures are only available after the 1872 
Coal Mines Act which managed to iron out many of these anomalies. By that date the 
principle of State intervention was well established but it had taken time to reach that 
level of acceptance. 
Mine Inspectors 
In many ways coal mining in the early 19
th
 century was according to Mills; 
‘invisible to the public eye.’27 Owners disliked any enquiry into pit deaths that would 
impinge upon their management practice and discouraged them if possible.
28
 Inquests 
into deaths in the North-East only began in 1813 and juries were largely under the 
control of the owners.
29
 The Newcastle Journal even claimed to have acceded to a 
request from owners not to report disasters.
30
 But mining deaths could not be hidden 
from view. In 1812 an explosion at Felling Colliery that killed ninety-two attracted a 
public outcry that led to the formation of the Sunderland Society in 1813. They 
commissioned the scientist Sir Humphry Davy who invented a wire gauze safety lamp 
and believing their work completed, the Society disbanded. Local men like the 
Reverend Hodgson were active in broadcasting the plight of miners by publishing his 
                                                 
26
 R. Church, The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume Three 1830 to 1914 (Oxford, 1986) pp. 
3-8. For example in 1854 Hunt gives a figure of 64.5 million tons. Church’s revised figure is 71.5 
million tons. 
27
 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 
2010) p. 39. 
28
 R. Boyd, Coal Mine Inspection: its History and Results (London, 1879) pp. 26-7. 
29
 C. Challinor and B. Ripley, Miners` Association: a Trade Union in the age of the Chartists (Whitley 
Bay, 1990) p. 205. 
30
 M. Flynn, The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume 2 1700 to 1830 (Oxford 1984) p. 413. 
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emotive sermons and John Sykes compiled lists of deaths from disasters that were 
presented to the 1835 Select Committee as the only available statistics of fatalities.
31
 
National newspapers were outside the influence of coalowners and the Times in 1821 
published an article criticising colliery management.
32
 The specialist Mining Journal 
was established in 1835 with a stated mission to reduce accidents by reporting 
fatalities and advocating enforceable legislative remedies.
33
 In 1839 an explosion in St 
Hilda Colliery killed fifty-two and again a committee was formed as a result. The 
South Shields Committee set itself the task of investigating accidents and reported 
after three years calling for the compulsory registration of mining plans, the 
establishment of Inspectors of Mines, the prohibition of the underground employment 
of women and children and the better scientific education of mine engineers.
34
 It even 
negotiated with Durham University to provide the requisite training for mine 
engineers. By then the government had begun its own limited inquiry into the coal 
industry which addressed one of the proposals of the Committee. 
In 1840 the Childrens’ Employment Commission began an investigation into the 
condition of children employed in mines. It was convened at the behest of Lord 
Ashley
35
 who wished to gather empirical evidence to support a limitation of child 
employment. The scale of inquiry was impressive. There were four commissioners, 
none of whom had any knowledge of the coal mining industry. These were the 
economist Thomas Tooke,
36
 Dr Thomas Southwood, active in public health reform 
and one of the three commissioners of the 1833 Royal Commission on Employment 
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 C. Mills, Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industries 1800 to 1914 (Aldershot, 
2010) pp. 40-6. 
32
 The editorial suggested managerial failures in appointing competent ‘overseers’ to enforce safety on 
a workforce that saw accidents as ‘ill luck’ rather than ‘an incident necessarily connected with their 
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 A. Wilson, The Pick and the Pen (London, 1979) p. 24. 
34
 F. Linsley, The North of England Institute of Mining Engineers and the Establishment of the College 
of Physical Science at Newcastle Upon Tyne. Public lecture University of Newcastle upon Tyne (9 July 
1971) copy NEIMME website. 
35
 ODNB: Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury (1801-1885). He was known as ‘The Poor Man’s Earl’ for 
his support of better treatment of the working classes. His causes included factory reform, child 
chimney sweeps, ragged schools and reform of the lunacy laws. 
36
 ODNB: Thomas Tooke (1774-1858). This mainly covers his economic theory, particularly his six 
volume History of Prices published between 1837 and 1857. 
 Page | 272 
 
of Children in Factories; and two factory inspectors, Leonard Homer and Robert 
Sanders. Some twenty sub-commissioners were appointed to serve under them, each 
allocated one or more coal districts on which to report. Mitchell was the 
commissioner for Warwickshire and Leicestershire. They interviewed some 4,000 
witnesses and the report was illustrated with twenty-six drawings depicting various 
aspects of the employment of women and children.
37
 In particular Lancashire and 
West Yorkshire commissioners discovered that miners sometimes worked naked and 
this was shown in a number of the drawings. The fact that young girls would regularly 
be exposed to the sight of men working naked led to a moral outcry which certainly 
assisted Ashley in the passing of the bill. It conveniently ignored the truth that girls 
raised in mining district would daily see fathers and brothers strip to wash pit grime 
from their bodies in a tin bath. Some commissioners appeared to equate opportunity 
with licence with Commissioner Symons in a section entitled ‘Prostitution in Pits’ 
concluded that; ‘it is not to be supposed but that where opportunity prevails sexual 
vices are of common occurrence.’38 Kirby has questioned the sexual implications of 
nudity in the pits.
39
 He suggests that accounts of promiscuity probably resulted more 
from imagination and gossip than from reporting actual events. Nevertheless Lord 
Ashley stressed the need for moral and spiritual education and not just to discourage 
sexual excess. In the Quarterly Review
40
 he stated that the; 
two great demons in morals and politics, Socialism and Chartism, are 
stalking through the land (producing) an incurable cancer of the 
population. (Moral education would provide) understanding of the 
delusionary nature of radical political panaceas.
41
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The 1842 Coal Mines Act was passed with relatively little opposition although the 
apologists for the coalowners in the House of Lords 
42
 succeeded in reducing the ages 
of boys excluded from the pits from thirteen down to ten and women from only 
working underground.
43
 It was only in the committee stage that they realised that they 
would need some kind of enforcement and appointed Seymour Tremenheere as the 
first – and only – mine inspector, with very limited powers compared to the factory 
inspectorate.
44
 Tremenheere came from a wealthy family with a tradition of public 
service.
45
 In 1839 he gave up his employment as a barrister and accepted the post of 
the first Inspector of Schools on an annual salary of £500, rejecting an offer from a 
Calcutta law firm that offered £3,000 a year. In 1843 he accepted an extra £100 a year 
to become the first Inspector of Mines and brought to the post his technique of fact 
finding and reporting that he had developed in his previous position. He would visit 
an area and interview all strata of society and read back their statements for 
verification. He would then consult any documentary evidence like pay sheets or 
contracts of employment. He was not a mine engineer and never went underground or 
reported any account concerning machinery or methods of working.
46
 This was 
mainly in deference to coalowners who had objected to this in the 1842 Act 
47
 but as 
he lacked any practical mining experience, the exercise would have been pointless. He 
                                                 
42
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then made a number of recommendations that were later to be adopted. These 
included the reporting of fatal and non-fatal accidents; training of managers; pithead 
baths and improved housing for miners; and an early kind of joint consultative 
machinery where miners should appoint a small committee to improve 
communication with managers. Some of these would have to wait until the 20
th
 
century before fruition.
48
 
Tremenheere reflected the prevailing views of his times. A spate of gas explosions 
in South Wales and the North-East led him to call in his 1847 Report for a 
government officer as a surveyor of mines to diffuse knowledge on the best system of 
ventilation. He was against compulsion believing that: 
It would materially interfere with the application of capital and of 
individual skill and enterprise and lead the Government altogether 
beyond its legislative function.’ Compulsion would ‘transfer the 
responsibility for their (collieries) safe and proper management from the 
proprietors to the Government.
49
 
He believed in what Bryan terms ‘the moral and intellectual approach to mine 
safety.’50 If an accident was shown to be the result of an owner or manager failing to 
adopt a practice previously recommended by the Inspector and in successful use in 
other collieries, the adverse publicity would prevent a reoccurrence. The Government 
response was to appoint a number of eminent scientists to investigate the explosions 
51
 
and set up a Select Committee in 1849 to investigate ‘The Best Means of Preventing 
the Occurrence of Dangerous Accidents in Mines.’ Its conclusions mirrored those of 
Tremenheere that Inspectors should but report and offer advice and it voiced his fears 
                                                 
48
 It was not until Nationalisation that such a committee was established. In Warwickshire the first pit 
head bath was not built until 1928 at Pooley Hall Colliery. Yet there is archaeological evidence that the 
Romans had pit head baths at their Welsh gold mine. See P.Lewis and G.Jones, ‘The Dolauchi Gold 
Mines: Surface evidence, The Antiquaries Journal 49.2 (September 1969) 244-72. 
49
 Tremenheere, Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines 1847. 
50
 A. Bryan, The Evolution of Health and Safety in Mines (Letchworth, 1975) p. 39. 
51
 Lyell and Faraday, Report on the Explosion at the Haswell Colliery and on the means of preventing 
similar occurrences. ( London, 1845); L. Playfair, Report on the Explosion at Jarrow Colliery. 
(London, 1846). 
 Page | 275 
 
that if their authority was increased ‘owners and managers would try to evade the 
responsibility which naturally belongs to them and which it is not only desirable not 
to withdraw but rather if possible increase.’52 Yet the call for Inspectors with some 
power of intervention continued. It came from the reports of coroners’ juries, from the 
newspapers in the colliery districts and from the trade unions.
53
 In 1844 a meeting of 
20,000 Durham miners petitioned parliament for Inspectors who would check 
ventilation, ropes and machinery
54
 and in his 1849 evidence to the Select Committee, 
the Jarrow miners’ representative proposed Inspectors who could impose on the spot 
fines.
55
 Two further reports on mine safety were commissioned and presented to 
parliament in 1850.
56
 Both reinforced earlier findings and called for the appointment 
of Inspectors, the technical training of managers and the establishment of mining 
schools. Parliament at last acquiesced to the growing evidence that technically 
qualified Mine Inspectors would be beneficial to the safety of the mining industry. 
The 1850 Coal Mines Act appointed four Mine Inspectors, rising to six in 1851. 
Unlike Tremenheere they had to possess a mining background but not be practising 
mine agents or owners. The Mining Journal was content with the calibre of the men 
chosen declaring that; ‘they are possessed of the requisite practical knowledge to 
perform effectively their arduous and difficult duties.’57 Their role was now more 
directed towards safety and they had the power to enter and examine coal mines 
(ironstone mines from 1860), view the working plans of the colliery and receive 
notice of fatal accidents. They could take no direct steps to promote education but 
could use every opportunity to point out its advantages. Enforcement rested on the 
right to call managers before them and give advice but they could not initiate 
prosecutions without first informing the Secretary of State. Edmonds notes that: 
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For five years these original six strove to persuade management and their 
letters requesting installation of safety precautions or amending 
unsatisfactory conditions are a model of politeness and courtesy. Herein 
perhaps lay the germ of the complaint to be voiced for many years that 
they were the tools of the management.
58
 
As the tools of the State they were certainly undervalued.
59
 Their initial salary was 
only £400 a year compared to the £1,000 received by factory inspectors.
60
 This was 
more than a manager could earn but considerably less than a competent mine agent. 
They received expenses but no secretarial assistance to cope with the average eighty 
letters a week sent to and from them. They gained scant support when prosecutions 
were deemed necessary and in 1854 Inspector Mackworth complained of ‘the 
practical immunity from all responsibility, criminal or civil, of the managers of 
mines.’61 Coalowners, or their family and friends, acted as magistrates in the coal 
districts and the jury was often composed of men that worked for the same owner and 
whose first consideration was protecting their employment. Cases often failed to get 
that far as coroners’ juries believing that blame was split between the management 
and the neglect of the deceased, opted for a verdict of ‘accidental death’ which unlike 
‘manslaughter’ precluded future prosecution. Job states that they; 
walked a tightrope between the aspirations of the colliers who wanted 
change and the owners who resisted it. Yet when they tried to introduce 
safety measures that directly affected the output and pay of the colliers, it 
was now they that resisted.
62
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Despite such difficulties their contribution to mine safety was gradually accepted by 
the industry and their recommendations became the basis of future legislation.
63
 
However the Mine Inspectors never worked in isolation. Following two more 
Select Committees into mining safety in 1852 and 1854 
64
 a consensus emerged on the 
beneficial application of general rules to all coal mines. This was a contrast to the 
lament of the 1835 Select Committee which thought it impossible to lay down general 
rules for mining due to the great dissimilarity in mining conditions in different parts 
of the country.
65
 A meeting was convened in London in 1853 with forty-nine 
representatives from different coal districts, the six mine Inspectors and four 
delegations from workmen. Bryan makes the point that the; 
practice of incorporating in the statutes rules already tested in the field 
and proven to be effective, is but a simple application of that well known 
principle behind the development of all legislation affecting health and 
safety in mines, namely to bring the standard of the worst managed mines 
into line with that of the best.
66
 
From consulting all interested parties the 1855 Act imposed seven General Rules 
concerning ventilation, fencing of pits, signalling in the shaft and the requirements of 
winding engines and steam boilers. Falls of coal, the most prolific cause of fatalities, 
was intentionally excluded as it was believed that there was too wide a variation in 
different coal seams and coal districts. The number of Mine Inspectors doubled to 
twelve, each in their own district and their Annual Reports appeared to chart a steady 
decline in accidents. The number of lives lost in raising a million tons of coal fell 
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from 19.35 in 1851 to 10.95 in 1861.
67
 Yet accidents continued and a Select 
Committee set up in 1865 reported in 1867,
68
 the worst year for mining fatalities, 
when 1,484 died. The Act of 1872 was largely based upon this report. Inspectors were 
doubled with each receiving a deputy and two further Inspectors were appointed to 
cover the rising number of metalliferous mines. Managers now required certification, 
abandonment plans had to be deposited with a new Mining Office, workers could 
appoint men at their own expense to inspect their mine and boys under sixteen were 
restricted to a ten hour day. The General Rules which had risen to fifteen in 1860 now 
reached thirty-one. These now included safety lamp inspection of all gassy seams 
before the men could work and that all such reports should be recorded in a colliery 
book; lengthy blasting regulations and the provision of man holes on incline planes 
and roadways where men could take shelter from passing tubs. The 1887 Act again 
followed the recommendations of a Royal Commission Report.
69
 Bryan claims that it; 
amplified and made more specific many of the requirements of the 1872 
Act, made no changes in legislative policy but was largely concerned with 
developing already established principles in the light of increasing 
scientific and technical knowledge, improved mining practice and more 
administrative experience.
70
 
General rules were increased to thirty-nine and now included watering of areas before 
blasting and the provision of ambulance or stretcher with splints and bandages for 
immediate use. 
The appointment of deputy inspectors for each of the twelve mining divisions in 
the 1872 Act was supposed to allow Inspectors more time for ‘spontaneous 
inspection’ but this failed to materialise.71 By 1878 Home Office instructions changed 
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further increasing their panorama of power by commending them to ‘abate any 
practice which in the opinion of the Inspector is dangerous though not expressly 
forbidden by the statute.’72 The passing of the 1887 Act further augmented the work 
and responsibilities of the Inspectorate and more deputies were appointed. The decline 
in metal mining at this time led to the two Metalifferous Inspectors to be abolished, 
the first in 1891 and the second in 1901, but as the Quarries Act of 1894 brought 
quarries of over twenty feet in depth under the Mine Inspectorate, more deputies were 
appointed. By the time of the 1906 Royal Commission into mine safety the 
Inspectorate was comprised of twelve Inspectors in charge of the twelve divisions and 
twenty-six assistant inspectors, of whom three were appointed for the inspection of 
metalliferous mines and quarries only. In 1908 two new posts were created. Professor 
Redmayne from Birmingham University was appointed to the Home Office as HM 
Chief Inspector of Mines and Robert Nelson HM Electrical Inspector of Mines. Yet 
still there were calls for a more far reaching reorganisation. Speaking in the 1910 
parliamentary debate on accidents in mines Henry Twist MP
73
 reported that the 
Liverpool Inspector had spent ninety days visiting collieries where fatal accidents had 
occurred and another ninety days at coroners’ inquests: 
Surely that is not inspection of mines. It is simply inquiry into the causes 
of deaths and the Inspector is only an instrument of the coroner’s jury. 
While performing that duty he cannot be said to be inspecting mines at 
all.
74
 
The Royal Commission recommended radical changes to the Inspectorate. In 
1910 they reorganised the twelve divisions into six geographical areas based on major 
coalfields. Warwickshire became part of the thirty-one counties of the Midland and 
Southern Division under Inspector Johnston. The staff were organised into three main 
grades of Divisional, Senior and Junior Inspectors with two subordinate grades of Sub 
Inspector of Mines who were to make detailed inspections of roadways and working 
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places, and Special Inspectors to examine the horses working in mines. Bryan 
summarised as follows: 
With the completion of these changes the enlarged establishment 
numbered ninety-two, comprising at headquarters a Chief, a Deputy Chief 
and an Electrical Inspector and in the field seven Divisional, thirteen 
Senior and thirty-two Junior Inspectors, together with twenty-two Sub 
Inspectors of Mines, eight Sub Inspectors of Quarries and eight Inspectors 
of Horses.
75
 
This was a far cry from Tremenheere’s lonely voice in the early 1840’s. 
The State had established a comprehensive safety inspectorate but their prognosis 
and remedies for dangers needed to be understood by the men who worked the pits. 
Education 
Dr Mitchell in his 1841 Report on Children in Mines in Warwickshire noted that 
four out of every five colliers he interviewed could not read.
76
 He interviewed a 
number of children and their answers revealed the dearth of education. Even the two 
who claimed they could read did not know the number of weeks in a year or had 
heard of places like Ireland, France and the USA. One of the readers, a sixteen year 
old, who had already worked eleven years in the pit, would still attend school five 
nights a week after a twelve hour shift.
77
 In 1854 James Darlington, a Lancashire 
coalowner who later ran Hawkesbury Colliery gave evidence to a Select Committee 
on the reading abilities of four collieries in different parts of the country. At 
Hawkesbury in Bedworth he claimed that 55 per cent could read, falling to 40 per cent 
of those aged between fifteen and twenty. When it came to writing he also noted the 
inferiority of underground workers to those that worked at the surface. Those who 
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could write a signature were 50 per cent of surface workers and 35 per cent of those 
working underground, falling to 40 per cent and 35 per cent respectively for the 
younger miners. Those who could write a letter were 41 per cent of surface workers 
and 25 per cent of underground workers, again falling to 20 per cent and 18 per cent 
for younger miners.
78
 From such unpromising results owners would have difficulty in 
finding those capable of rising to positions of authority or simply reading or 
comprehending the increasingly detailed regulation that were put before them. This 
can be illustrated from the report of an Inquest in 1892. At Stockingford Colliery the 
jigger, the youth in charge of the jig chain on the incline, had removed the ‘monkey’ 
or stop block before attaching a loaded tub to the chain and the tub ran down the 
incline killing a boy then ascending to fetch candles. Under questioning the jigger 
revealed that he had a copy of the rules but as he could not read, they had to be 
explained to him. In his summing up the coroner stated that if the man had ‘been 
possessed of reasonable intellect’ he would now be on a charge of manslaughter, but 
that ‘the responsibility rested more on the management for employing him.’79 
In 1857 the Midland Inspector of Mines, Mr Hedley, debated the problem of 
creating a class of intelligent and educated practical managers. If boys stayed at 
mining school until the age of fifteen or sixteen ‘few if any would be disposed to go 
into the mines to work.’80 Even if they did, those earmarked for management would 
cause jealousy with the men. ‘Good managers must be known to be a good worker, 
know local conditions, and have good natural ability and man management skills. 
Such qualities are not evident in youth.’81 Hedley recommended a five point plan: 
1. Boys should be educated until the age of thirteen or until they could read, 
write and do basic arithmetic. Adults could attend evening school. To promote 
school attendance a Tremenheere style prize scheme named after the first 
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Inspector of Mines, would reward annual attendance, attendance for a certain 
period, proficiency and good conduct. When this had been introduced in other 
districts it had worked well. 
2. Periodic lectures should be held at the colliery on subjects to do with mining, 
particularly the dangers and the need for the Special Rules. The emphasis 
should be upon practical application rather than scientific theory. 
3. Reading rooms and libraries should be established at all large collieries with 
smaller collieries combining to provide the facility. In addition a museum 
should be set up; ‘of minerals, fossils, and natural curiosities of the district 
collected by the lads and the workmen.’ 
4. Local societies should be established of ‘managers of mines and intelligent 
workmen,’ to hold monthly or bi-monthly lectures on the working of mines, 
ventilation, economy and the practice of other districts. 
5. A national college should be established. The Government School of Mines in 
Jermyn Street, London, although ‘excellent’, was too far from the mining 
districts for regular attendance. The North of England was in the process of 
establishing a mining institute, but its emphasis would be upon the pillar and 
bord system extensively used in the North-East, Lancashire and Wales. The 
longwall system used in the Midlands, Scotland and the South-West, merited a 
second mining institute being established in the Midlands.
82
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Progress was made. In 1861 Hedley reported that nearly all collieries had stopped 
employing children under twelve and that some were leaving the mine for half a day 
two days a week to attend the National School.
83
 Some collieries like Wyken provided 
a school for colliery children. In 1867 it ran at a cost of £110.
84
  
Colliery schools had been reported in most pit villages of the North-East in the 
1842 Childrens’ Employment Commission Report.85 In proposing the Commission in 
1840 Ashley had asserted that his primary aim was to bring these children within the 
reach of education
86
 but coalowners were largely against this. John Buddle,
87
 the 
influential viewer that ran Lord Londonderry’s collieries, voiced their concern that 
schooling beyond the age of ten would be detrimental to the industry as boys would 
seek employment as a clerk rather than pit work.
88
 The apparent threat to social order 
in the 1840’s from strikes and Chartism whose leadership was drawn from self taught 
primitive Methodists, led to a change of view.
89
 Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations 
had asserted that education would advance respect for ‘lawful superiors’ and Malthus 
in his Essay on Population the ‘prevention of crime and the promotion of industry, 
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morality and regular conduct.’90 For Fromm writing in 1967 ‘inner compulsion’ 
would replace ‘outward force’91 but Tremenheere was more succinct: 
To teach children to read, to write and to cipher may be within the 
capacity of many an ordinary labouring man made into a schoolteacher 
after some accident disabled him from work. But all persons are now 
agreed that this in not education. Education was needed to fortify the 
mind against attempts at misdirection against agitators of their own 
class.
92
 
The attitude of coalowners towards education had changed by the 1850’s93 and by 
1865 the chief agent of Lord Londonderry attributed company involvement in 
schools, reading rooms, churches and chapels, lectures, friendly societies, fetes and 
teas as ‘killing strikes by kindness.’94 Duffy saw the increase in colliery schools as an 
attempt by the Anglican Church to counter Methodist influence
95
 and Heesom was 
prepared to concede that altruistic paternalism was at least part of the motives of 
coalowners.
96
 Yet for Colls this was nothing less than a ‘struggle for cultural 
hegemony’ between owners and pitmen.97 Even if one rejects Colls assertion that 
school were there to replace the Rights of Man with morality lessons on Carelessness 
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and Industry, neither were they there to develop safety awareness in future 
employees.
98
 
Evening classes are not recorded in Warwickshire until the 1890’s. In July 1891 
the County Council placed an advertisement in the Colliery Guardian for a lecturer at 
a new Warwickshire School of Mining to be situated in Nuneaton.
99
 In August the 
Nuneaton Observer announced that George Bailes had been appointed and that a 
series of fortnightly lectures would begin in October in eight centres stretching from 
Foleshill in the south to Dosthill in the north.
100
 The lectures would be enlivened with 
magic lantern illustrations and free to all, but enrolled students for a fee of 5/- for the 
course would receive additional benefits. At the end of each lecture enrolled students 
would attend a class for discussion and explanation and be presented with printed 
notes intended to build into a text book of colliery practice. A set of exercises for 
home study would later be marked by Mr Bailes. At the end of the course an optional 
exam would be held simultaneously at all centres and certificates and prizes of books 
on mining awarded. The syllabus for the thirteen week course stressed practical 
knowledge. 
1. Geology of the district. 
2. Sinking and securing of shafts. 
3. Explosives, blasting and the dangers of coal dust. 
4. Methods of working coal and precautions to be taken when approaching old 
workings. 
5. Gases in mines. 
6. Lighting of workings: safety lamps. 
7. Ventilation of mines. 
8. Securing of roof and sides. 
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9. Mechanics and strengths of materials. 
10. Engineering: boilers. 
11. Winding and haulage. 
12. Drainage of mines. 
13. Safety provisions of the Mines Acts and special rules. 
The newspaper article predicted that ‘doubtless the time will come when in the 
appointment of colliery officials, underlookers or firemen only those that hold a first 
or second class certificate will be chosen.’ 101 
In 1891 the Mine Inspector confirmed that classes for ‘technical instruction in 
mining’ had been set up in Nottinghamshire and Warwickshire, and that at the end of 
the course; ‘an optional exam took place, and certificates and prizes awarded in 
accordance with the standard of merit they had obtained.’102 In Warwickshire there 
were ‘nine’ centres with one hundred and seventy-three students on roll. The average 
attendance was thirty-nine, and at classes for the exam, sixteen. In 1891 Warwickshire 
employed 6,111 miners.
103
 Between 1892 and 1894 one hundred and forty-eight sat 
the elementary exam and one hundred and seven were successful, a pass rate of 72 per 
cent. Between 1893 and 1894 forty-three had moved on to the advanced exam and 
thirty-four achieved success, a pass rate of 79 per cent. In 1894 the first sixteen 
students sat the honours exam, but only five were deemed successful, a pass rate of 31 
per cent
104
 It was Stokes who set and marked the Warwickshire examinations and in 
his report to the Technical Education Committee of 1893 he stated that ‘a miner 
should be able to read a plan or make a sketch with the same feasibility that he reads a 
newspaper.’105 The advanced students of 1894 did not heed these words as the low 
pass rate was ascribed to ‘poor sketches to illustrate answers, failure to read a colliery 
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plan and inability to measure the quantity of air passing through a mine.’106 Inspector 
Stokes reported the continuation of these free lectures in 1898: ‘Lecturers visit the 
mining centres and the workmen and youths can obtain the benefit of the instruction 
without interfering with their daily toil or drawing upon their hard earned wages.’107 
There were even reports of miners from Leicestershire crossing the county border to 
attend lectures.
108
 By 1902 Beales was editing a monthly publication entitled Mining 
Examiner and for two pence students could obtain lecture notes, and read reports on 
local colliery workings.
109
 Yet Inspector Stokes’ statistical analysis could not hide the 
fact that the number taking up this opportunity was lamentably small.
110
 
In an editorial of 1906 the Nuneaton Observer lamented the poor attendance of 
only 30 per cent in the previous year but attributed this not to the working of double 
shifts noted in the report of the Mining School but to poor mathematics teaching in 
day schools which needed to be addressed as; ‘over 60 per cent of boys went to work 
in the collieries.’111 The following year attendance had risen to 52 per cent of the 165 
on roll but there were reports that some on the county council believed that too much 
was being spent on the Mining School in comparison with the results achieved.
112
 By 
1910 the chairman of the Education Committee was complaining of the ‘least 
satisfactory report he had ever had on the Mining School.’ It was apparent that the 
system of instruction needed revamping and Mr McTrusty was appointed from Wigan 
Mining and Technical College as the new mining lecturer. Mr Bailes had been forced 
to resign in 1905 when he was declared bankrupt and the examination classes had 
been taken by Mr Briggs from Birmingham University. Now those under the age of 
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sixteen would be required to attend a preliminary year to study English, arithmetic 
and basic mining. The three year senior course would include electricity, geology, 
machinery, mechanics and mining arithmetic with practical work introduced at the 
latter stages.
113
  
The basic problem was to overcome the prejudice that intelligence was 
incompatible to working in the mine. The Colliery Guardian of 1884 reported the 
annual meeting of the Midland Institute of Mining, Civil and Mechanical Engineers. 
Mr A.M. Chambers complained of ‘the most serious difficulty of getting properly 
educated and intelligent men into the positions of managers, deputies and other 
offices about the mine.’114 If a boy passed standard six he was deemed ‘too clever to 
go into the pit.’115 William Garside Phillips, the owner and manager of Ansley Hall 
Colliery, had risen from working in the pits and was the main instigator for the 
promotion of a Warwickshire School of Mines.
116
 It began in rented rooms adjoining 
Nuneaton Police Station but had moved to a purpose built Mining School in 1896. 
After a decade of its existence it proudly reported that twenty-six former students 
were now managers or undermanagers of mines.
117
 The Nuneaton Chronicle 
published an article to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in 1941.
118
 The School then 
had a full time staff of five and boasted one hundred and fifty on roll. The Head of 
School was a Mr Thomas, a Cardiff University graduate who had been in post since 
1919. The article noted that when the school opened there had been problems in 
obtaining adequate managers, who tended to come from university and lacked 
practical experience, or had risen from the colliery but did not always possess 
sufficient technical knowledge. As a contrast the School was now an established route 
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to progress in the profession and it proudly presented a long list of graduates who held 
management positions in Warwickshire and in other coalfields. 
Professional Mine Management 
In 1851 Inspector Charles Morton railed against the use of butties to run mines. 
He claimed; ‘Under this system supervision by the coalmaster of his bailiff is lax and 
irregular and by degrees the butty becomes almost the sole controller of the colliery 
and those who work therein.’119 He calls then uneducated men with little capital ‘to 
whom remuneration derived from the proprietors on the one hand and the labourers 
on the other, is the chief object, regardless often of the permanent welfare of both.’120 
As a contract could be terminated at short notice, the butty had little incentive in 
incurring the cost of adequate ventilation or maintaining the shaft and tram roads. 
Tools and timber were grudgingly supplied and the responsibility for safety was 
delegated to the individual miner.
121
 Morton also noted the preponderance of butties 
who owned tavern and shops where miners were forced to spend their money at 
inflated prices.
122
 Owners were reluctant to abandon this system of management 
which allowed them to receive their financial rewards while standing back from the 
process and responsibilities of production. However increasingly legislation forced 
them to take accountability for those employed in their pits and the higher financial 
demands of the deeper pits were beyond the resources of a butty.
123
 In 1879 Evans, 
the Midland Inspector, told the Royal Commission that the new larger mines could not 
have been run by the mine management previously in place.
124
 Both economic and 
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legislative considerations conspired to make the butty increasingly anachronistic in all 
but the smallest pits.
125
 
In the Colliery Guardian of December 1867 W. Smyth, a Mine Inspector and later 
president of the Geological Society, called for an increased professionalism in the 
mining industry. ‘As long as we find collieries managed by a shopkeeper or joiner, or 
half educated young gentleman, a nephew of the owner, we must expect that accidents 
will occur which would be preventable under better auspices.’126 When certified 
managers had first been proposed in 1861 the same newspaper had dismissed it as 
‘too childish for serious discussion.’127 In 1872 owners and managers were for the 
first time liable for dereliction of duty for non compliance of colliery rules with a 
penalty of £20. The Act of 1872 also demanded the certification of mine managers, 
and the 1887 Act, extended this to a second class certificate for undermanagers. The 
examination of managers varied in each district and in 1881 Midland Inspector Evans 
complained to the Royal Commission that he felt that some areas had made it too 
easy.
128
 It was not until 1911 that a national board was established ending the practice 
of local boards setting their own examinations and enforcing a national standard for 
certification.
129
 In the Midland district candidates for either exam had to be twenty-
three years old with five years mining experience.
130
 In 1903 two years scientific and 
practical study at an accredited college or institution could count for two of the five 
years. Candidates had to sign to keep exam papers secret and at the time of the exam 
could not use any books or notes. Indeed exam paper exemplars were not published 
until 1910 and 1911 in the case of Warwickshire. All had to provide four documents. 
The first was a paid up authorisation from the Secretary of State, costing 2/- for the 
first class certificate and 1/- for the second. Secondly, a signed declaration from the 
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candidate and a witness, that they had the necessary five years’ experience. Thirdly, a 
character reference called a ‘certificate of sobriety and good conduct’ signed by a 
clergyman, minister or magistrate, and a second separate certificate signed by two 
‘responsible members of the district – names and addresses supplied.’ Lastly they 
needed a certificate of ability and experience from their employer, or two ‘competent 
others’ such as mine engineers. The four county Midland district set up the 
examination centre at Nottingham and the two days of exams were held in October. 
This was increased to three days in 1888 with the inclusion of the undermanager’s 
certificate. The ten man board who appointed examiners and set subjects, consisted of 
three mine owners, three mine engineers, three unnamed ‘others’ who were not 
owners or engineers, and the Inspector of Mines. 
In 1911 the newly created thirty-one coalfields Midland and Southern district 
transferred the exam centre to Birmingham University and held the exams in April.
131
 
In both cases figures are given for the district and Warwickshire’s entrants are not 
differentiated. Between 1873 and 1912 693 sat the managers exam and 296 were 
successful, a pass rate of 42 per cent. Usually around seventeen a year took the exam, 
but this was as high as forty-six in the initial three years. Between 1888 and 1912 
1,137 sat the undermanager’s exam with 573 gaining success, a pass rate of almost 50 
per cent. The annual average was forty-five, but as with the first class certificate, there 
was an initial rush of eighty-three for the first three years. The manager’s first class 
exam was in eight parts: 
1. Writing on the 1887 Coal Mines Act, and the Special Rules of the district 
in which the candidate resides. 
2. Arithmetic. 
3. The winning and working of mines of coal, ironstone, shale and fire clay. 
4. Machinery. 
5. Ventilation. 
6. Safety of mines and the opening of works closed for a period. 
7. Surveying and plans.  
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8. First aid, St John’s Ambulance. 
The undermanager’s second class certificate had seven parts: 
1. Writing on the 1887 Act and special rules 
2. Reading. 
3. Arithmetic. 
4. Use of anemometer, barometer and water gauge.132 
5. Ventilation and the use of safety lamps. 
6. The practical working of mines. 
7. First aid, St John’s Ambulance. 
The 1911 Act extended the principle of state certification to include deputies, 
examiners, and firemen.
133
 This brought the lower tiers of management under similar 
State control. The late 19
th
 century had seen an increasing domination of the industry 
by larger firms with Church noting that between 1895 and 1913 the average colliery 
size rose from 235 to 410 underground employees.
134
 There was a growing tendency 
to employ professional firemen as shot firers, a task previously undertaken by the 
hewers. The terms ‘deputy’ and ‘examiner’ tended to be used interchangeably 
depending upon the tradition of the particular coalfield, but Ackers noted a subtle 
distinction that had developed. The deputy was employed on the coal producing day 
shift whereas those who performed these duties on other shifts were known as 
examiners and received a lower rate of pay.
135
 The 1887 Act had allowed for 
‘competent persons’ to make mine inspections and assist managers with their duties, 
the standard of competency left to the manager to decide. The 1911 Act now 
demanded a certificate of competency, hearing and eye tests every five years, an 
inspection of each working district twice a shift where previously there had been one, 
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and that a deputy should be employed full time on their statutory duties except when 
involved in shot firing or measuring work. 
The appointment of Mine Inspectors who were required to publish annual reports 
helped disseminate information. This was assisted in 1858 with the establishment of 
the Colliery Guardian which reproduced whole or summaries of these reports, 
together with a wealth of detail concerning winning and working techniques. Mine 
engineers began to band together to promote good practice. The first was the 1852 
North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers,
136
 but these were 
joined by institutes in South Wales in 1864, South Staffordshire and East 
Worcestershire in 1867, Midland in 1869, Chesterfield and Midland in 1871 and 
North Staffordshire in 1872. In 1889 the Federation of Institutes could claim 1,239 
137
 
members, rising to 3,277 in 1914. The Federation began publishing its Transactions 
from its foundation year of 1889. Church calculates that by 1890 there was a mine 
engineer in every colliery, and two for every thousand colliers, rising to three by 
1900. Reflecting the spread of new technology an Association of Mining Electrical 
Engineers was created in Manchester in 1909.
138
 Kitteringham believed that together: 
they ‘helped establish a collective identity among engineers that resulted in a 
commitment to their profession where previously their commitment might only have 
been to their own mining operation and themselves.’139 This was apparent in 1890 
when the Colliery Guardian reported the President of the National Association of 
Colliery Managers as saying that the first duty of a manager was to provide safety for 
the men he employed.
140
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Yet the lack of suitable educational facilities continued to frustrate progress. The 
London based Royal School of Mines was established in 1837 to offer instruction in 
Mining Science. It was renamed in 1851 the School of Mines and Science but its 
influence was limited. Between 1855 and 1895 it produced only 500 associates, only 
10 per cent of which entered the coal industry as managers or mine engineers. This 
failure led to many to call for the establishment of Schools of Mining in the mining 
districts, but progress was slow. It was not until 1880 that leading coalowners 
endowed a Chair of Mining at Armstrong College of Physical Science at Newcastle 
and within a few years this had overtaken the Government School of Mines as the 
main source of mine engineers.
141
 In 1882 Sheffield had established an evening 
institute, appointing a Professor of Mining in 1890 and a Department of Mining and 
Metallurgy in 1910. Birmingham University established a Professor of Mining in 
1883 to head a Department of Coalmining and Colliery Management, but it lapsed 
through lack of funds. It was revived in 1902 under Professor Redmayne, a graduate 
from Newcastle and a future Chief Inspector of Mines, to train mine engineers and 
managers in practical mining experience and relevant scientific theory. By then there 
were professors of mining in Glasgow, Cardiff, Manchester and Leeds and Durham 
University offered a degree in mining. In 1907 the Royal School of Mines (the prefix 
‘Royal’ had been added in 1863) merged with City and Guilds College and the Royal 
College of Science to become Imperial College of the University of London. Such 
slow progress compares unfavourably with Britain's European competitors. In 
Germany a state run Freiberg Mining Academy had been established in 1776 in 
Saxony. It was located in the heart of the mining area and acted as a centre for a 
network of mining schools in each mining district.
142
 The model had been copied by 
France in 1783
143
 and enshrined in the Napoleonic decrees of 1810.
144
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Sir Richard Redmayne
145
 progressed from the ranks of colliery management to be 
a professor of mining and then the first HM Chief Inspector of Mines. In his 
autobiography he outlined how he devised the schemes of work and list of equipment 
required for his new Department of Mining at Birmingham University.
146
 Appointed 
in 1902 there was then only the London School of Mines and Newcastle University as 
national examples of higher education so he was encouraged to travel to the USA and 
Canada where Schools of Mining had a long tradition. He visited most of them and 
discovered that in America the emphasis in the laboratory, the classroom and the field 
was upon the actual conditions the students would encounter in their work. In 
America managers were expected to hold a diploma from a technical college whereas 
in Britain a system of pupillage persisted. He also noted what he termed the ‘ruthless’ 
approach of American mine engineers. 
It does not matter how new or how imposing the plant, mining or 
otherwise, which he has. If anything more efficient, ie by which he can 
secure more money, comes along, down comes the existing plant and away 
to the scrap heap it goes: no one will buy it, no one wants it, for they are 
all moving in the same direction.
147
 
Redmayne was impressed with the success of the system that stressed the practical 
application of scientific theory and remembered the constant comment that Britain 
would need to adopt American mining practice to remain internationally competitive. 
On his return to Birmingham he encouraged his students to spend at least a year in a 
colliery before embarking upon degree study. The first two years were to be spent 
studying pure science and the third year on the application of the scientific knowledge 
acquired. Any specialist research was left for post graduate study. Each summer 
vacation he held a school of practical mining to allow students to see methods in 
actual use which had been described in the classroom, and to give them practice in 
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land surveying and in geological survey and mapping. The teaching and equipment at 
the School of Mining were described in the Transactions of the Institution of Mining 
and Metallurgy.
148
 Redmayne noted that ‘this scheme has, with various modifications, 
been almost universally adopted since by most of the great technical universities.’149 
His book with Bulman, Colliery Working and Management first published in 1896 
became the standard text for aspiring managers and his five volumes of Modern 
Practice in Mining is a comprehensive account of how mines were run in the inter-
war years. In 1906 he served on the committee that studied the economic effects of 
introducing an Eight Hour Day for miners and in 1908 he resigned his professorship 
to become the first Chief Inspector of Mines. In that year he became Chairman of the 
Royal Commission appointed to study the causes and prevention of accidents in 
mines and as HM Chief Inspector of Mines he was one of the two principal architects 
of the comprehensive Coal Mines Act of 1911.
150
 
In 1904 the Institute of Mining Engineers held their AGM at Birmingham 
University where Redmayne read a paper on his Mining Department outlining 
schemes of work and listing facilities.
151
 The University attracted three types of 
student; the irregular students who studied part of the first year programme, the 
diploma students who took the two year course and degree students who took the 
three year course. There were regular visits to local collieries on a Saturday and an 
annual Summer School. In 1904 the Summer School had visited the clay and iron 
working in the North-East of England and in 1905 the gold, manganese, lead and slate 
mines of Wales. The Mining Department consisted of a large museum of various 
colliery machinery, a budding library, a draughting room for surveying and drawing, a 
classroom for advanced students, two laboratories and an experimental mine.
152
 The 
meeting attracted representatives from other academic institutions offering mining 
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qualifications including an American from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and many published praise and criticism of the Birmingham scheme. Professor 
Hardwick of Sheffield compiled a table of the twelve British institutions that offered a 
mining diploma outlining subjects taught and schemes of work.
153
 (see Table 6:2) 
Although he observed that ‘the weight attached to certain subjects differs a great 
deal’154 there is a consistency in the courses. Most had an entrance examination with 
the exception of Birmingham and Durham who both required evidence of 
matriculation in science, and Sheffield had a preliminary year. The diploma course 
usually took two to three years but this rose to four years at Wigan and a possible five 
years at Sheffield. Birmingham, Durham and Glasgow offered a degree course and 
Sheffield an Associateship in Metallurgy which it described as equivalent to an 
honours science degree. All involved laboratory work, visits to collieries and evidence 
of employment at a colliery before the award could be obtained. The subjects studied 
were usually a foundation year of applied mathematics, physics and chemistry, 
geology, surveying and mechanical drawing. The second year included courses on 
mining, metallurgy, engineering and electrical engineering with Wigan and Sheffield 
offering an ambulance course. Oxford was the only institution to put French or 
German translation as one of their four compulsory subjects but Latin or a modern 
language was included in a number of entrance examinations. The American 
representative succinctly pointed out that in his country the professional journals 
provided translations of any relevant foreign mining research. 
The most telling criticism came from the three Sheffield representatives. Ordinary 
miners who aspired to colliery management could not afford the time or fees to follow 
the academic route Their University had developed close links with the providers of 
local mining education and offered a part time evening and Saturday afternoon access 
to courses. In the past six years they had trained sixty-one practical men in the skills 
of teaching and a further one hundred and forty-three had taken the Saturday 
programme on electricity in mines. In its thirteen year existence some 10,700 
Derbyshire and West Riding mining students had achieved various qualifications with 
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ten day students and fifteen evening students gaining the degree.
155
 Redmayne’s 
rejoinder that the local authorities provided excellent mining courses could not hide 
the fact that the University offered nothing to working miners.
156
 
Table 6:2 Institutes of Higher Education approved by the Home Secretary for the 
Diploma of Mining 1904 
University of Birmingham 
University College Bristol 
Armstrong College: University of Durham 
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow and West of Scotland Technical College 
University of Leeds 
Royal School of Mines, London 
University of Oxford 
University College Sheffield 
University College South Wales 
Wigan Mining and Technology College 
University of Cambridge: course in preparation 
Source: Professor Hardwick of Sheffield, in R. Redmayne The Mining Department of 
the University of Birmingham: Institute of Mining Engineers, London 1905 p24-33. 
Education was the passport to success and William Garside Phillips, manager and 
owner of Ansley Hall Colliery, was an example of what a working miner could 
achieve. However if the ‘carrot’ did not work owners were prepared to turn to the 
‘stick’ of the law courts to enforce adherence to safety regulation. 
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Prosecution 
The introduction of General and Special Rules in 1855 brought with it the 
prospect of punishment for those who ignored or disobeyed them.
157
 Trade Unions 
were unhappy with the fact that miners’ offences could be punished by imprisonment 
whereas owners merely faced a fine,
158
 and that some owners even interpreted Special 
Rules to include compulsory attendance at Sunday service or shaving before reporting 
to work.
159
 Although these early anomalies were removed the Act continued to be 
applied unfairly. The mine inspectors reported the prosecution of a number of 
Warwickshire owners. In 1863 Wood and Greenwood, owners of Tame Valley 
Colliery, were fined 21/- for neglecting to give notice of both a gas explosion and the 
opening of a new colliery. In 1890 the manager of Griff Colliery was fined £20 with 
two guineas costs for allowing boys under sixteen to move railway wagons. This 
followed the inquest of a fifteen year old crushed at the buffers. In 1892 Mr Heap, 
owner of Bedworth Railway Colliery, was fined £5 with 16/- costs for failure to 
forward a plan of an abandoned mine and in 1901 the manager at Baddesley Colliery 
was fined a total of £17 and the undermanager £5:10:0 for allowing fire damp to build 
up in the mine and gunpowder to be used in an explosion. Finally in 1907 the owner 
of Kingsbury Colliery was fined £1:4:0 for employing a thirteen year old in the mine. 
The boy had been injured underground and it was found that he had worked thirteen 
consecutive night shifts. There were thus five prosecutions of Warwickshire 
coalowners or their surrogates in the period of study.
160
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Table 6:3 Prosecutions of Warwickshire Miners for Breaches of Colliery Regulations 
1895 to 1913. 
Collieries Numbers Collieries Numbers 
Griff 
Newdigate 
Kingsbury 
Tamworth 
Baddesley 
Stockingford 
Exhall 
Collycroft 
Wyken 
Hockley Hall 
32 
23 
21 
17 
14 
13 
12 
12 
9 
8 
Skey 
Sir Alfred Hickman 
Stanley 
Morris and Shaw 
Pooley Hall 
Arley 
Merry and Cunningham 
Ansley Hall 
Glascote 
8 
7 
7 
6 
6 
4 
4 
3 
2 
Source: Annual Mine Inspector Reports 1895 to 1913. 
Prosecution of men was not unusual 
161
 but the passing of the 1888 Special Rules 
allowed this to be more formalised. The mine inspector began publishing these 
prosecutions in 1892 listing the date of the offence, occupation of the accused, the 
offence, the rule broken and the fine and costs awarded. It was not until 1895 that the 
name of the company was given, allowing Warwickshire to be disseminated from the 
Midland District.
162
 Between 1895 and 1913 there were two hundred and eight 
Warwickshire miners prosecuted in some twenty collieries. These are shown in Table 
6:3.
163
 The highest individual case is Newdigate, which prosecuted fourteen miners in 
1908. Pooley Hall Colliery prosecuted thirteen men in 1901 for absenteeism following 
a month when 20 per cent of the workforce had committed this offence but this was 
for breach of contract and not for an infringement of colliery rules.
164
 Offences were 
listed under eleven headings: ventilation; safety lamps; smoking; explosives; 
timbering; tubs; electricity; disobeying orders, animals; intoxication and 
miscellaneous. The three most numerous, all around 20 per cent, were smoking, 
timbering and tubs, with disobeying orders 13 per cent and explosives 12 per cent the 
only other significant categories. Most fines were around £1 including costs, and only 
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 For example Charity Colliery in Bedworth was particularly harsh. The Nuneaton Chronicle lists 
prosecution of Charity men 29 November; 6 December and 13 December 1878. 
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 Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1895-1910; and Midland and Southern 
Division 1911-1913. 
163
 For the development of the collieries see Chapter Two. 
164
 A similar breach of contract occurred in 1913 when Stockingford Colliery prosecuted 20 men for 
‘taking holidays’ claiming that on average 25 men a day committed this offence. Nuneaton Observer, 7 
February 1913.Atherstone Petty Sessions, Nuneaton Observer, 1 November 1901. 
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seventeen were £2 and above. There appears to be little consistency in fines with 
much depending upon the whim of the magistrate. The highest fine of £5 ‘without 
costs’ was awarded against two Stanley Colliery holers in 1909 that holed fifteen feet 
without sprags. A third was fined £3:7:6 for holing only twelve feet without sprags. 
Six of the £2 plus fines were in the timbering category. The third highest fine of 
£4:17:6 were against a Newdigate colliery dataller who assaulted the manager. Four 
of these £2 fines were in the smoking category, but why they should be more serious 
than the other thirty-eight smoking offenders is not clear. Only eight of the 
prosecutions were dismissed and only one led to a custodial sentence. In 1903 a 
Morris and Shaw Birch Coppice horse driver was sentenced to fourteen days hard 
labour for ripping the tongue out of a horse.
165
 
On average sixteen Warwickshire miners were prosecuted every year and perhaps 
a closer analysis of offences will give a clearer understanding of why this was so. Of 
the eight ventilation offences, three were for breaking open a door, two were for 
failure to close a door and one was described as cutting off ventilation. Half of the 
eight safety lamp offences were concerned with possessing an unlocked lamp or a 
device to unlock. The others were breaking a safety lamp, lighting a candle in a 
heading, being asleep in charge of a safety lamp, and swinging a pick within nine 
inches of a lamp. The forty-two smoking offences included nineteen possessing 
matches, nine possessing cigarettes, seven possessing pipe and matches and seven for 
smoking.
166
 The forty-two timbering offences are more homogeneous. Insufficient 
sprags account for twenty-four, with setting timber too far eight, and not setting props, 
five. Three were for allowing men to work under coal not spragged and two for 
knocking out props without the use of ringer and chain. The forty-three tub offences 
cover the whole area of safety. Ten were for riding in tubs with one case of allowing 
men to ride illegally, and two cases of getting out of a moving train. There were eight 
cases of walking when the train was moving, six of going in front of tubs and one of 
                                                 
165
 Statistics tabulated from Annual Report of the Inspector of Mines: Midland Division 1895-1910; and 
Midland and Southern Division 1911-1913. 
166
 Miners had nowhere to leave their pipe or cigarettes that they smoked on their way to work and had 
‘hiding places’ outside the colliery. It is easy to see how simple forgetfulness or rushing when late 
could lead to an oversight. 
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allowing the use of a dangerous plane. Three were cited for neglecting to use lockers, 
three for neglecting to use stop blocks and one for neglecting to use the safety barrier. 
Two failed to couple tubs, two did not set tubs properly and one for putting a tub on 
the rope when he lacked the authority to do so. There were also two cases of not 
reporting a breach of the rules. There were no electricity offences, but twenty-seven 
disobeying orders. There were four cases of disobeying a deputy, and one of failing to 
inspect workings when ordered to do so. There were five cases of passing through or 
taking down a fence, two not reporting gas and one of failing to build enough pack. 
Four men were cited for taking their pick on the cage, three for refusing to leave a 
cage and two for the suicidal act of getting on a moving cage. Finally, two entered 
districts where they were not working, one man was found sleeping and there were 
two cases of assault. There were seven cases of animal cruelty, six for hitting a horse 
and one for tearing the tongue from a horse that refused to move. There were but three 
cases of intoxication, all in the north of the county. A Tamworth miner stayed three 
hours in the pub neglecting his boiler, a Baddesley man was found drunk in charge of 
a boiler and a Morris and Shaw miner went to work drunk. In the miscellaneous 
section, two were employed underground longer than permitted, one man put a tree in 
a manhole and one was guilty of walking on the sidings. There were only seven 
prosecutions for animal cruelty in eighteen years, but a table produced in 1912 
perhaps gives a clearer picture. Inspector Johnston reported that there were 594 horses 
employed on the Warwickshire coalfield. In that year seven died from injury and two 
from disease, and a further twenty-eight had to be destroyed because of injury, six 
from disease and two from old age Thus forty-five horses or 7.5 per cent of the total 
were destroyed in the year. A further five were injured by ill treatment and one 
hundred and twenty-three injured at work. This means more than 29 per cent of 
Warwickshire horses were injured or killed in 1912.
167
 
The analysis above may give an insight into what managers considered the most 
important breaches of mine safety. Of the three main offences timbering and tubs are 
both reflected in the major causes of mine fatalities yet it is more difficult to explain 
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a horse was seventy times more likely to be killed in a colliery than a man. 
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why smoking should command similar attention. There was not a single Warwickshire 
fatality attributed to smoking and its contribution to the inevitable respiratory 
problems of older miners was not then understood. The repercussions of breaches in 
the rules fell unequally upon managers and the men. In 1911 the Chief Inspector of 
Mines gave a summary of prosecutions for that year. There were sixty-one mine 
owners or managers prosecuted with twenty-five convictions; a conviction rate of 41 
per cent. There were 1,408 mines prosecuted with 1,339 convictions; a conviction rate 
of 95 per cent.
168
 How effective prosecution was as a tool to reduce accidents is also 
open to debate. South Wales had the highest incidence of prosecutions yet fatalities 
there were always above the national average. 
The use of education and the law courts were dissimilar approaches with the 
common aim of reducing accidents in mines. When accidents resulted in a number of 
injured and dead they would need to be recovered and this was particularly difficult if 
the accident was the product of a gas explosion. The next section will reveal that the 
technology available to rescuers was not equal to their bravery for most of our period 
and that it was only in the years before the First World War that Britain at last made 
meaningful provision for mine rescue. 
Mine Rescue 
The Baddesley mining disaster of 1882 
169
 typifies all that was good and bad in 
the old system of mine rescue. Nine died from suffocation following a fire in a 
wooden conduit that was meant to take the smoke from a newly installed underground 
steam pumping engine to the surface. A further twenty-three would be rescuers died in 
a gas explosion. This rescue attempt which included the Baddesley owner and all the 
management team was led by Reuben Smallman, owner of Stockingford Colliery and 
a skilled mining engineer. One of the rescuers that died was Roland Till, who worked 
in the neighbouring Birch Coppice Colliery. The survivors were joined on the surface 
by the consultant mining engineer from Derby, two mine inspectors and the owners or 
managers from Bedworth Colliery, Ansley Hall Colliery, Hawkesbury Colliery, 
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Amington Colliery and Pooley Hall Colliery. When the decision was taken to seal the 
mine, the manager of Bedworth Charity Colliery took charge of this task. 
Management and men of the Warwickshire coalfield had answered the distress call of 
a sister colliery, but despite creditable leadership, they simply did not possess the 
equipment to tackle the chocking smoke and poisonous gas. 
To be effective mine rescue requires a self-contained breathing apparatus, a safety 
lamp that can be used in an explosive and oxygen deficient environment (that is 
electric), training in the use of the equipment and competence in administering first 
aid.
170
 There were a number of attempts to develop a breathing apparatus and in the 
year before the Baddesley disaster Henry Fleuss gave a demonstration of his design to 
the Chesterfield and Derbyshire Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers.
171
 
Without an adequate source of illumination the breathing apparatus could not be used 
and although a pioneer in its development, Britain lagged behind Europe in its 
deployment. By 1901 France and Austria made its accessibility mandatory and it was 
available though still voluntary in the mines of Germany.
172
 In 1908 Redmayne 
presented the annual prizes at the Warwickshire School of Mining and used the 
occasion to speak on mine rescue. He noted that in Russia, Germany and France the 
training of miners in rescue stations was compulsory but that in Britain it was being 
introduced piecemeal. 
173
 
In 1906 a student at Birmingham University School of Mining won the prize for 
the best article to be published in the Mining Society Journal.
174
 In it he attempted to 
cost the provision of life saving equipment to be used by a rescue team following an 
explosion. His requirements for a four man team was 
                                                 
170
 A good summary is J. Ritson, ‘Mine Rescue’, In Mining Association of Great Britain Historical 
Review of Coal Mining. (London, 1924) pp. 229-52. 
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 R. Foreggel, ‘Development of Mine Rescue and the underwater breathing apparatus appliances of 
Henry Fleuss’, Journal of the Social History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 1 (January 1974) 317-30. 
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 D. Kitteringham, 'Health and Safety in the Collieries of the East Midlands 1850 to 1911’, 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2005) pp. 110-14. 
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 Nuneaton Observer, 2 October 1908. 
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- 4 Fleuss appliances at £20 each £80 
- 4 Fleuss safety lamps at £14 each £56 
- 4 oxygen bottles; at £4:10 a bottle and 15/- oxygen £21 
- Tools, brandy and stretchers £16 
- Picks and timbering, supplied by the colliery - 
For an outlay of £167 a colliery or number of collieries connected by telephone could 
obtain rudimentary cover. The man judging the essays was Redmayne who in 1908 
became the first HM Chief Inspector of Mines. 
 
Illustration 6:1 An Advertisement for Rescue Apparatus (1915) 
Source: Advertisement Birmingham University Mining Society Journal February 
1915. 
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In 1910 a mine rescue station was established at Birmingham University ‘for the 
South Staffordshire and Midland district’ and they held an exhibition of equipment for 
mine owners and managers.
175
 It was not until 1911 that the government established a 
professional response team known as a rescue brigade.
176
 There was to be one brigade 
in mines of less than 250 men, two brigades in mines of 350 to 500 men, three 
brigades in mines of 500 to 800 men, and four brigades in mines of over 800 men. 
Each brigade was to consist of at least five men, and led by a man known as a captain. 
All were to be employed at the mine and selected on their underground knowledge, 
coolness in a crisis and powers of endurance. As well as being physically fit, they had 
to posses St John Ambulance first aid qualifications. They were to receive training in 
the reading of mine maps, the use and construction of breathing apparatus, the 
properties and detection of poisonous and inflammable gases, and the appliances used 
in mine rescue and recovery. Each station had to possess fifteen sets of breathing 
apparatus; twenty electric hand pumps, each capable of giving light for four hours; 
four oxygen reviving apparatus; a first aid box; cages of birds and mice,
177
 and a car 
had to be kept on permanent standby. 
In 1912 a few months before the Act came into operation the lecturer of the 
Warwickshire School of Mining gave a talk on mine rescue to a meeting of the 
Warwickshire Mining Students Association. In his introduction to the lecture Garside 
Phillips stated that ‘there was scarcely a single person in the Midland District that had 
any practical experience of rescue equipment.’178 Rescue brigades had been sent ‘at 
the owner’s expense’ to train at Birmingham University from where Mr McTrusty had 
obtained a set of equipment weighing thirty pounds and the students tried in on. In 
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 Small animals breathe more quickly than humans and thus succumb to gas before miners and are a 
visible sign that gas is present. When in 1911 an article in the Nuneaton Observer suggested that a 
modern safety lamp could detect black damp (carbon dioxide) and white damp, the lecturer of the 
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Warwickshire a central rescue station was established at Wilnecote colliery to serve 
the smaller collieries in the northern area of Warwickshire, and a training centre was 
set up at Haunchwood Colliery in Nuneaton utilising buildings from old brickworks 
that had closed in 1884. The payment for the centre was funded on a percentage of the 
respective outputs of the collieries that used it, and in return the centre provided 
apparatus, equipment and training, carried out in an old brick kiln. The canary farm of 
over 200 birds for all local pits was situated at Haunchwood and an early photograph 
showing the graduation of the first six man brigade reveals that it employed a full 
time trainer.
179
 Before 1914 the centre had its own ambulance funded by local owners 
and men, a great improvement on the bath chair that had been used to transport 
injured miners home.
180
 By 1913 further training centres had been established at the 
Bedworth collieries of Charity and Exhall where they had already repaid their 
investment. In May 1912 a serious fire had occurred at Exhall Colliery and although 
no one was injured the rescue team using their apparatus were able to tackle the fire 
and save the pit from closure.
181
 As early as 1910 Inspector Johnston reported that 
mine engineers were working in an experimental mine established at the Birmingham 
University Department of Mining and were developing through practical tests the type 
of apparatus needed in rescue.
182
 In 1912 he gave the results of exams held at the 
university, which served both the Black Country and Shropshire collieries as well as 
Warwickshire. The full fireman’s certificate had been obtained by 827; the certificate 
for gas testing and hearing only, 942; the certificate for hearing only, 114 and the 
certificate for air measurement and hearing only, two. There had been 51 failures. 
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 In 1908 the Inquest on a Griff stallman killed by a fall of coal from a roof bump were critical of the 
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Inspector Johnston could report; ‘Certified firemen are now employed at practically 
every mine in the district.’183 
This chapter has charted the development of the Mining Records Office, the 
establishment of the Mine Inspectorate, the move to professional management of 
mines, the feeble attempts to foster the education of miners, the vigorous use of the 
law to enforce safety measures and the emergence of a practical system of mine 
rescue. But how successful was the State in reducing accidents in mines? 
The Limitations of State Intervention 
The progress of legislation had an undeniable impact upon safety in mines. The 
call to deposit old plans of abandoned mines grew from the best practice established 
in the North-East of England and evolved from the voluntary system of the 1840’s to 
the compulsion imposed from 1872. The appointment of Mine Inspectors and their 
increasing numbers and powers came initially from calls following a number of 
horrific gas explosions of the 1840’s that claimed many lives. Similarly the 
requirement that mines should have two shafts was the direct result of the Hartley 
Colliery disaster of 1862 where over two hundred suffocated because their single 
shaft access was blocked. A series of Select Committees and Royal Commissions into 
accidents in mines recommended further innovation. The certification of mine 
managers in 1872, extended to undermanagers in 1888, was again an attempt to 
impose best practice upon all. Research revealed the necessity to use safety lamps in 
gassy seams, the use of tested and approved patent explosives in dry dusty seams 
from 1896 and from 1905 a code for the growing use of electricity. Yet accidents 
remained persistently high and would not significantly decline until the late twentieth 
century.
184
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The reason for this decline in the 20
th
 century has been summarised by Habibi as 
an increase in systematic research, the widespread dissemination of safety education 
for miners and the adoption of ATM or Advanced Technology Mining.
185
 The Safety 
in Mines Research Board was established in 1913 and began to have an impact in the 
inter-war years. Explosions decreased due to a stricter control of permitted explosives 
and improvement in ventilation which eventually led to statutory requirement in 
respect of the quality of mine air. The testing of electrical equipment to a flameproof 
level also prevented the ignition of gas. The nationalization of the industry in 1947 led 
to a programme to train all miners in basic safety procedure with further specific 
training for certain types of collier. The National Safety Committee from the 1960’s 
promoted inter-colliery rivalry by providing cash prizes and trophies that rewarded 
safety attainment in different sized collieries.
186
 The ATM movement from the 1970’s 
attempted to remove the miner from danger areas by introducing remote control or 
automatic operation. Deaths fell below a thousand in 1933, below five hundred in 
1955 and below one hundred in 1970.
187
 It is not realistic to suggest that such 
measures could have been introduced earlier. The research of the nineteenth century, 
often promoted by enlightened employers, required the injection of government 
finance for prolonged existence. The training initiative of the 1950’s came in the era 
of nationalization when a single industry employer had the benefit of a more literate 
workforce that was required to remain at school until the age of fifteen. The 
technology of the ATM movement was simply not available. 
It appears somewhat churlish of Mills to accuse the 19
th
 century State of not 
possessing the values and beliefs prevalent in a society a century later. As a 
burgeoning democracy slowly expanding the parameters of power, parliament needed 
to bring that electorate with it especially in the latter period as well as responding to 
their concerns and aspirations. The constant trade union demands that the State should 
take over the everyday safety supervision in the mines was never realistic as the cost 
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of employing the necessary vast army of officials was prohibitive. Yet the coalowners’ 
assertion that as they provided capital for their enterprises they should have unfettered 
control of their collieries became increasingly anachronistic. In theory the 1850 Act 
was a temporary measure that needed to be renewed in 1855 and again in 1860 and 
Morrah claimed that the real function of the new Inspectors was ‘to collect facts as to 
the sources of danger rather than to compel preventative or remedial measures.’188 It 
took time for the seed of State intervention to germinate but in less than twenty years 
they had moved from prohibiting the employment of children in mines to imposing 
good practice through legislation. It took that period to gather the necessary data to 
bolster argument and advances in science and technology to provide practical 
solutions to known problems. Even the influential Colliery Guardian of 1861 had 
dismissed the need for qualified managers yet came to support their introduction in 
the Act of 1872. When science failed to prove the influence of coal dust in mine 
explosions in the 1880’s the problem lay unaddressed for over a decade, yet even 
when they did prove that poorly illuminated safety lamp mines were the cause of 
miners’ nystagmus, it required the technological provision of superior electric lighting 
before that disease could be tackled. The Safety in Mines Research Board was only 
established in 1913 and the government could be criticised in not funding scientific 
and technological advances at an earlier date. But yet again this arose from the 
findings of a lengthy Royal Commission and protracted parliamentary debate that 
created the climate for change. Perhaps critics are guilty of attributing to the State too 
much power over the economy. Just as the government of today is powerless to 
prevent the export of manufacturing jobs to low labour cost Asian economies the 
government of the 19
th
 century had to keep one eye on the international 
competiveness of the British coal industry, especially when a third of production was 
exported. 
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Conclusions 
In 1893 the lecturer of the Warwickshire School of Mining gave an interview to 
the Nuneaton Observer. He claimed that in the expanding coalfield men were 
recruited from the fields, brickyards and stone quarries and managers imported from 
outside the district. As the county possessed fewer ‘born miners’ many men were 
‘incapable of placing a proper interpretation upon the rules under which they work’ 
and were designed for their safety.
1
 While it is difficult to argue with Mr Beales’ 
assertion that a better trained and educated workforce would have a greater 
understanding of the dangers that surrounded them, his implied conclusion that 
Warwickshire would suffer a higher incidence of accidents than elsewhere proved to 
be erroneous. From an examination of accident fatalities from 1850 through to 1913 
this study has shown that paradoxically the 1890’s was the safest period for the 
Warwickshire miner.
2
 From a zenith in the 1880’s caused by the Baddesley disaster of 
1882, fatalities fell in the county and were consistently below the national average. 
The areas of danger did change. While underground haulage deaths remained 
consistently around a quarter of the total, shaft deaths which approached nearly a third 
of fatalities in the 1850’s then rapidly declined as cage winding replaced the skip and 
lifting fences were applied universally around the pits. With the exception of the 
1880’s when gas explosion replaced the fall of coal as the major cause of death, it was 
a minor cause of fatality reflecting Warwickshire’s relatively few gassy coal seams. 
Surface deaths were insignificant until the 1880’s when the increasing adoption of 
steam locomotives to replace horse drawn transport led to more banksmen being 
crushed by wagons. With the exception noted above, falls of coal was the greatest 
cause of fatalities and with the move to deeper pits in the 1890’s it became 
increasingly dominant and was approaching half of all deaths by 1913.
3
 Nevertheless 
the overall trend was to a decline in mining fatalities and the aim of this study has 
been to identify the contribution to this decline from the miner, the coalowner and the 
State. 
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From 1840 through to the 1870’s most Warwickshire miners were in the employ 
of butties who ran the pits on contract from the coalowners. The professional mine 
engineers known as viewers who were in charge of the collieries of the North-East 
and were the main source of recruitment for the new safety Mine Inspectorate, were 
critical of such men who placed so little regard on mine safety but Midland 
coalowners were reluctant to abandon a system which gave them the rewards without 
the responsibilities of production. Butties delegated considerations of safety to the 
men and given the short duration of many contracts, were reluctant to invest in safety 
measures that could impact their projected profits. Miners were fully aware that 
adherence to the orders of butties was necessary for sustained employment even if 
such obedience could have fatal consequences.
4
 An individual miner could have little 
impact on mine safety
5
 and a collective voice was only available with the 
establishment of the first Warwickshire miners’ union in 1872, but this had collapsed 
by 1880. It was therefore not until the creation of the WMA in the late 1880’s that any 
meaningful input into mine safety could be realised. 
 How far miners utilised this opportunity is difficult to measure. The masculine 
environment of the pit bred an acceptance of risk taking that undermined safety 
measures.
6
 Falls of coal were the greatest cause of death and although the 
overwhelming majority are attributed to the difficult Warwickshire geology of slips 
and bumps, the Annual Reports of the Mine Inspectors also contains numerous 
examples of experienced colliers who chose to ignore basic safety precautions. Some 
failed to set sufficient sprags or returned too soon to undercut coal that had failed to 
fall when sprags were removed. Others decided to remove sprags with a hammer 
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At Hawkesbury Colliery in 1850 and Victoria Colliery in 1853 men died because of butty insistence to 
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See for example A. Weyman, D. Clark and T. Cox, ‘Developing a Factor Model of Coalminers’ 
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rather than use the proscribed method of a ringer and chain.
7
 When we turn to 
underground haulage Warwickshire suffered twice the national death rate and 
although much of this can be attributed to the necessity to work on an incline of some 
thirty degrees, the mean age of twenty years old for haulage fatalities reflects the 
youth of many oncost workers. This corroborates Bedington’s findings that age was 
the most significant factor in accidents and that those in their teens and early twenties 
are most likely to fall victim.
8
 Yet mining families and their trade unions made little 
attempt to limit the employment of younger children in the mines.
9
 
 In the 1840’s the MAGB had campaigned for an Inspectorate which had the 
technical knowledge to approve the safety of underground workings and the power to 
enforce their findings. They were disappointed with the Mines Inspectorate that was 
created in 1850 which appeared to be little more than a servant of the coroners’ 
court
10
 and with the creation of the MNU in 1863 they renewed their campaign for a 
powerful Inspectorate that could rigorously enforce mine safety. Yet these optimistic 
aspirations were received with coolness in a society that was only slowly extending its 
political democratic base and coming to terms with the need to remove the most 
blatant abuses of uncontrolled capitalism. It was unlikely that any government would 
sanction the expense of employing a vast army of officials to inspect every seam 
worked in every colliery. Even when trade unions successfully applied political 
pressure the results could be unsatisfactory. In the late 1870’s the TUC sought redress 
for industrial accidents and succeeded in gaining the support of 300 parliamentary 
candidates for a bill, but the resulting Employers Liability Act of 1880 was not what 
they had hoped for.
11
 Around a quarter of employers simply ‘opted out’ of the act by 
increasing their contributions to accident relief funds and the rest turned to insurance 
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R. Bedington, 'The Growth and Awareness of Health and Safety at work 1780 to 1900’, (Unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Aston 1983) pp. 8-10. 
9 
As late as 1911 miners voted against a proposal to employ only boys of sixteen down the pits 
retaining the age of fourteen. MFGB Annual Conference Report (October 1911) p. 173. MRC 
MSS429MFGB 4/8. 
10 
See Petition of coalminers of Northumberland and Durham to House of Commons, Times, 3 January 
1853. 
11 
J. Benson, ‘Trade Unionism and the Use of the Law: English Coalminers’ Unions and Legal Redress 
for Industrial Accidents’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 3 (March 1997) p. 34. 
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to ensure heavy damages did not fall upon a single enterprise.
12
 The subsequent trade 
union campaign against contracting out and the use of insurance fell on deaf ears. At 
the local level the Warwickshire Miners’ Association was successful in the early 
1890’s in forcing two reluctant Conservative MPs to promise support for an Eight 
Hour Day from bank to bank, but an act was not passed until 1908.
13
 
 If the trade unions’ political campaign to gain concessions from the State was 
disappointing, their efforts to punish employers with poor safety records in the courts 
appeared a total failure. Benson could unearth only five cases where damages were 
awarded to miners under the common law 1860 to 1897 and only forty cases of 
compensation being paid under the Employers’ Liability Act 1881 to 1897.14 Defence 
lawyers were able to construct a number of apparently insurmountable barriers to 
scotch any compensation claim. Employers could point to the premium paid on wages 
for this dangerous work and assert that by signing a contract of employment miners 
were accepting that risk. The myth of ‘common employment’ meant that a worker was 
responsible for their actions and could not sue a fellow ‘worker’ then widely defined 
to include those in a supervisory role. It was also a common belief that most accidents 
were the cause of worker carelessness and that any contributory negligence nullified 
claims. Courts were also reluctant to place any additional burden on British industry 
that could have a debilitating influence on international competitiveness. Not many 
workers were prepared to follow this unpredictable legal path to industrial redress. 
High costs would inevitably eat into any compensation that was awarded and the 
souring of relations between employer and employee might jeopardise the small but 
assured payments that most owners were prepared to concede. Even if one accepts the 
MNU assertion that any measure of success must include the pressure on employers 
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Bartrip and Burman, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry (Oxford, 1983) pp. 172-3 and 213. 
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to sometimes make out of court settlements, it is difficult to view the policy as one of 
achievement.
15
 
 Yet it would be mistaken to dismiss trade union efforts as a failure. Benson 
asserts that; 
 there can be little doubt that in the clear and audible articulation of 
miners’ grievances on this issue the unions played a crucial role both in 
forcing accident compensation onto the legislative agenda and still more 
importantly, keeping it there.
16
 
In the 1840’s the government responded to popular pressure by appointing a 
succession of eminent scientists to investigate the recurring explosions in coal mines 
and it was their accumulative recommendations that led to the establishment of a 
safety Mine Inspectorate.
17
 With the revival of mining trade unions in the 1860’s the 
government established a Select Committee with specific instructions to examine 
miners’ grievances and the Coal Mine Act of 1872 was a direct consequence of this.18 
It has already been noted above that the growing numbers and spatial concentration of 
miners afforded them political influence and court cases even when lost were reported 
in both national and local newspapers. The emergence of powerful unions in the late 
1880’s with the resources to survive strikes gave them economic power that prompted 
the unprecedented government intervention to force a settlement in two national 
disputes.
19
 The focus of union policy may be open to criticism. Their campaign for the 
eight hour day was motivated more by the need to limit coal production to sustain its 
price and therefore wages
20
 although publicly they voiced the very real concern that 
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tired men were more prone to accidents.
21
 Similarly economic considerations 
prevented them applying a like concern to eliminate the dangerous practices of 
working double shifts
22
 or limiting the employment of young boys underground.
23
 Yet 
this does not negate their unquantifiable success in keeping the issue of mine safety in 
the public and political eye. 
 Coalowners too made a significant contribution to mine safety. It was their 
concerns regarding the use of safety lamps which provoked the first government 
Select Committee to inquire into accidents in mines in 1835.
24
 It was the coalowners 
who called for a national repository for abandonment plans that led to the creation of 
a Mines Record Office in 1840 and a coalowner dominated conference of 1853 which 
demanded general safety rules that should be applicable to every coal mine.
25
 It was 
coalowners who endowed a Chair at Armstrong College, Durham in 1880 to train 
mine engineers and this quickly surpassed the ineffectual London based School of 
Mining as a source for mine managers.
26
 It was coalowners too who sponsored safety 
research at the turn of the century that was to develop into a government Safety 
Research Board of 1913 that was to have such an impact on mining fatalities in the 
inter-war years.
27
 As a corollary to this it was coalowners who led the attack on the 
1842 bill and succeeded in reducing the age of children excluded from the pits from a 
proposed thirteen down to ten years of age, and excluding women only from working 
                                                 
21 See Johnson’s argument for the Eight Hour Day to Warwickshire MPs, Nuneaton Observer, 25 April 
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underground.
28
 When the government became more proactive in mine safety from the 
1870’s it was the power of the owner’s political lobby that made them exclude any 
issue that proved to be controversial.
29
 The intransigence of coalowners was recorded 
in the press from 1842 through to 1916 and this undermined the efforts of the few to 
advance mine safety.
30
 Too many, particularly in South Wales, appeared to be 
motivated by a ruthless pursuit of profits with little regard for the workers or 
communities where that wealth was gained. 
 One aim of this study was to investigate if the mode of colliery ownership had 
any bearing on mine safety. The hypothesis was advanced that as mine engineers were 
the acknowledged experts on mine safety the pits that they controlled without the 
overbearing presence of a board of directors may display a greater evidence of mine 
safety than colliery companies. The position of landowners was more difficult to 
predict. Unlike the directors of colliery companies, they would stand back from the 
process of production and how would the managers that ran their collieries react to 
this greater freedom of action? The results showed conclusively that it was not the 
form of management but the size of the enterprise that was the dominating factor. 
Fatalities increased in the large deep mines that became more common at the turn of 
the century and were more susceptible to deaths from falls of coal and men crushed 
by wagons on the surface. The reason for the different fatality rates of similar sized 
collieries was also immediately apparent. In all collieries with a high death rate falls 
of coal was the greatest cause, usually well above the Warwickshire average of 40 per 
cent. In all collieries with a death rate of under five a decade falls of coal were 
significantly below the Warwickshire average. An interesting comparison is the two 
Stanley owned collieries that were both expanded after 1899 and ran by the same 
manager until 1907. Nuneaton Colliery suffered twenty deaths a decade during this 
period with falls of coal accounting for 47 per cent. As a contrast Charity Colliery 
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suffered a death rate of fewer than five a decade with falls of coal responsible for 25 
per cent.
31
 
 Although paternalistic welfare was evident from all modes of ownership, the 
greatest contribution to mine safety came from two mining engineers. Garside Phillips 
was the driving force behind the creation of the Warwickshire School of Mining based 
in Nuneaton. This gave miners an accessible inroad into the practical knowledge of 
their industry and was to develop in the 20
th
 century as a route to a career in mine 
management.
32
 Reuben Smallman was in charge of developing and maintaining the 
high quality examinations for prospective managers and undermanagers in the 
Midland District. He advocated the application of stone dust to smother flames in 
colliery explosions, developed the Smallman clip which made oncost haulage safer 
and was the architect of a coal cutting machine which was to eventually remove 
miners from the most hazardous area of danger at the coal face. It could be argued 
that Reginald Stanley was the ‘Boulton to his Watt’ as without Stanley’s resources and 
business acumen his plans for a rotating disc coal cutting machine would have 
remained on the drawing board. 
However not all Warwickshire coalowners were as progressive. Although the fault 
should perhaps lie with the manager, Dugdale’s parsimony in not insisting that the 
roof above a newly installed underground boiler should be bricked or that the conduit 
to remove smoke was to be steel instead of wood, led to the greatest single loss of life 
on the Warwickshire coalfield in the Baddesley disaster.
33
 At Hall End and Wyken 
collieries the continued use of outdated oncost haulage practice led to preventable 
deaths as horses in sling gears had less control over heavy coal tubs than those 
working in shafts. At Hall End again their willingness to allow teenagers to work 
double shifts led to preventable deaths. At coroners’ inquests the lack of training was 
often cited when teenagers in charge of the jig engine on the incline would blatantly 
                                                 
31
See the conclusion in Chapter Five. 
32 
This was recognised at the time. The 1896 report on the School of Mining noted that in its five year 
existence eleven pupils had moved into management. Nuneaton Observer, 19 June and 31 July 1896. 
After a decade this had increased to 26. Nuneaton Observer, 19 July 1901. 
33 
See Baddesley disaster in Chapter Three. 
 Page | 319 
 
disregard safety rules that had been merely read to them if they were illiterate.
34
 It was 
also revealed in an inquest that it was not against colliery regulations to leave trains of 
wagons without applying the brakes on the lines or in sidings, and that as brakes were 
often only on one side of the wagon, it was not always easy to perform this.
35
 Such an 
obvious application of common sense would have saved the lives of many banksmen. 
It would be wrong however to blame deaths simply on the unwillingness of certain 
coalowners to invest in their collieries or a disregard for safety in the pursuit of 
profits. Some like Hickman and Stanley ensured that their new deep pits were 
equipped with the latest technology although Newdigate Colliery was not similarly 
endowed, yet deaths remained high. George Skey had an almost legendary reputation 
for frugality yet his collieries had the best safety record of the entire group selected 
for study. Yet, at Peel and Beauchamp pits, seams of coal, clay and alum had to be 
extracted separately, requiring the employment of steady experienced men and it may 
well have been their collective experience rather than any contribution from Skey that 
kept fatalities low. 
 The State was pushed reluctantly into intervention in the coal industry. It was 
Lord Ashley’s revelations of working conditions that forced a shocked parliament to 
agree to regulate child employment in 1842 and the cumulative recommendations of 
Select Committees set up to assuage public disquiet at deaths in colliery explosions 
that led to the establishment of safety mine Inspectors in 1850. The early Inspectorate 
was financially underfunded and given the dominating influence of coalowners in the 
courts, was forced to rely upon moral argument rather than legal compulsion to 
advance mine safety. From the Act of 1872 state intervention was more embedded and 
the diffusion of scientific and technological innovation became more pronounced. 
Some advances like the adoption of a ringer and chain to remove sprags, became part 
of the Special Rules of 1888 and could be enforced by colliery regulation
36
 but in 
many instances the Inspectorate still had to rely on persuasion. The Midland Inspector 
could advocate that horses should work in shafts rather than sling gears or that the 
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primary battery should be used for blasting but collieries were free to ignore this 
advice with fatal consequences to the workforce.
37
 Towards the end of the period of 
study there is evidence that legislation had a positive impact on the technological 
development of the Warwickshire coalfield. In a survey of 1900 gunpowder had 
dominated blasting in the county but by 1912 the use of patent explosives had leapt to 
fifty per cent as a direct consequence of government enforcement.
38
 The Mine 
Inspectorates’ campaign to have all collieries run by a professional management team 
was more successful. Certification was required of managers in 1872, of 
undermanagers in 1887 and of minor officials in 1911. This was assisted by the 
growth of Associations of Mine Engineers from the 1860’s and the establishment of 
official industry publications like the Colliery Guardian to help disseminate 
knowledge. Education was neglected with the technical education committee of the 
county council only establishing a Warwickshire School of Mining in 1891 but it was 
the Midland Mining Inspector who took on the role of examiner for the school. 
 Mills has been critical of the slow pace of State intervention and the neglect of 
areas like occupational disease and the declining ironstone industry which lacked the 
visibility to promote an ‘agent of change.’39 In contrast Bryan has charted the growth 
of State intervention from a single inspector in 1842 to a body of ninety-two by 
1911.
40
 The succession of Select Committees and Royal Commissions were no 
guarantee of legislative redress but usually marked significant progress in the pursuit 
of mine safety. The State had to balance the conflicting demands of trade unions, 
coalowners and their electorate to achieve a consensus and not all problems offered an 
immediately apparent solution. A climate of change needed to be developed by 
identifying a problem, hearing evidence from all sides in a Select Committee, 
debating proposals in parliament and publicising that debate in the press. Mills may 
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retort that not all problems were subjected to such scrutiny but the influential 
government Safety Research Board of 1913 that grew from the Act of 1911 would not 
have been deemed worthy of consideration in a parliament of the mid-19
th
 century. 
Trade unions were successful in promoting a publicity campaign that highlighted 
the problems of the mining industry to the wider public. Yet it was largely enlightened 
coalowners who pushed for the establishment of legally enforced General and Special 
Rules to ensure that all collieries adopted best practice in mine safety. Mine engineers 
developed the technology to improve working conditions like the Smallman clip to 
make underground haulage safer, and their Institutes and industry publications 
ensured this knowledge was widely disseminated. But it was the element of 
compulsion explicit in State intervention that ensured that such measures were 
adopted. The State may be criticised for the pace of this intervention and on reliance 
upon legal penalty rather than industrial education but it was the most important 
factor in the reduction in mining fatalities.
41
 
In conclusion this thesis has attempted to make a significant contribution to the 
historiography of the British coal industry. It has focussed on a minor coalfield that 
has largely escaped the attention of historians. Although Warwickshire contributed 
less than two per cent to national coal output in 1913 its importance to the local 
economy was significant with two thirds of boys leaving school finding work in the 
collieries.
42
 The examination of local coalowners has undermined the stereotype of 
the uncaring capitalist that is so apparent in the existing literature. Warwickshire 
owners were prepared to negotiate with a trade union characterised by moderate 
leadership and reasonable demands and Warwickshire miners were rewarded with 
superior pay and conditions even when compared to other counties of the East 
Midland coalfield. The thesis also builds on the recent work of Mills and McIvor who 
have began to shine a light upon the neglected but important area of health and safety 
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in the coal industry.
43
 Although safety if not health was a prominent theme for trade 
unions, parliament and the press in the 19
th
 century, few have attempted to analyse the 
factors that led to the declining number of fatalities. This study of Warwickshire has 
identified the impact of technological change, education and legislation on mine 
safety. Further local and regional studies will enhance our understanding of the 
relative importance of these agents of change and the contribution they made to 
improving working conditions in the British coal industry. 
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